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Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management And Reform

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  • Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management And Reform

    AZERBAIJAN: DEFENCE SECTOR MANAGEMENT AND REFORM

    Europe Briefing N°50
    www.crisisgroup.org
    29 October 2008

    Azerbaijan wants to create a strong army to regain Nagorno-Karabakh
    and seven adjacent districts, either by improving its negotiating
    leverage with Armenia or going back to war. It has exponentially
    increased its military budget, though it has not so far gained clear
    superiority over Armenian forces. If the new military is to be not
    only stronger but also better governed, however, it needs deep reforms
    to make it less corrupt and personality driven, more transparent and
    better directed. So far there has been insufficient political will
    either to do the part that should involve increasing democratic and
    civilian control or to break the habit of treating the army as above
    all an instrument with which to protect elite interests.

    A war in Nagorno-Karabakh is unlikely in the immediate
    term. But in the longer term fragmented, divided,
    accountable-to-no-one-but-the-president, un-trans­par­ent,
    corrupt and internally feuding armed forces could all too easily be
    sent off to fight to satisfy internal power struggles. A modern and
    efficient army, even if subject to democratic, civilian control, is
    not unproblematic while the Nagorno-Karabakh situation remains deeply
    resented in the polity. However, the ability to hold the leadership
    responsible for expenditures and policy priorities at least has the
    potential to make the system more responsible and predictable. NATO,
    which is helping with military reform, should enhance Azerbaijani
    knowledge of peacekeeping and laws of war, and when possible facilitate
    dialogue and contacts between the militaries of the two sides. The EU,
    U.S. and Russia should also reinvigorate efforts to push the parties
    to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

    The government's pledge to significantly reform the military is part of
    a stated goal of national modernisation and democratisation. Though the
    presidential election on 15 October 2008 was technically improved, it
    offered no genuine alternative to the incumbent. As democratisation has
    stalled, so too have crucial parts of military reform. Thus, parliament
    has failed to oversee military expenditure and has no authority to
    summon power ministers, including the defence minister, to report on
    their activities, but it is itself the product of flawed elections and
    far from a truly democratic institution. Democratic improvements in
    the military can contribute to national democratisation, but they are
    unlikely to drive that process or advance in isolation. If Azerbaijan
    is committed to thorough reform of the military, it will need to change
    substantially in many other areas of government and society as well.

    The defence reforms that have occurred have often been stimulated by
    cooperation with NATO. Azerbaijan was one of the first former Soviet
    countries to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994.

    Especially the 2005 and 2008 Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP)
    provide a blueprint for democratic control of the armed forces, defence
    planning and budgeting, interoperability with NATO and structural
    reorganisation according to NATO standards. Baku has often dragged
    its feet in implementing IPAP-recommended reforms, however, in part
    at least because it has no clear membership aspirations, due to a
    foreign policy which seeks to balance interests with the U.S., EU,
    Russia and Iran. Moscow's August military intervention in Georgia
    has further convinced it of the advantages of an ambiguous policy
    and made it less ready to push forward with NATO integration.

    Defence sector reform in Azerbaijan is an understudied subject, about
    which little comprehensive analysis has been attempted. The bulk of
    research has been carried out by a handful of journalists. The defence
    sector remains one of the most secretive and non-transparent segments
    of the government. Crisis Group was restricted in its own field work
    by limited access to government sources, military personnel and
    installations. By improving the dissemination of information, the
    government could do more to dispel the doubts that arise regarding
    the impact of its increased military spending.

    If it indeed wishes to pursue a more efficient, NATO-standard military,
    subject to more democratic civilian control and greater transparency
    and accountability, the government should:

    enhance the oversight capacities of the parliament, especially its
    standing committee for defence and security and the audit chamber and
    encourage parliamentarians to increase their knowledge about military
    reform by organising regular training, work­shops and conferences;
    improve public information on and participation in security sector
    management by publishing the NATO IPAP documents, making it easier to
    access information on military matters, and setting up a regularly
    updated defence ministry website; increase civilian control in the
    defence ministry; complete elaboration of a military doctrine and
    conduct a strategic defence review; amend legislation and military
    regulations in line with its international human rights commitments,
    in particular by disallowing detention of service personnel without
    proper trial, adopting a new law on alternative service and creating a
    military ombudsman; and improve personnel management and training by
    establishing efficient systems for payment and compensation, officer
    rotation, reservist training and call-up systems, military education
    and merit-based promotion.

    In the meantime, NATO should carefully review its strategic purpose
    in working with the militaries of Caucasus states, particularly
    with respect to unresolved conflicts. It should focus its military
    cooperation with Azerbaijan strictly on efforts to improve democratic,
    civilian control of the armed forces and not move beyond the IPAP
    while Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved. Especially the U.S. and the
    EU should at the same time move resolution of that simmering conflict
    much higher up their agendas and seek, in cooperation with Russia, to
    put pressure on both Azer­baijan and Armenia to compromise in line
    with the principles proposed by the Minsk Group of the Organization
    for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

    --Boundary_(ID_SHSuF1KVlXmLRMpRRtFHRQ)--
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