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  • The Biased Mediator

    The Biased Mediator

    November 1, 2008

    By Ilgar Velizade
    Special to Russia Profile

    Georgia's Exodus from the CIS Left the Caucasus with Little Common Ground

    At a time of escalating tensions in the region, Turkey is offering its
    services in organizing negotiations.

    In the disarray that overwhelmed the international community following
    the August events in Georgia, few noticed an inconspicuous but
    potentially dangerous moment: after Georgia left the CIS, the countries
    of the Southern Caucasus no longer have an organization in which they
    could discuss common problems in a `close circle.'

    The situation is that Armenia is a member of the CIS and the
    Russia-centered Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but is
    not included in GUAM, named after the first letters in the names of its
    four members'Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, all interested
    in laying pipelines that circumvent Russian territory. Azerbaijan plays
    a key role in GUAM and is a member of the CIS who holds regular
    meetings of the heads of state and governments. Georgia, however,
    stayed in GUAM and withdrew from the CIS, shutting the door behind
    itself: the decision was made at a meeting of the parliament and the
    Georgian authorities viewed it as a gesture of protest against Russia.
    As a result, a deficit of negotiating platforms has suddenly arisen.
    Even though the prospect of Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS became
    apparent after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, the fact that the
    withdrawal would happen in such dramatic circumstances as the war in
    South Ossetia was hard to predict.

    However, Georgia's statement on its withdrawal from the CIS only
    reminded of the permanent political paralysis that this organization
    has found itself in for many years. After all, it is simply impossible
    to take an organization seriously when its members engage in not just
    diplomatic conflicts, but also in full-scale war (as was, for example,
    the case between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991 to 1994).

    In principle, European structures such as the OSCE and the Council of
    Europe could be of some help, but these are major international
    organizations whose humanitarian bias could interfere with real
    politics, and these organizations include countries that are far from
    the Caucasus region and its problems. Additionally, Iran is not
    represented in the OSCE or in the Council of Europe, and it would be
    quite problematic to ensure the security and prosperity of the Caucasus
    without taking this country into account. So who will give these bygone
    `fraternal republics' of the former Soviet Union an arena to address
    common problems?

    The proposal to create a new forum for communication between the South
    Caucasian countries and their neighbors came from an unexpected
    source'from Turkey. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict
    between Georgia and Russia, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
    visited Moscow and Tbilisi, and soon thereafter followed up with a
    visit to Baku, where he unveiled his initiative for the establishment
    of an Alliance for Cooperation and Security in the Caucasus or the
    Stability Pact for the Caucasus. The essence of this initiative is that
    problems in the region must be tackled by all three states of the
    Caucasus, with the support of the bordering Turkey and Russia. Soon
    after Erdogan voiced his idea, Iran proposed the `three plus three'
    formula: within the framework of the pact, stability in the region will
    not only be secured by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but by all
    their neighbors (Russia, Turkey and Iran) as well.

    None of the six potential participants rejected Erdogan's idea, and
    Turkey is pushing it forward with commendable zeal. For example, the
    summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states that was scheduled for
    September in Baku has been postponed for the second time, while in one
    month's time, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has visited not only the
    friendly Azerbaijan, but also completed a historic visit to Armenia,
    attending a football match between the Turkish and Armenian teams.
    Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations because of the
    Armenian-Turkish conflict dating back to the beginning of the twentieth
    century, exacerbated by the conflict over the separatist region of
    Karabakh in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan's fight against the
    separatists. Moreover, also in September, Abdullah Gul hosted the
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Ankara, and the Turkish
    Foreign Minister Ali Babacan hosted his Russian counterpart Sergei
    Lavrov, who supported what he called the `Turkish initiative on the
    platform of stability and cooperation in the Caucasus.'

    Perhaps Ankara had decided that given the escalating tension in the
    region due to the conflict in South Ossetia, a summit of Turkic
    countries in Baku would simply not be appropriate. The situation
    arising from Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
    presently of much greater concern for the Turkic states than the
    prospect of building a `Turkic home.' However, in addition to
    Azerbaijan, there are several other Turkic speaking nations in the
    Caucasus, a factor that could help Turkey play the role of a mediator
    and a peacemaker. Still, even though the `Turkic home' project has been
    the subject of serious discussion for 16 years, the `general
    contractor' of the project, Ankara, is now preoccupied with the
    stability and sustainability of an adjacent building'the Greater
    Caucasus, which has in recent years developed dangerous cracks.

    The Caucasus today is a bustling cauldron of passions where complex
    processes have ethnic overtones, and thus consensus is difficult to
    achieve. For instance, asking the residents of Moscow, Tbilisi,
    Yerevan, and Baku `how many states are there in the South Caucasus
    today?' garners a minimum of three different responses: `three,'
    `five,' and `not sure.' All three of these responses are formally
    correct.

    This alone proves how difficult it will be to implement the Stability
    Pact for the Caucasus. One of the main obstacles is the controversy
    over the very recognition of separatist entities. The Karabakh
    conflict, related to the separation of the unrecognized
    Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from Azerbaijan, has hung like the Sword of
    Damocles over Baku for over 20 years. In these circumstances, the
    recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia
    is viewed in Azerbaijan as a very undesirable precedent. Russia, for
    its part, was disappointed that Turkey recognized Kosovo shortly after
    the announcement of its independence by this separatist region of
    former Yugoslavia. Some analysts even rushed to declare that this
    discontent was the cause of Russia's tightening customs regulations on
    Turkish goods, which ended up costing Turkish businesses quite a bit in
    August and September.

    Another fact that prevented greater rapport from being established was
    Turkey (as a NATO member) allowing the U.S. Navy and its allies to
    enter the Black Sea via the Turkish-controlled Bosporus and Dardanelles
    straits. However, sober politicians in Moscow are not making excessive
    demands of Turkey, conscious of the commitments thrust upon it by
    membership in NATO and by its own economic interests.

    There is some hope in the conciliatory tone of the statements made by
    Lavrov during his visit to Turkey on September 2. `Turkey never puts
    commitments to NATO above other international commitments, but rather
    follows through on all its obligations. This is a very important trait,
    one that is not characteristic of all countries. We appreciate this and
    try to approach our relations likewise.' Lavrov stressed this fact
    while never giving the Turkish journalists a logical answer to
    questions about the reasons for the severity of Russian customs
    officials. Commenting on Turkey's recognition of Kosovo, Lavrov added:
    `In relations between Russia and Turkey, such differences do not cause
    any hysterics or mutual threats, and are simply accepted as a fact of
    life.'

    It is also known that in Armenia, and to a lesser extent in Russia, the
    large-scale economic projects between Turkey and Azerbaijan related to
    energy and infrastructure are met with mixed attitudes. For example,
    Armenia feels `marginalized' by the construction of the
    Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Turkey
    while bypassing Armenian territory. Russia, for its part, is not
    delighted by the `Nabucco Pipeline' project, which will deliver Caspian
    natural gas to Europe through Turkey while bypassing Russia.

    It is no secret that a large part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will
    be on Georgian territory, where the Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki section will
    require fundamental reconstruction. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that was
    lobbied for by the United States and circumvents Russian territory, had
    to temporarily suspend operations during the Russia-Georgia conflict.
    All of this prompted the Azerbaijani leadership to make greater use of
    the Russian Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline to transport oil to Europe. This
    fact was happily commemorated at the summit of presidents Dmitry
    Medvedev and Ilham Aliyev on September 16. With both goodwill and
    responsibility and with the creation of a real, not virtual, Stability
    Pact for the Caucasus, there is enough Caspian oil to go around for
    everyone.

    Ilgar Velizade is an independent Azerbaijani political scientist. He
    oversaw the RIA Novosti Baku bureau until 2008.
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