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  • "Russia Has Every Right To React And Investigate"

    "RUSSIA HAS EVERY RIGHT TO REACT AND INVESTIGATE"
    by Ivan Sukhov

    WPS Agency
    DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
    October 8, 2008 Wednesday
    Russia

    INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP VICE PRESIDENT ALAIN DELETROZ ABOUT THE
    FUTURE RUSSIAN-EU RELATIONS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE GEORGIAN CRISIS
    RESOLUTION; An interview with Alain Deletroz, Vice President of the
    International Crisis Group.

    The first round of international consultations over Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia stipulated by the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan begins in Geneva
    on October 15. Alain Deletroz, Vice President of the International
    Crisis Group (a conflict-prevention non-governmental organization with
    headquarters in Brussels and missions in more than 140 countries,
    it analyzes conflicts and offers recommendations to the involved
    governments), met with this correspondent and answered some questions
    on future relations between Russia and the European Union from the
    standpoint of the Russian-Georgian crisis resolution.

    Question: Your opinion of the debates at the Parliamentary Assembly
    over the situation in Georgia?

    Alain Deletroz: The Parliamentary Assembly is an important organization
    but rather symbolic. I'm convinced that all principal issues will
    be handled and settled at the meeting in Geneva. What happens there
    will be of paramount importance for the security of the southern part
    of the Caucasus and for the future relations between Russia and the
    European Union.

    Question: What will the format of the meeting be?

    Alain Deletroz: There is no saying at this point. I've completed
    three-day consultations in Moscow, mostly with the Foreign
    Ministry. I'm scheduled to discuss it with the French in several days
    and I hope that Paris being the locomotive force behind the whole
    process will have some ideas on that score.

    The way I see it, the stand Moscow takes at the consultations will be
    decisive. If Russia comes to Geneva with a constructive suggestion of
    some sort of international mechanism for crisis resolution in Georgia,
    then everything will be all right. If, however, it comes with its mind
    firmly set, with the attitude that there is nothing more to discuss,
    that Russia will cope, thank you very much for the 200 observers... it
    will be different, of course. Then the deterioration of the relations
    that is setting in may last years.

    Question: What constructive discourse can we expect from the two
    concerned parties with polar opinions on the situation? Russia
    recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states and the
    European Union did not. What kind of compromise is possible here?

    Alain Deletroz: If the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
    what we begin with, then the negotiations will be as good as over
    before they really begin. We should start with discussing the actual
    situation and the problems. Russia for example tends to draw parallels
    with Kosovo. In Kosovo, however, a great deal of human, military,
    and financial resources are expended by NATO, the EU, and the UN to
    preserve Serbians in their enclaves there. In South Ossetia on the
    other hand, not a single surviving Georgian is to be found anymore.

    Question: And yet, reports made by independent observers paint a less
    bleak picture from the conflict area. They say for example that some
    Georgians did remain in the villages and hamlets the conflict spared,
    the ones where neither side had outposts. Though a great deal of
    Georgians did escape, of course. Who do you mean when speaking of
    refugees? Just the Georgians from South Ossetian villages or also
    those who had been driven out of their households in Abkhazia in 1993?

    Alain Deletroz: I mean them all. I mean refugees. The International
    Crisis Group has never advocated recognition of sovereignty of these
    two republics. It follows that the term "refugee" applies to every
    person who found him- or herself out of Georgia. It applies to the
    Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians living beyond the territory
    of Georgia. Mostly in Russia, that is. All the rest are displaced
    persons. Anyway, we should be talking about all of them, both refugees
    and displaced persons. That's a colossal problems. The Ossetians who
    fled inner Georgia in the early 1990s encounter colossal difficulties
    and problems with recognition of their ownership rights. The same
    goes for the Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Russia
    and the European Union really want a solution to this problem, then
    they should pool efforts in seeking a way out. Relations between the
    European Union and Russia are different from the relations between
    the United States and Russia. We live on one and the same continent,
    so it all affects us equally. So, if we have the will to develop
    new relations, then we should be focused on specific mechanisms and
    solutions to the problems that plague a specific region.

    Question: Leaving the matter of the status aside?

    Alain Deletroz: Leaving the matter of the status for later. Russia
    recognized the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we all
    know it. This is, however, what I believe. There were provocations in
    conflict areas. They happen every summer as we all know, and not in
    Georgia alone. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation takes a definite turn
    for the worst every summer, and there are but six foreign observers
    posted along quite lengthy a front there. It is always difficult in
    conflicts such as these to find out who did what and who did not do
    anything. There is, however, one important nuance. Reaction of the
    Georgian government on August 7 and 8 was disproportional. Russia
    with its peacekeepers in South Ossetia had every legitimate right to
    react and investigate. We cannot understand why Russia didn't bloody
    the Georgian nose right away but within the administrative borders
    of South Ossetia and not a step beyond them. Or why it wouldn't
    follow with convening a special meeting of the UN Security Council or
    OSCE Council to launch an international process... But Russia went
    beyond the conflict areas, right to the towns of Poti and Senaki
    in Georgia and to Gori in South Ossetia. Russia established buffer
    zones there. That's why we keep saying that Moscow's reaction was
    disproportional too.

    Besides, the unilateral recognition of sovereignty, all on one's own
    and without international processes paid even lip service to... it was
    another move we of the European Union cannot understand. Moreover,
    some EU members, particularly former Socialist states, took it as a
    frightening development.

    Question: Do you advocate evolution of NATO's mission into that of
    civilian and humanitarian cooperation rather than military?

    Alain Deletroz: Yes. Among other considerations, it would have made
    obsolete NATO's expansion practically to the Russian borders. Actually,
    Russia would have been directly involved as a participant in this
    case. After all, we live in a fairly chaotic world where being together
    with others is preferable to standing all alone.

    Question: Yes, it is, but the subject of NATO's expansion with Russia's
    participation became history years ago...

    Alain Deletroz: And what shall we do then? The Russian president and
    prime minister plainly says that Russia does not want to see NATO on
    its borders. People in the West therefore ask why NATO should include
    Russia then and invest in it the veto power in internal affairs of the
    Alliance... These are two visions and two truths. Meanwhile, is there
    a point to the escalation of tension and confrontation? Wouldn't it be
    better for all concerned if we launched a different discussion instead,
    one over what kind of security we wanted on the continent? Your
    President Dmitry Medvedev suggested it already, and so did you Foreign
    Minister Sergei Lavrov.

    Question: The impression is that this discussion is unlikely to be
    constructive in the light of the Georgian situation...

    Alain Deletroz: It may be made constructive. Sure, Europe is strongly
    distrustful and suspicious of the Russian leadership these days. Europe
    is as distrustful of the Kremlin - or perhaps even worse than that
    - as it was of Bush's Administration in 2003 and 2004. So, it's up
    to Russia really. It may emulate Bush and say "to hell with these
    midget Europeans" the way he did then. But consider what happened
    then, consider the situation in which Bush found himself in Iraq. He
    discovered to his dismay that America was all alone in Iraq, with
    allies like Nicaragua standing by it. Well, perhaps, not exactly like
    Nicaragua. Argentine did dispatch some ship or other there... We all
    have approached the moment when it is still possible for Russia to
    say: OK, it's difficult for us to accept what you did in Kosovo. Same
    thing with acceptance in Europe of what Russia did in Georgia. Let
    us then look for constructive factors to develop.

    Question: It is hard to find a constructive solution when Georgia's
    firm determination to join NATO was one of the factors that decided
    Russia to interfere in the Georgian situation. Russia decided that
    it needed South Ossetia and Abkhazia to station its military in...

    Alain Deletroz: Come on. You probably know better. Russia has its
    embassies throughout the world. Russia cannot help knowing of the
    heated debates taking place within NATO over expediency of granting
    membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Yes, Bush would dearly like to
    throw NATO doors open for them. Most serious NATO members in the
    meantime have a different opinion. I'm talking NATO countries that are
    prepared to send their military hardware and soldiers into harm's way
    when it is necessary, not the countries with regular armies 10,000
    men strong. (And that does not mean neophytes alone, there are NATO
    veterans with countries like that.) We all know that Bush's time is
    up and that he has bare weeks. In other words, his opinion carries
    weight of course but it is not decisive at all.

    Question: But Russia's behavior in Georgia altered the positions
    even of some of its traditional partners in Europe. Like Germany,
    for example. NATO veterans are no longer unanimous.

    Alain Deletroz: They are not unanimous, as long as the matter does
    not concerned membership in NATO for Georgia. Yes, Germany has some
    serious questions to Russia and its behavior. On the other hand,
    public opinion in Germany and the German media are quite understanding
    and sympathetic with Russia. German general public normally stands by
    Russia because of a simple fact, namely that Russia withdrew from the
    DDR when the Cold War ended. Yes, Germany has questions to Russia but
    they are not restricted to its behavior in the Caucasus alone. There
    are questions concerning Kosovo as well. It's another side of the
    matter, right? The contact group for Kosovo took its time to discuss
    the matter. The debates were even extended on Russia's request. So,
    in the long run, Russia became the only country in the contact group of
    six that objected to recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. Russia
    impeded the process enormously. It killed the motion to turn Kosovo
    over from the UN to the European Union. Why, when the UN is notoriously
    short of funds and cannot even scrap up enough for missions elsewhere
    was the European Union prepared to pay out of its own wallet? Some
    observers believe that Russia views the international law and the
    territorial integrity principle it includes as inviolate. It is
    understandable. Russia itself is a federation. Other observers,
    however, suspect that Russia refused to recognize Kosovo not because
    it cared about the international law but because it was playing some
    strategic game of its own, because settlement of this conflict in
    the middle of Europe interfered with its strategic ends.

    Question: I'd say rather it was quite consistent. After all, it went
    public questioning the territorial integrity of Georgia (something
    non-existent for over 15 years already) only after recognition of
    Kosovo by a group of countries of the West.

    Alain Deletroz: Yes, but the European Union remembers that there
    was a draft resolution of the UN Security Council on Kosovo in 2006
    plainly stating that Kosovo was not to serve as a precedent for
    other regions. Its adoption would have voided separatist aspirations
    elsewhere but Russia killed this document.

    Question: And how would you have explained it to the population of
    other regions? They'd have inevitably demanded to know why something
    was all right for Kosovo but not for them.

    Alain Deletroz: It would have been explained. Twenty-two EU members
    out of 27 would have encountered no problems with explaining to
    their respective population why it was done in Kosovo and not, say,
    in Somalia or Chechnya. It was possible to explain what was making
    Kosovo a unique case. But Russia interfered and had this phrase omitted
    from the text of the resolution. It fomented suspicions that that was
    what Russia intended to pull off in the Caucasus at some later date.

    The way I see it, Russia should go to Geneva on October 15 with
    some set of constructive proposals that will pose no threats to its
    positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead, they will show that
    it cares for all victims of this conflict and not just Ossetians and
    Abkhazians. I dare say that the Europeans will be happy to meet Russia
    halfway then.

    Question: Russia wants representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
    present at the consultations. What is the opinion of the European
    Union?

    Alain Deletroz: The European Union is understandably cautious. Russia
    recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia an sovereign states. It
    automatically raises the question of their delegations' status. And
    forms of address, and whatever else. I believe that representatives
    of these republic should be there. I believe that the European Union
    should advance its relations with these republics. Isolating them
    will be wrong. The International Crisis Group is firmly convinced
    that the new EU aid package to Georgia must include Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia too, even despite Saakashvili's displeasure. After all,
    it is not Saakashvili who decides how the European Union should spent
    its own finances.

    Question: Your appraisal of the outcome of Russia's interference in
    the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008?

    Alain Deletroz: To be frank with you, Russia's military operation was
    no surprise. For me, that is. But the speed with which it recognized
    sovereignty of these republics was. I thought Russia would be more
    prudent because of the general situation in the Caucasus.

    Question: Does it occur to you that the military operation all but
    made it an inevitability?

    Alain Deletroz: No, I'm convinced that this situation before
    recognition was a much more formidable card in the Russian diplomatic
    hand. Moscow chose to play this card, and did so without considerable
    success. Look who recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Russia's
    wake - Nicaragua and Somalia. Had Kim Jong-il been all right, North
    Korea might have recognized them too. As things stand, even Belarus
    hesitates to recognize these republics, and so do Moscow's neighbors
    in the Commonwealth and partners in the CIS Collective Security Treaty
    Organization and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Did you see the
    Shanghai Cooperation Organization declaration? President Medvedev
    said he had encountered understanding at the summit, but when the
    final text of the official document includes but a single phrase
    concerning how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was disturbed by
    the situation in Georgia, then I cannot help start wondering... Well,
    perhaps all that was done was great as an image-builder for the new
    president. From the standpoint of international relations, however,
    it looks like a diplomatic defeat of Russia.

    Question: What do you think it may mean for the Caucasus?

    Alain Deletroz: Russian autonomies as such might start wondering why
    something is permitted Abkhazia and South Ossetia but denied them. The
    situation in some republics of the Caucasus is quite volatile. In
    Ingushetia, for example. When the matter of self-determination is
    brought up, reaction of neighbor countries of the region is difficult
    to anticipate. They are not particularly happy as we all know. What
    if some irresponsible people get elevated to power there? How will
    they react to a situation analogous to what happened in Chechnya in
    the middle of the 1990s? God forbid we have to discover it the hard
    way, of course.
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