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Guardian, UK
Dec 18 2004
Despite this deal, the road ahead remains rocky indeed
Turkey's bid for European membership is full of contradictions
Martin Woollacott
The European Union and Turkey took a fateful decision this week.
Unease, pride, anger and an element of guile are evident on each
side. The settlement which it brings over Cyprus - much as it is to
be desired - should not conceal from us the collisions between
different values, and between the aims of decision makers and the
instincts of their peoples, that lie ahead.
Nothing illustrated so well the disjunction between carefully
formulated common aspirations and the reality of divergent values
than the situation earlier this year. A final assessment of Turkey's
application was being undertaken at about the same time as the
European parliament was revolting against Jose Manuel Barroso's
choice of Rocco Buttiglione as justice commissioner. The objections
to Buttiglione were that he held traditional Catholic views on
homosexuality and the role of women. Can we imagine for a moment how
a majority of Turkish MEPs, had they been present, would have voted
on the issue?
The party from which most of them would have been drawn had just
withdrawn a proposal to criminalise adultery because it had
discovered to its surprise that the measure was offensive to the
union. Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, nevertheless made
it clear that Turkey had no intention of trading its social and
cultural values for EU membership. And why should he not do so, as a
conservative Muslim? Yet the same MEPs who were outraged by
Buttiglione's views have now voted for accession negotiations with
Turkey to begin. They are either oblivious to contradiction, or they
conceive of the negotiations as a project to transform Turkey into a
country happy to be in the close company of a Britain soon to abolish
the blasphemy laws, or a Spain moving to endorse gay marriage.
That may happen. After all, 30 years ago Spain, Italy, and Ireland,
to take just three examples, were societies that appeared to be
deeply religious, and they appear much less so today. But that does
not mean Turkey will go in the same direction, and it is not the
direction in which Erdogan and his Justice and Development party, the
AKP, wish to take their country.
When the AKP's predecessor, the Welfare party, came to power in 1996,
a party journal declared: "For almost a century, the foes of Islam
have governed Turkey. Now a new period begins." Erdogan clearly has
no intention of confronting the Kemalist division between religion
and the state, but a shift of power toward the religious and, in
particular, toward the religiously educated has been obvious in
Turkey for at least the past 10 years.
The irony is that the European political forces opposed to Turkey's
entry because it is Muslim are precisely those likely to be in broad
agreement with the conservative social views of Erdogan and his
party, and with their conviction of the centrality of religious
faith. Equally, the political forces in Europe most in favour of
Turkish entry are the left and liberal groups least likely to share
such views.
Surely there are grounds for trouble here. The stage is set for a
struggle in which Turkey, at least as long as the AKP is in charge,
tries to take from Europe what it wants in terms of economic and
security advantage, and tries to change what it deems essential as
little as possible - while Europe demands its pound of liberal flesh.
It is not only religious values that will be at issue, but deeply
established habits of Turkish nationalism, such as the denial that
anything happened to the Armenians worse than the general suffering
of all the peoples affected by the collapse of the Ottoman empire - a
position that must surely change before Turks can claim to have
purged themselves of past sins.
On the surface, there seems to be a sharp contrast between European
public opinion, in the main dubious about Turkish entry, and Turkish
public opinion, strongly in favour. But if you go deeper, the
asymmetry is not so obvious. It can be argued that Europe is a
curiously unifying factor in Turkey only because so many different,
competing and sometimes mutually hostile groups see it as a solution
to their problems, a way to move on the long game of modern Turkish
politics in their favour.
For ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, and religious minorities
such as Orthodox Christians, Europe could provide a guarantee of
secure minority status, even autonomy. For the business class, at
least the upper tier of it, the present arrangements with the union
have already brought benefits, and more are in prospect. For those
sections of the working class in western Turkey, which already have
strong European connections, full EU membership would make easier the
dual existence that is already a reality for their families.
For Turkish liberals Europe is a hedge against both religious
extremism and secular authoritarianism. For the armed forces, uneasy
about American policy in the Middle East, Europe may represent a way
of reducing its US links. And, very important, for Turkey's
decision-makers, who worry about population growth, unemployment and
what will happen to the rural masses, Europe is the only visible
answer.
For the Turkish political class, moreover, Europe was a policy that,
pursued in the right way, could bring permanent advantage to the
party that brought home the prize. Against the expectations of only a
few years ago, it is the Islamic party that seems closest to this
goal. Having for years opposed entry and talked about an Islamic
common market as an alternative, it shrewdly stole the European
clothes of the secular parties and presented itself to the electorate
as able both to maintain traditional and religious values and to reel
in what Europe had to offer. Its coup has, however, put it in an
exposed position, for it must now deliver this contradictory package.
It has also left the Turkish party system in a state of disarray,
which is not often noted in discussions of Turkish democracy.
There are Turks who feel strongly European, and there is a true
European sense in some classes in that country. But "If not Europe,
what?" calculations, and a prickly "We're as good as you" sentiment
also mark the Turkish approach. This latter feeling appears to have
ruled out the halfway house of a special relationship. Thus Turkey is
embracing Europe less in enthusiasm than with a mix of pride and
desperation, while Europe is embracing Turkey with reluctance and a
degree of fear. Not fear of Turkey, but of its own population,
because there is no getting away from the fact that this will be
another big thing the European elite has done that its peoples on the
whole do not want.
The ways in which, through lost referendums and other national votes,
this could damage the European project are clear enough. A rocky road
indeed.
Dec 18 2004
Despite this deal, the road ahead remains rocky indeed
Turkey's bid for European membership is full of contradictions
Martin Woollacott
The European Union and Turkey took a fateful decision this week.
Unease, pride, anger and an element of guile are evident on each
side. The settlement which it brings over Cyprus - much as it is to
be desired - should not conceal from us the collisions between
different values, and between the aims of decision makers and the
instincts of their peoples, that lie ahead.
Nothing illustrated so well the disjunction between carefully
formulated common aspirations and the reality of divergent values
than the situation earlier this year. A final assessment of Turkey's
application was being undertaken at about the same time as the
European parliament was revolting against Jose Manuel Barroso's
choice of Rocco Buttiglione as justice commissioner. The objections
to Buttiglione were that he held traditional Catholic views on
homosexuality and the role of women. Can we imagine for a moment how
a majority of Turkish MEPs, had they been present, would have voted
on the issue?
The party from which most of them would have been drawn had just
withdrawn a proposal to criminalise adultery because it had
discovered to its surprise that the measure was offensive to the
union. Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, nevertheless made
it clear that Turkey had no intention of trading its social and
cultural values for EU membership. And why should he not do so, as a
conservative Muslim? Yet the same MEPs who were outraged by
Buttiglione's views have now voted for accession negotiations with
Turkey to begin. They are either oblivious to contradiction, or they
conceive of the negotiations as a project to transform Turkey into a
country happy to be in the close company of a Britain soon to abolish
the blasphemy laws, or a Spain moving to endorse gay marriage.
That may happen. After all, 30 years ago Spain, Italy, and Ireland,
to take just three examples, were societies that appeared to be
deeply religious, and they appear much less so today. But that does
not mean Turkey will go in the same direction, and it is not the
direction in which Erdogan and his Justice and Development party, the
AKP, wish to take their country.
When the AKP's predecessor, the Welfare party, came to power in 1996,
a party journal declared: "For almost a century, the foes of Islam
have governed Turkey. Now a new period begins." Erdogan clearly has
no intention of confronting the Kemalist division between religion
and the state, but a shift of power toward the religious and, in
particular, toward the religiously educated has been obvious in
Turkey for at least the past 10 years.
The irony is that the European political forces opposed to Turkey's
entry because it is Muslim are precisely those likely to be in broad
agreement with the conservative social views of Erdogan and his
party, and with their conviction of the centrality of religious
faith. Equally, the political forces in Europe most in favour of
Turkish entry are the left and liberal groups least likely to share
such views.
Surely there are grounds for trouble here. The stage is set for a
struggle in which Turkey, at least as long as the AKP is in charge,
tries to take from Europe what it wants in terms of economic and
security advantage, and tries to change what it deems essential as
little as possible - while Europe demands its pound of liberal flesh.
It is not only religious values that will be at issue, but deeply
established habits of Turkish nationalism, such as the denial that
anything happened to the Armenians worse than the general suffering
of all the peoples affected by the collapse of the Ottoman empire - a
position that must surely change before Turks can claim to have
purged themselves of past sins.
On the surface, there seems to be a sharp contrast between European
public opinion, in the main dubious about Turkish entry, and Turkish
public opinion, strongly in favour. But if you go deeper, the
asymmetry is not so obvious. It can be argued that Europe is a
curiously unifying factor in Turkey only because so many different,
competing and sometimes mutually hostile groups see it as a solution
to their problems, a way to move on the long game of modern Turkish
politics in their favour.
For ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, and religious minorities
such as Orthodox Christians, Europe could provide a guarantee of
secure minority status, even autonomy. For the business class, at
least the upper tier of it, the present arrangements with the union
have already brought benefits, and more are in prospect. For those
sections of the working class in western Turkey, which already have
strong European connections, full EU membership would make easier the
dual existence that is already a reality for their families.
For Turkish liberals Europe is a hedge against both religious
extremism and secular authoritarianism. For the armed forces, uneasy
about American policy in the Middle East, Europe may represent a way
of reducing its US links. And, very important, for Turkey's
decision-makers, who worry about population growth, unemployment and
what will happen to the rural masses, Europe is the only visible
answer.
For the Turkish political class, moreover, Europe was a policy that,
pursued in the right way, could bring permanent advantage to the
party that brought home the prize. Against the expectations of only a
few years ago, it is the Islamic party that seems closest to this
goal. Having for years opposed entry and talked about an Islamic
common market as an alternative, it shrewdly stole the European
clothes of the secular parties and presented itself to the electorate
as able both to maintain traditional and religious values and to reel
in what Europe had to offer. Its coup has, however, put it in an
exposed position, for it must now deliver this contradictory package.
It has also left the Turkish party system in a state of disarray,
which is not often noted in discussions of Turkish democracy.
There are Turks who feel strongly European, and there is a true
European sense in some classes in that country. But "If not Europe,
what?" calculations, and a prickly "We're as good as you" sentiment
also mark the Turkish approach. This latter feeling appears to have
ruled out the halfway house of a special relationship. Thus Turkey is
embracing Europe less in enthusiasm than with a mix of pride and
desperation, while Europe is embracing Turkey with reluctance and a
degree of fear. Not fear of Turkey, but of its own population,
because there is no getting away from the fact that this will be
another big thing the European elite has done that its peoples on the
whole do not want.
The ways in which, through lost referendums and other national votes,
this could damage the European project are clear enough. A rocky road
indeed.