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PINR - The Power and Interest News Report
Dec 28 2004
''Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: 1991-2004''
Over the last decade and a half, an unprecedented initiative has
taken place in the Former Soviet Union (F.S.U.). In all 15 republics
that made up the U.S.S.R., the introduction of Western-style liberal
democracy and its principles became the dominant political modus
operandi since 1991. Today, it is useful to assess the initial
results of this important development, and draw conclusions in order
to gauge the significance of such a profound change. The overall
outcome of democracy's introduction has been very mixed, and although
a few success stories exist, the rest of the process has quickly
fallen prey to old habits that refuse to part with the past.
Democracy as a Political Tool
The introduction of democracy to the F.S.U. itself has taken place in
an unprecedented environment of unipolarity, with the dominant
Western democratic United States as the most powerful state in the
world -- politically, economically and militarily. Never before in
known history has there been a single state that could wield such an
incredible amount of power, nor has there ever been a state that was
so secure geopolitically in its preeminent place among the world's
nations. Even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a
limited dampening effect on the United States, as its economy and
society rebounded within a year after the strikes.
U.S. actions since 1991 can be characterized as the logical course of
action in a unipolar world, moving from a mix of unilateral and
multilateral approaches towards a more unilateral stance on issues
that involved the safety and security of the country. While the
United States could consider itself safer in a new unipolar world
than ever before, it still required the absence of potentially
threatening political/military entities. Ensuring that states shared
Western norms and values became one of the main U.S. policies in the
post-1991 world. The spread of democracy in the newly independent
states of the F.S.U. was a key way to counter any potential
neo-Soviet entity from emerging and challenging America. The key
belief underlying the policy that promotes democracy is the notion
that liberal democratic states do not threaten each other the way
pairs of non-liberal states do. Historically, since the early 19th
century, democratic states enjoyed pacific, fruitful and secure
relations.
This has certainly been the case between the United States and its
European and Asian allies during the Cold War. The demise of the
Soviet Union presented Washington with an unprecedented opportunity
-- to introduce the concept of democracy and a market economy to its
former enemy. Such a policy worked once before, when the United
States fostered and built Western liberal democracies in defeated
Germany and Japan after WWII. At present these nations are U.S.
allies and trade partners, though they can still disagree on certain
political and economic issues.
In 1991, U.S. policymakers considered an option that if all 15 states
of the F.S.U. were to become democratic, then the only possible
threat they could present to the United States would be in economic
terms, and not military/ideological ones. If democracy were to take
root in these countries, then the U.S. position around the world
would be further solidified as the leader of the market-oriented,
pacific liberal democracy.
In hindsight, such a concept made political and economic sense.
Soviet people, starved for political freedom, eagerly embraced
democratic values in the first years after the fall of the U.S.S.R.
The majority of the population had vague concepts of how democracy
should really work, but there was hope that once the democratic
"flood gates" would open, the ensuing flow of political freedoms
would usher in a new order of the day.
What did not happen from the start, and what is only now slowly
becoming apparent, is that civil society in the F.S.U. lacked proper
education on even basic democratic principles. Newly found political
freedom roughly translated into free elections for the majority of
the people, but they knew next to nothing about other principles that
are so crucial to a vibrant, working democracy. The importance of
properly prepared civil society was demonstrated repeatedly in U.S.
and U.N. efforts at establishing the rule of law in post conflict
societies around the world after 1991. In countries as diverse as
East Timor and Bosnia, properly prepared civil society was the
keystone that determined the success or failure of a given
international mission. Its importance was crucial to the F.S.U. as
well, but there, democracy became a process that was largely
instituted from the top-down, with the masses sidelined in crucial
decision-making or policy-setting agendas.
Almost all of the former Soviet states had a long and rich history of
autocratic executive rule. The notion of parliamentary-style
democracy, with checks and balances on the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government, was a totally foreign and unfamiliar
concept. While many Soviet people for decades secretly wished for
their authoritarian Communist government to either fall or change,
most had no idea what would be able to effectively replace it. The
ephemeral concept of free elections, proportionate representation and
a leadership responsible to the people was just that -- a desired
notion with no real grounding in the immediate post-Soviet reality.
Soviet people were used to the mass showcasing of their collective
desires, as millions would take to the streets in
government-organized demonstrations during Soviet rule. Many tapped
into that "training" during the democratic protests in 1991 and 1993,
when reactionary political challenges threatened the slowly emerging
democratic societies. Yet, one of the key concepts of Western
democracy was not properly introduced -- that of the elected
leadership's responsibility to its electorate. Used to trusting and
relying on non-elected Communist officials for decades, millions of
former Soviet people carried this "trust" with them into the new and
unknown post-1991 era. Thus, the F.S.U.-style mix of new
"democracies" that emerged on the international arena are as
different from each other as they are from the Western world.
Present Political Picture
Three of the most Western-leaning states in the F.S.U. were the
fastest to shed their Soviet "skin" to launch the process of
democratic reorganization. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania spent the
least amount of time in the U.S.S.R., as the three states were
absorbed by Moscow only in 1940. While five decades of Soviet rule
had a tremendous effect, these Baltic states were part and parcel of
Northern Europe, itself a democratic area for a long time.
Even during Soviet rule, these three states stood apart from the rest
of the republics socially, economically and historically. And while
numerous post-Soviet problems still remain to be solved, these states
have been more successful at becoming Westernized. Their refusal to
associate with the past is exemplified by their desire not to be part
of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose political
affiliation of the former Soviet republics with Russia at its center.
Consequently, countries with culturally engrained importance of
authority had the most difficult time making the transition to fully
functioning Western-style democracy. Central Asian republics
exemplify this trend -- only one out of the five states has elected a
new head of state after 1991. Three of them -- Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- are headed by the men who were in
charge of these republics in Soviet times. Having changed their
titles from the first secretary of the communist party to prime
minister/president was largely the extent of democracy in these
states.
Tajikistan experienced a vicious civil war from 1992-1996, and Russia
is effectively keeping the country together with economic and
military influence. Only Kyrgyzstan has experienced a relatively fair
and peaceful transition to democratic rule. The power of the
executive in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is
disproportionately stronger vis-à-vis real or perceived opposition.
There, ruling communist parties and functionaries, in charge of the
state's economy and finances, quickly reorganized themselves,
assuming new titles draped in nationalistic flags. "New" political
entities appeared virtually overnight. Yet, whatever civil groups and
political opposition that slowly developed in the last decade of
Soviet rule quickly found itself sidelined and incapacitated,
existing as a showcase of a "multi-party" political system.
Historically, autocratic rulers have governed the lands of Central
Asia. Tribal and clan connections still play a significant role in
the political, social and economic interactions amongst the
populations, but are now effectively utilized to maintain the ruling
elite in power, not to successfully mobilize any significant
opposition. Turkmenistan stands apart even amongst other Central
Asian republics in the degree to which the executive has a dominant
role in the country. Its leader has cultivated a Stalin-like cult of
personality, wiping out any hint of opposition to his autocratic
rule. According to Turkmenistan's leadership, the people are not yet
ready for real democratic reforms, and will be potentially granted
that opportunity in the yet-to-be-determined future.
While neighboring countries point to the near-extreme situation in
Turkmenistan, no real opposition can successfully challenge the
executive in those states either. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the
executive branch has overwhelming power that maintains a nominal
existence of opposition that is capable of mounting only limited
political challenges.
Belarus is closer on the authoritarian scale to Turkmenistan than any
other post-Soviet state. Its leader retains a firm hold on the
political, social and economic life of the country. Just recently,
Belorussians "freely" voted the government of President Alexander
Lukashenka in for the third consecutive term. Much can be said about
a country where the security apparatus is still called the K.G.B., as
it was during the Soviet days, and where opposition is silenced
through physical intimidation.
While Lukashenka himself was elected to office democratically in the
first years of post-1991 political freedoms, he has since done
everything possible to not allow real democratic reforms and
principles to take root. While the people can hold small-scale
protests against the government, they can do little else against a
strong security apparatus with carte blanche from the capital. A
similar situation exists in Armenia, where a democratically elected
executive allows for opposition to exercise its rights, yet retains a
firm hold on the country's political, economic and military
decision-making. While Armenia does have a capable civil society, it
is many years away from achieving its full potential that would be
able to effectively mount a challenge to the wide-reaching
presidential powers.
Azerbaijan and Moldova have also experienced a limited amount of
democratic freedoms, but there the changes have been handed from the
top down, and no capable challenge can be mounted to the executive
powers. In Azerbaijan, power recently passed from Aliyev-senior, in
charge of the republic in Soviet times, to his son, Aliyev-younger,
in one of the few such power transfers around the world. This type of
regime change can hardly be characterized as democratic, and yet
Azerbaijan is considered a multi-party democracy.
Profits from oil sales strengthen Aliyev's hold on power, a situation
not likely to be challenged in the near future. Azeri opposition is
also kept in check, even as it tries to vocalize its discontent for
the ruling elite. Moldova remains split between the secessionist,
Russian-speaking, authoritarian Trans-Dniester region and the rest of
the country. Democracy did not usher in a peaceful post-Soviet
transition -- in fact, a secessionist civil war started as soon as
the country became independent from the Soviet Union and embarked on
the process of Westernization. While there are attempts to finally
unify the country, the process has stalled time and time again due to
mistrust that both sides -- especially non-Western Trans-Dniester --
feel for each other.
Future Trendsetters?
The progress of democratic reforms in the last three post-Soviet
states merits much closer attention, as these states are now setting
the trend for the possible future course of post-Soviet democracy. In
Russia, vibrant civil society exists, born in the Soviet times of
political repression and reared in the last fifteen years of
non-Communist rule. Numerous citizens' groups and political parties
make themselves heard on a daily basis on a variety of issues. Some
civil society groups have even thrown a gauntlet to the government,
openly defying the military draft that sent soldiers into the
prolonged and bloody Chechen conflict. Yet, currently, even such
valiant efforts fall short of effecting real political change.
Democratic reforms in the Russian Federation have gone to great
lengths to strengthen the executive, first as a post-1991 safety
alternative against resurgent communist and nationalist trends, then
as the only viable option capable of holding the country together.
Once-vibrant political opposition in Russia has seen its real power
diminish over the last seven years. Pro-executive political parties
now enjoy overwhelming support, with Russia becoming a one-party
state where President Vladimir Putin controls the media, as well as
economic, military and political processes. On the surface, Russia is
perhaps the only state where political processes resemble those of
Western Europe or the United States. In reality, Putin's political
party enjoys the preponderance of power that is unlikely to be
effectively challenged in the near future.
At present, there are only two post-Soviet states where real
democracy has a chance of limited success. At the end of 2003, the
people of Georgia gave their government a strong vote of no
confidence after a decade of corruption, crime, civil wars and
declining living standards. Following mass non-violent protests, they
peacefully forced the executive out of office in what came to be
known as the "Rose Revolution." The new, young, Western-oriented
leadership promised wide-ranging reforms aimed at reaching Georgia's
full economic, political and social potential.
Georgians exported their experience to Ukraine, where a repeat of
2003 is currently taking place, with the third round of presidential
elections most likely to usher in pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko as the
new leader of the country. In Ukraine, people went out into the
streets to protest the bitterly divisive presidential elections that
were marred by massive voting irregularities in favor of the
incumbent leadership aiming for closer ties to Russia. Ukrainian
civil society showcased its persistence, with month-long protests
taking place in Ukraine's major cities.
As in Georgia, the democratic opposition was able to mobilize itself
to the extent not seen in the post-Soviet republics since the August
1991 hardliners' coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
While the third voting round will be able to bring the democratic
opposition to power, it will be faced with the gargantuan task of
unifying a country that was virtually split in half by somewhat
diverse visions of Ukraine's future in the F.S.U. and the world.
While Georgians and Ukrainians were capable of efficiently mobilizing
and channeling their opposition fervor, it is unlikely that similar
protests can be held in other former Soviet republics to remove the
entrenched executives from positions of power.
Conclusion
The concept of democracy was introduced into the F.S.U. with
extremely varying results. By 2004, some states became one-party
autocratic systems with only a semblance of opposition. Such states
have multi-party parliaments and revised constitutions, while the
real power rests with former communist apparatchiks. Other states
walk the thin line between a one-party state and potential
multi-party democratic systems.
Still, others have been able to make the transition and to
approximate Western-style democracy as much as possible. These select
few states experienced revolutions "from below," when the people rose
in popular revolt against corrupt governments, challenging the
"top-bottom" distribution of power and political freedom. All 15
post-Soviet states are official democracies. Thus, the U.S. goal of
democracy promotion in the F.S.U. can be considered successful, with
major caveats to that explanation.
While the U.S. was capable of steering certain democratic processes
to their rightful conclusions -- such as offering support for
opposition in Georgia, Ukraine and in 1991-1996 Russia -- the process
of democratization was left to its own, local devices in many other
newly independent states. American interests of the day dictated the
course of action, such as the need for Central Asian military bases
after 2001 or access to oil reserves, often moving the plight of
democracy to the political background. As a result, the uneven spread
of democracy in the F.S.U. created a collection of pacific states
vis-à-vis their policies towards the United States. Nominally or
fully democratic, they are in no position to challenge Washington
effectively. On the other hand, they all can be courted or considered
as allies, based on American foreign policy needs.
The last decade and a half brought momentous changes to large parts
of the globe. While many of these changes were positive, the U.S. has
not been successful in fostering and aiding civil society capable of
making educated and informed decisions in many former Soviet states.
Instead, it acquiesced to "democratic" changes handed from the top by
governments and executives associated with old and fallen regimes.
Thus, a new brand of post-Soviet democracy was created. It is yet
unclear how the future development of such democracy will unfold.
However, it would be prudent of the U.S. government to take the
lessons of post-Soviet political transitions into consideration as it
continues to promote political processes in diverse regions of the
Middle East and South Asia that are historically unprepared to bring
the concept of democracy to Western-style fruition.
Report Drafted By:
Yevgeny Bendersky
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around
the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and
interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This
report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the
written permission of [email protected]. All comments should be
directed to [email protected].
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=249&la nguage_id=1
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Dec 28 2004
''Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: 1991-2004''
Over the last decade and a half, an unprecedented initiative has
taken place in the Former Soviet Union (F.S.U.). In all 15 republics
that made up the U.S.S.R., the introduction of Western-style liberal
democracy and its principles became the dominant political modus
operandi since 1991. Today, it is useful to assess the initial
results of this important development, and draw conclusions in order
to gauge the significance of such a profound change. The overall
outcome of democracy's introduction has been very mixed, and although
a few success stories exist, the rest of the process has quickly
fallen prey to old habits that refuse to part with the past.
Democracy as a Political Tool
The introduction of democracy to the F.S.U. itself has taken place in
an unprecedented environment of unipolarity, with the dominant
Western democratic United States as the most powerful state in the
world -- politically, economically and militarily. Never before in
known history has there been a single state that could wield such an
incredible amount of power, nor has there ever been a state that was
so secure geopolitically in its preeminent place among the world's
nations. Even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a
limited dampening effect on the United States, as its economy and
society rebounded within a year after the strikes.
U.S. actions since 1991 can be characterized as the logical course of
action in a unipolar world, moving from a mix of unilateral and
multilateral approaches towards a more unilateral stance on issues
that involved the safety and security of the country. While the
United States could consider itself safer in a new unipolar world
than ever before, it still required the absence of potentially
threatening political/military entities. Ensuring that states shared
Western norms and values became one of the main U.S. policies in the
post-1991 world. The spread of democracy in the newly independent
states of the F.S.U. was a key way to counter any potential
neo-Soviet entity from emerging and challenging America. The key
belief underlying the policy that promotes democracy is the notion
that liberal democratic states do not threaten each other the way
pairs of non-liberal states do. Historically, since the early 19th
century, democratic states enjoyed pacific, fruitful and secure
relations.
This has certainly been the case between the United States and its
European and Asian allies during the Cold War. The demise of the
Soviet Union presented Washington with an unprecedented opportunity
-- to introduce the concept of democracy and a market economy to its
former enemy. Such a policy worked once before, when the United
States fostered and built Western liberal democracies in defeated
Germany and Japan after WWII. At present these nations are U.S.
allies and trade partners, though they can still disagree on certain
political and economic issues.
In 1991, U.S. policymakers considered an option that if all 15 states
of the F.S.U. were to become democratic, then the only possible
threat they could present to the United States would be in economic
terms, and not military/ideological ones. If democracy were to take
root in these countries, then the U.S. position around the world
would be further solidified as the leader of the market-oriented,
pacific liberal democracy.
In hindsight, such a concept made political and economic sense.
Soviet people, starved for political freedom, eagerly embraced
democratic values in the first years after the fall of the U.S.S.R.
The majority of the population had vague concepts of how democracy
should really work, but there was hope that once the democratic
"flood gates" would open, the ensuing flow of political freedoms
would usher in a new order of the day.
What did not happen from the start, and what is only now slowly
becoming apparent, is that civil society in the F.S.U. lacked proper
education on even basic democratic principles. Newly found political
freedom roughly translated into free elections for the majority of
the people, but they knew next to nothing about other principles that
are so crucial to a vibrant, working democracy. The importance of
properly prepared civil society was demonstrated repeatedly in U.S.
and U.N. efforts at establishing the rule of law in post conflict
societies around the world after 1991. In countries as diverse as
East Timor and Bosnia, properly prepared civil society was the
keystone that determined the success or failure of a given
international mission. Its importance was crucial to the F.S.U. as
well, but there, democracy became a process that was largely
instituted from the top-down, with the masses sidelined in crucial
decision-making or policy-setting agendas.
Almost all of the former Soviet states had a long and rich history of
autocratic executive rule. The notion of parliamentary-style
democracy, with checks and balances on the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government, was a totally foreign and unfamiliar
concept. While many Soviet people for decades secretly wished for
their authoritarian Communist government to either fall or change,
most had no idea what would be able to effectively replace it. The
ephemeral concept of free elections, proportionate representation and
a leadership responsible to the people was just that -- a desired
notion with no real grounding in the immediate post-Soviet reality.
Soviet people were used to the mass showcasing of their collective
desires, as millions would take to the streets in
government-organized demonstrations during Soviet rule. Many tapped
into that "training" during the democratic protests in 1991 and 1993,
when reactionary political challenges threatened the slowly emerging
democratic societies. Yet, one of the key concepts of Western
democracy was not properly introduced -- that of the elected
leadership's responsibility to its electorate. Used to trusting and
relying on non-elected Communist officials for decades, millions of
former Soviet people carried this "trust" with them into the new and
unknown post-1991 era. Thus, the F.S.U.-style mix of new
"democracies" that emerged on the international arena are as
different from each other as they are from the Western world.
Present Political Picture
Three of the most Western-leaning states in the F.S.U. were the
fastest to shed their Soviet "skin" to launch the process of
democratic reorganization. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania spent the
least amount of time in the U.S.S.R., as the three states were
absorbed by Moscow only in 1940. While five decades of Soviet rule
had a tremendous effect, these Baltic states were part and parcel of
Northern Europe, itself a democratic area for a long time.
Even during Soviet rule, these three states stood apart from the rest
of the republics socially, economically and historically. And while
numerous post-Soviet problems still remain to be solved, these states
have been more successful at becoming Westernized. Their refusal to
associate with the past is exemplified by their desire not to be part
of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose political
affiliation of the former Soviet republics with Russia at its center.
Consequently, countries with culturally engrained importance of
authority had the most difficult time making the transition to fully
functioning Western-style democracy. Central Asian republics
exemplify this trend -- only one out of the five states has elected a
new head of state after 1991. Three of them -- Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- are headed by the men who were in
charge of these republics in Soviet times. Having changed their
titles from the first secretary of the communist party to prime
minister/president was largely the extent of democracy in these
states.
Tajikistan experienced a vicious civil war from 1992-1996, and Russia
is effectively keeping the country together with economic and
military influence. Only Kyrgyzstan has experienced a relatively fair
and peaceful transition to democratic rule. The power of the
executive in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is
disproportionately stronger vis-à-vis real or perceived opposition.
There, ruling communist parties and functionaries, in charge of the
state's economy and finances, quickly reorganized themselves,
assuming new titles draped in nationalistic flags. "New" political
entities appeared virtually overnight. Yet, whatever civil groups and
political opposition that slowly developed in the last decade of
Soviet rule quickly found itself sidelined and incapacitated,
existing as a showcase of a "multi-party" political system.
Historically, autocratic rulers have governed the lands of Central
Asia. Tribal and clan connections still play a significant role in
the political, social and economic interactions amongst the
populations, but are now effectively utilized to maintain the ruling
elite in power, not to successfully mobilize any significant
opposition. Turkmenistan stands apart even amongst other Central
Asian republics in the degree to which the executive has a dominant
role in the country. Its leader has cultivated a Stalin-like cult of
personality, wiping out any hint of opposition to his autocratic
rule. According to Turkmenistan's leadership, the people are not yet
ready for real democratic reforms, and will be potentially granted
that opportunity in the yet-to-be-determined future.
While neighboring countries point to the near-extreme situation in
Turkmenistan, no real opposition can successfully challenge the
executive in those states either. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the
executive branch has overwhelming power that maintains a nominal
existence of opposition that is capable of mounting only limited
political challenges.
Belarus is closer on the authoritarian scale to Turkmenistan than any
other post-Soviet state. Its leader retains a firm hold on the
political, social and economic life of the country. Just recently,
Belorussians "freely" voted the government of President Alexander
Lukashenka in for the third consecutive term. Much can be said about
a country where the security apparatus is still called the K.G.B., as
it was during the Soviet days, and where opposition is silenced
through physical intimidation.
While Lukashenka himself was elected to office democratically in the
first years of post-1991 political freedoms, he has since done
everything possible to not allow real democratic reforms and
principles to take root. While the people can hold small-scale
protests against the government, they can do little else against a
strong security apparatus with carte blanche from the capital. A
similar situation exists in Armenia, where a democratically elected
executive allows for opposition to exercise its rights, yet retains a
firm hold on the country's political, economic and military
decision-making. While Armenia does have a capable civil society, it
is many years away from achieving its full potential that would be
able to effectively mount a challenge to the wide-reaching
presidential powers.
Azerbaijan and Moldova have also experienced a limited amount of
democratic freedoms, but there the changes have been handed from the
top down, and no capable challenge can be mounted to the executive
powers. In Azerbaijan, power recently passed from Aliyev-senior, in
charge of the republic in Soviet times, to his son, Aliyev-younger,
in one of the few such power transfers around the world. This type of
regime change can hardly be characterized as democratic, and yet
Azerbaijan is considered a multi-party democracy.
Profits from oil sales strengthen Aliyev's hold on power, a situation
not likely to be challenged in the near future. Azeri opposition is
also kept in check, even as it tries to vocalize its discontent for
the ruling elite. Moldova remains split between the secessionist,
Russian-speaking, authoritarian Trans-Dniester region and the rest of
the country. Democracy did not usher in a peaceful post-Soviet
transition -- in fact, a secessionist civil war started as soon as
the country became independent from the Soviet Union and embarked on
the process of Westernization. While there are attempts to finally
unify the country, the process has stalled time and time again due to
mistrust that both sides -- especially non-Western Trans-Dniester --
feel for each other.
Future Trendsetters?
The progress of democratic reforms in the last three post-Soviet
states merits much closer attention, as these states are now setting
the trend for the possible future course of post-Soviet democracy. In
Russia, vibrant civil society exists, born in the Soviet times of
political repression and reared in the last fifteen years of
non-Communist rule. Numerous citizens' groups and political parties
make themselves heard on a daily basis on a variety of issues. Some
civil society groups have even thrown a gauntlet to the government,
openly defying the military draft that sent soldiers into the
prolonged and bloody Chechen conflict. Yet, currently, even such
valiant efforts fall short of effecting real political change.
Democratic reforms in the Russian Federation have gone to great
lengths to strengthen the executive, first as a post-1991 safety
alternative against resurgent communist and nationalist trends, then
as the only viable option capable of holding the country together.
Once-vibrant political opposition in Russia has seen its real power
diminish over the last seven years. Pro-executive political parties
now enjoy overwhelming support, with Russia becoming a one-party
state where President Vladimir Putin controls the media, as well as
economic, military and political processes. On the surface, Russia is
perhaps the only state where political processes resemble those of
Western Europe or the United States. In reality, Putin's political
party enjoys the preponderance of power that is unlikely to be
effectively challenged in the near future.
At present, there are only two post-Soviet states where real
democracy has a chance of limited success. At the end of 2003, the
people of Georgia gave their government a strong vote of no
confidence after a decade of corruption, crime, civil wars and
declining living standards. Following mass non-violent protests, they
peacefully forced the executive out of office in what came to be
known as the "Rose Revolution." The new, young, Western-oriented
leadership promised wide-ranging reforms aimed at reaching Georgia's
full economic, political and social potential.
Georgians exported their experience to Ukraine, where a repeat of
2003 is currently taking place, with the third round of presidential
elections most likely to usher in pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko as the
new leader of the country. In Ukraine, people went out into the
streets to protest the bitterly divisive presidential elections that
were marred by massive voting irregularities in favor of the
incumbent leadership aiming for closer ties to Russia. Ukrainian
civil society showcased its persistence, with month-long protests
taking place in Ukraine's major cities.
As in Georgia, the democratic opposition was able to mobilize itself
to the extent not seen in the post-Soviet republics since the August
1991 hardliners' coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
While the third voting round will be able to bring the democratic
opposition to power, it will be faced with the gargantuan task of
unifying a country that was virtually split in half by somewhat
diverse visions of Ukraine's future in the F.S.U. and the world.
While Georgians and Ukrainians were capable of efficiently mobilizing
and channeling their opposition fervor, it is unlikely that similar
protests can be held in other former Soviet republics to remove the
entrenched executives from positions of power.
Conclusion
The concept of democracy was introduced into the F.S.U. with
extremely varying results. By 2004, some states became one-party
autocratic systems with only a semblance of opposition. Such states
have multi-party parliaments and revised constitutions, while the
real power rests with former communist apparatchiks. Other states
walk the thin line between a one-party state and potential
multi-party democratic systems.
Still, others have been able to make the transition and to
approximate Western-style democracy as much as possible. These select
few states experienced revolutions "from below," when the people rose
in popular revolt against corrupt governments, challenging the
"top-bottom" distribution of power and political freedom. All 15
post-Soviet states are official democracies. Thus, the U.S. goal of
democracy promotion in the F.S.U. can be considered successful, with
major caveats to that explanation.
While the U.S. was capable of steering certain democratic processes
to their rightful conclusions -- such as offering support for
opposition in Georgia, Ukraine and in 1991-1996 Russia -- the process
of democratization was left to its own, local devices in many other
newly independent states. American interests of the day dictated the
course of action, such as the need for Central Asian military bases
after 2001 or access to oil reserves, often moving the plight of
democracy to the political background. As a result, the uneven spread
of democracy in the F.S.U. created a collection of pacific states
vis-à-vis their policies towards the United States. Nominally or
fully democratic, they are in no position to challenge Washington
effectively. On the other hand, they all can be courted or considered
as allies, based on American foreign policy needs.
The last decade and a half brought momentous changes to large parts
of the globe. While many of these changes were positive, the U.S. has
not been successful in fostering and aiding civil society capable of
making educated and informed decisions in many former Soviet states.
Instead, it acquiesced to "democratic" changes handed from the top by
governments and executives associated with old and fallen regimes.
Thus, a new brand of post-Soviet democracy was created. It is yet
unclear how the future development of such democracy will unfold.
However, it would be prudent of the U.S. government to take the
lessons of post-Soviet political transitions into consideration as it
continues to promote political processes in diverse regions of the
Middle East and South Asia that are historically unprepared to bring
the concept of democracy to Western-style fruition.
Report Drafted By:
Yevgeny Bendersky
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around
the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and
interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This
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http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=249&la nguage_id=1
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress