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  • Iran and Osama: Match Made In Hell

    Global Politician, NY
    Jan 13 2005

    Iran and Osama: Match Made In Hell

    1/16/2005

    By Ryan Mauro

    While the world remains fixated on the situation in Iraq, the Bush
    Administration seems equally concerned with Iran. As the world's most
    intense (in quantity and quality) sponsor of international terrorism,
    and a rogue state in search of weapons of mass destruction, including
    nuclear weapons, the specter of an alliance between Al-Qaeda
    terrorists and the fundamentalist Iran is indeed a scary one.
    Accusations by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President
    Bush show that this is indeed the case. This article will examine if
    the evidence has been stretched or even falsified.

    Iran in the past has been responsible for attacks on Americans.
    Beginning with the hostage crisis of 1979, through the 1980s Lebanon
    bombings that forced the withdrawal of American troops, and to the
    recent war in Afghanistan. As the primary sponsor of terrorist groups
    including the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades (terrorist wing of Fatah which
    is a branch of the PLO), The Popular Front for the Liberation of
    Palestine, The PFLP-General Command, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
    Jihad, Hezbollah, and a wide range of other anti-Israeli
    organizations, there is a realistic possibility of the forging of an
    alliance with Al-Qaeda. Beginning in the 1980s, Iran's openly
    proclaimed goal through sponsoring militants was to remove Western
    influence from the region so as to encircle Israel. The linkage the
    extremists see from the Jewish state of Israel to the United States
    is that the U.S. is `Big Satan', while Israel is `Little Satan',
    cooperating hand-in-hand on a campaign of genocide against Islam.

    Such thinking began with the Islamic revolution in 1979, after which
    the new Islamist government of Iran called for striking out upon its
    enemies as a religious duty. These callings would increase throughout
    the decade, particularly because the extremists saw victories in
    Lebanon, Somalia, and other places which resulted in the withdrawal
    of Israeli and/or American forces. Some analysts feel that do to the
    inability of the Western countries to see the `hidden hands' involved
    in major terrorist attacks, has encouraged state sponsors to continue
    using proxies for their war, as it covers their fingerprints.

    By the end of 1990, Iran and other state sponsors saw the world in a
    very simplistic manner, particularly in the Middle East. Any
    government in the world, whether it hold a Moslem majority or not,
    decided its fate by their relationship to the United States and the
    United Kingdom, even if that relationship was different than the
    relationship they had with Israel. Thus, any country assisting the US
    in any manner was thought to be a `puppet government' of the West
    used in its War on Islam. To this end, the Iranians, Sudanese,
    Iraqis, and other state sponsors felt the first step in fighting the
    West and moving towards the destruction of Israel was the promotion
    of radicalism so as to topple `infidel' governments in the region
    `serving' America, and terrorism was seen as a way to intimidate the
    West, a bargaining chip, a way to radicalize Moslems and inspire
    Moslems that through the power of jihad, they could prosper. The
    state-controlled media blamed their poverty and despair on the West,
    so as to draw a link between the `glory of jihad' and the pursuit of
    happiness. Manipulating religious teachings served as another tactic
    to magnify the campaign.

    The radical states had little fear of Western retaliation as they saw
    several encouraging signs:

    A. The United Nations leaving Saddam Hussein in power after the Gulf
    War
    B. The West forcing Israel into limiting retaliation against
    Palestinian militants
    C. The lack of retaliation for the 1980s episodes in Lebanon
    D. The failure of the Americans to rescue the hostages at the embassy
    in Tehran
    E. The withdrawal from Sudan
    F. The toleration of Yasser Arafat's militants while simultaneously
    pressuring Israel into giving concessions
    G. The growing impact of extremism on the Moslem youth and the
    growing anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism grew do to state
    propaganda, the lack of confidence in the West after these episodes,
    and American support for regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia which
    committed serious human rights violations, while going unpunished do
    to their cooperation with the American forces.
    H. A reoccurring belief that any major Israeli or American
    retaliation not seen as justified would arouse pan-Arabism and
    pan-Islamism, resulting in a unified Islamic or Arab world holding
    all the major oil deposits.

    As Islamic religious sects united against their common enemies
    beginning with the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and
    later Israel and the West, their theological differences were removed
    for the time being. Soon after the Gulf War, the dozens of branches
    of militants, the strongest being the `Afghans' (those who fought
    against the Soviets), formed a common front known as the Armed
    Islamic Movement, or the `International Legion of Islam'. Seeing
    confidence in this union, the sponsoring states of Sudan, Iran,
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, and to a lesser degree, Syria and Iraq, began
    cooperation with the legion as a form of proxy warfare. This is
    similar to what we are seeing today in Iraq, where the Saddam
    Fedayeen guerillas have united with the foreign terrorists.
    Seeking leaders, Osama Bin Laden rised to the top of this union do to
    his experience in Afghanistan, his financial power and his lengthy
    international connections. Inside the Armed Islamic Movement were
    still intact branches of militants, and Osama Bin Laden recruited
    only the best for his organization, Al-Qaeda, or `The Base'. Al-Qaeda
    then would cooperate with a closely fitting ring of similar
    organizations such as the Armed Islamic Group (rebels in Algeria) so
    as they would all form a network, with Al-Qaeda as the nexus.

    The network depended heavily upon state sponsors, so the network
    would be careful not to upset their state sponsors in order to keep
    the delicate alliance alive. The state sponsors initially began their
    own terrorist groups, as Iran did with Hezbollah, but as these groups
    grew closer to the branches of the Armed Islamic Movement, the
    sponsorship would extend to AIA so as to:

    A. Enhance the deception and denial strategy
    B. Enhance the overall terrorist legion
    C. Enhance the capabilities of their closest terrorist allies that
    served directly under them
    D. Remove ideological and theological barriers preventing the
    accomplishment of the primary objectives of the extremists.
    E. Change the competitive nature of rival groups into a productive
    catalyst for the cause.
    F. Increase influence over the elements of other Islamic sects they
    did not approve of.

    In 1991, Sudan (in close cooperation with Iran) took a further step
    to unify the various branches of terrorists into a single front. The
    Islamic Arab Peoples' Conference was formed while Sudan and Iran
    simultaneously created the Popular International Organization, an
    allied front of Sunni Moslem extremists that would take part in the
    driving power for the Islamic Arab People's Conference. This began
    the setting up of Sudan as a terrorist harbor, and the placement of
    Iranian forces in Sudan to facilitate this infrastructure.

    As a result of the meetings and conferences, the Egyptian Islamic
    Jihad led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, now Al-Qaeda's main operational
    branch became deeply involved in the various Islamic movements. On
    October 18, 1991, the group went to the International Conference in
    Support of the Islamic Revolution of the People o Palestine, with
    over 400 representatives. The meeting also managed to unify the
    branches despite their theological differences although Sudan and
    Iran secretly hoped that their Popular International Organization
    would take the lead in the efforts. Subsequently, Osama Bin Laden saw
    the gathering movement and began concentrating his major efforts
    towards that movement, landing him a spot at the top of the movement,
    and as a result, assistance from Iran and the various state sponsors
    of terrorism.

    In July of 1992, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, now Al-Qaeda's #2 leader, went to
    Tehran after consulting with Sudan. Zawahiri had already become a
    huge figure in the Islamist movement, serving as a conduit for
    coordination between many branches of organizations. His prestige and
    theological beliefs drew Osama Bin Laden to him, later resulting in
    the fusion of Egyptian Islamic Jihad into Al-Qaeda and tightening of
    the overall Islamic coalition, all under the union sponsored by that
    of Iran and other state sponsors.


    The Alliance

    Beginning in 1992, an agreement was reached. In return for Zawahiri's
    efforts in the movement led by Iran, the Iranians agreed to provide a
    safe harbor and training camp for about 800 of the Egyptian Islamic
    Jihad terrorists in Mashhad. Iranian proxy forces like Hezbollah, and
    the Pasdaran division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps based
    in Sudan would assist in virtually all areas of Zawahiri's
    contributions to the movement. Zawahiri subsequently agreed to join a
    faction of the overall movement, called the Arab Liberation
    Battalions which was headed by the Revolutionary Guard's intelligence
    community. By the end of the year, Al-Zawahiri's alliance with
    Hezbollah became complete. It also set the stage for the battle of
    Mogadishu, Somalia which accelerated the prestige of the various
    Islamist movements banned into one union. This is why after 9-11,
    President Bush had to make it clear the War on Terrorism was required
    to fight all terrorist organizations.

    In 1992, 12,000 Arab volunteers who had fought into Afghanistan
    transferred into the terrorist organizations involved in the
    movement. The leading force in Afghanistan of extremist volunteers
    was Hizb-i-Islami, led by Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, the force behind the
    recent guerilla warfare in Afghanistan in alliance with the Taliban
    and Al-Qaeda. This same year, Osama Bin Laden sent 3,000 Yemenis he
    had recruited back to their homeland from Pakistan to help expand the
    terrorist network in Arabia. The bases were reportedly in the
    al-Maraqishah Mountains. But by mid-1993, with the movement's new
    focus on East Africa, many of these Yemeni forces were moved to
    Somalia, which he claimed cost him $3 million. These forces later
    took part in the Mogadishu battle.

    The alliances continued into October 1994, accelerating with the
    Iranian-sponsored meeting in Khartoum, Sudan with Iranian
    intelligence delegates, Osama Bin Laden, Hezbollah, and the various
    branches of Muslim Brotherhood. The focus returned to the Arabian
    Peninsula. Another meeting with the same groups occurred in November
    1994 in Cyprus, to discuss operations in the United States. There
    were even more people at the meeting, including Sudanese, Syrian, and
    Iranian intelligence, and various other terrorist organizations
    including Hamas, Hezbollah, PFLP-GC, Islamic Action Front, etc.

    In early 1996, Iran formed the Hezbollah International, which
    cooperated closely with Osama Bin Laden. Hezbollah International
    picked up from where Iran-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East in
    1995 left off. The new Hezbollah International worked to facilitate
    attacks by financing and training, while very often, Bin Laden and
    Zawahiri led and commanded the terrorist forces. To oversee such
    activities, the President of Iran, Ali Akbatrr Hashem Rafsanjani
    created the Supreme Council for Intelligence Affairs. Dr. Mahdi
    Chamran Savehi led the External Intelligence branch which was
    responsible for sponsoring terrorism, often through hiring the
    al-Quds Forces of the Iranian military. Also in 1996, there was a new
    turn towards the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia where the state
    sponsors send forces, alongside Bin Laden to the region to assist the
    Moslems in their war with Serbia.

    As part of the new campaign, groups which were not part of Hizballah
    International did decide to cooperate and form an alliance to
    coordinate their activities with the Iranian-sponsored movement. This
    included Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Lebanese
    Hezbollah, Osama Bin Laden's forces, Popular Front for the Liberation
    of Palestine-General Command, Hamas, The Turkish Islamic Party,
    Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Kurdish People's
    Party. The Islamic Change Movement, a group of organizations, also
    joined the alliance. Iran's main instruments in the non-Hezbollah
    forces inside the alliance were Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas
    which work very closely with Iran. Efforts to assist operations in
    Saudi Arabia and East Africa continued, as a way to reduce American
    and Israeli power.

    The alliance members held a meeting on September 20-23, 1997. The
    meeting included Ayman al-Zawahiri and an Al-Qaeda commander, where
    they all agreed to escalate the terrorist campaign. Plans were to
    begin for attacks on Turkey, Israel, and the USA.

    Bin Laden decided the next month to begin preparing a base of
    operations more centrally located in Afghanistan to facilitate the
    coming offensives. Bin Laden intended to preserve his prestige and
    power in the revolution. Most of the Al-Qaeda forces went from Sudan
    into Pakistan and Afghanistan with the assistance of Pakistani
    intelligence, while at the same time coordinating the upgrading of
    capabilities with the anti-Indian militant forces backed by Pakistan
    in Kashmir, who were simultaneously planning for a new campaign. Bin
    Laden and Zawahiri soon held a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan to
    talk about a new campaign to counter American influence all over the
    world, and Zawahiri became the leader of the major operational
    elements of Al-Qaeda, particularly the efforts against Egypt.
    Meanwhile, forces from the various terrorist organizations spread out
    into the Balkans, India, and Western Europe.

    Later in 1997, Iran had a breakthrough in their planning for the
    Islamic revolutions. At the final meeting to prepare the details of
    the next campaign, about 20-30 organizations, or terrorist `unions'
    took part including non-Moslems! Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah joined, as
    did the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, The Algerian
    Armed Islamic Group, various extremist factions from all over the
    world, the Armenian Secret Army, 17th of November based in Greece,
    and Latin American groups. Immediately after, Zawahiri issued a call
    for jihad on the United States and our allies in the Middle East if
    we did not withdraw from the areas of Islam. On November 17, 1997,
    Zawahiri's forces attacked Luxor, Egypt and killed nearly 70 West
    European civilians. The campaign had shot off.

    In February 1998, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (already close to Bin Laden)
    joined the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,
    an umbrella over Al-Qaeda and all their associated groups. This new
    umbrella cooperated side-by-side with the Armed Islamic Movement - some
    analysts even suggest they are the same thing, as most of the groups
    were members of both umbrella organizations. Nevertheless, the
    world's radical Islamic terrorist groups had united under the
    supervision of the several state sponsors of terrorism.

    Yossef Bodansky's book, `Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on
    America' goes much further into details of how Iran may have been
    behind the major Al-Qaeda attacks, particularly the operations in
    Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Tanzania and Kenya. It shows how Iran
    works behind the various extremist unions, issuing restrictions and
    permits on terrorist entities depending on how they fit Iran's
    interest. If you are interested, I suggest buying the book. Since I
    am unable to prove and verify Iran's role in these acts, it will not
    be discussed here. However, what can be proven is how Iran has
    provided aid to Al-Qaeda.

    Pre-9/11

    In the mid-1990s, Iran began to diversify the types of terror
    sponsorship it would pursue. Rather than regular assassination and
    guerilla warfare-type training, new methods of attacks were expanded
    upon, a trend also seen in Iraq. Much of this upgrading would be seen
    later in the Palestinian Intifada uprising against Israel and by
    militants around the world in the late 1990s and the new millennium.

    According to one of Yossef Bodansky's books, hijacking airliners was
    involved in the training. The book however, was written in 1993. He
    is currently the US Congress' Director of the Joint Task Force on
    Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. There were two training
    facilities set up in Iran for advanced warfare involving aerial
    platforms. One was at Wakilabad, the other near Mashhad (where
    Al-Qaeda forces currently reside). Several former Iran Air pilots and
    Air Force pilots, including ones trained in the United States, served
    as instructors under the Revolutionary Guards and intelligence
    community. At the airfield at Wakilabad were a Boeing 707, Boeing 727
    and a Boeing 747. Selected pilots were sent to train at the Won San
    Air Force Base in North Korea, where Korean pilots gave training over
    the course of one year. Military training for the air force and navy
    in North Korea traditionally teaches the tactics of the kamikazes. By
    1995, at Salman Pak in Iraq, a similar training site was set up with
    a Boeing jet used for hijacking training, which witnesses confirm
    consisted of foreigners.

    The former highest ranking CIA operative in Iraq, Robert Baer, says
    that in December of 1995, one of Osama Bin Laden's associates went to
    Tehran, for a meeting with several officers of the Ministry of
    Intelligence and Security. The following July, Bin Laden met with an
    Iranian intelligence officer whom was sent to Afghanistan to make the
    anti-American alliance stronger in coordination and trust. The
    cooperation soon extended to all `sections' of Al-Qaeda, including
    the Egyptian Gami'at group, whom established contact with Iran
    through Imad Mughniyah and Hezbollah. By late 1997, the CIA knew that
    Bin Laden had discussed coordination efforts with Iran and the
    prospect of destabilizing central Asia as part of the war against the
    West was brought up.

    Most of the Iranian-Bin Laden cooperation was done through Ayman
    Al-Zawahiri. The efforts described above were the result of meetings
    with this man. Over the past decade, Zawahiri could often be spotted
    in Iran meeting with high-level government officials including the
    Minister of Intelligence and Security, Ali Fallahian and Ahmad
    Vahidi, the leader of the al-Quds forces, which consist of special
    forces operatives whom assist terrorists or carry out terrorist acts
    themselves. These forces are responsible for supervising covert
    support to militants.

    Beginning in the summer of 2000, Osama Bin Laden alongside Syria and
    Iran began working to upgrade the militant capabilities in Lebanon
    and the areas of Palestinian resistance against Israel. New stages of
    Arab cooperation in the extremist realm led to reestablished ties
    between Syria and the Syrian branch of Muslim Brotherhood, which was
    tied to Al-Qaeda, and with Iraq by July 2000. The various Palestinian
    terrorist organizations and Hezbollah also began a ground-breaking
    chapter of cooperation. Iran even managed to build trust between Bin
    Laden's group and Syria by showing that they intended not to topple
    the Bashar Assad regime, but rather to work together.

    In mid-July, Iran called for a meeting in Afghanistan between the
    head of Bin Laden's bases in Lebanon and representatives of other
    Palestinian groups. They agreed to coordinate activities, and that
    Al-Qaeda would receive safe harbor at Ein Hilweh, Nahr al-Bard,
    Hezballah-dominated areas in the Bekka Valley and the Palestinian
    refugee camp of Tripoli. In the Bekka Valley, Iran's Hezbollah
    organization began training and arming the Al-Qaeda forces based
    there to integrate the forces into an anti-Israeli militant
    infrastructure. Keep in mind, any activities of Hezballah should be
    under the direct responsibility of Iran and sometimes, Syria, as the
    group is founded by, trained by, armed by, directed by, and
    accompanied by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and intelligence.

    As the new network was build, Al-Qaeda contributed dozens of fighters
    to join the Palestinian militants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to
    work alongside Hamas and Islamic Jihad, more groups sponsored by
    Iran. Arafat's forces took no action against Al-Qaeda's movements
    once they were seen as non-threatening to the Palestinian Authority,
    which was promised by Iran. This resulted in Arafat giving permission
    to Syria, Iran, and radical Palestinian groups to facilitate Al-Qaeda
    escapes to the harbors made available by the Palestinian groups.

    In Tehran on June 1, 2002, there was another terrorist conference to
    coordinate plans for the war on Israel. It involved most Iranian
    leaders, the founder of Hezballah, senior Iranian Pasadaran
    commanders from Lebanon, Syrian intelligence officials, Imad
    Mughniyah and an Al-Qaeda commander, alongside the Palestinian
    radical forces of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and PFLP-GC.

    Before we go any further, one must understand the cycle of Iranian
    terrorism, regarding the United States, particularly in the Gulf.
    While some terrorist acts occur at a timely moment at the leaders'
    wishes, the separate campaigns Iran launches go on a cycle. Beginning
    in March 1990, Iran began the three-phase terror escalation strategy:
    1) Terrorism using local capabilities, loss of which would not hinder
    the movement for Islamic movement. 2) More advanced attacks using
    sleeper cells that depend upon sleeper networks, so as to avoid
    detection and enhance the capabilities of the attacks. 3)
    `Spectacular strikes', usually with suicide bombers, and
    top-of-the-line trained militants that aim to incite the Muslim world
    and usually take place far away from Iran.

    After each phase, a new terrorist sleeper network is planted so that
    any intelligence the West gains from the investigations into the
    operations does not hinder the subsequent plans of the Iranian
    regime. The Iranian-directed coordinated campaign, for the more
    decisive attacks (as opposed to small-scale bombings like that in
    Israel carried out by mediocre Palestinian groups with Iranian
    permission or support) utilize the manpower of Hezballah, sleeper
    cells consisting of `Afghans' (volunteers of the mujahideen in
    Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets, this is where
    Al-Qaeda associated branches come into play) and Sunni networks far
    away with local capabilities whose elimination does not affect the
    separate networks.

    Regarding the `Afghans', Iran's contact with them, particularly
    through Ayman Al-Zawahiri began in May 1986 with a meeting at Ben
    Bella to unify the branches, as we discussed before. The initial
    components of the giant union of Islamic radicals included Muslim
    Brotherhood, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and intelligence, Syrian
    Muslim Brotherhood, the forces behind the Islamic Conferences in
    Europe, Hezballah, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, operational branch of
    Al-Qaeda today, which were represented by Sheikh Umar Abdel-Rahman,
    mufti of the organization. Iran's links to the inner circle of
    Al-Qaeda go back for over a decade. Beginning that summer, Iranian
    intelligence began funding Egyptian Islamic Jihad and providing
    technical assistance.

    According to Ali Mohammed, a former Al-Qaeda security chief whom
    testified during the trials after the 1998 embassy bombings, the
    organization's financial manager, Muhmud Salim met with Imad
    Mughniyah, an associate of the Iranian intelligence community,
    government, and Revolutionary Guards (and `employee' of Iran to take
    part in the business of terrorism sponsorship) in Sudan several times
    between 1992 and 1996, laying the foundation for tight cooperation
    between the two groups of extremists. Insight Magazine also has
    provided details from the court case that raise much worry.


    `The federal grand jury that indicted bin Laden in 1998 for the
    embassy bombings described the operational support al-Qaeda received
    from governments in explicit terms: "Al-Qaeda also forged alliances
    with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with the government
    of Iran and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah for the purpose
    of working together against their perceived common enemies in the
    West, particularly the United States," the indictment says. Mohamed
    testified that "much of this type of training is actually carried out
    at a training camp there, in Iran, run by the Iranian Ministry of
    Information and Security." Even more damning comments were made by
    Mohamed under seal, because James Owens, one of the victims of the
    U.S. Embassy bombings in Tanzania, told the court at a sentencing
    hearing last month for the convicted bombers that "Iran provided the
    explosives for the bombings which have brought us here today."
    Despite this evidence of operational ties between Iran and the
    network that blew up the U.S. embassies, no Iranian official has yet
    been publicly indicted for the bombing.'


    Ali Mohammed goes on to say that as of October of 2000, he knew that
    representatives of Iran, Hezballah, Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad,
    along with Imad Mughniyah himself were holding several meetings. At
    these meetings, shipments of arms to Egyptian Islamic Jihad (and thus
    Al-Qaeda, as E.I.J. is the group's operational arm) were discussed,
    and at one particular meeting, the Iranian representatives
    specifically pointed out they intended to use Hezballah as a proxy
    force for the cooperation. The meetings concluded with Hezballah
    agreeing to pass on their tactics used in Lebanon to the new Armed
    Islamic Movement (more specifically Bin Laden's forces, although they
    didn't have the widely known name of Al-Qaeda just yet) for use
    against `Big Satan' and `Little Satan', particularly in the countries
    with their influence, specifically pointing out Saudi Arabia.

    These contacts continued throughout the decade, mostly unnoticed,
    until the 1998 bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
    According to captured documents during the investigation and trial
    testimony, Hezballah forces, Iranian government and intelligence
    officials and members of the Special Revolutionary Guard forces all
    had contact with high-ranking Al-Qaeda forces, and enjoyed at least
    one visit from Osama Bin Laden himself. At the meeting mentioned,
    Iran directed its Hezballah forces near Al-Qaeda safe havens to arm
    and train Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda, which had recently
    joined forces. At the meeting, Osama Bin Laden stressed that the
    organization needed to push aside differences with Shiite militants,
    specifically Iran and Hezballah, in order to pursue a common war
    against a common enemy.

    Even when the Al-Qaeda and associated Islamic militant branches
    centralized into Afghanistan under Taliban rule, Iran assisted them.
    During the war in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance identified two
    instructors at an Al-Qaeda training camp at Shomali as Iranians, both
    of which previously had experience with Hezballah. Documents seized
    at the camp showed blueprints to seize an American embassy, run
    assassination missions, and formulas for enriched uranium.

    The days prior to 911 also show Iran had an alliance with terrorists.
    Over the summer of 2001, the bulk of Egyptian Jihad forces that we
    would fight in Afghanistan began entering the country through Iran,
    crossing at Mashhad. But in the first week of September, Iran stopped
    the immigration to Afghanistan. Some in US intelligence suspect this
    means Iran had some idea of a major terrorist attack that was
    imminent, which could potentially incriminate the Iranian regime.

    On September 11, 2001, immediately before or after the first attack,
    a senior Iranian government official called relatives in Los Angeles
    saying he was hoping to flee to the United States. The official
    explained that Iran's media/propaganda machine hoped to blame the
    attacks on the Japanese Red Army, providing details of elements of
    the disinformation operations that did not play out until weeks
    later. What is known though is that immediately following 9/11, the
    government-controlled media (broadcasting into Lebanon) did in fact
    try to spin the facts to make it appear it was the Japanese Red Army.
    And so we go back to the Insight Magazine report on November 9, 2001.
    In the investigation, they write:

    `A former Iranian-government intelligence officer who has defected to
    the West tells Insight during telephone interviews from Germany that
    he personally informed the FBI at the beginning of September of a
    plot by Iran to crash civilian jumbo jets into the World Trade Center
    and government buildings in Washington. A key element of the plot,
    which was code-named Shaitan der artash (Devil in the Fire), was the
    use of Arab "muscle men" to hijack the airliners. "Only the men
    leading the cells were Iranians," he says, "and they were recruited
    from among Iran's Arab-speaking population" in the southwest province
    of Khouzistan, bordering Iraq.....
    The former intelligence officer says he received a coded message from
    inside Iran one week before the Sept. 11 attacks, signaling that the
    Shaitan der artash plan had been reactivated. He says he contacted
    the German intelligence agency, the BND, and the legal attaché at the
    U.S. Embassy in Berlin. U.S. government officials tell Insight that
    the FBI now claims it didn't receive the defector's warning until
    after Sept. 11.

    To carry out the plan, a private company connected to the Iranian
    government purchased a Boeing 757 simulator through the European
    Airbus consortium 18 months before the attacks, the defector tells
    Insight. One of the individuals who purchased the simulator in Paris
    was in the United States on Sept. 11, he adds. `

    Hamid Reza Zakeri

    Insight Magazine ran another amazing investigation on June 10, 2003.
    It was about Hamid Reza Zakeri, whom defected from the Supreme
    Leader's intelligence directorate, bringing along with him classified
    intelligence documents. Zakeri has testified to being in charge of
    the security apparatus surrounding at least two meetings inside Iran
    between Al-Qaeda and Iranian officials prior to 9/11. The secret
    document he gave to US intelligence was dated May 14, 2001, signed by
    the Minister for Information and Security, and quoted Khomeini in
    regards to how to handle the cooperation with Osama Bin Laden.

    In the document written less than four months before the attack,
    Khomeini says to `strike at [American] economic structure, their
    reputation - and their internal peace and security....We should be very
    careful and very clever, so as not to leave behind any evidence that
    could negatively impact our future standing or policies.'
    At the end of the document, the Minister of Information and Security
    writes to his ministry to `...improve our plans, especially in
    coordination with fighters of Al-Qaeda and Hezballah to find one
    objective that is beneficial to both sides...The Leader [Khomeini]
    mentioned that we should limit our relations with Al-Qaeda to just
    two people, as before - Imad Mughniyeh and Ayman Al-Zawahiri - and deal
    only with them.'

    Zakeri says the first meeting he was present at was held in January
    2001 when Al-Zawahiri arrived in Iran (from Afghanistan) alongside 29
    other Al-Qaeda officials for a meeting that would go on for four
    days. `Zawahiri told my boss, Mustafa Hadadian, that they were
    planning a `major operation' against the United States and Israel.'
    Zakeri says the meeting was at Varamin, just outside of Tehran. He
    testifies, `After the meeting, 12 of them [Al-Qaeda officials] stayed
    in Iran. They were talking about their `plans for the future', and
    that they had the `same enemy' as the Iranians. They said they were
    trying to build up one movement to cooperate together, and were
    asking Iran for operational support, equipment and money-laundering
    help in Dubai, as well as assistance with travel documents to help
    them travel from Iran to Europe. Ayman Al-Zawahiri told my boss that
    Al-Qaeda was `very soon' going to make a major operation against the
    United States.'

    Zakeri says Naleq-Nouri, former speaker of Iranian parliament and top
    aide to Khomeini, led the Iranian delegation and was assisted by Ali
    Akbar Parvaresh, former education minister and member of Section 43,
    the planning unit of the intelligence ministry. The success of the
    meeting led to Osama's sending of Saad Bin Laden to Iran on May 4,
    2001. Flying from the Talebat border of Afghanistan, to the Damavand
    airfield near Tehran, he and three Al-Qaeda officials began their
    three-week stay, which would include at least one meeting with
    Iranian government officials.
    At Khomeini's meeting house in Jamaran at the slopes of Elburz
    Mountains (just north of Tehran), the five members of the Leadership
    Council (the ayatollahs, Khomeini, and ex-president Rafsanjani) began
    discussing operations with Al-Qaeda representatives. Not long after,
    in the main hallway of the Ministry of Information and Security
    headquarters in Tehran was a new exhibit with models of the World
    Trade Center, the Pentagon and Camp David. Zakeri says: `From the
    ceiling, a missile was suspended as if to strike the buildings.
    `Death to America' was written on its side in Arabic, not Farsi.'
    Zakeri says that the same hallway often had pictures of dissidents
    targeted by Iranian intelligence, whom would die or disappear soon
    after their pictures were posted. Zakeri went to the US embassy in
    Azerbaijan on July 26, 2001, met with the CIA station chief, and
    warned of a something occurring on or around September 10th. Insight
    Magazine was unable to confirm if he really did make that prediction,
    but was able to confirm that the meeting took place.

    Worldwide Expansion

    In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran even helped forces that were
    part of the growing Armed Islamic Movement to expand worldwide into
    the menace we see today. Apart from helping Pakistan in the training
    and equipping of Kashmir-based militants, Iran often took a
    unilateral approach in these efforts. Even Pakistan often played only
    a minor role. From 1990 to 1991, Iran began helping Islamic radicals
    in the Philippines, particularly present-day Abu Sayyaf (one of
    Al-Qaeda's Pacific branches) to build camps and general
    self-sustaining infrastructure. Often this was done through Iranian
    intelligence agents accompanying Hezballah. Present-day Moro Islamic
    Liberation Front also got help from Iran (and Pakistan) in making a
    network of camps, and establishing lines of supply and communication.
    By 1994, the rebels numbered over 120,000 organized into 6 divisions,
    with an elite division of 6,000 veterans including Afghan mujahideen.
    Throughout the fall of 1994, reaching the height in October, Iran
    send huge amounts of experts (embedded into Hezballah) and supply to
    the radicals in the Philippines, landing on Mindanao. Even a few
    American-designed Stinger missiles are suspected of being shipped. By
    the end of the year, nearly 180,000 people had joined the rebellion.

    Do to differences with a commander in the Moro Islamic Liberation
    Front, Abu Sayyaf split apart (but did not fight with the MLF), now
    being led by a graduate from an Iranian training camp. In 1995, Abu
    Sayyaf formed back the alliance with MLF, and the militants became a
    crucial part of Al-Qaeda's network of terrorism. The next year, Iran
    withdrew most forces from the Philippines including Hezballah to
    avoid the political ramifications. Iran had successfully covered up
    their role, and instead of risking being caught in the act, withdrew
    as the new terrorist infrastructure had already reached
    self-sustaining capabilities. Nevertheless, Hezballah still often
    helped recruiting efforts overseas, and graduates from Iranian and
    Hezballah camps were encouraged to join the group.

    In fact, many of the Latin American recruits for Al-Qaeda were
    initially recruited by Hezballah. This is certainly the case in 1996
    and afterwards when new Hezballah networks were propped up in
    Uruguay, Chile and Argentina that expanded as time went on. Using its
    connections in the Pacific, Hezballah networks expanded in Thailand,
    Australia and Indonesia (possibly contributing to the current
    Al-Qaeda branch there, known as Jeemah Islamiyya). Even today, the
    representatives of the various terrorist groups belonging to the
    Armed Islamic Movement meet at the Triple Border where Paraguay,
    Brazil, and Argentina meet, to coordinate terrorism. Mughniyah
    himself has met with Al-Qaeda representatives here. According to
    intelligence, this is where Western Hemisphere-based terrorism was
    planned and coordinated between several groups including Islamic
    Jihad, Hezballah, Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, etc., for during
    and after the war in Iraq.

    Other Assistance

    By early May, the US was pressuring Iran to hand over Al-Qaeda and
    extremist forces being harbored in their territory, with the
    knowledge of the government. It has been reported that Iran demanded
    that members of the opposition forces, Mujahideen-e-Khalq be handed
    to them first, which the US refused to do. According to some
    reporting, one of those harbored in Iran was Saadoon Mohammed Abdul
    Latif, also known as Abu Wail, who was an Iraqi intelligence officer
    who served as Iraqi liaison with Bin Laden by visiting in Afghanistan
    in 1999. Also hidden in Iran was Ayub Afghani, an Al-Qaeda explosives
    expert and senior leaders of Ansar al-Islam, an Al-Qaeda branch
    formerly in northern Iraq. Also from Iraq was Al-Qaeda associate Abu
    Mussab al-Zarqawi, head of a terrorist poisons network and weapons of
    mass destruction efforts, and who also has been given the
    responsibility of finding safety for hundreds of Taliban and Al-Qaeda
    fighters using his expertise in false documentation and escaping the
    authorities.

    Iran has become a major base for Al-Qaeda operations. In fact, the
    military commander of the group and the #3 ranking leader, Seif
    al-Adel, organized the May 12th bombing attacks on Riyadh, Saudi
    Arabia in Iran. The head of logistics, Saad Bin Laden, Osama's oldest
    son, as well as the head of training, Abu Mohammed Masri, are also in
    Iran forming this command group.

    Seif al-Adel has coordinated Al-Qaeda's cooperation with local
    extremist groups including those in Morocco and Pakistan to launch
    attacks. He also oversees the security of the organization and
    distributes money and propaganda to Afghanistan-based forces from
    Iran. Working alongside Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi (whom escaped to Iran
    between March 19th and 29th from Iraq) and Saad Bin Laden, Saif
    al-Adel coordinates his actions wtih the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
    and the Intelligence Ministry. It is believed at least 500 Al-Qaeda
    connected or associated persons are in Iran despite their claims of
    expelling them. The strategy behind this is to use the group's
    profound influence to launch terrorist attacks that cannot be traced
    back to Iran, and to promote Iranian influence in Afghanistan and
    Iraq. The most dangerous detail not mentioned yet is that Seif
    Al-Adel is currently in the process of activating sleeper cells in
    Western Europe and the United States.

    Iran enjoys a tremendous advantage do to this. According to Ali Nouri
    Zadeh of the Arabic paper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, if any attacks or
    militant circles are traced to Iran, they simply remove them from
    their territory. Iran is careful not to reveal their role in
    terrorism (unless it is Palestinian resistance). Immediately after
    the May 12th Riyadh attacks, Seif al-Adel and Saad Bin Laden left
    Iran (but returned later). Other forces of Al-Qaeda and Ansar
    al-Islam began moving back into northern Iraq, Afghanistan, or the
    triple border between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. An
    investigation in February revealed an Al-Qaeda network centered in
    Tehran, Mashhad and Zahedan. Saad Bin Laden, al-Adel, and Abu Khaled
    at the time were all living in a safehouse under the ownership of the
    Special Revolutionary Guards in the Bamk Abroad district.

    Israeli intelligence says that the reason for a heightened alert in
    Saudi Arabia which occurred about a week before the May 12th attacks
    on Riyadh, was that Western intelligence had picked up suspicious
    amounts of electronic `chatter' among Al-Qaeda cells around Saudi
    Arabia, and simultaneous movement of operatives from the
    Pakistani-Afghani tribal areas to Abu Dhabi, Yemen and Qatar through
    Iran. Saad Bin Laden, Seif al-Adel, Abu al-Walid, and Al-Masri were
    all supervising the movement from Iran.

    The command centers for Al-Qaeda and associated militants such as
    Ansar al-Islam in Iran were said to be in four areas. Up to 600
    operatives and associates were in the province of Khorasan at Tayebat
    (12 miles from the border of Afghanistan) and near Garmab (60 miles
    away from Mashhad). In the province of Baluchistan there were two
    locations for cells at Zabul and Zahedan, where Revolutionary Guards
    forces were stationed. The week after the attack, the United States
    cut off diplomatic contacts with Iran and demanded the extradition of
    terrorists and cooperation with the Riyadh investigation.

    This could also be do to the suspicion that Iran may be at times
    harboring Osama Bin Laden. The most common view held right now is
    that the he and Ayman Al-Zawahiri often find harbor in the southern
    Assir province of Saudi Arabia in the Empty Quarter Desert (which is
    not controlled by the Saudi government), and the area which extends
    onto the Yemeni border. From here, it is believed they very often
    travel to the Pakistani tribal areas, sometimes slipping into
    Afghanistan, and sometimes slipping into Iran where the borders of
    the three countries meet. Other people hold that they are always in
    the Pakistani and Afghani tribal areas, where some have even said
    they are often at the Hindu Kush Mountains.

    Nevertheless, the suspicion towards Iran in regards to their location
    is justified. According to Italian intelligence, Osama Bin Laden
    often meets with his oldest son, Saad in Iran, traveling freely
    throughout Iran to consult with his group's leadership. In early May,
    it is said that Osama and seven senior aides including Al-Zawahiri
    went to Iran, and were spotted in Tehran, where they are believed to
    have authorized the May 12th Riyadh attacks (and the other attacks
    throughout the spring) putting Seif al-Adel in charge. Attacks on
    Turkey, Pakistan and Italy were reportedly discussed. The reports
    finish with saying that the delegation carried Iranian passports,
    identifying themselves as businessmen.

    In the face of US threats, Iran claimed it had detained senior
    Al-Qaeda in the country but would not hand them over to the United
    States, but rather would send them to their homelands after being
    identified. Even today, in the second week of July, there is still
    `identification' going on and the militants are still `detained'. The
    definition of `detained' appears to be loose, as it can mean they are
    under `arrest', but really in police possession while being allowed
    to continue their work. Iranian authorities have said there are some
    350 Al-Qaeda in their possession.

    The Al-Qaeda spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, was leaked to the press
    (probably on purpose) to be among those detained. Immediately, Egypt
    began contacting Iran about sending Egyptian nationals home for
    prosecution. At least 14 Egyptian terrorists are believed to be given
    safe haven in Iran, particularly those involved in the 1998 embassy
    bombings.

    Among those harbored: Mustafa Hamza, conspirator in a plot to kill
    Egyptian president Mubarak in 1995; Abdul Rahman Khader, leader of
    Egyptian Islamic Jihad and conspirator in the bombing of the Egyptian
    embassy in Pakistan in 1995; leading members of Gamiat Islamiya
    including members of the Shura Council like Muhammed Shawqi
    Islambuli, the brother of the assassin of Anwar Sadat.


    The War in Afghanistan

    Around the first week of October 2001, Imad Mughniyah, a senior
    intelligence official from Iran, and an Iraqi intelligence official
    close to Saddam Hussein met in Mashhad. Knowing the American
    onslaught was near; it is likely this had to do with preparations for
    the import of militant forces.

    Ever since winter 2001-2002, when the American forces toppled the
    Taliban government in Afghanistan, these forces have been welcomed in
    Iran, for the proper amount of money. Most of the forces that escaped
    to Iran are in northern training camps, while more important
    officials moved to Tehran, Qom, and Mashhid. Upon significant
    pressure, Iran would transfer selected militants to northern Iraq
    and/or Syria and Lebanon to bolster the Hezballah forces. By December
    2001, Israeli intelligence reported that hundreds, possibly thousands
    of foreigners harbored in Afghanistan had escaped a very large
    portion of which escaping through Iran. It was said that they escaped
    using drug trafficking routes in Baluchistan, with full awareness of
    Iranian intelligence. Most of those escaping were Saudis, which makes
    the observer question the significance of the Saudi-Iranian alliance
    (as it relates to terrorism investigations, as we saw when the Saudis
    covered up incriminating evidence against Hezballah and Iran in the
    investigation into the Dhalan bombings and Khobar Tower bombings).

    Iran also traditionally interferes in Afghan relations to sway
    factors in the politics in their favor. Such covert operations
    dramatically increased before 9/11 (it is reported that Iran assisted
    Al-Qaeda in killing the Northern Alliance commander just days before
    9/11 by providing transportation and security) and had another
    acceleration once Western forces attacked Afghanistan. According to
    an American special ops officer, the Iranian-modified AK-47 flooded
    Afghanistan in increasing numbers during the fighting. Press reports
    also indicate that three officers from the Revolutionary Guards were
    killed in the bombing raids at Herat on Taliban and Al-Qaeda sites.
    Herat has always been a site for Iran's `active measures', and today
    is ruled by Ismail Khan, a man who openly admits ties to the
    government of Iran. According to an Insight Magazine investigation,
    Khan has ten Iranian generals serving under him whom are suspected of
    being involved with resistance forces against the new post-war
    government. One of the generals, General Blokian of the Revolutionary
    Guard, previously assisted Hezballah based in southern Lebanon, and
    now trains resistance forces loyal to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. On
    the other hand, to manipulate the forces consisting of the Northern
    Alliance, Iran supported ethnic Tajik factions in the Alliance.

    Today Iran still supports the Hekmatyar forces allied to the Taliban
    and Al-Qaeda whom lead a rebellion against the Western forces in
    Afghanistan, as well as the new government there. Even the former
    deputy chief of finance for the Taliban, and the former Chief Justice
    of the Supreme Court of the Taliban have said that Iran is supporting
    Hekmatyar and the regrouping terrorist forces, allowing them to have
    just as much funding as they did before 9/11.
    The fact that Iran has assisted Al-Qaeda's campaign of terrorism
    during the war in Afghanistan should be a sign that the hope that
    Iran will quit the business is faint. It appears that Iran's very
    foundation as a radical Islamist government depends upon serving the
    forces of evil, even if it means confrontation with American forces.
    Iran, immediately after the war in Afghanistan began, provided safe
    haven for militants from a wide range of groups to assemble across
    the border in eastern Iran, where a militant camp was detected by US
    spy satellites. An obstacle course and rifle training (primarily used
    for guerilla warfare and targeted killings) have been seen from the
    bird's eye.

    Iraq War

    Iran originally intended to, if possible, ignite a regional war with
    Israel if Iraq was attacked, feeling that their regime would be in
    peril if such a war was successful. As war came close, seeing how
    this was not the route to take as conditions was not ripe (including
    the fact that Palestinian militants were unable or unwilling to
    launch spectacular attacks to provoke Israel), Iran with Syria's help
    chose another tactic. The Iranian regime cooperated with Saddam
    Hussein's Iraqi regime in the past few years but of course, a more
    trustworthy regime would be more favorable. Iran aimed to keep the
    Coalition forces bogged down in Iraq as long as possible while
    assisting radical Shiites in winning the government over, through
    democratic means or by coup.

    As early as February, the Iranian-backed force called the Badr
    Brigades (more like an extension of the Revolutionary Guards) crossed
    into northern Iraq. This group consists of 5,000 Shiites used to
    expand Iran's influence in the post-war environment. At the exact
    same time, Iran began shipping light and medium weapons to Ansar
    al-Islam, the Kurdish branch of Al-Qaeda based in northern Iraq (and
    sponsored by Saddam Hussein's regime as a way to persecute the
    rebellious Kurdish forces). Not long after, their northern offensive
    meant to hinder cooperation between Coalition forces and Kurdish
    rebels was launched. This can be seen as a forced bargaining tactic,
    as it was reported that Iran promised the Patriotic Union of
    Kurdistan and other Kurdish forces that Iran would assist against
    Ansar forces in return for a promise of extended Shiite influence in
    Iraq.

    It was decided in March that paramilitary units would be sent to five
    Shiite cities to begin sporadic resistance once Saddam Hussein's fate
    was sealed. The five cities initially targeted for Shiite upheaval
    was Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Kirkuk. It is interesting to
    note these were the same sites of fighting with volunteer foreign
    terrorists, as well as Al-Qaeda cells. As part of this effort, Iran
    purchased Kuwaiti and Saudi military uniforms. If the Shiites were
    rejected the representation they deserved in the government (so Iran
    would have great influence in Iraq) or the Americans were preparing
    to confront Iran in any way, the plans were to cooperate with
    Baathist remnants and foreign volunteers for the resistance. A branch
    of Hezballah was established in northern Iraq specifically for this
    purpose, and according to Israeli intelligence, there was evidence
    that truck bombings were part of the contingency planes.

    During the beginning of the campaign, Iran donated $2 million to
    their agents in the Shiite communities in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to
    incite the peoples. Part of that money was shifted to build a
    `command center' at Ahuaz in Kohzestan province to oversee the covert
    warfare. After learning that portions of Iraq's Republican Guards
    planned to merge in with the population and fight from the
    underground, Iran sold communications equipment, as well as agreed to
    temporarily harbor senior commanders if they were in transit.

    Within one week, efforts to recruit and distribute militants in Umm
    Qasr, al-Amara, the Faw Peninsula and Basra began. Shiite extremists
    temporarily got public eye and power as the lack of control allowed
    their pour to source in central and southern Iraq, particularly
    around the oil fields. Not long after, six Hezballah insurgents were
    captured along the Syrian border, planning some form of an explosives
    attack on American soldiers.

    By April 22, especially in the time up to the annual Shiite
    pilgrimage in Iraq, thousands of Badr Brigades had entered Iraq as an
    Iranian proxy force. Entering from Kurdistan, they established base
    in areas of Baqubah in the Diyala region near Baghdad, while a second
    force established base in Nasariya, Najef and Karbala. Iran also
    ordered Hezballah, while Arafat ordered certain extremists under the
    supervision of the Palestinian Authority to enter Iraq so as to
    recruit and incite people amongst the crowds. Fortunately, there were
    only a few violent protests and minor bloodshed, and the plot to
    incite the Shiites into either bribing for overwhelming power in the
    government or to begin anti-American revolution had failed. This led
    to the beginning of the end of the power of the Supreme Assembly for
    the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which had hoped to win by democratic
    means.

    Mujahideen-e-Khalq, a terrorist group that opposes the Iranian
    regime, which disarmed and surrendered to the US and provided
    valuable intelligence, has confirmed all this. The group (which has
    not targeted civilians for many years) claims to have captured four
    of the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards in Nandalr, Iraq which
    had infiltrated with the goal to cooperate with the Badr Brigades to
    incite revolution. Immediately after, American officials confirmed
    that thousands of Iranian agents had been organizing anti-American
    demonstrations in Shiite towns, and had been assisting Hezballah
    political activities in the country.

    The failure to incite revolution led to, while still capitalizing on
    anti-American sentiment, Iranian forces to try to destabilize any
    type of post-war government. Beginning April 8th but continuing for
    the next few months, religious edicts were issued in Iran and in Iraq
    by clerics and mullahs on the extremist payroll, calling for Shiites
    to use all efforts to seize administrational jobs or to incite others
    to peacefully remove the American presence. Clerics in Najaf began
    funding and appointing clerics to cities, who are given
    responsibility to appoint officials that run everything from civil
    defense forces to civilian infrastructure construction. This even
    resulted in Coalition forces arresting a Shiite self-proclaimed
    mayor.

    Parts of this effort aim to have pro-Iran Shiites take power over
    pro-American Shiites and then to gain higher power, as the Shiites is
    the majority in Iraq. To do this, assassinations and intimidation of
    `unhelpful' Shiite leaders must occur to frighten the rivals. This
    tactic began on April 10th, with the assassination of Ayatollah Abdel
    Majid el-Khoei, believed to have been done by Iranian special agents.
    Disappointed with the incitement campaign, efforts resumed to win
    politically, by having favorable Shiites in critical centers of power
    in Iraq. During the first two weeks of May, approximately 2,000
    Iranian elite troops expanded the infiltration campaign to include 11
    Iraqi cities. In cooperation with the Badr Brigades, the extremists
    hoped to appoint mayors and governors in power to undermine US rule.
    The cities targeted included Karbala, Najef, Hillah, Kufah,
    Diwaniyah, Kut, Nasariya, and Amarah.

    Soon after, Iran set up four Arabic radio stations, hired hundreds of
    indoctrinated mullahs to go into major mosques, and began preparing
    for a sequel to the Lebanon episodes of the 1980s. Now, in July, Iran
    is using eight radio stations to incite attacks, while moving
    selected Hezballah and Al-Qaeda experts into northern Iraq to work
    alongside the Baathist militant resistance. Israeli intelligence has
    reported that Iran even sometimes does surveillance activities for
    these terrorists, including sending intelligence officers to
    investigate potential attacks on American command-and-control sites
    in the Gulf and warships. At Iran's disposal is said to be at least 5
    senior commanders of Al-Qaeda located in Tehran and Mashhad, and
    according to the unconfirmed report, about 1240 low and mid-ranking
    operatives associated with Bin Laden's forces.

    It is easy to mistake Iranian-backed Shiite attacks on Coalition
    forces for Baathist militants. It has been alleged this was the case
    in the killing of 6 British soldiers in Iraq, in a Shiite-dominated
    town said to have been infiltrated by Iranian agents, and occupied by
    the Shiite forces known as Badr Brigades and also the Supreme Council
    for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, an Iranian-backed umbrella
    organization of Shiite extremists.

    Like in Afghanistan, we see Iran overtly and covertly assisting
    elements loyal to terrorist forces of all kinds (Al-Qaeda,
    miscellaneous groups and foreign volunteer batches, even Baathist
    loyalists which have formed alliances with the Islamic radicals and
    terrorists). As presented, there seems to be a pattern with a cycle
    that is unlikely to be broken. The motive for Iran's government,
    Islamic revolution and the perceived threat of the United States in
    the region and in the world is one that will drive terrorism for a
    time to come. The only option to make is either to succumb to Iran's
    wishes, which would throw the USA out of the region, result in the
    destruction of Israel, and in further expansion of hostile elements,
    or to confront this threat in escalating fashion.

    Ryan Mauro has been a geopolitical analyst for Tactical Defense
    Concepts (www.tdconcepts.com), a maritime-associated security
    company, since 2002. In 2003, Mr. Mauro joined the Northeast
    Intelligence Network (www.homelandsecurityus.com), which specializes
    in tracking and assessing terrorist threats. He has been published in
    WorldNetDaily.com, Newsmax.com, StrategyPage.com, WorldTribune.com,
    HomelandSecurityUS.com, JRNyquist.com and in the Turkistan Newsletter
    (Turkistan Bulteni). He is a frequent writer for Milnet.com as well.
    He has appeared on radio shows including The Al Rantel Show, WIBG
    Radio, WorldNetDaily Radioactive with Joseph Farah, Jeff Nyquist
    Program, Kevin McCullough Show, Laurie Roth Show, Tovia Singer Show,
    Stan Major Show, and Preparedness Now. His book "Death to America:
    The Unreported Battle of Iraq" is scheduled to be published in the
    coming months. He publishes his own web site called World Threats.
    Mr. Mauro may be reached at [email protected]

    http://globalpolitician.com/articles.asp?ID=291&t=Iran+and+Osama%3A+Match+ Made+In+Hell
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