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Turkey And The Crisis In The Caucasus

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  • Turkey And The Crisis In The Caucasus

    TURKEY AND THE CRISIS IN THE CAUCASUS

    The Daily Star
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_i d=10&categ_id=2&article_id=96082
    Sept 17 2008
    Lebanon

    The outbreak of war between Georgia and Russia following the
    ill-advised Georgian attempt to wrest control of the breakaway
    province of South Ossetia on August 7 posed an immediate challenge to
    Turkish interests. The conflict introduced instability and dangerous
    unpredictability immediately beyond Turkey's northeastern border after
    a period of relative calm in the Caucasus. It also placed Turkey in
    a difficult diplomatic position, not only between two neighboring
    countries with which it has been cultivating close relations and
    cooperation, especially on energy, but also between the United States
    and Russia.

    Georgia has assumed particular importance to Turkey as the middle
    leg of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carrying Azeri oil to markets
    through the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
    gas pipeline bringing Azeri gas to Turkey. However, after centuries
    of conflict and confrontation, Turkish-Russian relations have also
    witnessed a remarkable improvement and Russia now supplies over 60
    percent of Turkish gas via Thrace and the Bluestream pipeline under
    the Black Sea.

    After reportedly attempting to contact Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
    Putin, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Georgian President
    Mikhail Saakashvili on August 8 to express support. However, three
    days later, as Russian forces were pushing deeper into Georgia and
    Saakashvili was pleading for immediate help against Moscow, Erdogan
    unveiled a Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Pact which would include
    the two combatants as well as Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey.

    Significantly, Erdogan first took his plan to Moscow on August
    13, where he met President Dimitri Medvedev and Putin, who were
    predictably receptive to the idea, before going on to Tbilisi to
    meet the beleaguered Saakashvili, whose response to the idea of
    participation in a new cooperative forum with a country occupying
    portions of his country was understandably less enthusiastic. The plan
    was then conveyed by Erdogan to Azeri President Ilham Aliyev in Baku
    on August 20 and by President Abdullah Gul to Armenian President Serzh
    Sarkisian during his ground-breaking visit to Yerevan on September 6.

    Although the fighting in Georgia has ended, the recognition by
    Russia of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia ensures the
    continuation of the Georgian-Russian confrontation. Azerbaijan and
    Armenia remain locked in a seemingly endless dispute over Nagorno
    Karabakh. It is therefore unlikely that the proposed pact will
    come into being in the near future. Consequently, the Justice and
    Development Party (AKP) government's willingness to push ahead with
    this proposal as its primary response to the Caucasus crisis needs
    to be understood with reference to its broader policy of striving
    for "zero problems" with its neighbors as well as its demonstrated
    enthusiasm for playing the role of a mediator or facilitator in the
    solutions of problems in the regions surrounding Turkey.

    These goals were also displayed during the prolonged effort to
    encourage Israel and Syria to proceed to a peace settlement, most
    recently during a visit by Erdogan to Damascus on September 4 where
    Syrian President Bashar Assad was reported to have given Erdogan
    yet another proposal to convey to Israel. At the same time, the
    AKP government has been trying to help in reducing tensions between
    the United States and Iran, whose controversial president Mahmoud
    Ahmedinejad visited Turkey on August 14-15.

    While there have been periodic statements by Turkish leaders and
    officials that their diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East
    were coordinated with the United States, as part of what Ahmet
    Davutoglu, the leading foreign policy adviser to Erdogan, calls
    "rhythmic diplomacy," it is noteworthy that the Bush administration
    has shown a distinct reluctance to provide open support for these
    efforts. Nevertheless, Erdogan remained convinced that despite its
    skepticism about the likelihood of positive results, the United States
    would ultimately recognize the benefits of his approach.

    Growing tensions in US-Russian relations engendered by the war in
    Georgia seem likely to test the limits of Washington's tolerance of
    Erdogan's brand of active regional diplomacy and coordination with
    Turkey's main ally. On August 19, a senior US official focusing on
    the Caucasus crisis, Matthew Bryza, hinted at the divergence between
    the two countries by publicly expressing his "surprise" over Ankara's
    Caucasus proposal.

    After an initial hesitation at the beginning of hostilities,
    the Bush administration has adopted a policy based on buttressing
    Georgia through the provision of diplomatic and economic assistance,
    mobilizing its allies and, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
    put it somewhat undiplomatically, "punishing" Russia. A critical
    component of this strategy involved Turkey directly as the planned
    dispatch of US Navy vessels to deliver supplies to Georgia required
    passage through the Turkish Straits.

    On August 14 the vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
    James Cartwright, identified the two ships that would be sent as the
    Comfort and the Mercy. As the tonnage of the ships exceeded the limits
    of the 1936 Montreux Convention governing passage through the straits,
    the United States may have expected Turkey to show flexibility in a
    gesture of allied solidarity. However, when Turkey chose to demand
    strict adherence to the convention, smaller US vessels were sent
    through the straits.

    After a pointed reminder from a Russian admiral that the US ships
    would have to leave the Black Sea after 21 days in accordance with the
    convention, the Turkish Foreign Ministry proceeded to confirm that
    Turkey would insist on the application of the relevant provision
    and notify the embassy of the country concerned in the event of
    transgression. The positive signals sent to Moscow were then underlined
    by an astonishing gesture on the part of the Turkish Navy commander,
    who hosted his Russian counterpart on a Turkish frigate in the Black
    Sea on September 1.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan had joined his NATO colleagues
    at an emergency meeting on August 19, convened at the request of
    the United States to formulate a response to the Russian military
    action, where it was agreed, as the NATO secretary general announced,
    that there could not be "business as usual" with Russia. However,
    Erdogan made it clear on September 2 that Turkey would not be a
    willing participant in a policy of confrontation with its important
    neighbor. In comments published in Milliyet, Erdogan said: "It would
    not be right for Turkey to be pushed toward any side. Certain circles
    want to push Turkey into a corner either with the United States or
    Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our closest
    ally, the United States. The other side is Russia with which we have
    an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey's
    national interests require."

    Erdogan's stance seems to have popular support in Turkey. While
    there is no particular affection for Russia or its leaders, there is
    also little sympathy for Georgia or its impetuous president. At the
    same time, as opinion polls confirm, Turks have developed a strong
    aversion to the policies and methods of the Bush administration and
    are therefore cool to the idea of cooperation with Washington against
    Moscow. The nuanced approach also has the backing of the influential
    Turkish General Staff which has been carefully cultivating its own
    links with the Russian military parallel to its traditionally close
    ties to the US military establishment.

    Turkish national interests apparently dictate a continuing dialogue
    with Moscow even as Washington is trying to isolate it. On September 2
    Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Istanbul for talks with
    his Turkish counterpart. After promising a resolution of the costly
    delays in the processing of Turkish goods through Russian customs,
    Lavrov publicly acknowledged the favorable thrust of Turkish diplomacy
    by expressing "appreciation for Turkey's efforts in the Caucasus." It
    is noteworthy that while Lavrov was enjoying Turkish hospitality,
    US Vice President Dick Cheney was on a trip to Georgia, Azerbaijan
    and Ukraine to underline the Bush administration's determination
    to confront Russian policy in the Caucasus. Cheney's itinerary did
    not include Washington's closest ally in the region and the task
    of maintaining contact with Turkey was delegated to William Burns,
    the undersecretary of state for political affairs, who was received
    by Erdogan on September 5.

    In view of the stated seriousness of the Bush administration's new
    policy toward Russia and the Turkish government's demonstrated
    desire to avoid a deterioration of its relationship with its
    northern neighbor, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
    Caucasus crisis is once again heightening sensitivities in US-Turkish
    relations. To be sure, both sides remain committed to the alliance and
    have endeavored to repair the breaches caused by Turkey's unwillingness
    to support military action by the United States against Iraq in
    2003 and the American delay in backing a Turkish military response
    against Kurdish terrorism emanating from northern Iraq. However,
    the shared interests which bound them so closely in their Cold War
    alliance against the Soviet Union are not as strong as they once were
    as Ankara's pursuit of its own interests with Moscow confirms.

    As the Bush administration is on its way out, it will be its successor
    which will have to determine how it will maintain the alliance with
    Turkey as well as the future relationship with Russia. Another
    important related task will be to examine the viability of the
    East-West energy corridor, which is the product of US-Turkish
    cooperation, in the new geopolitical environment. As part of its
    review it will have to take into account the North-South axis linking
    Russia and Turkey which is helping to shape international relations
    and energy politics in the Caucasus as well as beyond.

    Bulent Aliriza is director of the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies' Turkey Project.
    From: Baghdasarian
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