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  • Memorandum On Russian-Georgian Conflict

    MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

    A1+
    [04:58 pm] 29 September, 2008

    1. The Bureau of the Assembly, at its meeting on 5 September 2008,
    decided to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to study the situation on the
    ground in Russia and Georgia from 21 to 26 September 2008. The Ad
    Hoc Committee was composed of the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring
    Committee for Russia, myself and Mr Theodoros Pangalos (Greece,
    SOC); the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for Georgia, Mr
    Mátyás Eörsi (Hungary, ALDE) and Mr Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC);
    the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Mr Göran Lindblad
    (Sweden, EPP/CD); the Chairwoman of the Committee on Migration,
    Population and Refugees, Ms Corien Jonker (Netherlands, EPP/CD);
    the Chairman of the Socialist Group, Mr Andreas Gross (Switzerland);
    the Chairman of the Unified Left Group, Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands);
    and the First Vice-Chairman of the European Democrat Group, Mr David
    Wilshire (United Kingdom). 2. The delegation visited the Russian
    Federation from 21 to 23 September 2008 and, subsequently, Georgia
    from 24 to 26 September 2008. During their visit in the two countries,
    the delegation met with high-level state authorities, representatives
    of international organisations, as well as representatives of civil
    society and the diplomatic community. In addition, during the visit
    in Georgia, the delegation visited the so-called "buffer zone"
    and South Ossetia. The programme of the delegation is attached
    to this memorandum. The delegation wishes to thank the National
    Delegations of the Russian Federation and Georgia to the Assembly,
    as well as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
    of the Council of Europe in Tbilisi, for the excellent programme and
    logistical support provided to the delegation. 3. The itinerary of the
    delegation led to prolonged discussions with our Russian counterparts,
    who felt that the itinerary decided by the Bureau would not allow
    the Russian side to respond to the Georgian points of view -while
    this possibility existed for the Georgian side- and would not allow
    time for a visit to North Ossetia. They therefore proposed that the
    delegation should travel to Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) and from
    there directly to South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel. The delegation
    reconfirmed that it was willing to travel to Vladikavkaz in the
    framework of the programme in Russia, but that it could, and would,
    only enter Georgia via a border under the control of the Georgian
    authorities, also in order to avoid any implicit recognition of
    the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia. However, the
    Chairwoman of the Committee on Migration, Population and Refugees
    was willing to return to Moscow and Vladikavkaz, while three members
    of the delegation were willing to return to Moscow on Friday 26
    September, in their individual capacity, to meet Prime Minister Putin,
    who had indicated that he was interested in meeting members of the
    delegation on that day. The original itinerary for the delegation was
    therefore maintained, but, unfortunately, the meeting with Mr Putin
    could not take place due to scheduling problems, while the visit
    to Vladikavkaz could not be organised at such short notice. 4. The
    delegation visited several villages in the "buffer zone" and South
    Ossetiia, including Tskhinvali. The delegation was able, and allowed,
    to visit a majority of the villages on the list it had previously
    provided to the Russian military authorities and the visits in the
    villages themselves took place completely unimpeded. The delegation
    wishes to thank the Russian military authorities for their logistical
    support and security provided during this part of the programme. The
    delegation was however surprised and concerned about being welcomed
    by a member of the Russian State Duma and of our Assembly, Mr Slutsky,
    at the Karaleti check point to the "buffer zone", which is deep inside
    Georgia proper. Mr Slutsky indicated his understanding for the position
    of the delegation, but informed us that it would not be possible for
    the Russian military authorities to provide us with access to the
    "buffer zone" and South Ossetia without his presence. 5. On request
    of the "de facto" authorities in Tskhinvali, the delegation met with
    Mr Kokoity and other Ossetian "de facto" authorities The exchange of
    views with Mr Kokoity was frank and open and allowed the delegation
    to be better informed about the different positions of the "de facto"
    authorities. Outbreak of the war 6. During their meetings with the
    Russian and Georgian authorities, the delegation was presented with
    diametrically opposed versions about the circumstances that led to
    the outbreak of the hostilities, as well as the exact events on 7
    and 8 August as such. 7. According to the Russian authorities, the
    tension and outbreaks of violence, involving small arms and light
    artillery fire, between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides had been
    steadily escalating over the summer months mainly as a result of, but
    not exclusively, Georgian provocations and this despite all efforts
    by the Russian Peacekeepers to calm both sides down and bring them
    back to the negotiating table. At approximately 22:38 on 7 August,
    the Georgian authorities then initiated an unprovoked and, in their
    opinion, clearly premeditated, full-scale military attack on Tskhinvali
    and Ossetian villages in the security zone, including a "massive and
    indiscriminate" shelling with heavy artillery and multiple rocket
    systems of Tskhinvali. When reports of heavy civilian casualties and
    attacks on Russian Peacekeepers became clear, the Russian authorities
    launched their counter-offensive and sent troops through the Roki
    tunnel into Georgia. 8. According to the Georgian authorities,
    tensions in South Ossetia had been steadily escalating for several
    months as a result of provocations and attacks on Georgian villages
    by South Ossetian separatist forces, which were not prevented by
    Russian Peacekeepers. Repeated attempts by the Georgian side to
    stop the hostilities by peaceful means were met with a refusal
    from the South Ossetian side, with the tacit approval of the
    Russian Peacekeepers. On 6 and 7 August, the escalations reached
    unprecedented heights, which risked destabilising the country. When,
    on the 7 August in the late evening, the Georgian authorities
    received multiple intelligence reports that Russian military troops,
    including tanks and heavy artillery, were crossing the Roki tunnel
    and building up in South Ossetia, a counter-attack was launched in
    self defence of the Russian invasion of Georgian territory. 9. The
    Russian authorities strongly deny that Russian troops passed the Roki
    tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali and point out that the
    intelligence information to that effect made public by the Georgian
    authorities is widely considered to be at best inconclusive and not
    independently verified. The delegation was surprised to be informed
    that neither Russia nor the United States possess satellite images
    that could help either confirm or contradict the Georgian assertion
    that Russian troops passed the Roki tunnel prior to the attack on
    Tskhinvali. 10. The Russian authorities presented the delegation
    with what they allege to be captured Georgian military plans for the
    invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the Russian opinion, these
    plans are the proof that the attack on South Ossetia was planned and
    prepared well in advance. The Georgian side strongly denies any prior
    preparation and planning for such an invasion. The delegation itself
    considered that military forces in most, if not all, countries would
    have plans for hypothetical military situations that could occur,
    and that therefore, even if these plans were genuine, the existence
    of such plans would not per se constitute the proof that the attack
    on Tskhinvali was premeditated and prepared in advance. Moreover,
    members of the international community in Georgia asserted that
    the level of disorganisation during the Georgian military action in
    South Ossetia, as well as the chaotic retreat, would seem to belie
    the notion that this attack was prepared well in advance. 11. From
    our exchanges with the Georgian and Russian authorities, as well
    as with members of the international community, it is clear that at
    present it is impossible to fully establish what happened, and what
    led to the events on 7 and 8 August. However, it is equally clear
    to us that the conflict and the escalation and deterioration of
    the situation leading to it did not start at 7 August and that the
    peacekeeping process had broken down well before that date. However,
    the start of the shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops, on 7
    August 2008, initiated a new level of escalation, namely that of
    open and full-fledged warfare. The delegation therefore called for an
    independent international investigation into the circumstances that
    led to the war, as well as into the exact sequence of events on 7
    and 8 August 2008. The Georgian authorities indicated that they would
    welcome such an international inquiry. Our parliamentarian counterparts
    in Russia have also indicated that they would not object to such an
    independent international investigation. The immediate aftermath of the
    war 12. During our talks with the Russian authorities, the delegation
    made it clear that the unilateral recognition by the Russian Federation
    of the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
    violated the principle of the territorial integrity of Georgia and
    is in contravention of international law and the obligations of the
    Russian Federation as a member state of the Council of Europe. 13. The
    Russian authorities stressed that a decision not to recognise the
    self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would have
    led to strong reactions in the Northern Caucasus republics which would
    have had a potential destabilising effect on this volatile region
    of the Russian Federation. Moreover, while agreeing that Kosovo
    and South Ossetia are completely different and incomparable cases,
    the Russian authorities stressed that the recognition of Kosovo by
    several European countries, in their opinion, had opened a Pandora's
    Box in this respect. 14. The delegation stressed the need for all
    parties to fully implement the provisions of the Sarkozy cease-fire
    agreement which was signed by both Presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili,
    especially with regard to the withdrawal of troops. 15. The delegation
    is seriously concerned about the issue of withdrawal of Russian
    troops to their pre-war positions and strengths. According to the
    recent negotiations between Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev, Russian
    troop withdrawal from the so-called "buffer zone" is foreseen to
    have been completed on 1 October, after the arrival of EU monitors,
    although the delegation received indications that the withdrawal may
    only start at 10 October. However, the Russian authorities informed us
    that the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
    no longer part of the cease-fire agreement as the Russian authorities
    have recognised the independence of these two regions. According to
    the Russian authorities, troop presence in those two regions will
    now be governed by bilateral agreements. This is a matter of serious
    concern to the delegation, as this would be in clear violation
    of the cease-fire agreement. 16. The recognition by Russia of the
    independence of these two regions also complicates the provision of
    humanitarian aid as well as monitoring of the implementation of the
    cease-fire agreement by independent monitors.

    International organisations are refused entry to South Ossetia via
    Georgia proper, while EU and OSCE monitors are prevented from entering
    South Ossetia and Abkhazia at all. 17. Several interlocutors informed
    the delegation they feared that various forms of provocation could
    be used to justify a prolonged presence of Russian troops in the
    "buffer zone", which could lead to increased tensions. Humanitarian
    and Human Rights concerns 18. The visit to the villages in the "buffer
    zone" and South Ossetia made clear the extent of the human rights
    violations in these areas. The delegation saw evidence of large-scale
    looting and destruction of property and heard accounts of assaults
    and robberies. According to the Georgian villagers the delegation
    spoke to, the looting and destruction of houses started mostly after
    the cease-fire agreement was signed on 12 August and is continuing
    unabated to this day. While the looting, assaults and destruction of
    property take place mostly during the night, we were informed that
    they also occur during the day. 19. When asked, the Georgian villagers
    indicated that these crimes were committed by South Ossetian irregular
    troops and gangs but also by so-called volunteers from the Northern
    Caucasus. Russian troops were not reported to have been involved in
    the looting and burning themselves, but allegedly had done nothing
    to stop these practices, often turning a blind eye. These accounts
    were confirmed by independent reports from Russian human rights
    organisations who had been present in South Ossetia both during and
    after the outbreak of hostilities. 20. The delegation was informed by
    international humanitarian and relief organisations, as well as human
    rights organisations and the diplomatic community in Georgia, about
    systematic acts of ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in South
    Ossetia by South Ossetian irregular troops and gangs. This pattern
    seemed to be confirmed by the visit of the delegation to the Georgian
    village of Ksuisi in South Ossetia, which had been completely looted
    and virtually destroyed. The delegation received reports that, in some
    cases, entire villages have been bulldozed over and razed. 21. The
    delegation is seriously concerned about these reports of ethnic
    cleansing, as well as of the looting and destruction of property it saw
    during its visit. The delegation stressed that the Russian Federation,
    under international law, bears full responsibility for any crimes
    and human rights violations committed on the territories that are
    under its effective control. 22. During our visit to Tskhinvali, the
    delegation saw several residential areas, as well as public buildings,
    that had been completely destroyed by indiscriminate shelling by
    Georgian troops in the initial phases of the war, as well as in the
    course of subsequent battles between Georgian and Russian troops over
    the city. The delegation stressed that the use of indiscriminate
    force and weapons in civilian areas can be considered a war crime
    and called for a full investigation in order to establish the facts
    in this respect. 23. The number of deaths as a result of the conflict
    is a matter of controversy, although all sides agree that the initial
    high numbers were inflated. Independent reports put the total number
    of deaths at between 300 and 400, including the military. However, it
    should be stressed that even one victim is a victim too many. 24. In
    the initial phases of the conflict, around 35.000 to 40.000 South
    Ossetian refugees were recorded in North Ossetia. All interlocutors
    highlighted the efficient manner in which this refugee stream was
    managed by the Russian authorities. Most of these refugees have now
    returned to their place of residence, while an estimated 2.000 remain
    in North Ossetia with their families. 25. According to different
    sources, the conflict initially led to 130.000 IDPs in Georgia, of
    which 60.000 currently remain. Another 29.000 are expected to be able
    to return when Russian troops have withdrawn from the so-called "buffer
    zone" and security for the population has been re-established. A total
    of 31.000 IDPs (25.000 from South Ossetia and 6.000 from Abkhazia)
    are considered to be "permanently" unable to return to their original
    place of residence. These numbers should be seen in the context of
    the approximately 300.000 already existing IDPs from these areas as a
    result of the 1992 conflict. 26. The humanitarian situation is further
    exacerbated by the uncertainty regarding the "buffer zone". The current
    serious security vacuum needs to be urgently addressed but there seem
    to be conflicting views regarding the role of the EU Monitors and
    Georgian police forces. While the EU is sending strictly civilian
    monitors to observe the security situation, and considers it to be
    the role of the Georgian law enforcement forces to provide security
    to the population in that area, the Russian authorities seem to be of
    the view that civilian protection will be also the responsibility of
    the EU Monitors and have reservations about the idea of armed Georgian
    police in this area. This issue needs to be urgently resolved to avoid
    an even further decline of security in this area. Conclusions 27. The
    delegation is extremely concerned that two member states of the Council
    of Europe, who committed themselves to resolve all conflicts, including
    old ones, by peaceful means, did not live up to this commitment. This
    can not be tolerated and both countries share responsibilities for
    escalating this conflict into war. Taking into account the complexity
    of the situation, the diametrically opposed views of the parties
    in the conflict, the mutually exclusive national public discourses,
    the negation by both states of any share of responsibility, as well
    as the short time that the delegation had at its disposal, it is
    impossible for the delegation to establish all the facts regarding
    the exact sequence of events on 7 and 8 August, as well as the
    circumstances that led to them, which are necessary to draw precise
    conclusions. The exact facts, as well as the precise responsibility of
    each of the parties in this conflict, including the outbreak of the
    war, can only be properly established in the framework of a thorough
    and independent international investigation as suggested in point 11
    in this memorandum. Truth is a prerequisite for reconciliation. This
    is of utmost importance as similar conflicts exist in other parts
    of this geographical region and it must be made clear that, for the
    Council of Europe or its Assembly, it can not be acceptable that such
    conflicts escalate into war. 28. It is clear that both sides did not do
    enough to prevent the war and that grave human rights violations were
    committed and continue to be committed up to this day. There can be
    no impunity for such violations and for alleged ethnic cleansing. The
    Council of Europe has an important role to play in this respect. All
    alleged human rights violations should be investigated and perpetrators
    held to account before the courts. In this respect, it is clear that
    the Russian Federation bears full responsibility for the protection
    of civilians in the territories that are under its effective control
    and therefore for the crimes and human rights violations committed
    against them. The use of indiscriminate force and weapons by both
    Georgian and Russian troops in civilian areas can be considered war
    crimes that need to be fully investigated. 29. While it is beyond the
    scope of this memorandum to discuss the possible action the Assembly
    should take, it is clear that it can not be business as usual. At the
    same time, there is a need to maintain the dialogue with, and between,
    both countries in the conflict. 30. It is my firm conviction that
    the Assembly has an important role to play in resolving the current
    situation. Following the debate in the Assembly, the Bureau might
    consider sending a follow-up mission to the region, possibly in
    different format and composition, in the not too distant future.

    --Boundary_(ID_DTg8+7rbo1m2VRYTmCr96Q)--
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