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Transitions on Line, Czech Republic
Jan 3 2005
From Freeze to Deep Freeze
by Ara Tadevosyan
3 January 2005
A decade after a cease-fire was signed, the chances of peace between
Armenia and Azerbaijan are, if anything, becoming more remote.
Another year has passed and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh remains
frozen, with no war but also no peace, and with no economic ties
between Armenia and, on the other side, Azerbaijan or Turkey.
But this was not quite an ordinary year of suspended motion. May
marked the 10th anniversary of the cease-fire that ended the conflict
between the Azeris and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. More
importantly, for the first time, the Armenian government has not been
dealing with Heidar Aliev, but with his son, Ilham. Year nine of the
cease-fire - 2003--had been a write-off, with presidential and
parliamentary elections in Armenia and, in October, the presidential
elections in Azerbaijan that brought Ilham to power. Year 10 marked
the start of a new era.
Optimists believed that, once in the president's seat, Ilham Aliev
might quickly push for a resolution in order to stabilize the overall
level of security in the region as, in 2005, Azerbaijan is due to
start pumping oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey.
Pessimists pointed instead to the domestic challenges faced by a
young leader, arguing that any compromise would weaken his public
legitimacy and his position in ruling circles. International
mediators chose to set out an optimistic schedule of high-level
meetings. But the pessimists have proved right. The peace process has
in fact gone backward even according to members of the mediation
group, a collection of U.S., Russian, and French diplomats working
under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and known as the Minsk Group.
THE BREAKTHROUGH THAT WASN'T
In fact, the peace process has been going backward since 2001, when
the two countries appeared on the verge of a breakthrough. Heidar
Aliev, already ailing, appeared close to accepting the notion that
the de facto status of Nagorno-Karabakh - as an ethnic-Armenian region
with no ties to Azerbaijan--would become permanent. But then the
talks collapsed.
The Armenians partly blame Aliev Sr.'s ill health. He feared he might
not be well enough to implement the agreements, believes Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian. But they have also blamed Aliev's
son and successor, Ilham. In January, Oskanian claimed that Heidar
Aliev `believed he had the necessary moral right to settle the
conflict' but `Ilham Aliev realizes his own weakness.' What the talks
foundered on, in his view, was the unwillingness of Heidar Aliev's
close entourage, including Ilham, to compromise. In other words, in
Armenian eyes Ilham is guilty not just of being unwilling to use the
Key West talks as the basis for continued negotiations, but also of
preventing a landmark treaty at Key West.
Such assertions clearly did not help create an atmosphere conducive
to a breakthrough this year. Nor did Ilham Aliev's February
declaration, `I am not in favor of making compromises' or that of his
then-foreign minister, Vilayat Guliev, who said that Azerbaijan had
the right to begin negotiations `from scratch.'
Baku now insists that Armenia give back seven Azeri-populated
districts of Azerbaijan seized during the war before it will discuss
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. For its part, Armenia insists
that any withdrawal must be agreed on at the same time as a final
status for the region. Yerevan has also put in the foreground an
issue that had seemed to be settled: the role of Nagorno-Karabakh
leaders in talks. Over the years, the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh has
become a bilateral discussion between Yerevan and Baku. That approach
dates to 1998 when Robert Kocharian moved from his post as president
of Nagorno-Karabakh to the presidency of Armenia. But this year
Kocharian has cited the absence of Nagorno-Karabakh leaders as one of
two problems preventing a resolution. (The other is Azerbaijan's
alleged unwillingness to cooperate in reaching a settlement.)
The talks now seem to be moving in circles. Russia's former first
deputy foreign minister, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, has said, `All
possible variants of a settlement have already been on the agenda of
the negotiating process,' and, `Now the initial positions of the
sides in the Karabakh conflict differ much more than two to three
years ago.'
THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE STATUS QUO
Behind Aliev's declaration against compromise seems to be a belief
that the status quo suits the Armenians. Azerbaijan pins part of the
blame on the mediators. In May, Aliev accused the OSCE of `just
observing' talks. And in November, Azerbaijan went beyond the
framework of OSCE talks and put a motion before the United Nations to
condemn the `transfer of settlers' from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
`to artificially create a new demographic situation in those
territories.' France criticized the move as negative and Russia as
unhelpful.
Armenia had warned that a UN vote in favor of the Azeri motion would
spell the end of the latest phase of diplomatic efforts, a series of
meetings between the Armenian and Azeri foreign ministers known as
the `Prague process.' In the end, the UN General Assembly put off a
vote until an unspecified later date.
Armenia itself has had some critical words for the OSCE Minsk Group,
claiming that it had failed to react adequately to the `killing' of
the Key West agreement by Azerbaijan. But Kocharian has described the
Minsk Group as `the optimal format' for discussion, adding that `the
problem lies in the parties to the conflict and not in the
mediators' - which, judging by other comments he has made, means
Azerbaijan.
And, overall, Armenia seems satisfied both with the mediators'
efforts and the international environment. In some key relationships,
the year has been positive for Armenia. At one point, in January,
there appeared to be the possibility of a breakthrough in relations
with Turkey, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said
his government might reopen its border with Armenia if Yerevan
reciprocated "friendly initiatives' by Ankara. By April, the Azeris
and Turks were back to publicly declaring their unity on the Karabakh
issue. That followed a statement by Aliev in March that a settlement
would be `impossible' if Turkey were to reopen its border with
Armenia. Still, Turkey's initial statements cannot be wiped off the
record, and EU leaders commitment to start accession talks with
Turkey in October 2005 may put Ankara under increasing pressure to do
as the European Parliament has called for - to improve relations with
Armenia and end its blockade.
Most importantly, Armenia's key bilateral relationship, with Russia,
remained solid. Azerbaijan, perhaps partly because of its
disillusionment with the Minsk Group, took a number of steps that
amounted to a clear bid for greater favor from Russia. It allowed
Russia to build a radar station in the country (despite enacting a
law banning military bases in the country) and, unlike Georgia, it
has been standoffish in its military relationships with NATO and the
United States. In August, Baku called on Moscow to make a greater
effort on its own to broker a deal. But within a matter of days
Russian President Vladimir Putin met Kocharian for the sixth time in
12 months, and Armenian and Russian troops had held joint military
exercises.
(Russia has a pact with Armenia promising military support for
Armenia if it is attacked, it has a military base in Armenia, and it
patrols Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran. It also controls
almost all of Armenia's energy system.)
Azerbaijan enjoyed greater success with Iran, for the first time
winning Iran's support for its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. But, at the
same time, Armenia entered talks to build a pipeline to Iran.
To Armenian eyes, the international climate therefore seems
acceptable, possibly even working in its favor. Armenian negotiators
have little reason, therefore, to offer more compromises than they
did at Key West.
And it has few domestic reasons to push for change. Kocharian has
three and a half years left in his presidency, and, although the
governing coalition is in trouble, the opposition is weak, with no
leader like Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko or Georgia's Mikheil
Saakashvili and no clear vision of how to resolve the question of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Kocharian also faces little pressure from the
Armenian public. Armenians are not afraid of a new war, and, by and
large, they are happy with the status quo because as least the most
important issue is practically resolved: Armenians living in
Nagorno-Karabakh are free, feel reasonably secure, and are de facto
united with Armenia.
And the risks for Kocharian of being too bold were highlighted in
late 1997, when then-President Levon Ter-Petrossian accepted a
proposal under which Armenia would cede occupied territories outside
Nagorno-Karabakh and only then discuss the political status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The next year, he was forced out of office as a
direct consequence. Kocharian's lack of room for maneuver was made
clear in a June poll by the Armenian Center for National and
International Studies that showed that only 2.5 percent of the
population believes the Armenian authorities can resolve the issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Just 1 percent believes the captured territories
should be returned to Azerbaijan. Politically, Kocharian therefore
has nothing to gain and plenty to lose by making a major concession.
Meanwhile, the apparent failure of its overtures to Moscow and
Ankara's openness to think the previously unthinkable - to end the
blockade - show just how difficult it is for Azerbaijan to change the
status quo.
A RUBICON CROSSED?
The bottom line for Armenia is a position stated in private by
Armenian diplomats--that Key West was a Rubicon, even though no
treaty was signed. The preliminary understanding (as they put it) was
that Azerbaijan would cede sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia
would leave the occupied territories, and Azerbaijan might be granted
a secure corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakchichevan, an exclave of
Azeri territory within Armenia. Azerbaijan denies a framework deal
was agreed to, though the U.S. negotiator has said they were
`incredibly close' to one. But having received such an offer (as it
believes), Yerevan is now unlikely to discuss anything like `broad
autonomy' for Karabakh inside Azerbaijan - and Armenian diplomats
believe that is well-understood by the mediators.
Judging by their comments about Aliev Sr., diplomats in Yerevan are
waiting for Ilham Aliev to become politically strong enough to be
able to reach an agreement about Karabakh. Aliev himself seems to be
waiting for Azerbaijan to become stronger but for different ends. In
February, he said, "Justice is with us, and time will work for us,'
arguing that `assessing the countries [Armenia and Azerbaijan] in
terms of economic potential, you will see that we are in a better
position.' In July, Aliev promised that Azerbaijan "would liberate
its occupied territories at any cost"; oil may be what makes that
cost more affordable.
In the meantime, Ilham Aliev has begun to liken his policy to a cold
war with Armenia. In November, he said, `We are carrying on a cold
war successfully. Our propaganda activity in international
organizations has grown considerably. I am sure that this will allow
us to achieve what we want.'
Events of the past year, then, suggest that, after the failure of the
Key West talks, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are willing to wait a
long time for a resolution, each in the belief that time is on its
side. That is not a view shared by the U.S. co-chairman of the Minsk
Group, Steven Mann. Speaking in the autumn, he said, `We tell the two
governments: time is not on your side. It will be worse both for
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regional development is passing Armenia by.
Pipelines, roads, railways are being built, and Armenia is missing
the advantages it could get from economic integration with the whole
region. The country is paying a high cost for the army it has to
keep.'
That prompted Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian to say,
`Armenia cannot be frightened or troubled by statements that it is
standing apart from regional oil and gas and transportation projects.
Nagorno-Karabakh is priceless and is not a subject for bargaining.
That's why we do not accept the argument that, in defending its
interests, Armenia is missing an opportunity to take part in big
regional projects.'
For Azerbaijan, too, Nagorno-Karabakh remains priceless. So no break
in the ice of this frozen conflict seems likely soon.
Ara Tadevosyan is the director of the Armenian news agency Mediamax.
Jan 3 2005
From Freeze to Deep Freeze
by Ara Tadevosyan
3 January 2005
A decade after a cease-fire was signed, the chances of peace between
Armenia and Azerbaijan are, if anything, becoming more remote.
Another year has passed and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh remains
frozen, with no war but also no peace, and with no economic ties
between Armenia and, on the other side, Azerbaijan or Turkey.
But this was not quite an ordinary year of suspended motion. May
marked the 10th anniversary of the cease-fire that ended the conflict
between the Azeris and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. More
importantly, for the first time, the Armenian government has not been
dealing with Heidar Aliev, but with his son, Ilham. Year nine of the
cease-fire - 2003--had been a write-off, with presidential and
parliamentary elections in Armenia and, in October, the presidential
elections in Azerbaijan that brought Ilham to power. Year 10 marked
the start of a new era.
Optimists believed that, once in the president's seat, Ilham Aliev
might quickly push for a resolution in order to stabilize the overall
level of security in the region as, in 2005, Azerbaijan is due to
start pumping oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey.
Pessimists pointed instead to the domestic challenges faced by a
young leader, arguing that any compromise would weaken his public
legitimacy and his position in ruling circles. International
mediators chose to set out an optimistic schedule of high-level
meetings. But the pessimists have proved right. The peace process has
in fact gone backward even according to members of the mediation
group, a collection of U.S., Russian, and French diplomats working
under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and known as the Minsk Group.
THE BREAKTHROUGH THAT WASN'T
In fact, the peace process has been going backward since 2001, when
the two countries appeared on the verge of a breakthrough. Heidar
Aliev, already ailing, appeared close to accepting the notion that
the de facto status of Nagorno-Karabakh - as an ethnic-Armenian region
with no ties to Azerbaijan--would become permanent. But then the
talks collapsed.
The Armenians partly blame Aliev Sr.'s ill health. He feared he might
not be well enough to implement the agreements, believes Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian. But they have also blamed Aliev's
son and successor, Ilham. In January, Oskanian claimed that Heidar
Aliev `believed he had the necessary moral right to settle the
conflict' but `Ilham Aliev realizes his own weakness.' What the talks
foundered on, in his view, was the unwillingness of Heidar Aliev's
close entourage, including Ilham, to compromise. In other words, in
Armenian eyes Ilham is guilty not just of being unwilling to use the
Key West talks as the basis for continued negotiations, but also of
preventing a landmark treaty at Key West.
Such assertions clearly did not help create an atmosphere conducive
to a breakthrough this year. Nor did Ilham Aliev's February
declaration, `I am not in favor of making compromises' or that of his
then-foreign minister, Vilayat Guliev, who said that Azerbaijan had
the right to begin negotiations `from scratch.'
Baku now insists that Armenia give back seven Azeri-populated
districts of Azerbaijan seized during the war before it will discuss
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. For its part, Armenia insists
that any withdrawal must be agreed on at the same time as a final
status for the region. Yerevan has also put in the foreground an
issue that had seemed to be settled: the role of Nagorno-Karabakh
leaders in talks. Over the years, the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh has
become a bilateral discussion between Yerevan and Baku. That approach
dates to 1998 when Robert Kocharian moved from his post as president
of Nagorno-Karabakh to the presidency of Armenia. But this year
Kocharian has cited the absence of Nagorno-Karabakh leaders as one of
two problems preventing a resolution. (The other is Azerbaijan's
alleged unwillingness to cooperate in reaching a settlement.)
The talks now seem to be moving in circles. Russia's former first
deputy foreign minister, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, has said, `All
possible variants of a settlement have already been on the agenda of
the negotiating process,' and, `Now the initial positions of the
sides in the Karabakh conflict differ much more than two to three
years ago.'
THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE STATUS QUO
Behind Aliev's declaration against compromise seems to be a belief
that the status quo suits the Armenians. Azerbaijan pins part of the
blame on the mediators. In May, Aliev accused the OSCE of `just
observing' talks. And in November, Azerbaijan went beyond the
framework of OSCE talks and put a motion before the United Nations to
condemn the `transfer of settlers' from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
`to artificially create a new demographic situation in those
territories.' France criticized the move as negative and Russia as
unhelpful.
Armenia had warned that a UN vote in favor of the Azeri motion would
spell the end of the latest phase of diplomatic efforts, a series of
meetings between the Armenian and Azeri foreign ministers known as
the `Prague process.' In the end, the UN General Assembly put off a
vote until an unspecified later date.
Armenia itself has had some critical words for the OSCE Minsk Group,
claiming that it had failed to react adequately to the `killing' of
the Key West agreement by Azerbaijan. But Kocharian has described the
Minsk Group as `the optimal format' for discussion, adding that `the
problem lies in the parties to the conflict and not in the
mediators' - which, judging by other comments he has made, means
Azerbaijan.
And, overall, Armenia seems satisfied both with the mediators'
efforts and the international environment. In some key relationships,
the year has been positive for Armenia. At one point, in January,
there appeared to be the possibility of a breakthrough in relations
with Turkey, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said
his government might reopen its border with Armenia if Yerevan
reciprocated "friendly initiatives' by Ankara. By April, the Azeris
and Turks were back to publicly declaring their unity on the Karabakh
issue. That followed a statement by Aliev in March that a settlement
would be `impossible' if Turkey were to reopen its border with
Armenia. Still, Turkey's initial statements cannot be wiped off the
record, and EU leaders commitment to start accession talks with
Turkey in October 2005 may put Ankara under increasing pressure to do
as the European Parliament has called for - to improve relations with
Armenia and end its blockade.
Most importantly, Armenia's key bilateral relationship, with Russia,
remained solid. Azerbaijan, perhaps partly because of its
disillusionment with the Minsk Group, took a number of steps that
amounted to a clear bid for greater favor from Russia. It allowed
Russia to build a radar station in the country (despite enacting a
law banning military bases in the country) and, unlike Georgia, it
has been standoffish in its military relationships with NATO and the
United States. In August, Baku called on Moscow to make a greater
effort on its own to broker a deal. But within a matter of days
Russian President Vladimir Putin met Kocharian for the sixth time in
12 months, and Armenian and Russian troops had held joint military
exercises.
(Russia has a pact with Armenia promising military support for
Armenia if it is attacked, it has a military base in Armenia, and it
patrols Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran. It also controls
almost all of Armenia's energy system.)
Azerbaijan enjoyed greater success with Iran, for the first time
winning Iran's support for its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. But, at the
same time, Armenia entered talks to build a pipeline to Iran.
To Armenian eyes, the international climate therefore seems
acceptable, possibly even working in its favor. Armenian negotiators
have little reason, therefore, to offer more compromises than they
did at Key West.
And it has few domestic reasons to push for change. Kocharian has
three and a half years left in his presidency, and, although the
governing coalition is in trouble, the opposition is weak, with no
leader like Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko or Georgia's Mikheil
Saakashvili and no clear vision of how to resolve the question of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Kocharian also faces little pressure from the
Armenian public. Armenians are not afraid of a new war, and, by and
large, they are happy with the status quo because as least the most
important issue is practically resolved: Armenians living in
Nagorno-Karabakh are free, feel reasonably secure, and are de facto
united with Armenia.
And the risks for Kocharian of being too bold were highlighted in
late 1997, when then-President Levon Ter-Petrossian accepted a
proposal under which Armenia would cede occupied territories outside
Nagorno-Karabakh and only then discuss the political status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The next year, he was forced out of office as a
direct consequence. Kocharian's lack of room for maneuver was made
clear in a June poll by the Armenian Center for National and
International Studies that showed that only 2.5 percent of the
population believes the Armenian authorities can resolve the issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Just 1 percent believes the captured territories
should be returned to Azerbaijan. Politically, Kocharian therefore
has nothing to gain and plenty to lose by making a major concession.
Meanwhile, the apparent failure of its overtures to Moscow and
Ankara's openness to think the previously unthinkable - to end the
blockade - show just how difficult it is for Azerbaijan to change the
status quo.
A RUBICON CROSSED?
The bottom line for Armenia is a position stated in private by
Armenian diplomats--that Key West was a Rubicon, even though no
treaty was signed. The preliminary understanding (as they put it) was
that Azerbaijan would cede sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia
would leave the occupied territories, and Azerbaijan might be granted
a secure corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakchichevan, an exclave of
Azeri territory within Armenia. Azerbaijan denies a framework deal
was agreed to, though the U.S. negotiator has said they were
`incredibly close' to one. But having received such an offer (as it
believes), Yerevan is now unlikely to discuss anything like `broad
autonomy' for Karabakh inside Azerbaijan - and Armenian diplomats
believe that is well-understood by the mediators.
Judging by their comments about Aliev Sr., diplomats in Yerevan are
waiting for Ilham Aliev to become politically strong enough to be
able to reach an agreement about Karabakh. Aliev himself seems to be
waiting for Azerbaijan to become stronger but for different ends. In
February, he said, "Justice is with us, and time will work for us,'
arguing that `assessing the countries [Armenia and Azerbaijan] in
terms of economic potential, you will see that we are in a better
position.' In July, Aliev promised that Azerbaijan "would liberate
its occupied territories at any cost"; oil may be what makes that
cost more affordable.
In the meantime, Ilham Aliev has begun to liken his policy to a cold
war with Armenia. In November, he said, `We are carrying on a cold
war successfully. Our propaganda activity in international
organizations has grown considerably. I am sure that this will allow
us to achieve what we want.'
Events of the past year, then, suggest that, after the failure of the
Key West talks, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are willing to wait a
long time for a resolution, each in the belief that time is on its
side. That is not a view shared by the U.S. co-chairman of the Minsk
Group, Steven Mann. Speaking in the autumn, he said, `We tell the two
governments: time is not on your side. It will be worse both for
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regional development is passing Armenia by.
Pipelines, roads, railways are being built, and Armenia is missing
the advantages it could get from economic integration with the whole
region. The country is paying a high cost for the army it has to
keep.'
That prompted Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian to say,
`Armenia cannot be frightened or troubled by statements that it is
standing apart from regional oil and gas and transportation projects.
Nagorno-Karabakh is priceless and is not a subject for bargaining.
That's why we do not accept the argument that, in defending its
interests, Armenia is missing an opportunity to take part in big
regional projects.'
For Azerbaijan, too, Nagorno-Karabakh remains priceless. So no break
in the ice of this frozen conflict seems likely soon.
Ara Tadevosyan is the director of the Armenian news agency Mediamax.