Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Is Sri Lanka China's Georgia?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Is Sri Lanka China's Georgia?

    IS SRI LANKA CHINA'S GEORGIA?

    Groundviews
    September 22, 2008 at 12:00 pm
    Sri Lanka

    Seven years after 9/11, we're in between world orders.

    And winds of systemic change grip all nooks of the globe: the
    overstretch of America, geopolitical quicksand which is the Middle
    East, the benign growth of Brazil and Japan, rise of China and India,
    resurgence of Russia, expansion of EU and NATO, petrodiplomacy of
    Venezuela, nonviolent nuclear politics of Iran and North Korea.

    In this changing world order, for whom is the geostrategic asset of
    Lanka more important: China or U.S.-India? If Eelam IV's end date
    pushes well into 2009, is U.S.-India intervention plausible?

    World order changes imply a post-Bush II America, in addition to
    continuing its "War on Terror" in the Middle East, will seek to
    reinvigorate its engagement policy toward Latin America and South
    Asia to counterbalance the economic and political expansion of the
    China-Russia axis in Europe and Central Asia. Projecting American
    power in South Asia is likely to lead to increased U.S.-India
    engagement in Lanka. This engagement would test where the economic
    and political interests of China in Lanka stand in relation to those
    of U.S.-India. The nature of engagement would pivot on the status and
    optics of the military solution by year's end. If Colombo's "final
    battle" isn't won by then, a protracted victory intersecting with
    U.S.-India engagement will internationally politicize Eelam IV in
    ways which will not reverse Colombo's drift into Western isolation
    on the international stage.

    Changes in world order, and great power dynamics in Central Asia,
    Europe, and U.S.-China, demonstrate a possible emergence of a post-2009
    international climate incentivizing American engagement in Latin
    America and South Asia, and thus Lanka.

    The world order is increasingly post-American. The Asias are rising
    in places and ways the West is not. Multipolarity has arrived, but
    it is incipient, rudderless. Three dominant features characterize the
    current world order transition from American hegemony to multipolarity.

    First, the rise of new powers is flattening out the hierarchical
    orders which followed the end of World War II and the Cold War. The
    contemporary butterfly effects triggered by the overstretch of
    America on one front and the rise of China on multiple fronts is
    altering the structures of global power distribution such that
    the historical grip of the West, its aid, its arms, its human
    rights/democracy based conditionality underpinning intervention
    logic has been loosened in the Developing World. This effect is most
    pronounced in the Afro-Asian region, in part due to its distance from,
    and ineffective or disinterested engagement by, the main political
    centers of power in the system: America, China, EU, Russia. (India is a
    regional political non-player, operating within U.S.-China geostrategic
    competition). Momentarily liberated from what was a U.S.-led neoliberal
    order, Afro-Asian states, like Lanka, have been able to seek new
    economic and political alignment in between the old world order led
    by America and the new emergent one heralded by the rising Asias.

    Second, the space between world orders there is an evident vacuum
    of global leadership. Global leadership, vision, authority, and
    power have become diffuse, de-centered. This departs from the
    ideology-guided orders of American-Soviet bipolarity and post-Cold
    War American hegemony demarcating the eras flanking the fall of the
    Berlin Wall. America led globally in the post-Cold War world. Now
    it is overstretched. In the post-America vacuum, no rising power has
    stepped up to lead.

    The attendant redistribution of political authority in the system has
    been unable to marshal global consensus on global issues. Recent
    examples are: EU's Lisbon Treaty and Ireland, global nuclear
    non-proliferation policy (India, Iran, North Korea), collapse of the
    Doha rounds, the defunct Kyoto protocol and post-Kyoto framework
    talks, Darfur's genocide, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, energy
    and food security, climate change and global warming, humanitarian
    responses to flooding in Bihar and Haiti and Burma, Russia's invasion
    of Georgia. Global leaderlessness contributes to the international
    community's non-engagement in Lanka's war vis-a-vis its humanitarian
    dimension.

    Third, the political economic dimension of global power has
    progressively bifurcated. In the transition to a new order, the
    world is increasingly defined by political unipolarity and economic
    multipolarity. Political unipolarity lingers from the shadow of
    post-Cold War American hegemony. Economic multipolarity has emerged
    due to globalization, the decline of the West, and rise of the rest.

    The trend of economic multipolarity is particularly visible since
    the American hyperpower's post-9/11 response and overstretch in
    Iraq and non-normative war. Since then, the international system has
    demonstrably multipolarized, with new centers of power emerging in the
    Developing World, namely: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa,
    Mexico (BRICSAM), and ASEAN.

    Underneath the poles of BRICSAM plus America, Japan, and the EU are a
    subsidiary tier, reaching from Venezuela to Saudi Arabia to Iran to
    Turkey to Nigeria, and many states in between. This subsidiary tier
    contributes to China's rise and the erosion of the American political
    order, by for example providing arms and aid to states - like Lanka
    - that have learned that Western isolationism in multipolarity is
    negated by the "China option."

    A post-Bush II America will try to reestablish American primacy upon
    the global picture described above, within an international system
    characterized by global leaderlessness, de-centered political power,
    and multiple emergent centers of economic power. Developments in
    three regions, Central Asia, Europe, and the U.S.-China sphere, will
    pressure America towards consolidating its influence in Latin America
    and South Asia to counter the dissipation of its power elsewhere.

    In Central Asia, over the past several years, U.S.-Russia
    divergence and China-Russia convergence have increasingly supplanted
    U.S. influence in the region. China-Russia convergence enjoys bottom-up
    support from the Central Asian states which have leaned towards the
    China-Russia politico-security umbrella since the end of the Cold
    War. It has also been institutionalized. The Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization (SCO), comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
    Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization
    (CSTO), comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
    Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, together form a multilateral tier of
    convergence. The SCO's economic mandate, the CSTO's political-military
    mandate as a post-Soviet security alliance, and the bottom-up support
    from Central Asian states, secures Central Asia within the China-Russia
    orbit, where American displacement of power is likely to increase as
    China-Russia cooperation does.

    In Europe, American regional influence diminishes. Russia's 5-day
    August invasion of territorial Georgia, though violating international
    law, was met with tepid international responses from America and the
    United Nations, ambivalence from Central Asia and China. In retrospect,
    the invasion and withdrawal conveyed Russia's re-legitimatized paranoia
    that modern Europe's changing Trans-Atlantic security architecture on
    some level still seeks to re-institutionalize Cold War bloc ideology
    in a post-9/11 world.

    Also, Russian support of Abkhaz/South Ossetian independence could
    thaw other "frozen" independence struggles in the Caususes -
    Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino Balkariya, Tartarstan,
    Nagorno-Karabakh, Transitrei. However, the Russia-Georgia crisis had
    little to do with self-determination, and much to do with Western
    encroachment in Russia's backyard. From post-1991 to present, Russia
    has witnessed progressive Westernization of the post-Soviet European
    space. This includes: the post-Cold War democratization of the Baltics
    (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the post-2003 Flower revolutions
    (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan), the 2005 American supported regime
    changes in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, the Eastward creep of post-Cold
    War NATO (Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Ukraine), the expansion of the EU
    (Croatia, Ukraine), international support for Kosovo self-determination
    despite Belgrade-Moscow opposition, and recent agreements to place
    American anti-ballistic missile shields in Czech Republic and Poland
    to protect Europe and American allies from a nuclear Iran.

    Russian resurgence and Western impulses to isolate Russia in Europe
    will in confluence continue to polarize and consolidate exclusionary
    U.S.-EU and Russia-China alliances from Europe to Central Asia,
    steadily displacing American influence on the continent.

    In the U.S.-China sphere, China is displacing American influence
    globally. Containing China's multi-pronged projection of
    multidimensional power remains enigmatic to the West. And aware of
    American pretensions of containment, China has been smart in its
    growth model. It has created a financial architecture outside of the
    Bretton Woods system, relying predominantly on hub-and-spoke bilateral
    agreements, instead of being tied down in Western created multilateral
    frameworks. It has built alliances with Russia, Germany and the EU,
    Asia, East Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Iran, India.

    Furthermore, China's maritime power is encroaching on America's along
    sea lanes connecting China to energy resources in the Middle East and
    Africa. China has built a "string of pearls" through infrastructure
    projects, provision of military modernization, and diplomacy, extending
    territorially from mainland China to the South China Sea's littorals,
    to the Indian Ocean, to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf littorals.

    In the Indian Ocean region sensitive to Lankan security, between the
    straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca, the string of pearls
    links ports in Pakistan's Gwadar to Lanka's Hamabantota to Bangladesh's
    Chittagong to Burma's Sittwe. China's investments in Africa are also
    likely to lead to coastal bases on the continent, to further diversify
    energy supply routes for its growing economy and energy needs.

    However, China's Indian Ocean presence may become problematic. For
    American maritime interests from Hormuz to Malacca, the "string of
    pearls" could mature into a noose of energy dependencies held in
    China's palm. By 2030, BRIC economies are expected to eclipse the
    rich economies of Europe and North America, which will stress energy
    security equations of every status quo and rising power. While the
    global media fixates on diminishing American credibility and the
    Iraq/Afghanistan/Iran conundrum, China is economically crowding
    America out of Africa, the Asias, the trans-Pacific, and Latin America.

    Overall, the overstretch of America, rise of China, and broad-based
    multipolarization of the global economic system has created a global
    leadership vacuum within the international system. The political
    economic developments in Central Asia, Europe, and within the U.S-China
    sphere, have in aggregate, weakened America's influence globally. Since
    America will likely seek to re-establish its primacy and leadership
    role in the system, this trend makes Latin America and South Asia
    viable candidates for the re-projection of American power in the
    early months of a new Obama/McCain Presidency in 2009 to counter
    diminishing U.S. dominance in China-Russia spheres of influence.

    America can project power elsewhere, but these regions have fewer
    impediments. Latin America is attractive because it's in America's
    hemispheric reach, with only Venezuela to isolate, and an eager ally
    in Brazil, the world's 5th largest economy. South Asia is attractive
    because U.S.-India convergence would feed off China-India regional
    competition, making the projection of American power, directly, or
    via India, sustainable and in American and Indian self-interest. The
    recent U.S.-India nuclear deal and smaller developments like the
    Hindu-Muslim riots in Orissa, flooding in Bihar, if a pattern, are
    harbingers of a future bilateral climate conducive to cooperative
    efforts in global issues such as counter-terrorism and climate change.

    Consequently, increased U.S.-India cooperation in South Asia will
    increase the probability of U.S.-India engagement in Lanka. If the
    Tiger's defensive war and Colombo's scant regard for human rights
    persist to 2009, a U.S.-India axis impelled to consolidate influence in
    South Asia via Lanka to balance the China-Russia factor in Europe and
    Central Asia becomes more probable. Because U.S.-India engagement would
    arise from great power competition more than political considerations
    towards Eelam IV or human rights, issues of Colombo's acquiescence
    and Lankan sovereignty would be rendered peripheral.

    U.S.-India would likely engage upon an anti-GoSL anti-LTTE platform
    promoting human rights and counter-terrorism, while endorsing that
    the protection of international humanitarian norms trumps sovereignty
    in certain cases. This plausible future is inherently dubitable. But
    a post-Bush II America will search for ways to re-establish itself
    as global leader. In this regard, the Lankan case is evocative for
    U.S.-Indian intervention which would also send a global message
    apropos Chinese expansion in South Asia.

    Whether China will protect Colombo in this scenario remains
    unclear. The direction of Lanka's human rights record, from the
    UNCHR rejection to the Defense Secretary's recent request for
    removal of NGOs, INGOs, and the UN from the Northern theatre,
    is less so. Whether or not U.S.-India will engage, Eelam IV and
    its human rights albatross will likely qualify Lanka by 2009 as a
    place for U.S.-India engagement on humanitarian grounds, even in
    violation of Lankan sovereignty. U.S.-India engagement policy with
    Lanka would also test whether states like China, Iran, and Pakistan,
    will support Lanka not only in aid and arms, but also politically,
    in standing up against powers like the U.S., India.

    America abandoned Georgia when Russia invaded.

    What will Beijing do if U.S.-India engage on the island in 2009?

    Is Lanka China's Georgia?

    Or is the China-Lanka alliance more than just an economic, military,
    and geostrategic marriage of convenience?

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Working...
X