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The Caucasus, SCO, CSTO, Energy And The New Multipolarity

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  • The Caucasus, SCO, CSTO, Energy And The New Multipolarity

    THE CAUCASUS, SCO, CSTO, ENERGY AND THE NEW MULTIPOLARITY
    by Guner Ozkan

    Center for Research on Globalization
    September 30, 2008
    Canada

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has conformed to the
    Russian view that the conflict in South Ossetia is tantamount to
    shaking, if not entirely changing, the global balance of power that
    has orbited around US supremacy since the end of the Cold War.

    So the SCO has seen the unipolar mentality of the US as a
    source of conflict rather than a cure for the world's common
    challenges. Stressing the necessity of a multipolar world for the
    sake of international security, the SCO has supported the maintenance
    of a strategic balance of power. The SCO has thus warned that the US
    endeavor to create a global missile defense system, as in Poland and
    the Czech Republic, is a futile attempt, as such efforts will neither
    help uphold the strategic balance nor prevent the spread of weapons
    of every kind, including nuclear.

    So, along with demanding a multipolar international order, the SCO
    reiterated that Russia has an exclusive right to shape the "near
    abroad.'"

    Rising value of the CSTO

    Not surprisingly, Russia has received substantial political
    backing from certain countries within the borders of the "near
    abroad." Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan already
    announced their endorsement of Russia within the context of the
    SCO. More support has also come from members of the Collective Security
    Treaty Organization (CSTO) -- an organization established in 2002 that
    grew out of the Russian-led Collective Security Organization of 1993
    and was meant to improve security relations between Russia, Armenia,
    Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Like the
    SCO, the heads of state of the CSTO at their summit on Sept. 5 in
    Moscow endorsed Russia's role in the conflict region and condemned
    Georgia's military action against South Ossetia and "double standards"
    being pursued by the West on the issue. So, as well as showing that
    it is not and cannot be isolated, Russia made a comparison between
    the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia by putting the term "double
    standard" in the resolution of the CSTO summit.

    Here again, Russia conveyed that diplomatic recognition of South
    Ossetia and Abkhazia is a matter that should be decided by each member
    of the CSTO in line with their own national interests. Belarusian
    President Alexander Lukashenko has already announced his willingness
    to recognize them as soon as parliament returns from summer break
    at the end of September. After evaluating the changing political
    and military dynamics in the region, and of course, seeing a green
    light from Russia, Armenia may also prefer to recognize not only South
    Ossetia and Abkhazia but also Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In fact,
    perhaps encouraged by the Russian stance on the recognition of Abkhazia
    and South Ossetia, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan pointed out at the
    summit that all members of the CSTO should adopt a unified position
    on foreign policy, military and other issues. Certainly, Sarksyan
    had in mind a united front in the CSTO toward the Armenian-populated
    breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, including possible
    diplomatic recognition of it. True, Armenia and other CSTO members
    have still not recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However,
    it will be very interesting to see what the same states do when
    Abkhazia soon applies -- as Sergei Bagapsh, the Abkhazian leader,
    has already announced he will do -- for membership in the CSTO and
    the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

    Energy pipelines for control over the 'near abroad'

    Russia's success in challenging the West or exerting its control over
    the "near abroad" is greatly dependent on where future Caspian oil
    and gas pipelines are built: passing through Russian territory or not.

    Energy pipelines are in fact equally important for both sides. The EU
    and the US want to reduce their energy dependence on single and/or
    unreliable sources (the Middle East and Russia). On the other hand,
    Moscow strongly desires to preserve and increase the huge benefits
    it is getting from energy exports as Russia is now earning nearly
    two-thirds of its export revenues from oil and natural gas sales. Most
    importantly, Russia is spending 30-40 percent of its budget on the
    defense and security sectors. With all of this in mind, Putin made
    a verbal deal with Islom Karimov, the Uzbek president, on Sept. 2
    on another pipeline to carry around 30 billion cubic meters (bcm)
    of natural gas per year from Uzbekistan to Russia with a link
    to Turkmenistan. Russia has already transported a significant
    amount of natural gas from the region via its pipeline system
    and made another gas transportation deal (up to 80 bcm per year
    for 25 years) with Turkmenistan in May 2007. On the other side,
    Washington, Brussels and Ankara have also intensified their efforts
    to realize the trans-Caspian pipeline from energy rich Turkmenistan,
    with possible inclusion of Uzbek and Kazakh reserves, to Europe via
    the Caspian seabed, South Caucasus and Turkey. The trans-Caspian
    pipeline, which is currently seen as the most important component
    of the Nabucco project -- a proposed pipeline to carry the Caspian,
    Iraqi and other available natural gas yields to Central Europe via
    Turkey -- has been under discussion since the mid-1990s. There is
    no way that China will be left out of the pipeline equation in the
    "near abroad." Of its various other energy projects in the region,
    Beijing struck a gas agreement with Turkmenistan in April 2006 for a
    Sino-Turkmen pipeline to be completed by 2009 to transport up to 30
    bcm of natural gas annually for a 30-year period.

    In the final analysis, in the "near abroad" theater, many actors are
    still in the energy and security games that now have to be played under
    the new power balances created by the conflict in Georgia. Surely,
    any verbal political and security guarantees given by the US and
    the EU to the vulnerable regional leaderships in the "near abroad"
    come nowhere near to matching the military actions of the Russian
    army. It is likely that international private investors and politically
    unstable leaderships of the region have already begun to think twice
    before making up their minds on the paths of future energy lines
    and on establishing security and political relationships with the
    external world. Naturally, political leaderships in the "near abroad"
    have to lean toward the direction(s) posing little or no threat to
    their rules. Even if some of them show a certain level of resistance
    to Russia's pressure, it is unlikely they will turn their faces to
    the West, but rather to the East, China and other alternatives in
    that direction.

    Assistant Professor Guner Ozkan is an expert on the Caucasus at the
    Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO/USAK)
    and a lecturer at Mugla University.
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