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THE SOUTH OSSETIAN CRISIS AND TURKEY (I)
Rafet Davletov
en.fondsk.ru
20.10.2008
Turkey's reaction towards the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia
came as a surprise to many European politicians. It was not only the
timing of the visit to Moscow of Turkish president Abdulla Gyul and
premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan that took place immediately after the
beginning of hostilities in South Ossetia, but also because the visit
looked like Ankara's show of support of Russia as an ally.
A number of experts presume that :
a) as the war in South Ossetia grew out of the US attempts to draw
Russia into this local conflict, growing into a regional one and
b) a certain chill began to be felt in the relations between Ankara
and Washington following that; thus signs of outlines of a potential
"condominium" of Russia and Turkey over the Greater Black Sea region
taking shape, and given their intention to build up a system of
regional security from the Balkans to Caspian Sea on their own,
without assistance from non-resident countries in this region, is
not out of the question.
Many in the West grew indignant over these developments as they had
long been accustomed to regard Turkey as a satellite of the leading
nations of the North Atlantic alliance. However, times are changing,
and many in the present-day Turkey stopped viewing the West as their
friend. The reasons are many... They include US policies in Iraq,
especially with reference to the Kurdish problem; and the situation
of Turkmen, Turkish kith and kin, the area of whose residence is
almost identical with the territory of the so-called "Free Kurdistan"
(a quasi-state of Kurds created "under the US security umbrella"),
but with Turkmen living suffering from a genocide on the hands of
military Kurdish formations, and Washington trying to close its eyes on
this. To add up to this is the US intention to implement its project
of "Greater Middle East" with plans to have - among other things -
bringing together the Iraqi, Turkish, Syrian and Iranian Kurds with the
corresponding re-mapping of national borders in the Middle East. (It
must be noted that despite the evident threat to Turkey's sovereignty,
these plans were supported by "Party of Justice and Development",
the ruling party led by R.T.Erdogan).
Ankara cannot be unconcerned over issues like the absence of a solution
of key issues relating to the Kurds issue, willing to ensure its
energy security, its EU entry, the refusal of the rest of the world
to recognise the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the actual
failure to create a Turk-Islamic union, and other issues,
The political crisis in Turkey caused by the standoff of the ruling
Islamic party and nationalist forces represented by the Peo ple's
Republican Party (Deniz Baikal) that is supported by the pro-US
Turkish top military leaders along with US attempts to weaken Ankara's
positions in the Black Sea (frontier) states, in the South Caucasus
as well as the Northern Iraq make Turkey face a serious geopolitical
choice. The option will determine both the implementation of Turkish
ruling elites desire to make their country a leading nation in the
Near East and the Greater Black Sea region, as well as the future of
Turkey's statehood.
What has made the Turkish political leadership respond to the
developments in South Ossetia in a specific way that at first puzzled
the West so?
Washington and Brussels have come to realize that to expect Turkey
act in the Greater Black Sea region as "their own", a 100% ("North
Atlantic") state is now highly unlikely. The US attempts to secure
a foothold in the Trans-Caucasus by way of drawing Georgia into the
NATO orbit at any cost cannot leave Ankara unconcerned given its
claims to create a "strategic corridor" in-between Black and Caspian
seas. For that matter, in turn, the United States keeps a close watch
of the movements of Azerbaijan, Turkey's principal strategic partner
in the Caucasus.
Matthew Braiza's recent statements shed enough light on the US
stance on the issue. Stressing that until recently "Georgia acted as
a regional hub setting the political rhythm and dictating political
fashion to other countries", Braiza underlined that as "the Georgian
knot has been severed, the dialogue between Turkey and Russia over
Armenia has become inevitable." Given that Georgia's former status of
a safe transit state ensuring transport of oil from Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, has been dramatically shaken Turkey and Azerbaijan will
need to mend their relations with Armenia, which they now regard as an
"extra route for the transport of Caspian hydrocarbons, which can play
this role only in the conditions of warming of interstate relations
in the "Ankara-Yerevan-Baku" triangle.
This can account for both the Turkish activities regarding Armenia
in August and September that came as a surprise to many, and
Turkish intention to broker the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. Given certain frictions with Washington, the latter is the
factor coercing the Turkish leaders to begin dialogue with Moscow.
It can be recollected that in the early 1990s when preferential
routes of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeihan oil pipeline were discussed,
the Turkish side proposed the so-called "two-pronged formula" of a
territorial exchange for Azerbaijan and Armenia (this "smart" scheme
was suggested to Turks by US intelligence agent Paul Gobble). In
line with the formula, Azerbaijan was to depart from the mountainous
parts of Nagorno Karabakh with its predominantly Armenian population,
which was to become a part of Armenia. In exchange Yerevan was to
give away to Baku the strategically important Zangezur corridor.
As for Moscow, it appears it is interested in bringing its view of the
situation in Nagorno Karabakh closer to that of Ankara - at least with
an eye to prevent further growth of violence in this sub-region. The
chances are that Moscow would soon boost activities in consolidating
its relations along the axis "Yerevan - Ankara." Russia is capable of
achieving this, given its own and Armenia's membership in the OTCS
and the pending Armenian presidency in this organisation in 2009as
well as taking into account the roles played in Armenian economy by
Russian companies Gazprom, Rosatom and Inter RAO UPS, the ongoing
restoration by the Russia's "Rossiyskiye Zhelezniye Dorogi." of the
Armenia-Turkey railroad, and the Russian military base in Gyumri.
The current developments have become one of the factors that motivated
Ankara to propose dialogue with Moscow on the initiative named "The
Platform of Stability in the Caucasus", which many in Ankara view as
a new "venue" for discussion of problems of regional security. The
initiative was discussed during the blitz visit to Moscow of
R.T.Erdogan and Abdulla Gyul. The discussion continued during Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's visit to Istanbul Septe mber 2, 2008.
(to be continued)
Rafet Davletov
en.fondsk.ru
20.10.2008
Turkey's reaction towards the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia
came as a surprise to many European politicians. It was not only the
timing of the visit to Moscow of Turkish president Abdulla Gyul and
premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan that took place immediately after the
beginning of hostilities in South Ossetia, but also because the visit
looked like Ankara's show of support of Russia as an ally.
A number of experts presume that :
a) as the war in South Ossetia grew out of the US attempts to draw
Russia into this local conflict, growing into a regional one and
b) a certain chill began to be felt in the relations between Ankara
and Washington following that; thus signs of outlines of a potential
"condominium" of Russia and Turkey over the Greater Black Sea region
taking shape, and given their intention to build up a system of
regional security from the Balkans to Caspian Sea on their own,
without assistance from non-resident countries in this region, is
not out of the question.
Many in the West grew indignant over these developments as they had
long been accustomed to regard Turkey as a satellite of the leading
nations of the North Atlantic alliance. However, times are changing,
and many in the present-day Turkey stopped viewing the West as their
friend. The reasons are many... They include US policies in Iraq,
especially with reference to the Kurdish problem; and the situation
of Turkmen, Turkish kith and kin, the area of whose residence is
almost identical with the territory of the so-called "Free Kurdistan"
(a quasi-state of Kurds created "under the US security umbrella"),
but with Turkmen living suffering from a genocide on the hands of
military Kurdish formations, and Washington trying to close its eyes on
this. To add up to this is the US intention to implement its project
of "Greater Middle East" with plans to have - among other things -
bringing together the Iraqi, Turkish, Syrian and Iranian Kurds with the
corresponding re-mapping of national borders in the Middle East. (It
must be noted that despite the evident threat to Turkey's sovereignty,
these plans were supported by "Party of Justice and Development",
the ruling party led by R.T.Erdogan).
Ankara cannot be unconcerned over issues like the absence of a solution
of key issues relating to the Kurds issue, willing to ensure its
energy security, its EU entry, the refusal of the rest of the world
to recognise the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the actual
failure to create a Turk-Islamic union, and other issues,
The political crisis in Turkey caused by the standoff of the ruling
Islamic party and nationalist forces represented by the Peo ple's
Republican Party (Deniz Baikal) that is supported by the pro-US
Turkish top military leaders along with US attempts to weaken Ankara's
positions in the Black Sea (frontier) states, in the South Caucasus
as well as the Northern Iraq make Turkey face a serious geopolitical
choice. The option will determine both the implementation of Turkish
ruling elites desire to make their country a leading nation in the
Near East and the Greater Black Sea region, as well as the future of
Turkey's statehood.
What has made the Turkish political leadership respond to the
developments in South Ossetia in a specific way that at first puzzled
the West so?
Washington and Brussels have come to realize that to expect Turkey
act in the Greater Black Sea region as "their own", a 100% ("North
Atlantic") state is now highly unlikely. The US attempts to secure
a foothold in the Trans-Caucasus by way of drawing Georgia into the
NATO orbit at any cost cannot leave Ankara unconcerned given its
claims to create a "strategic corridor" in-between Black and Caspian
seas. For that matter, in turn, the United States keeps a close watch
of the movements of Azerbaijan, Turkey's principal strategic partner
in the Caucasus.
Matthew Braiza's recent statements shed enough light on the US
stance on the issue. Stressing that until recently "Georgia acted as
a regional hub setting the political rhythm and dictating political
fashion to other countries", Braiza underlined that as "the Georgian
knot has been severed, the dialogue between Turkey and Russia over
Armenia has become inevitable." Given that Georgia's former status of
a safe transit state ensuring transport of oil from Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, has been dramatically shaken Turkey and Azerbaijan will
need to mend their relations with Armenia, which they now regard as an
"extra route for the transport of Caspian hydrocarbons, which can play
this role only in the conditions of warming of interstate relations
in the "Ankara-Yerevan-Baku" triangle.
This can account for both the Turkish activities regarding Armenia
in August and September that came as a surprise to many, and
Turkish intention to broker the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. Given certain frictions with Washington, the latter is the
factor coercing the Turkish leaders to begin dialogue with Moscow.
It can be recollected that in the early 1990s when preferential
routes of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeihan oil pipeline were discussed,
the Turkish side proposed the so-called "two-pronged formula" of a
territorial exchange for Azerbaijan and Armenia (this "smart" scheme
was suggested to Turks by US intelligence agent Paul Gobble). In
line with the formula, Azerbaijan was to depart from the mountainous
parts of Nagorno Karabakh with its predominantly Armenian population,
which was to become a part of Armenia. In exchange Yerevan was to
give away to Baku the strategically important Zangezur corridor.
As for Moscow, it appears it is interested in bringing its view of the
situation in Nagorno Karabakh closer to that of Ankara - at least with
an eye to prevent further growth of violence in this sub-region. The
chances are that Moscow would soon boost activities in consolidating
its relations along the axis "Yerevan - Ankara." Russia is capable of
achieving this, given its own and Armenia's membership in the OTCS
and the pending Armenian presidency in this organisation in 2009as
well as taking into account the roles played in Armenian economy by
Russian companies Gazprom, Rosatom and Inter RAO UPS, the ongoing
restoration by the Russia's "Rossiyskiye Zhelezniye Dorogi." of the
Armenia-Turkey railroad, and the Russian military base in Gyumri.
The current developments have become one of the factors that motivated
Ankara to propose dialogue with Moscow on the initiative named "The
Platform of Stability in the Caucasus", which many in Ankara view as
a new "venue" for discussion of problems of regional security. The
initiative was discussed during the blitz visit to Moscow of
R.T.Erdogan and Abdulla Gyul. The discussion continued during Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's visit to Istanbul Septe mber 2, 2008.
(to be continued)