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ANKARA: The southern energy corridor in context (1)

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  • ANKARA: The southern energy corridor in context (1)

    http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load =detay&link=174538&bolum=101

    Today's Zaman
    May 7, 2009

    The southern energy corridor in context (1)


    A large-scale international conference in Budapest aimed at mobilizing
    tangible support for Nabucco, a genuine southern corridor project,
    despite the agonizing problems that have been stalling its progress,
    in particular the ambiguities over Nabucco's potential gas sources and
    financiers.

    On May 8 the "Southern Corridor -- New Silk Road" conference in
    Prague, launched by the European Union under the Czech presidency,
    will round off a series of summits in Budapest, Ashgabat and Sofia
    that started in January.

    Their different agendas notwithstanding, all of these conferences
    centered on future cooperation between producers, consumers and
    transporters for the reliable supply of natural gas to Europe, or, in
    other words, on which energy networks will deliver to Europe from
    which sources and via which pathways. Ironically, the summit will take
    place against the backdrop of European energy security and partnership
    embracing Russian involvement, which it was previously intended to
    balance. Whether the Turkish energy conduit will become a pivotal link
    in the "new silk road" is highly questionable due to the chain of
    developments this article aims to illuminate.

    Paradigm shift in the context of recent politics

    The first of its kind in the new year, the Budapest Summit (Jan.
    26-27, 2009) brought together high-level representatives from the
    Nabucco consortium (Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary and
    Romania), potential supplier countries (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq,
    Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), of transit nation Georgia (in the
    absence of the Iranian delegation), and the EU, as well as delegates
    from Russia and the United States. The large-scale international
    conference aimed at mobilizing tangible support for Nabucco, a genuine
    southern corridor project, despite the agonizing problems that have
    been stalling its progress, in particular the ambiguities over
    Nabucco's potential gas sources and financiers ("Nabucco pipeline or
    pipedream," Today's Zaman, Feb. 26, 2009). This, however, did not
    transpire, as the conference remained under the shadow of several
    events that reinforced the split among EU member states regarding
    differing levels of Russian gas dependency and energy security
    concepts.

    In March Nabucco was removed from the list of priority projects to be
    financed by a 5 billion euro EU stimulus plan. Instead, Nabucco was
    put under a more inclusive common title, "southern gas corridor,"
    which involves several other and partly more promising projects, such
    as Russia's South Stream. Against the backdrop of groundbreaking
    developments, the US proposed uniting Nabucco, South Stream and other
    projects into a larger "southern energy corridor" plan in order to
    create a friendly basis for Western-Russian cooperation on issues such
    as Iran's controversial nuclear program and Afghanistan. Similarly,
    key EU members such as Germany, France and Italy, backed off from
    funding an alternative gas bridge excluding and, presumably,
    antagonizing Russia. The new southern corridor concept is obviously
    founded on this substantially different approach to European energy
    affairs, and contradicts Turkey's plans to become an energy hub rather
    than a mere energy transit point with fixed fees.

    Russian foreign energy politics

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made two calls during his visit to
    Helsinki prior to the Sofia Energy Summit (April 24-25, 2009): first,
    for a new global security order (Helsinki Plus) mirroring the
    realities of a substantially changed and multi-polar international
    political system in which Russia has reclaimed its place as a
    re-emergent superpower; and secondly, for a "modern global energy
    supply system" based on Russia's "Conceptual Approach to the New Legal
    Framework for Energy Cooperation" that will appropriately reflect and
    "unconditionally" accept the current conditions under which Russia is
    and will try to remain the primary source, producer and exporter of
    energy, most notably natural gas. However, these two forays also
    reflect the powerful role that Russia's energy strategies will
    continue to play in fostering its impressive comeback in the broader
    regional political sphere, and Russian foreign policies will share in
    advancing energy priorities by virtue of their geopolitical dividends.


    The interdependence between Russian geopolitical engagement and energy
    interests was most evident in the Russo-Georgian conflict way ahead of
    the 2009 summits. Aside from its geopolitical implications, the
    Russian invasion of Georgia exposed the vulnerability of the southern
    energy corridor transporting gas from the Caspian region and the
    Middle East into Europe via Turkey and helping producers, transporters
    and consumers diversify their energy alternatives and improve their
    resilience to export/import risks. Hence, the war triggered a chain of
    intertwined developments further discrediting the viability of such a
    concept, if it is to bypass Russia in the future. For Georgia, which
    every once a while has been embroiled in gas supply and pricing
    disputes with Russia's energy giant, Gazprom, the continuation of
    alternative gas transfers into and through its territory is vital.
    >From the European perspective, Georgia represents the only non-Russian
    energy outlet for existing Caucasian and possible Central Asian
    natural gas exports, and thus is considered pivotal for supply
    diversification. Likewise, Turkey attaches great importance to the
    Georgian conduit for several reasons.


    First of all, the Georgian conduit helps Turkey diversify own its gas
    import routes and foreign sources. Blue Stream is the only Russian
    pipeline delivering gas to Turkey. But considering its capacity for
    supplying 64 percent of Turkey's total annual gas demand (BP
    Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008) the Russian pipeline plays
    an immense role in tying Turkey to Russian influence. The utility of
    decreasing Russia's involvement in Turkey's energy equation, and
    easing Turkey's vulnerability to possible far-reaching repercussions
    that its over-dependency could imply, is just one aspect of the
    significance of the Georgian transit route. Other than that, Georgia
    is the only viable passage for potential Central Asian gas to feed the
    planned Nabucco pipeline, and other projects on the way to
    establishing a secure southern energy network. A non-Russian gas
    conduit would inevitably traverse Turkish networks, rendering it an
    indispensable ring in the future European energy supply chain. A
    Georgia subject to the coercive policies of a resurgent Russia
    complicates future energy transfer plans for Turkey, which does not
    border Azerbaijan or any of its other resource-rich Central Asian
    kinsmen. It also annuls the chances for establishing a secure and
    stable gas corridor without Russia's blessings.


    Iran is an economically and geographically viable option, as a future
    source and transit route for a non-Russian Southern Corridor, but not
    politically. Iranian populist rhetoric, at least until the general
    elections in June this year, will hamper Western rapprochement
    efforts, and thus possible solutions to the unsolved Iranian nuclear
    issue. In its most recent report the International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA) could not provide credible assurance about the absence
    of possible military dimensions to Iran's program. Additionally, the
    US State Department released its 2008 report on state sponsors of
    terrorism, which identifies Iran as "the most active state sponsor of
    terrorism" and a major destabilizing factor in the Middle East and
    Afghanistan. Without a mutually convincing solution for these
    important matters, it is unlikely that the US and the EU would want to
    equip Iran with vital leverage over Europe's energy security.


    By virtue of bordering Azerbaijan and Turkey, landlocked and
    impoverished Armenia would be an alternative to Georgia. Supply routes
    via Armenia would be shorter, and thus would pull down pipeline costs,
    which have been a huge barrier to Nabucco's realization. But bilateral
    relations had come to a deadlock when Turkey, on its own initiative,
    closed its borders with Armenia in 1993 in support of Azerbaijan and
    in retaliation against Armenian atrocities in and occupation of
    Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan's borders with Armenia remain closed as
    well.


    Turkish President Abdullah Gül's visit to Armenia last year was the
    product of cautious preparations for rapprochement that started last
    June. However, intentions for normalization of strained relations and
    partial reopening of borders for trade must also be considered in the
    light of the Russian-Georgian conflict, and the urgency it created on
    the part of Turkey to seek alternative energy lines to landlocked
    Caucasian gas. But sensibilities on all sides concerned cut off
    prospects of restoring full diplomatic ties quickly. Turkey's
    announcement in October that improved bilateral relations with Armenia
    would give conflict resolution efforts a new impetus, fueled
    Azerbaijan's concerns, since thawed relations and open borders would
    neutralize Azerbaijan's leverage over Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh
    issue. The blurry Armenian-Turkish Roadmap toward the gradual
    normalization of strained relations was certainly a move to preempt
    any US acceptance of Armenian genocide claims on April 24, when
    Armenians mark the 1915 events they believe constituted genocide.
    Despite Turkey's recent overtures toward Azerbaijan to tie
    Armenian-Turkish rapprochement to Azerbaijani sensibilities and to a
    separate Armenian-Azerbaijani détente, prospects of entering into a
    win-win trilateral energy dialogue are quite bleak for the medium
    term. Russia's involvement as mediator is more of a setback than a
    step forward in the standoff.


    Divide et impera


    The spat between Iran and the West has mainly helped expand and foster
    Russian energy hegemony over gas supply and pricing, its monopoly over
    European markets and monopsony in the broader resource-rich region.
    With a view to preempting future Iranian involvement in Europe's
    energy projects as an alternative to Russia, Moscow suggested that
    Iran and Qatar form a "gas troika" in October of last year. The main
    beneficiary, however, would be Russia's state-steered Gazprom, the
    world's third-largest energy company, with an already overwhelming
    amount of control over the production, marketing and transportation of
    gas beyond Russia's traditional sphere of influence. From this
    perspective, trilateral talks on a Russian initiative involving
    Armenia and Azerbaijan since November 2008 cannot be interpreted as an
    effort to contribute to the restoration of good neighborly relations
    between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. This would not be in the
    interest of Russia, since Russia has more to gain from their division.
    The November talks are based on an Armenian-Russian cooperation
    agreement for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in June
    2008, on the sidelines of which a more significant bilateral deal had
    been inked to extend the scope of military and energy cooperation. The
    same deal was extended to Azerbaijan in September 2008.


    Since 2003 Gazprom has been the only gas supplier for Armenia, the
    power generation sector of which is totally dependent on gas
    purchases. The company previously had a 45 percent stake in Armenia's
    major energy concern, ArmRosGazprom, and controlled the distribution,
    transportation and marketing of gas in Armenia together with Armenia's
    Energy Ministry (45 percent) and yet another Russian energy group,
    Itera (10 percent). Upon the implementation of an energy cooperation
    deal from March 2006, which stipulated ArmRosGazprom's acquisition of
    a series of important gas facilities and its planned investments in
    Armenia's power sector, Gazprom expanded its share in the internal
    energy market at the expense of the Armenian share. By buying off
    Itera's ownership in the joint venture (March 2009), Gazprom now owns
    80 percent of ArmRosGazprom, leaving a mere 20 percent under Armenian
    control. In April 2006 Armenia sold its section of the
    Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline to Russia, locking in prices for cheap
    Russian fuel ($100 per 1,000 cubic centimeters) until this year, but
    more importantly, locking itself out of the only alternative gas
    supply route. Russia's response to the recent Turkish-Armenian thaw
    came immediately after Turkey and Armenia announced their roadmap plan
    on April 22. ArmRosGazprom spokeswoman Shushan Sardaryan announced
    last week that Russian gas supply to fully dependent Armenia would be
    halted from April 23 to 26 for "maintenance work."


    Russia had been the sole gas supplier to Azerbaijan until 2007. Today
    Azerbaijan is referred to as the most likely first supplier for the
    controversial Nabucco project. A milestone in breaking off
    Azerbaijan's reliance on Russian exports and realizing the southern
    corridor concept had been the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC),
    and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (BTE), which currently
    supply Azeri oil and gas to Turkey and on to Europe. However, British
    Petroleum (BP) was forced to completely shut down the oil pipeline as
    Russian jets targeted it during a bombing raid near Tbilisi in August
    2008.


    Already in June, prior to Russia's Georgia offensive and Turkey's
    Armenian venture, Gazprom had made its plans public to buy off
    Azerbaijan's gas from Shah Deniz's second development phase paying
    market prices ($400 per 1,000 cubic meters). Russia had been able to
    win over Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in March to trade off
    their strategic assets at European prices. Azerbaijan had resisted
    Russian persuasion efforts, while explicitly arguing that it would
    consider selling its second phase Shah Deniz gas to Russia if it
    continued to trump other offers and, implicitly, if Europe lacked the
    political will to push ahead with alternative plans. Finally, Russia
    has been able to clinch a crucial deal with Azerbaijan, which
    stipulates negotiations on long-term gas supplies to Russia at market
    prices beginning in 2010. The deal can be traced back to the Russia's
    Georgia offensive, which produced a substantial shift in the European
    southern corridor concept, embracing Russian projects as well, and
    which inevitably accelerated the pace of Turkish-Armenian
    rapprochement at Azerbaijan's understandable dismay.


    * Bala Çelebi Þentürk is an energy strategy analyst who can be reached
    at [email protected].

    07 May 2009, Thursday
    BALA ÇELEBÝ ÞENTÜRK*

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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