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PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS OF THE ARMENIAN-TURKISH CONFLICT
(Interviews)
http://www.ararat-center.or g/?art=46&p=22&l=eng
Armen Ayvazyan, PhD
Director, "Ararat" Center for Strategic Research
Yerevan, Armenia
+(37410) 274-833
[email protected]
www.ararat-cent er.org
www.hayq.org
Some of the Responses
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives of
the general public, as well as state officials, politicians, public
figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti­ci­pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of Education of Turkey has been showing a
film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, in cluding students in elementary
grades. 600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
I have seen the DVD. It is extremely anti-Armenian. I believe the
move was a Turkish ultra-nationalist reaction to "overtures" being
planned by the AKA party towards Armenia.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this action?
To reinforce the false ethos laying at base of the Turkish
socialization process.
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
Continued fascist indoctrination of Turkish school children.
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
Either the Armenian government feels it is not worth expending any
effort in reacting to the continued anti-Armenian currents running
through Turkish society, or, they haven't thought about it well enough
to architect a response, or most likely both.
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
The Armenian government should have intelligence studies on the
Turkish socialization process. Based on those studies and knowing the
interests of the Armenian people, the government should have generated
a response exposing this false, anti-Armenian indoctrination of young
people. This response should have been made to international bodies
with the intelligent use of international press and human right
groups. This is a short answer to an endemic issue.=0 D
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and Azerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Clearly, Turkish policies have not changed regarding Karabakh in 15
plus years. Actually, they have not changed since WWI.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
They either do not feel it is worth the time and effort or are not
capable of articulating what should have been a clear foreign policy
principle, or again, both.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
End "talks" with the Turkish government coordinated with proper
diplomatic public relations. "Talks" can resume when Turkey changes
its policy.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
No, see 2.3.
Theme 3: The invitati on by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti­ci­pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Foolish and void of principles that are in the best interest of the
Armenian people. Even if the statement is actually political posturing,
it is ill conceived.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
Armenia would gain Turkish control over parts of its strategic
infrastructure. In making such a statement, the Armenian government
could have been sending signals to Russia that it has [perceived]
options other than a strict strategic relationship with Russia.
3.3. What national security problems are likely to arise if Turkey does
participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Clearly, Armenia would be at risk of Turkish blackmail. Further,
both Turkey and Russia would battle over influence in Armenia, with
Armenia not in control of a strategic element of its national survival.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20 days
after his first statement), change his position, stating that Turkey
is expected to particip ate only financially, through=2 0the sale of
some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
The Armenian government was most likely embarrassed when the original
position was exposed by thinking people.
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
No, never.
Respondent: DAVID DAVIDIAN System Architect / Technical Intelligence
Analyst Belmont, MA, USA
Present-Day Problems of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict (Interviews)
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives of
the general public, as well as state officials, politicians, public
figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of E ducation of Turkey has been showing
a film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, including students in elementary grades.
600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
This is the latest of a series of actions put into force in the
Turkish educational system. The AK party government as well as the
military-political elite of Turkey would like to counterbalance the
effects of the recent liberalization processes and external influences
on the upcoming generations of the populace.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this action?
It signals to all - Turks and external powers - that it will not stop
fighting the genocide issue and intends to deny any advantage to the
Armenian side in any negotiation in the long run.
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
It strengthens Turkey's hand internally and externally. It helps
address the somewhat muted defeatist mood in Turkey and among Turkey's
supporters in recent years. It also aims to make Armenian efforts in
this area much difficult, making it easier for Armenians to capitulate
in all areas.
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
Historically, successive Armenian governments have not been vocal about
Turkey's anti-Armenian policies20aimed at Armenia or at the Armenian
individual. They all seem be more pre-occupied with "navigating"
in the present than putting in efforts into future strategy.
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
They should raise the issue of Turkey's policies and its consequences
bilaterally with Turks as well as with third party powers.
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and Azerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Turkey's policies regarding the realization of Armenia's existence only
as an appandage of Turkey has stayed consistent for nine decades now.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
See 1.4 above.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
Armenia should tell Turkey that Armenia cannot accept=2 0Turkey as
a dealmaker and a party to the conflict at the same time and raise
the issue internationally.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
Armenia should reduce contacts with official Turkey until Turkey
genuinely re-evaluates its policies.
Theme 3: The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
This makes it difficult to bring forth the Turkish policies regarding
Armenia when needed as neither that offer nor Armenian complaints will
be taken seriously by anyone. On the other hand, imagine the free
publicity we would get if the Armenian government made this offer
with a necessary demand of complete reversal of Turkish policies
about Armenia.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
I cannot imagine anything to be gained by the Armenian public from a
Turkish participation. There is only one thing that Turkey can offer
to Armenia that other countries cannot offer: its re-evaluation of
its anti-Armenian policies .. And this is not forthcoming.
3.3. What nationa l security problems are likely to arise if Turkey
does participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant
in Armenia?
Strategic concerns about the power plant aside, Turkey will learn to
expect deals without making any concessions to Armenia.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20
days after his first statement), change his position, stating that
Turkey is expected to participate only financially, through the sale
of some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
That is not an important change of position.
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
Obviously, no.
RESPONDENT: HAGOP HACHIKIAN profession/position: information technology
place of residence: Watertown, MA, USA 3 /23/2009
Present-Day Problems of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict (Interviews)
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives of
the general public, as well as state officials, politicians, public
figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey20covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey s policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of Education of Turkey has been showing a
film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, including students in elementary
grades. 600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
This DVD was inserted in TIME magazine few years ago. Armenian
organizations obliged Time magazine to insert a counter documentary DVD
on the Armenian genocide with a bonus interview of Dr Ternon. Now the
Deep state in Turkey is striking back. Armenia, directly or indierctly,
must react.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this action?
The same thing decided in the 1930s with the establisment of Turk
Tarih Kurumu (TTK): falsify the history to back the theory of 'United
Turkish nation' initiated by Kemal.
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
Brain washing the new generations because the "Lie must go on".
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
They asked to a camel :" why your neck is not straight?". He answered:
"What a question ! What part of my body is straight ?"
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
Putting in place and financing an Armenia-Spyurk counter information
and communication center, as the Turkish state, even if it does not
have the same financial level.
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and Azerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Whether Islamist or nationalist, the foreign policy of Turkey toward
Armenia does not change an iota: waiting for the first occasion to
swallow Karabagh and then Armenia.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
I think, maybe I'm wrong, that authorities generally do not have an
autonomous voice on foreign policy in gener al and on this Karabagh
issue in particular.
As to political parties, what par ties? As to our European starndards,
there is no real "political" party yet in Armenia.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
At the minimum stating the fact that they can not have a double
language when Babacan talking to Nalbandian then Erdogan talking to
public on the same issue. In his late conference in Paris, March 10,
Nalbandian stated that they were on very good ground with Babacan
through more than 10 meetings in last months.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
Continue to speak: yes, if not there is no place to diplomacy. I do
not know what's the real definition of "rapprochement".
Theme 3: The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
I asked the question to Nalbandian at the Paris March 10th conference
underlinig the sensitivity of the subject due to security and
what Armenia was hoping to gain from a Turkish participation. H e
answered that the partners are, USA, France, Russia and Armenia. As
to Turkey,20it's one of the numerous partners wishing to participate
to this project. Their demand is at study as the others.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
Nothing but trouble.
3.3. What national security problems are likely to arise if Turkey does
participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Armenia?
I'm not a specialist of nuclear projects, but the simple logic asks
that you can not give, even a little part of control, to a state that
did not normalize its relations and seems like a threat up to date.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20
days after his first statement), change his position, stating that
Turkey is expected to participate only financially, through the sale
of some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies????
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
No.
Respondent: VAROUJAN SIRAPIAN Age: + 60 President of INSTITUT
TCHOBANIAN / Editor of Europe & Orient Paris, France 20/03/2009
Present-Day Problems of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict (Interviews)
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and=2 0 Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives
of the general public, as well a s state officials, politicians,
public figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of Education of Turkey has been showing a
film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, including students in elementary
grades. 600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
A sad, but typical and consistent, measure by the Turkish state to
perpetuate the Genocide of the Armenians of 1915. First, ethnically
cleanse the population, kill as many as possible, then Turkify the
orphans and built a modern state on the bones of the dead, and then
d eny. The last phase is to blame the victims.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this ac tion?
Prepare the next generation to continue internal hatred of Armenians,
possibly to justify continued aggression against Armenia (blockade,
acts of war etc).
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
Makes it more difficult to come to terms with the past and engender
any trust in Armenians. Adds insult to injury. Increases conflict
between the majority racist society and the minority (in danger of
becoming insignificant) of those who wish to face the facts and deal
truthfully with Turkish identity and past ghosts.
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
Armenia's government is weak and under pressure from the West. As
such it often caves in to Turkish pressure, overt or inferred.
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
Armenia's government probably risks less than perceived by taking
a more disciplined and vigilant stance. Turkey shouldn't be given
carte blanche to rewrite history, and this is not only Armenia's
responsibility to bring Turkey into the spotlight.
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and A zerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Turkey is a party to the conflict, and has no business posturing as
a third party.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
Unclear, and probably for different reasons. Additionally, see answer
to 1.4 above.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
See answer to 1.5 above. Call a spade a spade, and reject all efforts
by Turkey to "broker peace" in this conflict.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
No.
Theme 3: The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Incomprehensible. Some Armenians seem to h ave learned little from
their history.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
A growing Turkish headache.
3.3. What national security problems are likely to arise if Turkey does
participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Too many to enumerate. I cannot understand any upside to this position.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20
days after his first statement), change his position, stating that
Turkey is expected to participate only financially, through the sale
of some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
The change in position indicates confusion on the issue by the PM.
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
I am unfamiliar with the share-purchase terms, but despite any
degree of "open-to-the-public" parameters, I think that the Armenian
government should not be actively soliciting Turkish ownership of
national security institutions on Armenian soil.
Respondent: ARAM HAJIAN Age: 39 Professor place of residence: Yerevan
(Interviews)
http://www.ararat-center.or g/?art=46&p=22&l=eng
Armen Ayvazyan, PhD
Director, "Ararat" Center for Strategic Research
Yerevan, Armenia
+(37410) 274-833
[email protected]
www.ararat-cent er.org
www.hayq.org
Some of the Responses
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives of
the general public, as well as state officials, politicians, public
figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti­ci­pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of Education of Turkey has been showing a
film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, in cluding students in elementary
grades. 600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
I have seen the DVD. It is extremely anti-Armenian. I believe the
move was a Turkish ultra-nationalist reaction to "overtures" being
planned by the AKA party towards Armenia.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this action?
To reinforce the false ethos laying at base of the Turkish
socialization process.
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
Continued fascist indoctrination of Turkish school children.
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
Either the Armenian government feels it is not worth expending any
effort in reacting to the continued anti-Armenian currents running
through Turkish society, or, they haven't thought about it well enough
to architect a response, or most likely both.
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
The Armenian government should have intelligence studies on the
Turkish socialization process. Based on those studies and knowing the
interests of the Armenian people, the government should have generated
a response exposing this false, anti-Armenian indoctrination of young
people. This response should have been made to international bodies
with the intelligent use of international press and human right
groups. This is a short answer to an endemic issue.=0 D
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and Azerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Clearly, Turkish policies have not changed regarding Karabakh in 15
plus years. Actually, they have not changed since WWI.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
They either do not feel it is worth the time and effort or are not
capable of articulating what should have been a clear foreign policy
principle, or again, both.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
End "talks" with the Turkish government coordinated with proper
diplomatic public relations. "Talks" can resume when Turkey changes
its policy.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
No, see 2.3.
Theme 3: The invitati on by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti­ci­pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Foolish and void of principles that are in the best interest of the
Armenian people. Even if the statement is actually political posturing,
it is ill conceived.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
Armenia would gain Turkish control over parts of its strategic
infrastructure. In making such a statement, the Armenian government
could have been sending signals to Russia that it has [perceived]
options other than a strict strategic relationship with Russia.
3.3. What national security problems are likely to arise if Turkey does
participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Clearly, Armenia would be at risk of Turkish blackmail. Further,
both Turkey and Russia would battle over influence in Armenia, with
Armenia not in control of a strategic element of its national survival.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20 days
after his first statement), change his position, stating that Turkey
is expected to particip ate only financially, through=2 0the sale of
some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
The Armenian government was most likely embarrassed when the original
position was exposed by thinking people.
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
No, never.
Respondent: DAVID DAVIDIAN System Architect / Technical Intelligence
Analyst Belmont, MA, USA
Present-Day Problems of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict (Interviews)
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives of
the general public, as well as state officials, politicians, public
figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of E ducation of Turkey has been showing
a film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, including students in elementary grades.
600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
This is the latest of a series of actions put into force in the
Turkish educational system. The AK party government as well as the
military-political elite of Turkey would like to counterbalance the
effects of the recent liberalization processes and external influences
on the upcoming generations of the populace.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this action?
It signals to all - Turks and external powers - that it will not stop
fighting the genocide issue and intends to deny any advantage to the
Armenian side in any negotiation in the long run.
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
It strengthens Turkey's hand internally and externally. It helps
address the somewhat muted defeatist mood in Turkey and among Turkey's
supporters in recent years. It also aims to make Armenian efforts in
this area much difficult, making it easier for Armenians to capitulate
in all areas.
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
Historically, successive Armenian governments have not been vocal about
Turkey's anti-Armenian policies20aimed at Armenia or at the Armenian
individual. They all seem be more pre-occupied with "navigating"
in the present than putting in efforts into future strategy.
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
They should raise the issue of Turkey's policies and its consequences
bilaterally with Turks as well as with third party powers.
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and Azerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Turkey's policies regarding the realization of Armenia's existence only
as an appandage of Turkey has stayed consistent for nine decades now.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
See 1.4 above.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
Armenia should tell Turkey that Armenia cannot accept=2 0Turkey as
a dealmaker and a party to the conflict at the same time and raise
the issue internationally.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
Armenia should reduce contacts with official Turkey until Turkey
genuinely re-evaluates its policies.
Theme 3: The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
This makes it difficult to bring forth the Turkish policies regarding
Armenia when needed as neither that offer nor Armenian complaints will
be taken seriously by anyone. On the other hand, imagine the free
publicity we would get if the Armenian government made this offer
with a necessary demand of complete reversal of Turkish policies
about Armenia.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
I cannot imagine anything to be gained by the Armenian public from a
Turkish participation. There is only one thing that Turkey can offer
to Armenia that other countries cannot offer: its re-evaluation of
its anti-Armenian policies .. And this is not forthcoming.
3.3. What nationa l security problems are likely to arise if Turkey
does participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant
in Armenia?
Strategic concerns about the power plant aside, Turkey will learn to
expect deals without making any concessions to Armenia.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20
days after his first statement), change his position, stating that
Turkey is expected to participate only financially, through the sale
of some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
That is not an important change of position.
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
Obviously, no.
RESPONDENT: HAGOP HACHIKIAN profession/position: information technology
place of residence: Watertown, MA, USA 3 /23/2009
Present-Day Problems of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict (Interviews)
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives of
the general public, as well as state officials, politicians, public
figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey20covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey s policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of Education of Turkey has been showing a
film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, including students in elementary
grades. 600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
This DVD was inserted in TIME magazine few years ago. Armenian
organizations obliged Time magazine to insert a counter documentary DVD
on the Armenian genocide with a bonus interview of Dr Ternon. Now the
Deep state in Turkey is striking back. Armenia, directly or indierctly,
must react.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this action?
The same thing decided in the 1930s with the establisment of Turk
Tarih Kurumu (TTK): falsify the history to back the theory of 'United
Turkish nation' initiated by Kemal.
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
Brain washing the new generations because the "Lie must go on".
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
They asked to a camel :" why your neck is not straight?". He answered:
"What a question ! What part of my body is straight ?"
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
Putting in place and financing an Armenia-Spyurk counter information
and communication center, as the Turkish state, even if it does not
have the same financial level.
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and Azerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Whether Islamist or nationalist, the foreign policy of Turkey toward
Armenia does not change an iota: waiting for the first occasion to
swallow Karabagh and then Armenia.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
I think, maybe I'm wrong, that authorities generally do not have an
autonomous voice on foreign policy in gener al and on this Karabagh
issue in particular.
As to political parties, what par ties? As to our European starndards,
there is no real "political" party yet in Armenia.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
At the minimum stating the fact that they can not have a double
language when Babacan talking to Nalbandian then Erdogan talking to
public on the same issue. In his late conference in Paris, March 10,
Nalbandian stated that they were on very good ground with Babacan
through more than 10 meetings in last months.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
Continue to speak: yes, if not there is no place to diplomacy. I do
not know what's the real definition of "rapprochement".
Theme 3: The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
I asked the question to Nalbandian at the Paris March 10th conference
underlinig the sensitivity of the subject due to security and
what Armenia was hoping to gain from a Turkish participation. H e
answered that the partners are, USA, France, Russia and Armenia. As
to Turkey,20it's one of the numerous partners wishing to participate
to this project. Their demand is at study as the others.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
Nothing but trouble.
3.3. What national security problems are likely to arise if Turkey does
participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Armenia?
I'm not a specialist of nuclear projects, but the simple logic asks
that you can not give, even a little part of control, to a state that
did not normalize its relations and seems like a threat up to date.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20
days after his first statement), change his position, stating that
Turkey is expected to participate only financially, through the sale
of some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies????
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
No.
Respondent: VAROUJAN SIRAPIAN Age: + 60 President of INSTITUT
TCHOBANIAN / Editor of Europe & Orient Paris, France 20/03/2009
Present-Day Problems of the Armenian-Turkish Conflict (Interviews)
The Ararat Center for Strategic Research is running a series of
interviews about the latest interstate developments between Armenia
and=2 0 Turkey. The list of participants includes representatives
of the general public, as well a s state officials, politicians,
public figures and experts.
Anyone willing to participate in the survey can answer the questions at
the following address: [email protected]. In your response, please
indicate your name, age (optional), profession and place of residence.
The survey covers three themes, each based on a specific example:
1. Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue.
2. Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
3. The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to
Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia.
Theme 1: Turkey's policies on the Armenian Genocide issue Since
December 2007, the Ministry of Education of Turkey has been showing a
film in Turkish schools, which conveys that historically, Armenians
killed the Turkish people. The film has already been seen by about
12 million Turkish students, including students in elementary
grades. 600,000 copies of the film's DVD were distributed to Schools.
1.1. How do you assess this move by the government of Turkey?
A sad, but typical and consistent, measure by the Turkish state to
perpetuate the Genocide of the Armenians of 1915. First, ethnically
cleanse the population, kill as many as possible, then Turkify the
orphans and built a modern state on the bones of the dead, and then
d eny. The last phase is to blame the victims.
1.2. What objectives does Turkey pursue by this ac tion?
Prepare the next generation to continue internal hatred of Armenians,
possibly to justify continued aggression against Armenia (blockade,
acts of war etc).
1.3. What are the likely consequences of this action?
Makes it more difficult to come to terms with the past and engender
any trust in Armenians. Adds insult to injury. Increases conflict
between the majority racist society and the minority (in danger of
becoming insignificant) of those who wish to face the facts and deal
truthfully with Turkish identity and past ghosts.
1.4. Why is the government of Armenia staying silent about this
Turkish initiative?
Armenia's government is weak and under pressure from the West. As
such it often caves in to Turkish pressure, overt or inferred.
1.5. How should the Armenian authorities respond to this action?
Armenia's government probably risks less than perceived by taking
a more disciplined and vigilant stance. Turkey shouldn't be given
carte blanche to rewrite history, and this is not only Armenia's
responsibility to bring Turkey into the spotlight.
Theme 2: Turkey's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Officials in Armenia and Turkey talk about the development of
Armenian-Turkish relations. At the same time, on February 19, 2009,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: a) With regard to the
Karabakh conflict, the positions and policies of Turkey and Azerbaijan
are completely identical; b) Turkey and A zerbaijan have worked out
this policy and are implementing it jointly.
At the same time, Azerbaijan does not hide its goal to capture
Karabagh.
2.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this statement by Erdogan?
Turkey is a party to the conflict, and has no business posturing as
a third party.
2.2. Why have the authorities and the political parties of Armenia
not officially responded to this statement?
Unclear, and probably for different reasons. Additionally, see answer
to 1.4 above.
2.3. How should the government of Armenia have responded to Erdogan's
statement?
See answer to 1.5 above. Call a spade a spade, and reject all efforts
by Turkey to "broker peace" in this conflict.
2.4. After this statement by Erdogan, should the authorities of
Armenia continue the policy of rapprochement with Turkey?
No.
Theme 3: The invitation by the Government of the Republic of Armenia
to Turkey to parti¬ci¬pate in the construction of the new nuclear
power plant in Armenia
3.1. In the context of the questions discussed above, how do you
assess the February 21, 2009 statement by the Armenian Prime Minister,
effectively inviting Turkey to participate in the construction of
the new nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Incomprehensible. Some Armenians seem to h ave learned little from
their history.
3.2. What will Armenia gain from Turkey's participation in the Armenian
nuclear power plant construction?
A growing Turkish headache.
3.3. What national security problems are likely to arise if Turkey does
participate in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Armenia?
Too many to enumerate. I cannot understand any upside to this position.
3.4. Why did the Armenian Prime Minister, on the 12th of March (20
days after his first statement), change his position, stating that
Turkey is expected to participate only financially, through the sale
of some shares of the new nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
The change in position indicates confusion on the issue by the PM.
3.5. Do you support the idea of selling shares of the new Armenian
nuclear power plant to Turkish companies?
I am unfamiliar with the share-purchase terms, but despite any
degree of "open-to-the-public" parameters, I think that the Armenian
government should not be actively soliciting Turkish ownership of
national security institutions on Armenian soil.
Respondent: ARAM HAJIAN Age: 39 Professor place of residence: Yerevan