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  • Russia as a `Caucasian Power'

    Russia as a `Caucasian Power'


    November 1, 2008
    By Sergei Markedonov
    Special to Russia Profile



    Russia's interests in the region are historically rooted in the
    country's own security, global image, and its leadership's popularity
    ratings.

    `Security'this word has both a private and a public meaning. A collapse
    of security in both spheres has occurred in the Caucasus region in the
    last few years,' said Tomas de Waal, an expert at the London Institute
    of War and Peace. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this
    region has become one of the most unstable in Eurasia. The association
    of the Caucasus with conflicts (just like with ethnic cleansing,
    refugees and terrorism) has become standard in post-Soviet history.
    Unfortunately, the five-day-long war in South Ossetia in August only
    underscored this tendency.

    Five out of the seven armed interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet
    arena have taken place in the Caucasus. Specifically, these include the
    Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, the Georgia-Ossetia
    and Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts, and the Ossetia-Ingush and
    Russia-Chechnya conflicts. Moreover, in some parts of the Greater
    Caucasus some conflicts are `defrosting.' `Frozen' implies the absence
    of any momentum in the development of the conflict, but following the
    five-day war in South Ossetia, the old formats of peaceful regulation
    no longer apply.

    So far, none of the interethnic conflicts in the Caucasus has been
    fully settled. On August 26, two former Georgian autonomous regions,
    Abkhazia and South Ossetia, received formal legal recognition from
    Russia. However, this decision is not recognized by Georgia itself, or
    by most of the world community. Conflict settlements in Karabakh, South
    Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Prigorodny region of the Republic of North
    Ossetia are not inevitable. In 2007 alone, the number of violations of
    the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh (put it place in May 1994) increased
    threefold, and on March 4, the heaviest fighting was recorded between
    the two sides since the inception of the truce.

    Since the early 2000s, there has been markedly increased activity by
    Islamic radicals (jihadists) in the Russian North Caucasus, for whom
    the separatist idea of building a nation-state is not the true goal.
    They are working toward the creation of a Caucasus-wide Islamic
    movement, actively using subversive and terrorist methods of combat.
    Thus, the force factor is still one of the main themes in political
    processes in the Greater Caucasus.

    In addition to actualized conflicts, certain latent ones also develop
    in the region, occasionally switching to an `open phase.' It is the
    Caucasus that became the original `purveyor' of non-recognized
    governmental entities in the post-Soviet arena. Unlike the two
    `partially recognized' entities that have recently emerged,
    Nagorno-Karabakh remains unrecognized, even by the leadership of
    Armenia. However, in addition to the unrecognized states, there still
    exist certain uncontrollable territories (`grey zones') that do not
    even have an unrecognized governmental institution.

    Today's Greater Caucasus is one of the most militarized regions in the
    world. Independent states of the Southern Caucasus have military
    capabilities comparable to the capacity of an average European country.
    In addition to the military capabilities of these three nations, there
    are the military machines of semi-recognized and unrecognized entities.
    The combined potential for military conflict in the North and South
    Caucasus is comparable to that of the Middle East. In the Russian North
    Caucasus, the major challenge to regional security is posed by illegal
    armed groups (today, they are no longer Chechen separatists, but the
    subversive and terrorist Jamaat). In addition to these forces, there
    are also the semi-legal `paramilitaries' (from various bodyguards,
    security, and safety services of senior officials in the national
    republics to the neo-Cossack entities of the `Russian Caucasus').

    Dear to the Russian heart

    For Russia, the Greater Caucasus is of particular internal and foreign
    policy significance. Russian dominance in the South of the Caucasus is
    not a matter of `imperial revival.' Ensuring stability in the former
    republics of the Caucasus is a fundamental prerequisite for peaceful
    development within Russia itself, for preserving its national
    integrity. Russia is a Caucasian state, and this is not just a
    beautiful metaphor. Seven entities of the Russian Federation are
    located directly on the territory of the North Caucasus. They are:
    Adygea, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia,
    North Ossetia, and Chechnya. Another four regions are located in the
    Ciscaucasian steppe (the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, the
    Rostov Region, and Kalmykia). Additionally, the Black Sea coast of the
    Krasnodar Territory and the Caucasian mineral water region of the
    Stavropol Territory are part of the Caucasus. The territory of the
    Russian Northern Caucasus is larger in size than that of the
    independent states of the Southern Caucasus put together.

    The characterization of Russia as a `Caucasian Power' is not limited to
    geography. Most of the conflicts in the Russian Caucasus are closely
    linked to the conflicts in the former Soviet republics of
    Transcaucasia, and vice versa. The Ossetian-Georgian conflict is
    closely linked to the dynamics of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. The
    Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has contributed to consolidating the
    Adygean ethno-national movements in Kabardino-Balkaria and
    Karachayevo-Cherkessia. And today, the `Circassian World' is one of the
    major participants in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

    The Armenian-Azerbaijani opposition over Nagorno-Karabakh led to a
    significant movement of Armenian immigrants into the Krasnodar and
    Stavropol Territories of the Russian Federation. Thus, the `Armenian
    question' became one of the most important socio-political factors in
    Kuban and Stavropol, while anti-Armenian (xenophobic) rhetoric became a
    method of political legitimization by the regional elite, who wrote off
    their own failures on the migrants.

    The squeezing out of the Kvarelia Avars from Georgia in the early 1990s
    tied the north of Dagestan up in conflict. Avars (themselves of the
    mountainous economic-cultural model) moving into the Kizlyarsky and
    Tarumovsky areas of Dagestan came into conflict with the Russians and
    the Nogai (of the flatland economic-cultural type). This resulted in
    the outflow of Russian population from Northern Dagestan. The governing
    elite of Dagestan, as well as the socio-political movements of various
    ethnic groups of the republic, pay acute attention to the challenges of
    ethno-national development by the Azerbaijani people in Dagestan. The
    `Chechen factor,' as well as the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
    throughout the 1990s, substantially impaired bilateral
    Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Finding a solution to the `Chechen
    issue' at least partially depends on stabilizing the situation in the
    Akhmeta region of Georgia (more often referred to as the Pankisi
    Gorge).

    It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Greater Caucasus
    in recent Russian history. In the past eight years, the Caucasus region
    has more than once become a landmark symbol for both the ideology and
    political practices of the Russian state. Vladimir Putin's political
    star rose in the Russian sky precisely on the `Caucasian wave.' Prior
    to Shamil Basayev and Khatab's militias' incursion into Dagestan, the
    former prime minister (and future successor to Boris Yeltsin) had a low
    popularity rating, and a reputation as a `surrogate of the Yeltsin
    family.' However, movements by Islamic fundamentalists in the Botlikh
    and Tsumadinsk districts of Dagestan in August of 1999, supported by
    Chechen field commanders, caused panic in Moscow and brought forecasts
    of imminent accession by the Caspian republic into the then de facto
    independent Chechnya. Against this backdrop, the willingness of the new
    prime minister to `drown the terrorists in toilets' led to his
    popularity skyrocketing in Russia. In many ways, the legitimacy of
    Putin's first term had been due to his hard-line stance in the North
    Caucasus. The fact that Chechnya had ceased to be a zone of active
    hostilities (ideas of separatism ceased to be popular among the
    Chechens) helped strengthen the authority of the Russian president and
    eased his re-election in 2004.

    Political success came to Dmitry Medvedev in August (as witnessed by
    the rapid growth of his popularity among the population, as well as his
    presence in the media). The tough stance of the Russian president
    during and after the five-day war made him a legitimate leader of
    Russia, allowing him to emerge from Putin's shadow.

    However, for Russia, the significance of the Greater Caucasus is not
    confined to domestic politics. In 2001, framing Chechnya in the context
    of fighting international terrorism contributed to a substantial
    adjustment on behalf of the United States and the EU member states in
    their approach to evaluating Russia's actions in the North Caucasus.
    But on the other hand, Moscow's tough stance on the situation in South
    Ossetia caused an ideological confrontation with the Western world,
    unprecedented since 1985. This enabled experts and journalists to talk
    about `Cold War 2.0.' Using the Caucasus, Moscow declared itself an
    alternative center of power in global politics, thereby supporting the
    notion of `multipolarity' with some content. For the first time in many
    years, Russia was able to successfully defend its allies, while the
    United States and NATO allowed defeat for Georgia (considered to be the
    most pro-Western country not only in the region, but throughout
    Eurasia).

    A new agenda

    Today, the Russian state has to solve many complex problems. Even after
    the establishment of diplomatic relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali,
    Moscow will not be able to get away from the trend of the
    internationalization of the South Caucasus and the appearance of new
    players in the region. This includes the United States with its
    `Greater Middle East' project, as well as the EU with its `Wider Black
    Sea' and `New Neighbors' projects. Moreover, on the basis of the
    five-day war, Turkey's interests in the Caucasus have become more
    clearly defined. Thus competition for the Caucasus will not shrink,
    although after the events of August and September, Russia's position
    looks quite impressive.

    In any case, with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow
    set a precedent of successful ethno-political self-determination. Now,
    in the context of the Northern Caucasus, the national and religious
    policy of the Russian Federation needs to be much better thought out.
    Today, there is a marked decline in the ethno-separatist and
    nationalist sentiments in the region. At the same time, the growth of
    Islamic radicalism in the Northern Caucasus is a worrying factor.
    Complex problems are also created by regional particularities (the
    growth of both the political and managerial ambitions of Ramzan
    Kadyrov, his desire to have control over the proceeds of oil extraction
    and processing, and Mural Zyazikov's closed regional regime in
    Ingushetia).

    In the Northern Caucasus of the 2000s, the nature of threats has
    fundamentally changed. Firstly, the ethnic diversity of the region, in
    practice, makes radical ethno-nationalism into a political utopia.
    Secondly, the struggle for ethnic supremacy actually leads to victory
    by the ethnic elite, which quickly becomes corrupted and gets stuck on
    its own selfish aspirations. The folk masses are content to play the
    role of foot soldiers. As a protest ideology, `Pure Islam' (Salafi) has
    never been better suited to conditions in the Caucasus. Belonging to a
    certain people or ethnic group does not matter to its supporters, hence
    the possibility of horizontal links between activists from different
    Caucasian republics. In the absence of a clear ideology of Russian
    nation-building, Salafi Islam became the integrating factor for
    socio-political protest in the Caucasus.

    It would also be a great mistake to consider all the protest movements
    in the Northern Caucasus as Islamist. In Ingushetia and Dagestan there
    is also secular opposition whose criticism is directed against the
    republican government. And whereas in Ingushetia the secular opposition
    includes people of very different political backgrounds and views
    united by a rejection of the current regional power, in Dagestan it is
    made up of activists from a number of nationwide parties. Although in
    2007-2008 their power and influence was severely weakened, they are
    still present. The so-called intra-apparatus opposition in all states
    of the region does not speak with public slogans, nor does it conduct
    public debate. However, its role in framing policy and making
    administrative decisions cannot be underestimated.

    Therefore, Dmitry Medvedev is faced with the difficult task of
    rejecting imperial (in effect) management of the North Caucasus, where
    the main challenge is not the integration of the region into a legal
    Russian socio-cultural space, but overcoming the tradition of internal
    control and external loyalty to Moscow on the part of local elites.
    Today the main task of federal authorities in the North Caucasus is the
    `Russification' (in a civic sense of the term) of its inhabitants, who
    barely `imagine themselves' to be citizens of a single country'the
    Russian Federation. The region's population generally puts ethnicity,
    religion, and birthplace first and foremost, rather than a general
    countrywide Russian identity. In order to overcome this situation, it
    is imperative to overcome the intra-regional apartheid. To that end,
    the Russian government requires a fundamentally different personnel
    policy.

    As paradoxical as it sounds at first, the recognition of Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia could open up new possibilities for this effort. First of
    all, with this decision Moscow suspended the inertial scenario, whereby
    maintaining the status quo was thought of as the peak of strategic
    planning and political practice. By creating a new reality, Russia is
    creating new challenges and seeking new answers for them. Of course,
    all of this involves serious risks, both inside and outside the
    country. Reflecting on these realities and developing the best
    solutions will require new ideas and new people who can think in a
    non-standard fashion. Thus the modernization that so many in Russia
    hope for can begin precisely in the Caucasus.

    It would be fundamentally wrong to view the inhabitants of the Russian
    Caucasus as either wild mountain men or noble freedom-fighters, merely
    dreaming of a `flight from Russia.' The region's population, en masse,
    is largely far from overarching policy decisions, busy with solving
    `routine' problems, rather than reflecting on Shamil's imamate or the
    `great Cherkessia.' And in general, one should not overestimate the
    separatist capacity of the Northern Caucasus. Over the years, the
    residents there have been linked to Russia by thousands of ties` from
    culture and education to business. Indeed, in which regions of Russia
    are young men avoiding military service, and who considers it a
    necessary part of `male initiation' and an honorable duty? Based on
    this criterion, Moscow, rather than the North Caucasus, would be the
    most `separatist' region. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
    was, to some extent, a positive message to the Russian Caucasus. Russia
    came to the aid of the minority inhabitants of the region. This is
    precisely the positive backdrop against which Russia has the necessary
    capital that is required for internal political transformation.

    Sergey Markedonov, Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations
    Department at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
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