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Recognition Practice And Geopolitical Risk In Eastern Europe: Georgi

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  • Recognition Practice And Geopolitical Risk In Eastern Europe: Georgi

    RECOGNITION PRACTICE AND GEOPOLITICAL RISK IN EASTERN EUROPE: GEORGIA, KOSOVO AND BEYOND

    RGE Monitor
    Sept 17 2008
    NY

    In recognizing the two Georgian enclaves - South Ossetia and Abkhazia -
    Russia left no doubt that its decision was partly in retaliation for
    Western recognition of Kosovo, Serbia's breakaway province. Moscow
    deeply opposed Kosovo's independence and repeatedly warned recognition
    could set a precedent for other separatist regions. In return,
    western policy makers argued that Kosovo was a unique case, with no
    implications for other conflicts. Similarly, following the Russian
    recognition of the Georgian enclaves, western officials flatly
    rejected any parallels and maintained that the Kosovo case was only
    a convenient excuse for an increasingly assertive Moscow.That may be
    true, but the blame games and theoretical and legal debates only divert
    attention from the more serious point. Unilateral recognitions, whether
    justified or not, could influence other separatist movements which
    in turn could emphasize the exceptional nature of their own demands
    for statehood. The cases of the Kosovo and Georgian enclaves do,
    in effect, erode the international law of states' sovereignty and the
    sanctity of borders and could thaw the two remaining 'frozen conflicts'
    in the CIS region (Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Transnistria in
    Moldavia), fuel tensions in Ukraine's Russians populated Crimea and
    again destabilize the region where the recent trend of violent state
    fragmentations actually began - the Balkans. It is worth remembering
    that the secessionist governments of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia
    repeatedly called for international recognition following Kosovo's
    unilateral declaration of independence and argued that if Kosovo
    could break away, so could they. So who is next?

    South Ossetia and Abkhazia make only one half of the separatist
    provinces in the CIS region. Russia was a principal player in
    the outbreak and freezing of the two other 'frozen conflicts' -
    Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. These
    breakaway regions, along with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, emerged
    after the collapse of the Soviet Union following brief conflicts in the
    early 1990s. Moscow provided military, political and economic support
    to all four separatist governments and deployed peacekeeping forces
    on what have become de facto borders inside these states. Clearly,
    the road to peace settlement or conflict resumption in Transnistria
    and Nagorno-Karabakh leads through Moscow. This geopolitical fact
    can hardly lower the political risk in a region where Russia has been
    using 'frozen conflicts' to exert military or political pressures and
    maintain leverage over its former satellites. Only a few days after the
    Georgia incursion, Russian president Medvedev called Moldova to resume
    peace talks with Transnistria in a move some analysts interpreted as
    pressure on the Moldovan government to cut ties with NATO and accept
    a peace plan that would allow Russian forces to stay indefinitely in
    Moldova. Moscow's similar initiative for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh
    dispute is also seen as an attempt to woo Baku away from the West,
    secure gas purchase deals for Gazprom and undermine the pipeline
    projects that circumvent Russia. In theory, Moscow could also use
    the presence of the large Russian minority in the Crimea region as
    a pretext for conflict with NATO-aspirant Ukraine. It would be in
    accordance with recently outlined Russia's foreign policy concept
    that envisages protection of Russian citizens 'wherever they are'.

    Nonetheless, it seems that the highest risk of violent conflict
    resumption has been looming over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan's
    breakaway region. In recent years, military spending has been on a
    sharp rise in all Central Asian states, but the two leading countries
    are Georgia and Azerbaijan. According to Stockholm International
    Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Georgia increased its 2007 defense
    spending by $200m, to almost $600m, which is a 20-fold increase
    since 2000. Supported by its oil-booming economy, Azerbaijan has
    also been investing heavily in the defense sector ($667m in 2007
    compared to $141m in 2000), raising concerns the government may try to
    recover the breakaway region by force. The growing trend of clashes in
    Nagorno-Karabakh in the first half of 2008 and the aggressive rhetoric
    employed by the Azerbaijan central government is another disturbing
    sign that very much resembles the pre-war dynamic in Georgia. In June,
    the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, stated that the government
    will continue to explore political solutions for conflict resolution,
    but will not dismiss military options if necessary. The Georgia crisis
    only adds to the pre-existing security dilemma and could spark an
    outbreak of the violent conflict. It would inflict high costs for the
    economy of Azerbaijan which is named the top pro-business reformer
    according to the recent World Bank report.

    Finally, recent developments in Georgia could reverberate in the
    Balkans again. Kosovo, whose Western-backed unilateral declaration
    of independence infuriated Moscow and offered a convenient excuse
    for its actions in Georgia, is facing the threat of 'secession within
    secession'. The Serbian populated northern part of Kosovo is the new
    potential breakaway region that does not recognize Kosovo's statehood,
    has been under de facto authority of Belgrade and could eventually
    seek to rejoin its kinship state. Russia has been a traditional ally
    of Serbia and it is not hard to imagine Moscow throwing the northern
    part of Kosovo in its own basket of sui generis cases that do not fall
    under the international law of respecting borders. Meanwhile, border
    disputes and the fact that not all EU member states have recognized
    Kosovo, could further complicate EU integration process pursued both
    by Serbia and Kosovo.
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