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Eurasia Daily Monitor
November 4, 2008 - Volume 5, Issue 211
MOSCOW SUMMIT ON KARABAKH FALLS SHORT OF MEDVEDEV'S GOALS
by Vladimir Socor
Presidents Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan,
and Serge Sarkisian of Armenia met on November 2 near Moscow to discuss
the current state of negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
With those negotiations moving slowly forward at several levels and on
their own momentum, Medvedev initiated this summit to lift Russia into
the driver's seat of the process.
The Kremlin hoped to capitalize on the political effects of its
recent invasion of Georgia and seizure of that country's
territories through military occupation and diplomatic
`recognition.' The Georgia crisis served to demonstrate
that Russia can and does act decisively, brutally, and with impunity in
the South Caucasus, while the United States was drifting toward
strategic disengagement and the European Union failed to fill the
vacuum. The moment seemed ripe for Russia to display `regional
leadership' by taking the initiative in negotiations to settle
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Moscow also hoped to display a capacity for conflict resolution
through diplomacy, not just through force. One major goal of this
exercise in diplomacy, however, is to deploy Russian troops in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict theater as `peacekeepers' or
`guarantors' at some stage of the settlement.
The summit's only apparent result, however, is a joint
declaration that falls clearly short of Moscow's goals
(www.kremlin.ru, Arminfo, www.day.az, November 3, 4). The Azerbaijani
and Armenian presidents first held a two-hour, face-to-face session and
were then joined by Medvedev for finalizing the declaration. Signed by
the three presidents in front of TV cameras, then read out to the media
by Medvedev, the five-point declaration does not commit the signatory
parties to any specific approaches or actions within the continuing
negotiating process. If the Kremlin wished to show `forward
movement' by hosting this summit, it has no such results to
show.
The declaration's preamble underscores the continuity of
direct dialogue between the two countries with the mediation of the
three OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, the United States, and
France).
Point 1 envisages a `political settlement of the conflict
based on the principles and norms of international law.' This,
however, neither resolves nor circumvents the dilemma between
territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of internationally
recognized borders on one hand and national self-determination on the
other hand. This dilemma has been created and maintained artificially on
the Armenian side as a means to freeze the post-1994 situation, with
Azerbaijani territories occupied and the Azeri population forced out.
Point 2 reaffirms support for the ongoing and future mediation by
the OSCE Minsk Group's co-chairs, `taking into
consideration their meeting with the parties on November 29,
2007.' The reference is to the three co-chairs' joint
proposals presented during the OSCE's 2007 year-end ministerial
conference in Madrid. The Armenian side interprets that document as
elevating the national self-determination principle to the same level as
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. Yerevan therefore
prefers to cite `the Madrid principles' as a point of
departure for further negotiations. Azerbaijan, however, argues for the
primacy of the territorial integrity principle in OSCE and other
international documents of normative character. The Moscow declaration
downgrades the significance of Madrid to a mere
`meeting,' not principles and not even a document for
further reference. This undoubtedly comes as a disappointment for
Yerevan.
Point 3 stipulates that the `peaceful resolution should be
accompanied by legally binding international guarantees in all aspects
and stages of settlement.' Russia and Armenia insist on such
guarantees: Yerevan refers to the security of the Armenian population of
Upper Karabakh while Moscow needs an excuse for deploying Russian
`peacekeeping' or `guarantor' troops.
For its part, Azerbaijan does not oppose international guarantees but
does insist that any such guarantees be in line with
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The declaration's
reference to `stages' is consistent with
Azerbaijan's stage-by-stage approach to a solution of the
conflict, aiming for withdrawal of Armenian troops from the Azeri
districts around Upper Karabakh and return of Azeri refugees as the
first stage.
Point 4 records Azerbaijan's and Armenia's
intention to continue their efforts for a political settlement of the
conflict, at the level of the presidents and ministries of foreign
affairs, and through cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group's
co-chairs.
Point 5 `emphasize[s] the importance of creating
conditions that will contribute to the consolidation of trust, within
the framework of efforts aimed at settling the conflict.'
However vague, this point clearly does not imply that Azerbaijan ought
to agree to Armenia's inclusion in regional energy and transport
projects in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.
During the last few years, the European Union and even the United
States have attempted to persuade Azerbaijan to include Armenia in
regional projects before the Armenian forces withdraw from occupied
territories, presumably in order to advance efforts for peace.
Ideologically, this argument is a legacy of the classical liberal belief
that trade in and of itself promotes peace (`pipelines for
peace' is a latter-day reincarnation of that belief). On a more
mundane level, that argument reflects the influence of political lobbies
in Brussels and Washington, which has resulted in withholding funds from
projects of Western interest in Western-oriented Azerbaijan. For its
part, Azerbaijan is open to such cooperation with Armenia after the
Armenian forces vacate the occupied territories and the refugees are
free to return home.
-Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
November 4, 2008 - Volume 5, Issue 211
MOSCOW SUMMIT ON KARABAKH FALLS SHORT OF MEDVEDEV'S GOALS
by Vladimir Socor
Presidents Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan,
and Serge Sarkisian of Armenia met on November 2 near Moscow to discuss
the current state of negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
With those negotiations moving slowly forward at several levels and on
their own momentum, Medvedev initiated this summit to lift Russia into
the driver's seat of the process.
The Kremlin hoped to capitalize on the political effects of its
recent invasion of Georgia and seizure of that country's
territories through military occupation and diplomatic
`recognition.' The Georgia crisis served to demonstrate
that Russia can and does act decisively, brutally, and with impunity in
the South Caucasus, while the United States was drifting toward
strategic disengagement and the European Union failed to fill the
vacuum. The moment seemed ripe for Russia to display `regional
leadership' by taking the initiative in negotiations to settle
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Moscow also hoped to display a capacity for conflict resolution
through diplomacy, not just through force. One major goal of this
exercise in diplomacy, however, is to deploy Russian troops in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict theater as `peacekeepers' or
`guarantors' at some stage of the settlement.
The summit's only apparent result, however, is a joint
declaration that falls clearly short of Moscow's goals
(www.kremlin.ru, Arminfo, www.day.az, November 3, 4). The Azerbaijani
and Armenian presidents first held a two-hour, face-to-face session and
were then joined by Medvedev for finalizing the declaration. Signed by
the three presidents in front of TV cameras, then read out to the media
by Medvedev, the five-point declaration does not commit the signatory
parties to any specific approaches or actions within the continuing
negotiating process. If the Kremlin wished to show `forward
movement' by hosting this summit, it has no such results to
show.
The declaration's preamble underscores the continuity of
direct dialogue between the two countries with the mediation of the
three OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, the United States, and
France).
Point 1 envisages a `political settlement of the conflict
based on the principles and norms of international law.' This,
however, neither resolves nor circumvents the dilemma between
territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of internationally
recognized borders on one hand and national self-determination on the
other hand. This dilemma has been created and maintained artificially on
the Armenian side as a means to freeze the post-1994 situation, with
Azerbaijani territories occupied and the Azeri population forced out.
Point 2 reaffirms support for the ongoing and future mediation by
the OSCE Minsk Group's co-chairs, `taking into
consideration their meeting with the parties on November 29,
2007.' The reference is to the three co-chairs' joint
proposals presented during the OSCE's 2007 year-end ministerial
conference in Madrid. The Armenian side interprets that document as
elevating the national self-determination principle to the same level as
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. Yerevan therefore
prefers to cite `the Madrid principles' as a point of
departure for further negotiations. Azerbaijan, however, argues for the
primacy of the territorial integrity principle in OSCE and other
international documents of normative character. The Moscow declaration
downgrades the significance of Madrid to a mere
`meeting,' not principles and not even a document for
further reference. This undoubtedly comes as a disappointment for
Yerevan.
Point 3 stipulates that the `peaceful resolution should be
accompanied by legally binding international guarantees in all aspects
and stages of settlement.' Russia and Armenia insist on such
guarantees: Yerevan refers to the security of the Armenian population of
Upper Karabakh while Moscow needs an excuse for deploying Russian
`peacekeeping' or `guarantor' troops.
For its part, Azerbaijan does not oppose international guarantees but
does insist that any such guarantees be in line with
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The declaration's
reference to `stages' is consistent with
Azerbaijan's stage-by-stage approach to a solution of the
conflict, aiming for withdrawal of Armenian troops from the Azeri
districts around Upper Karabakh and return of Azeri refugees as the
first stage.
Point 4 records Azerbaijan's and Armenia's
intention to continue their efforts for a political settlement of the
conflict, at the level of the presidents and ministries of foreign
affairs, and through cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group's
co-chairs.
Point 5 `emphasize[s] the importance of creating
conditions that will contribute to the consolidation of trust, within
the framework of efforts aimed at settling the conflict.'
However vague, this point clearly does not imply that Azerbaijan ought
to agree to Armenia's inclusion in regional energy and transport
projects in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.
During the last few years, the European Union and even the United
States have attempted to persuade Azerbaijan to include Armenia in
regional projects before the Armenian forces withdraw from occupied
territories, presumably in order to advance efforts for peace.
Ideologically, this argument is a legacy of the classical liberal belief
that trade in and of itself promotes peace (`pipelines for
peace' is a latter-day reincarnation of that belief). On a more
mundane level, that argument reflects the influence of political lobbies
in Brussels and Washington, which has resulted in withholding funds from
projects of Western interest in Western-oriented Azerbaijan. For its
part, Azerbaijan is open to such cooperation with Armenia after the
Armenian forces vacate the occupied territories and the refugees are
free to return home.
-Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress