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Four post-war months

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  • Four post-war months

    WPS Agency, Russia
    DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
    December 31, 2008 Wednesday



    FOUR POST-WAR MONTHS

    by Ivan Sukhov

    RUSSIA'S POSITIONS IN THE CAUCASUS WEAKENED IN 2008; Positions of the
    Russian Federation in the Caucasus weakened in 2008.

    Russia began 2008 with quite enviable positions in the region. The
    early election of the president of Georgia on January 5 disappointed
    whatever experts had been predicting destabilization of Mikhail
    Saakashvili's government, but the statements made in both capitals
    right after the election allowed the hope for certain improvement of
    the bilateral relations rapidly approaching the freezing point. The
    task Russia was facing was ambitious but not in the least
    impossible. It was possible for Moscow to lift the transport blockade
    off Armenia.

    Armenia is traditionally regarded as Russia's number one ally in the
    southern part of the Caucasus. Neither Georgia salivating over what it
    perceives as a chance to integrate into the European and Atlantic
    community and licking the wounds made by conflicts in South Ossetia
    and Abkhazia nor Azerbaijan aspiring to a more independent role in the
    global framework of hydrocarbons production and export meet the
    requirements. Armenia's discord with Turkey and conflict with
    Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh all but boxed it in. Its two largest
    borders with neighbors are closed for the movement of individuals,
    shipments, and capitals.

    Resolved to support the Armenian political elite in the presidential
    election there on February 19, became concession manager of Armenian
    Railroads. Had Moscow agreed to discuss a gradual weakening of the
    border and customs regime on the Russian-Georgian border with
    Saakashvili following his reelection, Armenia Railroads would have
    been part of the Russian railroad framework by now.

    Transport corridors north to south would have "opened" Armenia and
    facilitated prosperity and stability in the southern part of the
    Caucasus. Recognition of Kosovo and Metohia by the Western community
    on February 17 (and election of the president of Russia on March 2
    that distracted the political establishment) disrupted this political
    solitaire.

    Medvedev's state visits t Baku in July and Yerevan in October and
    diplomatic activeness in general (the Meyendorf Declaration)
    notwithstanding, Russia's clout with the southern part of the Caucasus
    weakened.

    What Russia ended up with are two repressive regions that block
    transport arteries leading south. Their strategic value comes down to
    deployment of Russian troops totalling 7,600 men on the way of NATO's
    eastward expansion (not that the Alliance has made the decision to
    expand yet).

    Political cost of the escapade more difficult to live down. The former
    empire has done it once again and sent its army abroad for the first
    time since Afghanistan. Neither are indirect costs to be
    dismissed. All of the northern part of the Caucasus wonders why
    Abkhazia and South Ossetia are permitted to bend the rules (the
    territorial integrity principle, that is) but Chechnya and Ingushetia
    are denied this privilege.

    Unfortunately, Russia's positions in the Caucasus weakened in
    2008. They are no more precarious than they were when the year was
    beginning.

    Source: Vremya Novostei, December 29, 2008, p. 3
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