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BACK TO THE SAME POINT
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
18 Sep 2008
Armenia
The status quo of Karabakh to be maintained
The processes that started in the Armenian-Turkish and
Russian-Azerbaijani relations following the Russian-Georgian war led
some people to the wrong belief that it is also possible to achieve
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict in the near future by the
joint efforts of Russia and Turkey.
However, the in-depth analysis of the recent efforts towards changing
the situation in the region makes it possible to assume that unlike
the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhzia, the Karabakh conflict will
remain in a frozen state for a long time to come. This is evidenced
by the fact that the attempts towards settling the Karabakh conflict
through the bilateral efforts of Russia and Turkey are gradually
coming to a deadlock.
Although, in case of resuming the negotiation process within the
frameworks of the Minsk Group, the complicated situation in the
Russian-American relations will become obvious in the nearest future,
maintaining the given format remains the only serious guarantee for
continuing the negotiation process. So, the issue of proceeding
with the talks is again pushed to the foreground, leading to the
inevitability of maintaining the status quo during the coming months.
Following Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visit to Baku and the
statements he made there, the prospect of organizing a trilateral
meeting among the Armenian, Turkish and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers
within the frameworks of the UN General Assembly becomes somewhat
uncertain. The reason is that the recent developments came to prove the
invariability of Turkey's intentions with regard to the Karabakh issue.
Such uncertainty increases still further following the negotiations
between the Azeri and Russian Presidents that finished in Moscow two
days ago. There seemed to be certain pre-requisites for achieving a
breakthrough at least here, as the Russian side had thoroughly prepared
for the meeting. The previous day, the Russian "Komrsant" newspaper
had "thrown light" upon the key points of the Russian-Azerbaijani
strategic deal elaborated by Russia.
However, the Azerbaijani side called into question the expediency of
complying with Russia's demands regarding the deployment of foreign
troops along the basin of the Caspian Sea and the export of the power
generating substances of Middle Asia. And this was estimated as a
"loss of independence in return for Karabakh".
As a matter of fact, Russia just offered Baku to make a new concession
with regard to the Karabakh issue. That is, to replace the Armenian
control of the Latchin corridor by some joint control by mechanisms
which implied the military presence of the third side (i.e. Russia)
in the zone of conflict.
Whereas the20Armenian side is starting to make gradual though
consistent steps towards overcoming the consequences of the unilateral
and bilateral attempts of speeding up the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict by the mediation of third countries after the recent
development in Georgia. In the meantime, the tendency of increasing
Turkey's role is already being counteracted by the other centers of
force as well.
As shown by Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan's visit to
Iran, there are such dispositions in the country, particularly in
Tehran, which, being the ardent supporter of the regional model aimed
at the solution of the security issues of South Caucasus, doesn't
realize why Ankara is trying to leave Iran beyond the frameworks of
that model.
Today, there is a new status quo developing in all the conflict zones
of the region. That is, Russia, for the time being, satisfies itself
with the recent achievements on the South Ossetian and Abkhazian
"fronts" and tries to strengthen its positions. The West promises to
assist Georgia in its NATO membership programs and pushes Azerbaijan
to proceed with its oil-gas programs. With regard to Armenia, it
adopts an undisguised policy aimed at depriving Russia of acting as a
"patron" in the Armenian-Turkish dialogue.
In such conditions, the task of "pulling out" the Karabakh settlement
issue from the "Pandora's box" of the regional conflicts is beyond
the powers of the separate participants of the regional game; as to
the issue of coordinating the mutual attitudes, it is possible to
forget about them for the time being.
What is left to Armenia is to learn lessons from the recent
developments (which didn't absolutely contribute to the strengthening
of Azerbaijan's positions) and be more determined in its approaches
towards ruling out the possibility of solving the conflict through
military operations, clarifying the mutual security guarantees and
establishing control over the regions that serve as a linking channel
between Armenia and Artsakh.
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
18 Sep 2008
Armenia
The status quo of Karabakh to be maintained
The processes that started in the Armenian-Turkish and
Russian-Azerbaijani relations following the Russian-Georgian war led
some people to the wrong belief that it is also possible to achieve
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict in the near future by the
joint efforts of Russia and Turkey.
However, the in-depth analysis of the recent efforts towards changing
the situation in the region makes it possible to assume that unlike
the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhzia, the Karabakh conflict will
remain in a frozen state for a long time to come. This is evidenced
by the fact that the attempts towards settling the Karabakh conflict
through the bilateral efforts of Russia and Turkey are gradually
coming to a deadlock.
Although, in case of resuming the negotiation process within the
frameworks of the Minsk Group, the complicated situation in the
Russian-American relations will become obvious in the nearest future,
maintaining the given format remains the only serious guarantee for
continuing the negotiation process. So, the issue of proceeding
with the talks is again pushed to the foreground, leading to the
inevitability of maintaining the status quo during the coming months.
Following Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visit to Baku and the
statements he made there, the prospect of organizing a trilateral
meeting among the Armenian, Turkish and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers
within the frameworks of the UN General Assembly becomes somewhat
uncertain. The reason is that the recent developments came to prove the
invariability of Turkey's intentions with regard to the Karabakh issue.
Such uncertainty increases still further following the negotiations
between the Azeri and Russian Presidents that finished in Moscow two
days ago. There seemed to be certain pre-requisites for achieving a
breakthrough at least here, as the Russian side had thoroughly prepared
for the meeting. The previous day, the Russian "Komrsant" newspaper
had "thrown light" upon the key points of the Russian-Azerbaijani
strategic deal elaborated by Russia.
However, the Azerbaijani side called into question the expediency of
complying with Russia's demands regarding the deployment of foreign
troops along the basin of the Caspian Sea and the export of the power
generating substances of Middle Asia. And this was estimated as a
"loss of independence in return for Karabakh".
As a matter of fact, Russia just offered Baku to make a new concession
with regard to the Karabakh issue. That is, to replace the Armenian
control of the Latchin corridor by some joint control by mechanisms
which implied the military presence of the third side (i.e. Russia)
in the zone of conflict.
Whereas the20Armenian side is starting to make gradual though
consistent steps towards overcoming the consequences of the unilateral
and bilateral attempts of speeding up the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict by the mediation of third countries after the recent
development in Georgia. In the meantime, the tendency of increasing
Turkey's role is already being counteracted by the other centers of
force as well.
As shown by Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan's visit to
Iran, there are such dispositions in the country, particularly in
Tehran, which, being the ardent supporter of the regional model aimed
at the solution of the security issues of South Caucasus, doesn't
realize why Ankara is trying to leave Iran beyond the frameworks of
that model.
Today, there is a new status quo developing in all the conflict zones
of the region. That is, Russia, for the time being, satisfies itself
with the recent achievements on the South Ossetian and Abkhazian
"fronts" and tries to strengthen its positions. The West promises to
assist Georgia in its NATO membership programs and pushes Azerbaijan
to proceed with its oil-gas programs. With regard to Armenia, it
adopts an undisguised policy aimed at depriving Russia of acting as a
"patron" in the Armenian-Turkish dialogue.
In such conditions, the task of "pulling out" the Karabakh settlement
issue from the "Pandora's box" of the regional conflicts is beyond
the powers of the separate participants of the regional game; as to
the issue of coordinating the mutual attitudes, it is possible to
forget about them for the time being.
What is left to Armenia is to learn lessons from the recent
developments (which didn't absolutely contribute to the strengthening
of Azerbaijan's positions) and be more determined in its approaches
towards ruling out the possibility of solving the conflict through
military operations, clarifying the mutual security guarantees and
establishing control over the regions that serve as a linking channel
between Armenia and Artsakh.