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Corriere della Sera, Italy
Sept 11 2008
Europe and Moscow, the Danger Hour
by Alberto Ronchey
If Mikheil Saakashvili's Georgian Government made a mistake in the
August war with its military operation against separatism in South
Ossetia, Vladimir Putin has made an even more serious mistake with the
prolonged invasion of Georgia, a fully sovereign country. That is the
prevailing opinion where the apportionment of blame is concerned. But
what are the consequences?
For the time being the international dispute seems to be restricted to
posturing: witness the display of fleets in the Black Sea, as well as
Russia's recent decision to deploy 7,600 troops in the separatist
regions. Putin has exposed the excessive whimsicality and the
inconsistencies in Western diplomacy. But now, according to an
analysis conducted by several observers, there are some dangerous
unknowns looming for Moscow. Pro-Russian South Ossetia, drunk on
triumph, may clash with restless Ingushetia. Chechnya appears to have
been tamed, but not completely and in any case only after the
demolition of Groznyy, an experiment that cannot be repeated in any
other situation. The way Russia is looming over the Caucasus, posing
as "big brother," is sparking not only apprehension but mistrustful
responses also on the part of the Armenians and of the Azeris. And
that is not all. Once South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence from
Georgia has been sanctioned by decree from Moscow, we may well wonder
how many still latent rebellions or how many disputes over the right
to secede may hit the Russian Federation itself, with its myriad
ethnic groups spread out over as many autonomous republics on two
continents.
The August war has also caused Moscow some more or less "collateral"
financial damage. Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin himself acknowledged
that in the first two days after the invasion of Georgia, some 7
billion dollars worth of foreign capital was taken out of Russia. Then
it was learned that over the days following the invasion Moscow's
currency reserves dropped by some 16.4 billion dollars. Naturally, the
energy superpower still has huge resources to bring effective pressure
to bear in furthering its influence on the international stage, albeit
not without risk. Yet despite Putin's optimism, Russia's domestic
economy does not appear to be at all stable, with inflation running at
14.7 per cent.
In strategic and geopolitical terms, the biggest controversy today is
over whether or not to take Georgia into NATO along with Ukraine (and
this, despite the fact that Ukraine is split between pro-Russians and
pro-Westerners). There is no majority of European governments in
agreement over the issue, because it is an issue that demands special
caution. Pushing NATO's western borders even closer to Russia entails
the danger of triggering an exasperated spurt of national pride on
"Greater Russia's" part. And we are not just talking about Putin's or
the military oligarchy's neonationalism, but about a grassroots
sentiment centuries old.
This raises a complex dilemma for the West. Might failing to further
expand NATO placate the Russian patriots, who are irritated enough as
it is with "the volteface of history" which smashed Moscow's
traditional power in the nineties? Or might Western moderation not
encourage the nationalist extremists also in their claiming the right
to enforce a return to the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" on their
neighbours? Faced with questions like that, we must steer clear of
formulating a hasty response.
[translated from Italian]
Sept 11 2008
Europe and Moscow, the Danger Hour
by Alberto Ronchey
If Mikheil Saakashvili's Georgian Government made a mistake in the
August war with its military operation against separatism in South
Ossetia, Vladimir Putin has made an even more serious mistake with the
prolonged invasion of Georgia, a fully sovereign country. That is the
prevailing opinion where the apportionment of blame is concerned. But
what are the consequences?
For the time being the international dispute seems to be restricted to
posturing: witness the display of fleets in the Black Sea, as well as
Russia's recent decision to deploy 7,600 troops in the separatist
regions. Putin has exposed the excessive whimsicality and the
inconsistencies in Western diplomacy. But now, according to an
analysis conducted by several observers, there are some dangerous
unknowns looming for Moscow. Pro-Russian South Ossetia, drunk on
triumph, may clash with restless Ingushetia. Chechnya appears to have
been tamed, but not completely and in any case only after the
demolition of Groznyy, an experiment that cannot be repeated in any
other situation. The way Russia is looming over the Caucasus, posing
as "big brother," is sparking not only apprehension but mistrustful
responses also on the part of the Armenians and of the Azeris. And
that is not all. Once South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence from
Georgia has been sanctioned by decree from Moscow, we may well wonder
how many still latent rebellions or how many disputes over the right
to secede may hit the Russian Federation itself, with its myriad
ethnic groups spread out over as many autonomous republics on two
continents.
The August war has also caused Moscow some more or less "collateral"
financial damage. Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin himself acknowledged
that in the first two days after the invasion of Georgia, some 7
billion dollars worth of foreign capital was taken out of Russia. Then
it was learned that over the days following the invasion Moscow's
currency reserves dropped by some 16.4 billion dollars. Naturally, the
energy superpower still has huge resources to bring effective pressure
to bear in furthering its influence on the international stage, albeit
not without risk. Yet despite Putin's optimism, Russia's domestic
economy does not appear to be at all stable, with inflation running at
14.7 per cent.
In strategic and geopolitical terms, the biggest controversy today is
over whether or not to take Georgia into NATO along with Ukraine (and
this, despite the fact that Ukraine is split between pro-Russians and
pro-Westerners). There is no majority of European governments in
agreement over the issue, because it is an issue that demands special
caution. Pushing NATO's western borders even closer to Russia entails
the danger of triggering an exasperated spurt of national pride on
"Greater Russia's" part. And we are not just talking about Putin's or
the military oligarchy's neonationalism, but about a grassroots
sentiment centuries old.
This raises a complex dilemma for the West. Might failing to further
expand NATO placate the Russian patriots, who are irritated enough as
it is with "the volteface of history" which smashed Moscow's
traditional power in the nineties? Or might Western moderation not
encourage the nationalist extremists also in their claiming the right
to enforce a return to the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" on their
neighbours? Faced with questions like that, we must steer clear of
formulating a hasty response.
[translated from Italian]