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DISCUSSION IN THE CHARACTER OF THE KOCGIRI MOVEMENT
By Azad Aslan
The Kurdish Globe
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.j sp?id=62247F749832466FD3FCE16BF5D6456C
Nov 27 2008
Iraq
The Kocgiri movement was important not only because it was the first
against the Kemalists, but also because of its timing...It was also
a period in which the Great powers' policies were taking shape in
terms of the likely future of Middle East.
The Kurdish leaders' continuous nationalist activities and propaganda
culminated in the first serious Kurdish uprising against the Kemalists.
Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after the WWI
formation of Kurdish nationalism to aspire for a Kurdish independent
state found itself in competition or in conflict with that of
Turkish nationalism, in effect, Kemalism, a nationalist movement
followed a renewed version of the Committee of Union and Progress
policies in a restricted area famously known Misaki Milli (National
Pact). Aspirations of Kurdish nationalism for an independent statehood
were challenged by the Kemalist movement. The first serious challenge
of Kurdish national movement took place in 1920 against Kemalist
movement in a particular place in north Kurdistan's Dersim region,
known as Kocgiri.
The Kocgiri region, which was populated mainly by Alevi Kurds,
constituted the area between the east and northeast of Sivas province,
west Erzinjan, and northwest of Dersim, lying on the west bank of
the Euphrates. David McDowall remarked that "the timing and location
were significant. West Dersim, lying west of the Euphrates, had
been excluded from the area formally designated at Sevres in August
as part of an autonomous Kurdish state." Indeed, it was significant
that the movement began before the Sevres treaty was signed; however,
it was accelerated by the signing of the treaty and formulated the
movement's political objective.
The leading figures of the movement were varied, including nationalist
intellectuals such as Dr. Nuri Dersimi, who was a member of the
Kurdistan Teali Jemiyet (KTJ est. 1918); Mirzayan AliÅ~_er, who was
a poet and orator; and tribal leaders of the Kocgiri region including
Mustafa Pashazade Hayder Beg, his brother AliÅ~_an Beg, Haci Rassim,
Izzet, Muhammad, Gul Akka's sons Izzet and Neqi, Hasan Askeri,
and others.
Kocgiri, Kemalism, and Imperialism
The KTJ in Istanbul urged young members to go to various parts
of Kurdistan to establish the organization and spread propaganda
against the inclusion of parts of Kurdistan into Armenia. Among those
young members were Nuri Dersimi and Haydar Beg. Nuri Dersimi, who was
assigned to organize the tribes in the Sivas region, left Istanbul for
Sivas at the beginning of the summer of 1919. Haydar Beg was instructed
to establish KTJ branches in the Kocgiri region. Dersimi and Haydar
took with them books and issues of Jin to Kocgiri-Dersim. Haydar
opened a branch of the KTJ in Umraniye. AliÅ~_er was instructed to
establish an organization in the Dersim region.
These leading Kurdish nationalists' activities in the region caught
the eye of Mustafa Kemal who was also active in the region gathering
the support of the Kurds for his movement. Kemal invited AliÅ~_an Beg
and Nuri Dersimi to Sivas. Dersimi did not go but AliÅ~_an did. In the
meeting Mustafa Kemal told him that he was aware of their activities,
but he wished to hear from him directly. In response, AliÅ~_an
informed him that they were striving for an autonomous Kurdistan
within the Ottoman Empire as proclaimed by Wilson's Fourteen Points,
that they were working against the Armenian claims over Kurdish land,
and that they had no other objectives. Mustafa Kemal reacted by saying
that the Wilson Principles were worthless for the people of the East
and that the Kurds should cooperate with him, especially because in
the Erzurum Congress, the people of Kurdistan had promised to support
him and that he represented the Kurdish people. He further suggested
that AliÅ~_an and Dersimi should support him. However, both Dersimi
and AliÅ~_an Beg refused to participate with him.
Nuri Dersimi stated that after the failure of the Noel mission and
the Kemalists' harsh response to it, the local branches of the KTJ in
Kocgiri and Dersim region had ceased their communication with the KTJ
in Istanbul, and they had to act on their own to prepare a national
movement in Dersim in parallel with other parts of Kurdistan. This
suggests that there were coordinated efforts and cooperation between
the KTJ and its local branches for the purpose of creating a nationwide
central movement. However, it seems that the Kemalist policies against
the Kurdish nationalists in Kurdistan, which were compounded by the
division of the KTJ in Istanbul in the spring of 1920, interrupted
this coordination.
Some Turkish historians claimed that British intrigues were behind
the Kocgiri movement against the Kemalists, who were "launching an
anti-imperialist and national liberation struggle." The logic runs
like this: The KTJ was a pro-British Kurdish organization and a
puppet in the hands of British officers. The Kocgiri movement was
initiated by the KTJ, which in turn served British interests. Such
arguments, however, run counter to the evidence provided by the British
documents. It is true that the KTJ was very close to the British
officers and that they had high expectations from Britain with regards
to the solution of the Kurdish issue at the Peace Conference. However,
this does not mean that the KTJ was solely acting on the order of the
British officers. The British documents indicate that British officials
were not even aware of the extent of the Kocgiri movement. There
were only brief telegraphic statements mentioning that there was
something going on in Dersim region. A message from the Istanbul High
Commissioner, H. Rumbold, to Baghdad illustrated this clearly:
"Rumors have been current here for some time that a serious
anti-Kemalist movement has developed amongst Kurds of Dersim and the
adjoining country between Kharput and Sivas. The movement is alleged to
be causing considerable anxiety at Angora. It is impossible to control
these reports at this end. If any reliable news reaches you, perhaps
you would communicate it to His Majesty's Government and to me." i
A few weeks later, Rumbold still had no definite news:
"I am still without any definite information regarding the
anti-Kemalist movement that broke out some time ago among the Kurds
in the country east of Sivas. It appears to have been of sufficient
importance to cause apprehension in Angora and to necessitate strong
military action. I have, however, no reason to suppose that it has had
any extension beyond the Kizilbash or Alevi Kurds, who are numerous in
Dersim and the country adjoining it, or that it amounts to more than a
local insurrection, which the Kemalist authorities, with their superior
military organization and equipment, are capable of repressing." ii
Such telegrams indicate the fact that the British did not have any
role in the Kocgiri uprising.
Some scholars have paid attention to the religious and geopolitical
characteristics of the Dersim region in the uprising. H.L. Keiser
argued that the Dersimi Kurds, for a number of reasons, were the first
to demand their independence. These reasons were that they were Alevis
and did not accept the Sultan/Caliph as their spiritual leader, as he
saw them as heretics; their participation in WWI was highly marginal;
they were not affected by the Kemalists' call to save the Caliph
against the infidel; and finally, as compared to the Sunni Kurds,
relations were friendly between Dersimis and the Armenians. During
WWI a majority of Dersimis collaborated with Armenians and Russians
against the central Ottoman state. The Ottoman establishment's pressure
on Dersimis to change sides through Celebi Cemalleddin Efendi,
the guardian and keeper of the Haci Bektas Tekke, was a complete
failure. McDowall also paid attention to the Alevi-Sunni dichotomy
and the Armenian issue: "Kurdish nationalists, particularly those
who explored the chances for a Kurdo-Armenian alliance, could only
mobilize national feeling among those who felt least threatened by
Armenian ambitions. Of these the clearest group was the Alevis, who
did not share the fear felt by many Sunni Kurds further east." Both
Keiser and McDowall emphasized the relative freedom of the Dersim
region from Ottoman control. Indeed, the Dersim region had never
been directly controlled by the Ottoman central state and was only
temporarily subdued in 1878 for the first time.
The Kocgiri national movement, however, cannot only be explained
in terms of religion, location, or historical specificities,
though these are certainly important factors that contributed to
the uprising. This article suggests that, apart from the reasons
mentioned, one other crucial factor has to be considered. Namely,
that the Kurdish nationalists' activity in the Kocgiri region was for
the purpose of raising the Kurds against the Kemalists for Kurdish
self-rule or autonomy.
The Kurdish leaders' continuous nationalist activities and propaganda
culminated in the first serious Kurdish uprising against the Kemalists.
Local or National Movement
Hamid Bozarslan stressed the local character of the movement, which
"was aimed at a local rather than at a broader Kurdish autonomy, still
less at independence." The localism of the movement, argued Bozarslan,
referred to "the preservation of both Kurdishness and the Alevi
character of the Dersim region." It is true that the Kocgiri movement
was a local movement, but its localization was not due to its political
aim as Bozarslan suggested, rather it was due to its geographical
limitations. One of the first memorandums sent by the Kocgiri leaders
to the Ankara government envisioned a Kurdistan including Dersim,
Diyarbakir, Van, Bitlis, and Elaziz. This suggests that the Kocgiri
leaders did not limit themselves to the Kocghiri/Dersim region, but
wanted a wider Kurdistan. However, the fact that the movement failed
to inspire other regions of Kurdistan and the movement's limitation
to the borders of Kocgiri region characterized it as a local rather
than a national movement.
The Kurdish nationalists' activities and meetings in the Kocgiri-Dersim
region revealed the fact that they envisioned an independent Kurdistan,
or a Kurdistan as stipulated by the Sevres Treaty. With this political
objective in mind, the Kurdish nationalists began their activities
as early as 1919. The movement had taken place in a period in which
the Kemalists were engaged against a number of external and internal
forces. The Greek army offensive against the Kemalists in Ankara was
the most serious one. Kocgiri Kurdish nationalists had a different
attitude toward the Greek occupation of Anatolia than other Kurds. A
memorandum by an Interim Kurdish Government of Kocgiri , iii which
was found at the Turkish Republic Presidency archive, called on the
Kurdish people to participate in the struggle for independence and
declared the formation of an Interim Kurdish government that would be
the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state. The memorandum asked the
Kurdish people not to participate with the Kemalist forces against
the Greek army, and said that they had no reason to fear the Greeks,
but rather the Kemalists who had risen against the Sultan/Caliph. The
memorandum called on people to revolt against the Kemalists forces
until the day of freedom.
This memorandum is highly important as it reveals a number of crucial
characteristics of the Kurdish national movement in Kocgiri. First,
it indicates the true intention of the Kurdish nationalists, in
effect, to establish a Kurdish state. It is a clear manifestation
of the political development of Kurdish nationalism in pursuit of a
nation-state. Second, it suggests the order of priority was, rather
than Muslim versus non-Muslim, Kurds versus Kemalism. The Kurdish
nationalists clearly defined their prime enemy, which was the Kemalists
rather than the Greek army or other foreign forces occupying parts of
the Empire, including the capital, Istanbul. The Kurdish nationalists
explicitly perceived the Kemalists as the prime obstacles in the
way of Kurdish self-determination. Third, the Kurdish leaders were
aware of the great opportunities presented during this time period
and were keen to exploit these historical opportunities. Thus the
Greek army's offensive against the Ankara government was implicitly
welcomed by the Kurdish nationalists who urged the Kurdish people
not to take part alongside the Kemalist forces against the Greek
army. Such characteristics of the Kocgiri movement, however, were at
odds with the view of the considerable Sunni Kurdish population that
collaborated with the Kemalists.
Reasons behind the failure
The Kocgiri movement was important not only because it was the first
against the Kemalists, but also because of its timing. It occurred
from early 1920 to mid 1921, at a time when the Kemalists were engaged
against the Greek army in the west and Armenians in the east. It was
also a period in which the Great powers' policies were taking shape
in terms of the likely future of Middle East. Thus, the defeat of the
movement must be considered as a defeat not only of a local Kurdish
uprising but a general defeat of Kurdish nationalism. The Kemalists'
success against Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish forces without doubt
altered the Great Powers' policies in the region and forced them to
reconsider and reconstruct their post-war plans. This reconsideration
in turn caused the modification of the Sevres Treaty, which paved the
way for the Lausanne Agreement. It was this agreement that destroyed
the Kurdish nationalist aspiration for self-determination.
Having examined such a sensitive period, it is imperative to look
at some of the fundamental reasons behind the defeat of the Kocgiri
movement. N. Dersimi, in his account, mentions a number of crucial
reasons behind their failure. First, the movement lacked centrality
and coordination as a result of the liquidation of the Kurdistan Teali
Jamiyeti; second, there was a lack of foreign support for the Kurdish
cause; third, the tribal structure and the lack of a middle class
in Kurdish society foiled the attempt to create national unity and
coherence; fourth, some of the tribal leaders were easily co-opted
by the enemy; and fifth, religious and sectarian differences among
the Kurds thwarted national unity.
Dersimi's account, as Olson argued, was well-founded. Some of the
tribal leaders switched their allegiances right in the middle of
the war, Murad Pasha for example. Other tribal leaders allied with
the Kemalists and either remained indifferent or took their place
with the Kemalists against the Kurdish nationalists. As Bruinessen
noted, "In the years 1919-21, Mustafa Kemal's contacts with
Kurdish chieftains appeared to be better than those of the Kurdish
nationalist organizations." This indeed was "one of the ironies of
Kurdish history," as Olson acutely notes. "The Turkish nationalist
military and governmental challenge to the Istanbul government and to
the occupying forces began in areas that Kurdish nationalists claimed
as part of the homeland they wanted to establish. Instead, they aided
the Turkish nationalist forces, which prevented its realization."
Religious and sectarian differences certainly played their role in
the uprising. The Sunni participation in the movement was minimal as
most Sunni Kurds assumed it be an Alevi-only uprising. Sunni Kurds
were more attracted to the Kemalist call for Muslim unity against
the infidel and Armenia than the Alevi Kurds. The reason for the
attraction, as Olson argued, was that the Kurdish urban and rural
notables who possessed the Armenian land and properties could claim
legal rights from the Kemalists who were engaged against the Armenian
forces. Sunni Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide ironically
contributed to the defeat of Kurdish nationalism.
Olson added a few other reasons behind the failure, such as the
proximity of the region of the rebellion to areas largely populated by
Turks "meant that the Kurds were more amenable to Turkish authority and
more accessible to Turkish patronage." The overwhelming superiority of
Turkish military power and organization and the extensive patronage,
land, and resources at the command of the Ankara government was
another reason, according to Olson, contributing to the failure.
Apart from the abovementioned reasons, there were two interconnected
fundamental factors that also contributed to the Kurdish nationalists'
failure in Kocgiri. The first one was, as Dersimi briefly mentioned,
that the movement lacked central coordination and planning. This
was compounded by the second factor: the lack of a coherent national
political program.
The main Kurdish national organization and the leading Kurdish
nationalists, the KTJ, were in Istanbul rather than in Kurdistan. The
poor communication and transport system prevalent in the Empire
at the time contributed to the inefficient coordination between
the KTJ and the local leaders. Had the influential Kurdish leaders
established themselves in Kurdistan and centrally coordinated the local
Kurdish movements, they would have had a better chance of raising
a simultaneous nationwide movement against the Kemalists. The KTJ
certainly played a significant role in the Kocgiri-Dersim region as it
sent its members to the region for organizational purposes. However,
by the time Kurdish leaders such as Nuri Dersimi, AliÅ~_er, and others
managed to set up the KTJ branches throughout Kocgiri-Dersim region
and prepared the uprising as part of a general Kurdish movement,
the KTJ itself, due to internal conflicts and divisions, ceased to
be an effective organization. This forced the local leaders to take
the initiative into their own hands without clear contacts with the
rest of the country. The minimal Kurdish Sunni participation in the
Kocgiri movement was not solely due to religious sectarianism but also
due to this lack of centrality. The lack of creativity and vision
among the Kurdish leaders in Istanbul, despite the warning of Nuri
Dersimi, in smoothing the Alevi/Sunni contradiction in Kurdistan,
provided ample opportunities for the Kemalists to exploit religious
friction to their own advantage. Dersimi blamed the Kurdish leaders
in Istanbul for not paying attention to the Alevi-Sunni dichotomy
in Kurdistan. In a KTJ meeting in Istanbul, Dersimi urged that "we
[should] send, as soon as possible, a delegation to the Kurdish Alevi
areas in order to refute [the idea that] relations between the Sunni
and Alevi Kurds were cold. [I explained that] in the case of a Kurdish
uprising in the Alevi areas, the Sunni Kurds might remain quiet, and,
in the case of a national liberation movement in the Sunni areas,
the Alevi Kurds might behave in a similar way. The Turkish government
forces could profit from this situation."
Tribal social structure or lack of vision
This article suggests that the lack of centrality and central
coordination in Kurdish national movements cannot solely be
attributable to the tribal social structure. Certainly the tribal
social structure of Kurdistan played a significant role in the
formation and development of Kurdish nationalism. However, this is not
the whole picture. The lack of a coherent national political program
and lack of vision of Kurdish nationalists are two of the factors
that contributed to the fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism. This can
easily be seen in the Kocgiri movement. The confusion of the Kocgiri
leaders in terms of their political objectives is evident. Their
political objectives swayed between independence, autonomy, and a
Kurdish-administered Vilayet for certain Kurdish districts in the
Kocgiri-Dersim region. This confusion was not limited to the local
Kurdish leaders alone, but included the main Kurdish influential
leaders as well. They did not have a clear political vision in terms of
a future for Kurdistan. They naively believed that the Great Powers,
mainly Britain, would help them in establishing Kurdistan. The
Kurdish leading nationalists at the time did not perceive the
importance of mass movements and a cohesive organization. They did
not attempt to mobilize the Kurdish masses for a common strategy
and objective. Internal divisions within the KTJ, however, not only
paralyzed the organization and weakened the Kurdish nationalists in
Istanbul and Europe, but also, as Bozarslan argued, left the Kurdish
societies in the provinces without intellectual and moral input.
The fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism in Istanbul contributed
significantly to the decentralization and localization of the Kurdish
national movement in Kurdistan. The Kocgiri movement, thus, was
not only the first Kurdish national movement in the north but also
the first example of the fragmented, localized, and decentralized
characteristics of Kurdish nationalism throughout the 20th century.
---- i FO371/6346, E5242, from Sir H. Rumbold, High Commissioner,
Constantinople to Baghdad, repeated to Foreign Office, May 4, 1921
ii FO371/6346, E5713, from H. Rumbold, High Commissioner,
Constantinople, to Earl Curzon, May 18, 1921
iii It is not clear exactly when this memorandum was written
and distributed. However, it seems that it is possible to guess
the likelihood of its publication date given the content of the
memorandum and the actual national developments that had taken place
in Kocgiri. On 6 March 1921, the Kurdish forces attacked Umraniye and
raised the Kurdish flag. In the same month, the Greek army offensive
against the Kemalist forces in the west was intensified. It is highly
probable that the interim Kocgiri Kurdish government was established
in early March 1921.
--Boundary_(ID_BDG6fn+ZIB3vI5JyJBx4WA)--
From: Baghdasarian
By Azad Aslan
The Kurdish Globe
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.j sp?id=62247F749832466FD3FCE16BF5D6456C
Nov 27 2008
Iraq
The Kocgiri movement was important not only because it was the first
against the Kemalists, but also because of its timing...It was also
a period in which the Great powers' policies were taking shape in
terms of the likely future of Middle East.
The Kurdish leaders' continuous nationalist activities and propaganda
culminated in the first serious Kurdish uprising against the Kemalists.
Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after the WWI
formation of Kurdish nationalism to aspire for a Kurdish independent
state found itself in competition or in conflict with that of
Turkish nationalism, in effect, Kemalism, a nationalist movement
followed a renewed version of the Committee of Union and Progress
policies in a restricted area famously known Misaki Milli (National
Pact). Aspirations of Kurdish nationalism for an independent statehood
were challenged by the Kemalist movement. The first serious challenge
of Kurdish national movement took place in 1920 against Kemalist
movement in a particular place in north Kurdistan's Dersim region,
known as Kocgiri.
The Kocgiri region, which was populated mainly by Alevi Kurds,
constituted the area between the east and northeast of Sivas province,
west Erzinjan, and northwest of Dersim, lying on the west bank of
the Euphrates. David McDowall remarked that "the timing and location
were significant. West Dersim, lying west of the Euphrates, had
been excluded from the area formally designated at Sevres in August
as part of an autonomous Kurdish state." Indeed, it was significant
that the movement began before the Sevres treaty was signed; however,
it was accelerated by the signing of the treaty and formulated the
movement's political objective.
The leading figures of the movement were varied, including nationalist
intellectuals such as Dr. Nuri Dersimi, who was a member of the
Kurdistan Teali Jemiyet (KTJ est. 1918); Mirzayan AliÅ~_er, who was
a poet and orator; and tribal leaders of the Kocgiri region including
Mustafa Pashazade Hayder Beg, his brother AliÅ~_an Beg, Haci Rassim,
Izzet, Muhammad, Gul Akka's sons Izzet and Neqi, Hasan Askeri,
and others.
Kocgiri, Kemalism, and Imperialism
The KTJ in Istanbul urged young members to go to various parts
of Kurdistan to establish the organization and spread propaganda
against the inclusion of parts of Kurdistan into Armenia. Among those
young members were Nuri Dersimi and Haydar Beg. Nuri Dersimi, who was
assigned to organize the tribes in the Sivas region, left Istanbul for
Sivas at the beginning of the summer of 1919. Haydar Beg was instructed
to establish KTJ branches in the Kocgiri region. Dersimi and Haydar
took with them books and issues of Jin to Kocgiri-Dersim. Haydar
opened a branch of the KTJ in Umraniye. AliÅ~_er was instructed to
establish an organization in the Dersim region.
These leading Kurdish nationalists' activities in the region caught
the eye of Mustafa Kemal who was also active in the region gathering
the support of the Kurds for his movement. Kemal invited AliÅ~_an Beg
and Nuri Dersimi to Sivas. Dersimi did not go but AliÅ~_an did. In the
meeting Mustafa Kemal told him that he was aware of their activities,
but he wished to hear from him directly. In response, AliÅ~_an
informed him that they were striving for an autonomous Kurdistan
within the Ottoman Empire as proclaimed by Wilson's Fourteen Points,
that they were working against the Armenian claims over Kurdish land,
and that they had no other objectives. Mustafa Kemal reacted by saying
that the Wilson Principles were worthless for the people of the East
and that the Kurds should cooperate with him, especially because in
the Erzurum Congress, the people of Kurdistan had promised to support
him and that he represented the Kurdish people. He further suggested
that AliÅ~_an and Dersimi should support him. However, both Dersimi
and AliÅ~_an Beg refused to participate with him.
Nuri Dersimi stated that after the failure of the Noel mission and
the Kemalists' harsh response to it, the local branches of the KTJ in
Kocgiri and Dersim region had ceased their communication with the KTJ
in Istanbul, and they had to act on their own to prepare a national
movement in Dersim in parallel with other parts of Kurdistan. This
suggests that there were coordinated efforts and cooperation between
the KTJ and its local branches for the purpose of creating a nationwide
central movement. However, it seems that the Kemalist policies against
the Kurdish nationalists in Kurdistan, which were compounded by the
division of the KTJ in Istanbul in the spring of 1920, interrupted
this coordination.
Some Turkish historians claimed that British intrigues were behind
the Kocgiri movement against the Kemalists, who were "launching an
anti-imperialist and national liberation struggle." The logic runs
like this: The KTJ was a pro-British Kurdish organization and a
puppet in the hands of British officers. The Kocgiri movement was
initiated by the KTJ, which in turn served British interests. Such
arguments, however, run counter to the evidence provided by the British
documents. It is true that the KTJ was very close to the British
officers and that they had high expectations from Britain with regards
to the solution of the Kurdish issue at the Peace Conference. However,
this does not mean that the KTJ was solely acting on the order of the
British officers. The British documents indicate that British officials
were not even aware of the extent of the Kocgiri movement. There
were only brief telegraphic statements mentioning that there was
something going on in Dersim region. A message from the Istanbul High
Commissioner, H. Rumbold, to Baghdad illustrated this clearly:
"Rumors have been current here for some time that a serious
anti-Kemalist movement has developed amongst Kurds of Dersim and the
adjoining country between Kharput and Sivas. The movement is alleged to
be causing considerable anxiety at Angora. It is impossible to control
these reports at this end. If any reliable news reaches you, perhaps
you would communicate it to His Majesty's Government and to me." i
A few weeks later, Rumbold still had no definite news:
"I am still without any definite information regarding the
anti-Kemalist movement that broke out some time ago among the Kurds
in the country east of Sivas. It appears to have been of sufficient
importance to cause apprehension in Angora and to necessitate strong
military action. I have, however, no reason to suppose that it has had
any extension beyond the Kizilbash or Alevi Kurds, who are numerous in
Dersim and the country adjoining it, or that it amounts to more than a
local insurrection, which the Kemalist authorities, with their superior
military organization and equipment, are capable of repressing." ii
Such telegrams indicate the fact that the British did not have any
role in the Kocgiri uprising.
Some scholars have paid attention to the religious and geopolitical
characteristics of the Dersim region in the uprising. H.L. Keiser
argued that the Dersimi Kurds, for a number of reasons, were the first
to demand their independence. These reasons were that they were Alevis
and did not accept the Sultan/Caliph as their spiritual leader, as he
saw them as heretics; their participation in WWI was highly marginal;
they were not affected by the Kemalists' call to save the Caliph
against the infidel; and finally, as compared to the Sunni Kurds,
relations were friendly between Dersimis and the Armenians. During
WWI a majority of Dersimis collaborated with Armenians and Russians
against the central Ottoman state. The Ottoman establishment's pressure
on Dersimis to change sides through Celebi Cemalleddin Efendi,
the guardian and keeper of the Haci Bektas Tekke, was a complete
failure. McDowall also paid attention to the Alevi-Sunni dichotomy
and the Armenian issue: "Kurdish nationalists, particularly those
who explored the chances for a Kurdo-Armenian alliance, could only
mobilize national feeling among those who felt least threatened by
Armenian ambitions. Of these the clearest group was the Alevis, who
did not share the fear felt by many Sunni Kurds further east." Both
Keiser and McDowall emphasized the relative freedom of the Dersim
region from Ottoman control. Indeed, the Dersim region had never
been directly controlled by the Ottoman central state and was only
temporarily subdued in 1878 for the first time.
The Kocgiri national movement, however, cannot only be explained
in terms of religion, location, or historical specificities,
though these are certainly important factors that contributed to
the uprising. This article suggests that, apart from the reasons
mentioned, one other crucial factor has to be considered. Namely,
that the Kurdish nationalists' activity in the Kocgiri region was for
the purpose of raising the Kurds against the Kemalists for Kurdish
self-rule or autonomy.
The Kurdish leaders' continuous nationalist activities and propaganda
culminated in the first serious Kurdish uprising against the Kemalists.
Local or National Movement
Hamid Bozarslan stressed the local character of the movement, which
"was aimed at a local rather than at a broader Kurdish autonomy, still
less at independence." The localism of the movement, argued Bozarslan,
referred to "the preservation of both Kurdishness and the Alevi
character of the Dersim region." It is true that the Kocgiri movement
was a local movement, but its localization was not due to its political
aim as Bozarslan suggested, rather it was due to its geographical
limitations. One of the first memorandums sent by the Kocgiri leaders
to the Ankara government envisioned a Kurdistan including Dersim,
Diyarbakir, Van, Bitlis, and Elaziz. This suggests that the Kocgiri
leaders did not limit themselves to the Kocghiri/Dersim region, but
wanted a wider Kurdistan. However, the fact that the movement failed
to inspire other regions of Kurdistan and the movement's limitation
to the borders of Kocgiri region characterized it as a local rather
than a national movement.
The Kurdish nationalists' activities and meetings in the Kocgiri-Dersim
region revealed the fact that they envisioned an independent Kurdistan,
or a Kurdistan as stipulated by the Sevres Treaty. With this political
objective in mind, the Kurdish nationalists began their activities
as early as 1919. The movement had taken place in a period in which
the Kemalists were engaged against a number of external and internal
forces. The Greek army offensive against the Kemalists in Ankara was
the most serious one. Kocgiri Kurdish nationalists had a different
attitude toward the Greek occupation of Anatolia than other Kurds. A
memorandum by an Interim Kurdish Government of Kocgiri , iii which
was found at the Turkish Republic Presidency archive, called on the
Kurdish people to participate in the struggle for independence and
declared the formation of an Interim Kurdish government that would be
the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state. The memorandum asked the
Kurdish people not to participate with the Kemalist forces against
the Greek army, and said that they had no reason to fear the Greeks,
but rather the Kemalists who had risen against the Sultan/Caliph. The
memorandum called on people to revolt against the Kemalists forces
until the day of freedom.
This memorandum is highly important as it reveals a number of crucial
characteristics of the Kurdish national movement in Kocgiri. First,
it indicates the true intention of the Kurdish nationalists, in
effect, to establish a Kurdish state. It is a clear manifestation
of the political development of Kurdish nationalism in pursuit of a
nation-state. Second, it suggests the order of priority was, rather
than Muslim versus non-Muslim, Kurds versus Kemalism. The Kurdish
nationalists clearly defined their prime enemy, which was the Kemalists
rather than the Greek army or other foreign forces occupying parts of
the Empire, including the capital, Istanbul. The Kurdish nationalists
explicitly perceived the Kemalists as the prime obstacles in the
way of Kurdish self-determination. Third, the Kurdish leaders were
aware of the great opportunities presented during this time period
and were keen to exploit these historical opportunities. Thus the
Greek army's offensive against the Ankara government was implicitly
welcomed by the Kurdish nationalists who urged the Kurdish people
not to take part alongside the Kemalist forces against the Greek
army. Such characteristics of the Kocgiri movement, however, were at
odds with the view of the considerable Sunni Kurdish population that
collaborated with the Kemalists.
Reasons behind the failure
The Kocgiri movement was important not only because it was the first
against the Kemalists, but also because of its timing. It occurred
from early 1920 to mid 1921, at a time when the Kemalists were engaged
against the Greek army in the west and Armenians in the east. It was
also a period in which the Great powers' policies were taking shape
in terms of the likely future of Middle East. Thus, the defeat of the
movement must be considered as a defeat not only of a local Kurdish
uprising but a general defeat of Kurdish nationalism. The Kemalists'
success against Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish forces without doubt
altered the Great Powers' policies in the region and forced them to
reconsider and reconstruct their post-war plans. This reconsideration
in turn caused the modification of the Sevres Treaty, which paved the
way for the Lausanne Agreement. It was this agreement that destroyed
the Kurdish nationalist aspiration for self-determination.
Having examined such a sensitive period, it is imperative to look
at some of the fundamental reasons behind the defeat of the Kocgiri
movement. N. Dersimi, in his account, mentions a number of crucial
reasons behind their failure. First, the movement lacked centrality
and coordination as a result of the liquidation of the Kurdistan Teali
Jamiyeti; second, there was a lack of foreign support for the Kurdish
cause; third, the tribal structure and the lack of a middle class
in Kurdish society foiled the attempt to create national unity and
coherence; fourth, some of the tribal leaders were easily co-opted
by the enemy; and fifth, religious and sectarian differences among
the Kurds thwarted national unity.
Dersimi's account, as Olson argued, was well-founded. Some of the
tribal leaders switched their allegiances right in the middle of
the war, Murad Pasha for example. Other tribal leaders allied with
the Kemalists and either remained indifferent or took their place
with the Kemalists against the Kurdish nationalists. As Bruinessen
noted, "In the years 1919-21, Mustafa Kemal's contacts with
Kurdish chieftains appeared to be better than those of the Kurdish
nationalist organizations." This indeed was "one of the ironies of
Kurdish history," as Olson acutely notes. "The Turkish nationalist
military and governmental challenge to the Istanbul government and to
the occupying forces began in areas that Kurdish nationalists claimed
as part of the homeland they wanted to establish. Instead, they aided
the Turkish nationalist forces, which prevented its realization."
Religious and sectarian differences certainly played their role in
the uprising. The Sunni participation in the movement was minimal as
most Sunni Kurds assumed it be an Alevi-only uprising. Sunni Kurds
were more attracted to the Kemalist call for Muslim unity against
the infidel and Armenia than the Alevi Kurds. The reason for the
attraction, as Olson argued, was that the Kurdish urban and rural
notables who possessed the Armenian land and properties could claim
legal rights from the Kemalists who were engaged against the Armenian
forces. Sunni Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide ironically
contributed to the defeat of Kurdish nationalism.
Olson added a few other reasons behind the failure, such as the
proximity of the region of the rebellion to areas largely populated by
Turks "meant that the Kurds were more amenable to Turkish authority and
more accessible to Turkish patronage." The overwhelming superiority of
Turkish military power and organization and the extensive patronage,
land, and resources at the command of the Ankara government was
another reason, according to Olson, contributing to the failure.
Apart from the abovementioned reasons, there were two interconnected
fundamental factors that also contributed to the Kurdish nationalists'
failure in Kocgiri. The first one was, as Dersimi briefly mentioned,
that the movement lacked central coordination and planning. This
was compounded by the second factor: the lack of a coherent national
political program.
The main Kurdish national organization and the leading Kurdish
nationalists, the KTJ, were in Istanbul rather than in Kurdistan. The
poor communication and transport system prevalent in the Empire
at the time contributed to the inefficient coordination between
the KTJ and the local leaders. Had the influential Kurdish leaders
established themselves in Kurdistan and centrally coordinated the local
Kurdish movements, they would have had a better chance of raising
a simultaneous nationwide movement against the Kemalists. The KTJ
certainly played a significant role in the Kocgiri-Dersim region as it
sent its members to the region for organizational purposes. However,
by the time Kurdish leaders such as Nuri Dersimi, AliÅ~_er, and others
managed to set up the KTJ branches throughout Kocgiri-Dersim region
and prepared the uprising as part of a general Kurdish movement,
the KTJ itself, due to internal conflicts and divisions, ceased to
be an effective organization. This forced the local leaders to take
the initiative into their own hands without clear contacts with the
rest of the country. The minimal Kurdish Sunni participation in the
Kocgiri movement was not solely due to religious sectarianism but also
due to this lack of centrality. The lack of creativity and vision
among the Kurdish leaders in Istanbul, despite the warning of Nuri
Dersimi, in smoothing the Alevi/Sunni contradiction in Kurdistan,
provided ample opportunities for the Kemalists to exploit religious
friction to their own advantage. Dersimi blamed the Kurdish leaders
in Istanbul for not paying attention to the Alevi-Sunni dichotomy
in Kurdistan. In a KTJ meeting in Istanbul, Dersimi urged that "we
[should] send, as soon as possible, a delegation to the Kurdish Alevi
areas in order to refute [the idea that] relations between the Sunni
and Alevi Kurds were cold. [I explained that] in the case of a Kurdish
uprising in the Alevi areas, the Sunni Kurds might remain quiet, and,
in the case of a national liberation movement in the Sunni areas,
the Alevi Kurds might behave in a similar way. The Turkish government
forces could profit from this situation."
Tribal social structure or lack of vision
This article suggests that the lack of centrality and central
coordination in Kurdish national movements cannot solely be
attributable to the tribal social structure. Certainly the tribal
social structure of Kurdistan played a significant role in the
formation and development of Kurdish nationalism. However, this is not
the whole picture. The lack of a coherent national political program
and lack of vision of Kurdish nationalists are two of the factors
that contributed to the fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism. This can
easily be seen in the Kocgiri movement. The confusion of the Kocgiri
leaders in terms of their political objectives is evident. Their
political objectives swayed between independence, autonomy, and a
Kurdish-administered Vilayet for certain Kurdish districts in the
Kocgiri-Dersim region. This confusion was not limited to the local
Kurdish leaders alone, but included the main Kurdish influential
leaders as well. They did not have a clear political vision in terms of
a future for Kurdistan. They naively believed that the Great Powers,
mainly Britain, would help them in establishing Kurdistan. The
Kurdish leading nationalists at the time did not perceive the
importance of mass movements and a cohesive organization. They did
not attempt to mobilize the Kurdish masses for a common strategy
and objective. Internal divisions within the KTJ, however, not only
paralyzed the organization and weakened the Kurdish nationalists in
Istanbul and Europe, but also, as Bozarslan argued, left the Kurdish
societies in the provinces without intellectual and moral input.
The fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism in Istanbul contributed
significantly to the decentralization and localization of the Kurdish
national movement in Kurdistan. The Kocgiri movement, thus, was
not only the first Kurdish national movement in the north but also
the first example of the fragmented, localized, and decentralized
characteristics of Kurdish nationalism throughout the 20th century.
---- i FO371/6346, E5242, from Sir H. Rumbold, High Commissioner,
Constantinople to Baghdad, repeated to Foreign Office, May 4, 1921
ii FO371/6346, E5713, from H. Rumbold, High Commissioner,
Constantinople, to Earl Curzon, May 18, 1921
iii It is not clear exactly when this memorandum was written
and distributed. However, it seems that it is possible to guess
the likelihood of its publication date given the content of the
memorandum and the actual national developments that had taken place
in Kocgiri. On 6 March 1921, the Kurdish forces attacked Umraniye and
raised the Kurdish flag. In the same month, the Greek army offensive
against the Kemalist forces in the west was intensified. It is highly
probable that the interim Kocgiri Kurdish government was established
in early March 1921.
--Boundary_(ID_BDG6fn+ZIB3vI5JyJBx4WA)--
From: Baghdasarian