Tweet
THE RECENT RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN GEORGIA HAS MADE AN AMERICAN
By Prof. Mark Katz.
Persian Mirror
http://persianmirror.com/Article_det.cfm?id=2299& amp;getArticleCategory=41&getArticleSubCategor y=3
Nov 14 2008
Approchement with Iran highly desirable for the United States. Israel
has long opposed such a rapprochement, but this would also serve its
interests too. Here's why.
Europe has become increasingly dependent on Russia for natural gas
supplies, and this dependence is only likely to increase. This would
not be undesirable, except that Moscow has shown a proclivity for
cutting back or halting gas shipments to states with which it has
disagreements. To prevent Russia from acquiring leverage over Europe
through greater control over its gas imports, the United States and
many European governments have sought alternative gas supplies.
Iran has enormous natural gas reserves. Iran could also serve as an
alternative pipeline route for Azeri and Turkmen gas for transshipment
through Turkey to reach Europe. But Iranian-American hostility has
resulted in Washington acting to block American and discourage other
Western investment in this Iranian gas pipeline option in favor of
a route through the South Caucasus.
Continued Azeri-Armenian hostility, though, prevents pipelines being
constructed from Azerbaijan through Armenia to Turkey. This has left
Georgia as the sole available route for a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan
(and possibly Turkmenistan) to Turkey and Europe that bypasses both
Russia and Iran.
But Russia's successful intervention in Georgia casts doubt on whether
Georgia can serve as an alternative to Russia as a pipeline route. The
ease with which Russian forces took control of both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia demonstrated how readily Moscow could disrupt pipelines
through Georgia. There is also the possibility that Moscow could wait
until a gas pipeline through Georgia is built, and then take over
both the country and all pipelines through it. This would not just
frustrate Europe's efforts to reduce dependence on Russia for gas,
but actually increase it. Just the possibility that this could occur
may prevent the proposed Georgian gas pipeline.
How is Europe going to react to this problem? Will Europe see
dependence on Russia for its gas imports as inevitable and henceforward
adjust its behavior so as not to antagonize Moscow? Or will Europe
attempt to limits its dependence on Russia through seeking yet other
suppliers and supply routes?
Past West European behavior suggests that Europe will do the
latter. During the Cold War, when growing West European economies
needed more gas but North Africa was seen as an unreliable supplier,
Western Europe began to import gas from the Soviet Union. Further,
it did this despite American objections at a time when Western Europe
was dependent on the United States for protection against a possible
Soviet attack.
Europe is now less dependent on the United States for security but
increasingly dependent on the importation of gas. Europe, then,
can be expected to do now what it did during the Cold War when it
needed more gas and doubted the reliability of its existing suppliers:
find alternative suppliers.
Sooner or later, though, Europe is likely to seek to import gas from
Iran, especially since: 1) the Iranians have already indicated their
willingness to sell it to Europe; 2) Russia cannot interfere as easily
in Iran as it can in Georgia; and 3) Iran can also serve as a transit
route for gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
As Western Europe's behavior with regard to gas imports from the Soviet
Union during the Cold War demonstrated, Europe is likely to buy gas
from Iran despite opposition from America (and, of course, Israel). If
Europe is determined to buy Iranian gas, then the US will face two
choices: either it can attempt to prevent Europe from doing so, or it
can work with Europe by attempting to normalize US-Iranian relations.
Attempting to prevent Europe from buying Iranian gas is highly
inadvisable since not only are such efforts likely to fail, but will
only result in worsening EU-US relations. Nor will doing this result
in Iran moderating its behavior toward Israel, since it is doubtful
that Europe is going to let Israeli opposition stand in the way of
furthering its efforts to reduce dependence on Russia for gas. Further,
an American effort to prevent Europe from buying Iranian gas would
prevent the US from being able to exploit the increasing differences
between Russia and Iran that can be expected to emerge, especially
if Tehran is willing to serve as a transit corridor for Azeri and
Turkmen gas.
An US-Iranian rapprochement, by contrast, would help preserve EU-US
relations as well as allow the United States to benefit from the
Russian-Iranian differences that would arise from this. But would Iran
moderate its behavior toward Israel for the sake of rapprochement with
the United States, especially if an Iranian-European rapprochement
seems likely even if Iranian-American hostility remains?
There is reason to believe that it would. For while Europe can
provide Iran with much needed cash, Europe is neither willing nor
able to provide Iran with help on its security problems to the extent
that America can. And Iran has some very serious security problems,
including an increasingly active Sunni opposition inside Iran, the
likelihood that a resurgent Taliban will renew its hostility toward
Iran, the possible spillover into Iran from the renewed sectarian
conflict in Iraq that may well result as the American presence there
declines, and the growing Russian hostility toward Iran that can be
expected to result from Tehran competing with it as a gas exporter.
Tehran has little incentive to change its behavior toward Israel if
US-Iran hostility continues at a time when American intervention in
Iran appears highly unlikely. By contrast, Washington has a far better
chance of moderating Iranian behavior toward Israel as a condition
for providing Tehran with assistance against the very real threats
Iran faces than if the United States remains hostile toward Iran.
Where America's interests lie, then, should be clear: Opposing
European gas purchases from Iran will worsen EU-US relations, give
Russia further opportunity to exploit European-American differences,
and do nothing to moderate Iranian behavior toward Israel. An
American rapprochement with Iran, by contrast, would promote EU-US
cooperation, assist Europe in avoiding over-dependence on Russian gas
and Russian-controlled pipelines, and offer a better opportunity to
moderate Iran's behavior toward Israel.
By Prof. Mark Katz.
Persian Mirror
http://persianmirror.com/Article_det.cfm?id=2299& amp;getArticleCategory=41&getArticleSubCategor y=3
Nov 14 2008
Approchement with Iran highly desirable for the United States. Israel
has long opposed such a rapprochement, but this would also serve its
interests too. Here's why.
Europe has become increasingly dependent on Russia for natural gas
supplies, and this dependence is only likely to increase. This would
not be undesirable, except that Moscow has shown a proclivity for
cutting back or halting gas shipments to states with which it has
disagreements. To prevent Russia from acquiring leverage over Europe
through greater control over its gas imports, the United States and
many European governments have sought alternative gas supplies.
Iran has enormous natural gas reserves. Iran could also serve as an
alternative pipeline route for Azeri and Turkmen gas for transshipment
through Turkey to reach Europe. But Iranian-American hostility has
resulted in Washington acting to block American and discourage other
Western investment in this Iranian gas pipeline option in favor of
a route through the South Caucasus.
Continued Azeri-Armenian hostility, though, prevents pipelines being
constructed from Azerbaijan through Armenia to Turkey. This has left
Georgia as the sole available route for a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan
(and possibly Turkmenistan) to Turkey and Europe that bypasses both
Russia and Iran.
But Russia's successful intervention in Georgia casts doubt on whether
Georgia can serve as an alternative to Russia as a pipeline route. The
ease with which Russian forces took control of both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia demonstrated how readily Moscow could disrupt pipelines
through Georgia. There is also the possibility that Moscow could wait
until a gas pipeline through Georgia is built, and then take over
both the country and all pipelines through it. This would not just
frustrate Europe's efforts to reduce dependence on Russia for gas,
but actually increase it. Just the possibility that this could occur
may prevent the proposed Georgian gas pipeline.
How is Europe going to react to this problem? Will Europe see
dependence on Russia for its gas imports as inevitable and henceforward
adjust its behavior so as not to antagonize Moscow? Or will Europe
attempt to limits its dependence on Russia through seeking yet other
suppliers and supply routes?
Past West European behavior suggests that Europe will do the
latter. During the Cold War, when growing West European economies
needed more gas but North Africa was seen as an unreliable supplier,
Western Europe began to import gas from the Soviet Union. Further,
it did this despite American objections at a time when Western Europe
was dependent on the United States for protection against a possible
Soviet attack.
Europe is now less dependent on the United States for security but
increasingly dependent on the importation of gas. Europe, then,
can be expected to do now what it did during the Cold War when it
needed more gas and doubted the reliability of its existing suppliers:
find alternative suppliers.
Sooner or later, though, Europe is likely to seek to import gas from
Iran, especially since: 1) the Iranians have already indicated their
willingness to sell it to Europe; 2) Russia cannot interfere as easily
in Iran as it can in Georgia; and 3) Iran can also serve as a transit
route for gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
As Western Europe's behavior with regard to gas imports from the Soviet
Union during the Cold War demonstrated, Europe is likely to buy gas
from Iran despite opposition from America (and, of course, Israel). If
Europe is determined to buy Iranian gas, then the US will face two
choices: either it can attempt to prevent Europe from doing so, or it
can work with Europe by attempting to normalize US-Iranian relations.
Attempting to prevent Europe from buying Iranian gas is highly
inadvisable since not only are such efforts likely to fail, but will
only result in worsening EU-US relations. Nor will doing this result
in Iran moderating its behavior toward Israel, since it is doubtful
that Europe is going to let Israeli opposition stand in the way of
furthering its efforts to reduce dependence on Russia for gas. Further,
an American effort to prevent Europe from buying Iranian gas would
prevent the US from being able to exploit the increasing differences
between Russia and Iran that can be expected to emerge, especially
if Tehran is willing to serve as a transit corridor for Azeri and
Turkmen gas.
An US-Iranian rapprochement, by contrast, would help preserve EU-US
relations as well as allow the United States to benefit from the
Russian-Iranian differences that would arise from this. But would Iran
moderate its behavior toward Israel for the sake of rapprochement with
the United States, especially if an Iranian-European rapprochement
seems likely even if Iranian-American hostility remains?
There is reason to believe that it would. For while Europe can
provide Iran with much needed cash, Europe is neither willing nor
able to provide Iran with help on its security problems to the extent
that America can. And Iran has some very serious security problems,
including an increasingly active Sunni opposition inside Iran, the
likelihood that a resurgent Taliban will renew its hostility toward
Iran, the possible spillover into Iran from the renewed sectarian
conflict in Iraq that may well result as the American presence there
declines, and the growing Russian hostility toward Iran that can be
expected to result from Tehran competing with it as a gas exporter.
Tehran has little incentive to change its behavior toward Israel if
US-Iran hostility continues at a time when American intervention in
Iran appears highly unlikely. By contrast, Washington has a far better
chance of moderating Iranian behavior toward Israel as a condition
for providing Tehran with assistance against the very real threats
Iran faces than if the United States remains hostile toward Iran.
Where America's interests lie, then, should be clear: Opposing
European gas purchases from Iran will worsen EU-US relations, give
Russia further opportunity to exploit European-American differences,
and do nothing to moderate Iranian behavior toward Israel. An
American rapprochement with Iran, by contrast, would promote EU-US
cooperation, assist Europe in avoiding over-dependence on Russian gas
and Russian-controlled pipelines, and offer a better opportunity to
moderate Iran's behavior toward Israel.