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  • Turkey - Turkish nationalism, Ergenekon, denial of religious freedom

    FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
    http://www.forum18.org/

    The right to believe, to worship and witness
    The right to change one's belief or religion
    The right to join together and express one's belief

    ========================================== ======
    Tuesday 21 October 2008
    TURKEY: TURKISH NATIONALISM, ERGENEKON, AND DENIAL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

    A trial has begun in Turkey of influential people alleged to be part of an
    ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon. Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic
    charity Missio
    <http://www.missio-aachen.de/menschen-ku lturen/themen/menschenrechte>
    notes, in a commentary for Forum 18 News Service <http://www.forum18.org>,
    that opposition to religious freedom is widespread. Ergenekon members are
    alleged to have maintained deathlists of people, including Christians with
    a missionary background. The Malatya murder trial is revealing plausible
    links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and the murders. But local
    officials - who are almost certainly not in an Ergenekon-type group - are
    also hostile to religious freedom. The Ergenekon case is part of a
    power-struggle between the "deep state" and the AKP government, but it is
    unclear whether the current trials will advance freedom of religion and
    belief. Given the threats to the day-to-day security and religious freedom
    of non-nationalist Turks, whether the government effectively addresses the
    roots of these threats will be crucial.

    TURKEY: TURKISH NATIONALISM, ERGENEKON, AND DENIAL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

    By Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
    <http://www.missio.de>

    A court case in Turkey has pointed to the existence of a secretive
    underground ultra-nationalist organisation Ergenekon, though this might
    merely be another name for the "deep state". The trial began near Istanbul
    on 20 October of 86 alleged members - from the police, army, business,
    politics and the mass media - on charges that they were plotting to
    overthrow the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government by
    2009.

    The "deep state" is the term used in Turkey for nationalist circles in the
    army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police and
    state administration, which regard themselves as the custodians of the
    secularist legacy of the Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (see
    F18News 28 June 2007 <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id= 983>).
    The MIT closely monitors religious minorities, and some MIT officers do
    indeed believe in protecting religious minorities. But other MIT officers
    are staunch nationalists and fully part of the "deep state" (see F18News 10
    July 2007 <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id= 990>).

    Opposition to religious freedom is widespread among the "deep state" and
    wider sections of political life and the general public. This hostility has
    resulted in deaths and violent attacks, and has not been effectively
    addressed by the government (see F18News 15 April 2008
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=1115>).

    The anti-religious minority views of ultra-nationalist circles and the
    "deep state" were no secret, especially to the religious minorities
    themselves. But reports in the Turkish media about Ergenekon have, perhaps
    for the first time, given the wider Turkish public the details of the
    conspiracies. Many Turkish analysts think that the allegations made so far
    will turn out to be true.

    Members of Ergenekon are alleged to have maintained lists of people -
    including Christians with a missionary background - targeted for killing.
    The involvement of Ergenekon has been alleged in the murders of Catholic
    priest Fr Andrea Santoro in Trabzon in February 2006 and three Protestants
    - Necati Aydin, Tillman Geske and Ugur Yüksel - in Malatya in April 2007.
    The MIT secret police is known to have maintained observation of the places
    where all four of these Christians were killed (see F18News 10 July 2007
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=990>).

    The trial of those accused of the Malatya murders is revealing that there
    may be links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and the murders. As
    Christian news service Compass Direct reported on 21 October
    (<http://www.compassdirect.org/en/displ ay.php?page=news&lang=en&length=long&i delement=5658&backpage=summaries&critere=& amp;countryname=&rowcur=>),
    the lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who leads the legal team representing the
    victims' families, states that there is a "very dark, complex,
    sophisticated web of relations behind the scenes."

    Indeed, the Ergenekon people not only seem to be the masterminds of the
    Santoro and Malatya murders (and of the murder of ethnic Armenian
    journalist Hrant Dink), they even had a plan to kill the Ecumenical
    Patriarch - or at least to incite his murder in a way that could not be
    traced back to them.

    Among those arrested in the investigation against Ergenekon was
    ultranationalist lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz. As well as filing complaints
    against numerous writers for "insulting Turkishness" under the notorious
    Article 301 of the Penal Code, he also brought a high-profile case of
    "insulting Islam" under the same Article against Hakan Tastan and Turan
    Topal, Turks who joined a Protestant church.

    Even the so-called Turkish Orthodox Church - which has almost no followers
    and was apparently designed by its founders as an irritant to the Greek
    Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate - is revealed to have been closely linked
    with such circles. This "church" has been publicly supportive of
    Kerincsiz's claims that Turkish Christians "insult Turkishness". Ergenekon
    is said to have used "Turkish Orthodox Church" buildings, and to be closely
    liked with those who run this "church".

    Ergenekon-style nationalists are certain that almost everyone is against
    the Turks and Turkishness. Particular enemies of Turkey are thought by
    these circles to be all of Turkey's ethnic minorities, particularly Kurds
    (some of whom are Alevi Muslims), as well as non-Muslim minorities. These
    views have long been widespread even outside Ergenekon-type circles (see
    F18News 29 November 2007
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=1053>).

    Ergenekon-type circles collected information on groups within these
    populations - it helped that they had close ties to authorities with access
    to the personal data registry which records individuals' ethnic and
    religious affiliation. It is not known if Ergenekon itself - if it existed
    in the form that is claimed - sent spies into religious minority
    communities.

    However, all religious minorities - especially Christians - have long had
    unknown people visiting their services. Sometimes these visitors say they
    are there from the MIT secret police to "protect" them, though more often
    they refuse to explain who they are (see F18News 26 July 2006
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=817>).

    Religious minorities doubt whether the police or MIT secret police would
    really attend their places of worship to protect them: they are more likely
    to believe they are there to listen, watch and take notes. Even this year
    in 2008, believers leaving services are asked who they are and why they
    have attended. The authorities want to know whether those attending
    Christian churches are foreigners, local "foreigners" or possible converts.
    Ergenekon could have played a part in such enquiries.

    Many religious leaders have long been under surveillance by the MIT secret
    police. "Walls have ears," is the constant refrain in religious minority
    headquarters. Particularly close tabs were kept on Armenian Patriarch
    Mesrop Mutafyan, who had two "bodyguards" from the secret police with him
    constantly.

    Again it remains unclear if this surveillance is to protect them or to
    keep tabs on all their activity. That a grenade could have been thrown into
    Patriarch Bartholomew's office from a small street outside the Ecumenical
    Patriarchate in Istanbul's Fener district - which is under full and very
    visible police surveillance - shows that any "protection" is at best
    ineffectual. Those charged with protecting religious leaders have not
    managed to stop threats against them.

    Religious minority leaders live with threats constantly, whether through
    the media or directly. Patriarch Mesrop would receive about 300 emailed
    threats each day - whether from one individual or many is unknown. Unknown
    people watch religious minority buildings, making sure they are seen and
    noticed by the religious minorities.

    Perhaps the biggest impact so far of this constant atmosphere of threats
    is on the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate, Turkey's biggest Christian
    denomination. Mesrop Mutafyan, who was elected Patriarch in 1998 against
    the express wishes of the Turkish authorities, has been forced to retreat
    into health-related seclusion. Many believe the severe health problems he
    is suffering - which have affected him both physically and mentally - are
    akin to post-traumatic stress disorder. They believe these have been
    brought on by years of pressure from the media, the public and from the
    Armenian diaspora, some of which has dubbed him a traitor. As well as
    opposing his original election, the Turkish authorities also made trouble
    for him over the restoration of the Patriarchate several years ago.

    Should Patriarch Mesrop not recover and be in a position to take up his
    functions again, this could threaten the future of the Armenian Church in
    Turkey. The Turkish authorities are likely to insist - as they have done up
    to now - that the head of the Armenian (as well as the Greek Orthodox)
    Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident in Turkey. The Armenian
    Church may struggle to find a candidate with the diplomatic and linguistic
    skills and the international experience for such a crucial role in such a
    delicate and exposed position. This problem is of importance not just for
    the Church but for the Armenian community as a whole.

    However, it is clear that Ergenekon and the "deep state" are not the only
    obstacle for freedom of religion or belief. Local officials - who are
    almost certainly not in an Ergenekon-type organisation - continue to
    obstruct the work of non-Muslim communities. This can clearly be seen when
    it comes to property disputes.

    Roman Catholics, for example, face several difficult property battles,
    most notably in the southern coastal city of Mersin, where they have a
    large compound which they have used since Ottoman times. The only document
    the Catholics have confirming their ownership is a firman (decree) issued
    by the Ottoman sultan, which the local authorities do not consider is
    valid. Successive court cases brought by the local authorities in the 1980s
    finally reached Turkey's Supreme Court in Ankara in the 1990s, which ruled
    in favour of the Catholics.

    Such ownership problems are faced by all the minorities, despite their
    widely differing legal status. As is the case with all non-Muslim minority
    groups, Catholics do not legally exist. Furthermore, as their properties
    are not organised as "community foundations", their properties have no
    legal personality on their own. And as the Catholics do not legally exist,
    the government at times argues that they therefore also cannot have
    property. This shows that despite government claims, these property
    problems have not been resolved by the latest Foundations Law (see F18News
    13 March 2008 <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id= 1100>).

    In the case of the Catholics of Mersin, the local authorities re-started
    the dispute through the courts, in a case that is now pending at the High
    Court. Catholics fear a negative ruling, which would force them to take
    their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. This
    would be extremely expensive and time-consuming, even though this may turn
    out to be the only effective way for religious minorities to secure freedom
    of religion or belief (see F18News 18 January 2007
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=901>).

    The authorities in Mersin argue that the Ottoman firman only allows
    Catholic people to construct a specific building (a church) and did not
    grant them ownership of the land on which it was built. Similar court cases
    were brought in the past over the Assumptionist Church in Kadiköy, Istanbul
    (ECHR case No. 26308/95).

    The Mersin authorities' desire to confiscate Catholic property would leave
    the community with nowhere to worship, though it remains unclear how far
    the authorities would go. They could take away legal ownership, while
    allowing the Catholics to continue to use the church. In the past,
    authorities elsewhere have used such methods to confiscate religious
    property "legally".

    Another example is in Adana. The town's Jesuit-run Catholic church has
    long faced harassment from local people attending a nearby wedding hall,
    which was built close to it in defiance of regulations. The mayor's office
    has said that the wedding hall should be closed but has taken no action to
    enforce this.

    Ancient cemeteries where Christians are buried - such as in Samsun - or
    Christian sections of bigger cemeteries - as in Ankara - are also not being
    protected from vandalism, despite requests from the Christian Churches. In
    the Black Sea port of Trabzon - where Fr Santoro was murdered - the
    Christian cemetery is threatened with confiscation. Muslim cemeteries face
    no such problems.

    By contrast, spokespersons for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate have
    pointed to two positive developments. They welcomed the January 2008
    statement in parliament by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the
    issue of whether its Patriarch, Bartholomew, is "Ecumenical" or not is an
    "internal" matter for the Patriarchate and that the state should not
    interfere. Previously the authorities have responded ferociously to any
    claims that Bartholomew's religious role extends beyond Istanbul's tiny
    surviving Greek Orthodox community.

    Greek Orthodox spokespersons also welcome the July 2008 ruling by the ECHR
    in Strasbourg over the Buyukada orphanage, particularly the finding that
    not only does the property belong to the Orthodox Patriarchate but that the
    Patriarchate is an existing legal person (application no. 14340/05
    accessible at
    <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm. asp?sessionId=11514775&skin=hudoc-pr-en&ac tion=html&tableö9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DE A398649&key=71604&highlight=14340/05%20|%2 014340/05>).

    Erdogan's statement about the title "Ecumenical" is likely to have little
    immediate impact on the general public, which continues to regard the
    Patriarchate with suspicion or hostility. The ECHR ruling should have an
    impact on other religious communities which have so far struggled to assert
    their right to a legal existence.

    Meanwhile a new party, the Law and Equality Party (Hak ve Eşitlik
    Partisi), was created on 4 September to promote a nationalist agenda. The
    party, founded by a former general prominent in the war against the PKK
    Kurdish rebels, is also aimed at getting rid of Christians and ending
    Christian proselytism. The first sentence of the call to found the party -
    published as a full-page advertisement in many newspapers - attacks what it
    calls the "colonisation" of Turkey by missionaries, presumably Christian.
    "Turkish nation - we know that you are fed up that your democracy is
    treated like a child, that foreign representatives and missionaries run
    around on our soil and boss you around," it reads.

    Although the party seems to be well-organised in Turkey's provinces, it
    remains unclear how serious it is and how many votes it might be able to
    gather in an election. Nevertheless, the party reflects more widely-held
    chauvinist views, which see no place in Turkey for non-Muslim minorities
    (see F18News 29 November 2007
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=1053>).

    Public opinion in Turkey is becoming more hostile to freedom of religion
    or belief, and increasingly favours extreme nationalism of the Ergenekon
    kind. The government's actions are favourable to these kinds of views -
    even if not to the Ergenekon group itself - and it does not seem to want to
    act effectively to protect non-nationalist Turkish citizens. The ruling
    Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not itself an extreme nationalist
    party, but it could do much more to make it unambiguously clear that
    religious and ethnic minorities are Turkish citizens with equal rights.

    The AKP itself is under threat from Ergenekon-style views; indeed, those
    associated with the "deep state" recently tried to have the AKP banned. A
    fight is underway between the Army and the old Kemalist "deep state" on one
    side and the AKP on the other. But it is not at all clear that the AKP is
    necessarily in this fight to advance democratic values, including freedom
    of religion and belief.

    It also remains unclear whether the AKP will prevail. Visits by members of
    the General Staff to Ergenekon prisoners ahead of the trial have been
    interpreted as a warning to the AKP not to go too far.

    The court case against alleged key leaders and members of Ergenekon is
    merely the latest step in the power-struggle between the "deep state" (of
    which Ergenekon appears to have been a part) and the AKP. That the
    judiciary - quite obviously pushed by the government - has initiated the
    court case can be seen as proof that the AKP government is fighting back
    against those groups in society and state that are striving to drive the
    AKP from power.

    Whether the Ergenekon court case will prove to be a step towards real
    democracy in Turkey - leading to improvements in the area of freedom of
    religion and belief - is quite another question. It is not only the court
    cases on Ergenekon and the Malatya murders which will decide this. Given
    the undeniable threats to the day-to-day security and religious freedom of
    Turks who are not nationalists, whether the AKP government effectively
    addresses the roots of these threats will be crucial in deciding this
    question. (END)

    - Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
    <http://www.missio-aachen.de/menschen-ku lturen/themen/menschenrechte>, a
    Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to Forum 18
    News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily
    represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

    PDF and printer-friendly views of this article can be accessed from
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?articl e_id=1206>. It may freely be
    reproduced, redistributed or quoted from, with due acknowledgement to Forum
    18 <http://www.forum18.org>.

    More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and
    belief in Turkey can be found at
    <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?query=&a mp;religion=all&country=68>.

    A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
    <http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpedition s/atlas/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turk ey>.
    (END)

    © Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855
    You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
    F18News http://www.forum18.org/

    Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at
    http://www.forum18.org/
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