Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

In Aftermath of Georgia War, a More Stable Caucasus

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • In Aftermath of Georgia War, a More Stable Caucasus

    World Politics Review
    Jan 6 2009


    In Aftermath of Georgia War, a More Stable Caucasus

    Emil Sanamyan | 06 Jan 2009
    World Politics Review



    For most observers, the brief war between Russia and Georgia last
    August only underscored the instability of the Caucasus region and the
    dangerous potential energy stored in its so-called frozen
    conflicts. Remarkably, though, the war's immediate impact has actually
    led to a relatively more stable regional status quo.

    Dangerous Build-up

    The wars of the early 1990s, in which newly independent Georgia and
    Azerbaijan lost control of their Soviet-era ethnic minority regions,
    became formative experiences for the two young nation-states. In both
    countries, the popular nationalist narrative continues to promote the
    "return" of the breakaway territories as a sine qua non of their
    existence.

    The republics' post-Soviet economic recovery -- fueled in part by
    Western-sponsored Azerbaijani energy production exported via Georgian
    transit routes -- left them more confident about their ability to
    revise the status quo in their favor. The subsequent political
    transition in 2003, in which both countries replaced their Soviet-era
    leaders, reinforced the conviction.

    In Georgia, the "revolutionary" government of Mikhail Saakashvili
    unseated the stability government of Eduard Shevardnadze. Saakashvili
    moved to upgrade the Georgian military, raising its annual budget --
    to $1 billion in 2007 -- and, with it, the pressure on both South
    Ossetia and Abkhazia.

    In Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev succeeded his dead father, Heydar Aliyev,
    as president in the best traditions of Middle Eastern politics. But
    even in the absence of a popular "color revolution," growing oil
    revenues have led to a more hard-line approach with regard to the
    Armenian-supported separatist province of Nagorno-Karabakh. As in
    Georgia, the military budget grew -- to close to $2 billion -- and for
    the past several years, hardly a week has passed without an
    Azerbaijani official threatening a new war over the province.

    There have been several escalations in recent years in all three
    conflict areas, but things began to get increasingly out of hand in
    the first half of 2008.

    Georgia repeatedly sent its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to fly
    over Abkhazia, eliciting flyovers and attacks by the Russian air
    force. There were also bombing campaigns in Abkhazia and increased
    mortar attacks and assassination attempts in South Ossetia.

    In Karabakh, where -- unlike Ossetia or Abkhazia -- extensive trenches
    and minefields forming a de facto border separate the two opposing
    forces, the sides fought one of the deadliest skirmishes in
    years. Azerbaijani aircraft also began flying closer to the Line of
    Contact, apparently seeking to trigger an Armenian response.

    By summer, conditions were ripe for escalation, and the smell of war
    was in the air.

    What Changed in August

    When Georgia launched its attack on South Ossetia on Aug. 7, few could
    have imagined the rapidity and intensity of the Russian response.

    Speaking on the night of the attack, Assistant Secretary of State Dan
    Fried said there was "no evidence" of Russian involvement, and that he
    expected Russia to help "restrain" the Ossetian side.

    In Azerbaijan, a spokesman for the foreign ministry welcomed the
    Georgian operation, saying that it could chart a new course for
    "resolving" the Karabakh conflict as well. But once Russia responded
    to the Georgian operation with massive force, Azerbaijani officials
    and pundits became unusually silent.

    In the West, the response was one of surprise and anger.

    "This decision to invade Georgia was . . . simply stupid," the State
    Department's Caucasus manager, Matt Bryza, told RFE/RL-Georgia a week
    after the war.

    Nevertheless, this "stupid" war helped restore Russia's image as the
    sole hegemon in the Caucasus.

    In the past, Azerbaijan may have hoped for a "controlled" escalation
    in Karabakh as a form of political pressure against Armenia. But
    following the war in Georgia, the potential consequences of such an
    escalation, if exploited by Moscow, became rather apparent.

    Days after returning from the Beijing Olympics, Azerbaijan's Aliyev
    traveled to Moscow, where he assured Russian leaders of his
    determination to resolve all conflicts by peaceful means. Soon after
    that, he sat down with the presidents of Russia and Armenia to sign a
    declaration pledging a political settlement to the Karabakh conflict.

    On a visit to Armenia this fall, the State Department's Fried conceded
    to RFE/RL-Armenia that the "danger [of war in Karabakh] has somewhat
    receded because [of] the war in Georgia."

    The New Status Quo

    "Saakashvili should get a Nobel peace prize for bringing Armenia and
    Azerbaijan together," Georgian publisher Malkhaz Gulashvili wrote
    recently, with no small amount of sarcasm.

    But the Georgian president is unlikely to be so honored, either abroad
    or in his own country. His gamble humiliated Georgia militarily and
    resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians. With
    the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia now formally recognized
    by Russia, Georgia is left building new de facto borders around its
    two former provinces.

    While that makes another war much less likely in the foreseeable
    future, there are less fortunate consequences of the new status quo as
    well. In the words of the Georgian president, "[T]he reputation that
    America has gained since the Cold War [has gone] to hell." As have
    efforts to build democratic systems, to a certain degree, leaving
    countries in the region more likely to favor the seemingly more
    effective -- and obviously more authoritarian -- Russian political
    model. Unless, that is, the United States or Europe offers new
    credible alternatives.

    Emil Sanamyan is Washington editor and bureau chief for the Armenian
    Reporter.

    Image: Map of the Caucasus (Wikimedia Commons image, licensed under
    the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2).

    http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article. aspx?id=3121
Working...
X