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  • Can Europe Do Away With Nationalism?

    CAN EUROPE DO AWAY WITH NATIONALISM?
    By Emanuele Ottolenghi

    American Enterprise Institute
    http://www.aei.org/outlook/22572
    May 6 2009

    A united Europe should encourage the use of local nationalisms as an
    instrument of integration and social cohesion.

    A united Europe is not far from becoming reality. A European identity
    that transcends the national identities of Europe's member states,
    however, is still a distant dream. But Europe's rapidly changing
    demographics cannot wait for this dream to come true. Identity is
    a crucial component of social cohesion, and the rapid influx of
    immigrants, mainly from the Muslim world, demands a choice: Should
    immigrants be encouraged to integrate into the national cultures and
    identities of the EU member states? Or should Europe instead pursue
    a multicultural model, in which patriotism is discouraged in favor
    of a society divided by different identities, values, and historical
    narratives, but united by abstract rights and duties under EU treatises
    and regulations? Is a third way available, a common European identity
    for all Europeans, old-timers and newcomers alike, that can transcend
    narrower communal loyalties to find a new common home? And if a
    third way were possible, what kind of European identity would it
    yield anyway, given the post-national utopian vision on which Europe
    is built?

    Europeans need a mobilizing myth now more than ever if they want
    to successfully confront the double challenge of transforming an
    ever-expanding union into a coherent polity while successfully
    integrating an unprecedented wave of immigration, mainly from
    the Muslim world. A common European myth is still lacking. Local
    nationalisms are such readily available vehicles of identity. A united
    Europe should encourage their use as an instrument of integration
    and social cohesion.

    The Question of European Identity

    While the institutional framework of a united Europe inexorably
    marches on, the fabric of a shared supranational European identity
    lags behind. Yet, the realization that this identity is badly needed
    should be obvious if one looks deeper into the founding principles
    of the European ethos. The preamble to the EU Constitution proclaims
    that, "While remaining proud of their own national identities and
    history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their
    former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common
    destiny."[1] There is no common destiny, however, unless there is
    a sense of cohesion. A common identity promotes it, but a united
    Europe, for the time being, rests only on vague notions of rights
    and prosperity at home and peaceful internationalism abroad.

    Post-1945 Europe views itself morally bound to create a peaceful
    and prosperous society that will forever ban war: first from the
    continent, then from the world. To achieve this goal, Europe wants
    to do away with nationalism. Europe considers nationalism the main
    cause of its troubled past: it bloodied the continent until the
    defeat of Nazism gave way--no doubt under the benign protection of
    the American umbrella--to a post-nationalist European Union where
    war is forever banned and peaceful trade and diplomacy have become
    the sole instruments of power relations in the world. If nationalism
    caused Europe's twentieth-century tragedies, rejection of nationalism
    engendered Europe's post-1945 age of unity and prosperity: hence
    the exhortation to transcend nationalism in the name of a common
    European vision, which the preamble aptly characterizes as "united
    in diversity."

    This view is reinforced by "influential intellectual trends in the
    advanced world that deny the legitimacy of nationalism altogether as an
    atavistic concept. Their adherents regard nationalism as an obstacle
    to human rights, international harmony and economic rationality."[2]
    Replacing communism after its abject failure, this new internationalist
    doctrine quickly dismisses nationalism as a genuine and authentic
    force and portrays it as a concocted identity. In this view, elites
    selectively (and consciously) tap into an often imagined past to forge
    a group identity based on a powerful mobilizing myth. Opponents of
    nationalism see nations as Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities,"
    not modern elaborations of pre-existing identities; either way, for its
    critics, nationalism is not only an intellectually flawed construct,
    but also a dangerous force:[3] whether one imagines it or not, it
    is the wrong kind of imagination. The push for a united Europe is
    animated by this view: self-styled Europhiles support abandoning old
    allegiances in favor of an identity built exclusively on a doctrine
    of rights, the abating of frontiers, and the triumph of a common
    market. Nationalism, in their view, invariably begets brownshirts.

    If Europe actively discourages nationalism and the identities that gave
    rise to it, can it offer an alternative? Pan-European nationalism, even
    if based on a narrative that transcends the small confines of local
    identities, would still be a variant of nationalism and unquestionably
    an artifact of powerful elites. Besides, a pan-European national
    identity hardly exists, and it still awaits the laborious input of
    those intellectuals clamoring for one to arise. Can the peoples of
    Europe transcend their local identities and forge a common destiny
    based only on abstract values? As the editor of the British magazine
    Prospects, David Goodhart, put it, "Modern liberal societies cannot
    be based on a simple assertion of group identity--the very idea of
    the rule of law, of equal legal treatment for everyone regardless of
    religion, wealth, gender or ethnicity, conflicts with it."[4] Yet,
    at a very basic level, humans need to identify. As Goodhart notes,
    abstract notions of common humanity and universal values clash everyday
    with the choices public institutions must make--on welfare distribution
    and public funding of education, on health care and foreign aid. In
    making these choices, priorities are often based on identity. It
    follows that more narrowly based national identities still matter
    in Europe. They are more compelling to people than a European set
    of symbols and institutions that only a few recognize as truly their
    own. But the purveyors of the post-national ethos on which a united
    Europe is being built are doing everything in their power to chastise
    patriotism and national identity within the member states:

    The "European Idea" rests somewhat more openly upon hostility to
    European nations and their national identities. Its justifying claim
    is that the European Union has overcome the shameful legacy of the
    European nations that were responsible for two world wars and threaten
    the peace of the Balkans today.[5]

    Opposition to local national identities as both flawed and dangerous
    is not necessarily going to offer a compelling alternative, even
    after the amazing lure of European citizenship and the benefits it
    offers are taken into account:

    Citizenship is not an ethnic, blood-and-soil concept, but a more
    abstract idea--implying equal legal, political and social rights (and
    duties) for people inhabiting a given national space. But citizenship
    is not just an abstract idea about rights and duties; for most of us
    it is something we do not choose but are born into--it arises out of
    a shared history, shared experiences and, often, shared suffering.[6]

    Yet, Europe seeks to replace local identities with an abstract
    "European idea," actively advocating the disposal of a powerful vehicle
    for integration and social cohesion at a time when the arrival of large
    numbers of immigrants from foreign shores and alien cultures demands
    a vigorous policy of integration. Abstract notion though it may be,
    the question of European identity is not an abstract exercise in lofty
    utopian philosophy. For a polity to function, one needs its people to
    be united by the bonds of citizenship before they are divided by the
    conflicting loyalties of partisan politics. But citizenship cannot be
    made of abstract laws alone. It is built on shared values as much as
    shared memories. To command loyalty, Europe needs to be more than a
    geographical extension of territory that bestows rights to those who
    happen to inhabit it and castigates those holding onto allegiances
    considered both historically obsolete and socially pernicious,
    especially since those allegiances may hold the key to Europe's
    successful integration of its growing immigrant communities.

    Europe's effort to replace local national identities with a European
    idea devoid of nationalism is thus a serious mistake. Ideally,
    Europe's political project would need a nationalism of its own that
    was potent enough to give its citizens a sense of shared history as
    much as of shared destiny. That in itself would be an arduous task:
    "Pre-existing loyalties are an obstacle to any new political identity
    that is striving to assert itself."[7] Some of the crucial elements of
    a national identity are sorely lacking--there is no common language,
    there is no common history, there are few powerful unifying myths to
    which Europe can turn to as a way to inspire its masses, and aside
    from the promises of material wealth that Europe grants its citizens,
    there is no sense of a common destiny uniting the peoples of Europe. If
    anything, there is apathy in the face of unification--only 42 percent
    of Spaniards participated in the referendum on the EU Constitution--and
    fear at the prospects of further enlargement, as emotional responses
    to Turkey's possible accession to Europe indicate. The only glue
    that seems to cement Europe and mobilize people is anti-Americanism
    and the fantasy of a European superpower bent on taming America,[8]
    hardly a promising foundation for "European-ness." What remains is
    the very nationalism Europe's post-national utopia wants to dispose
    of. If its more virulent strains are kept at bay, nationalism might
    still offer the key to integration.

    Dilemmas of Identity and Integration

    Europe is not promoting a new, broader European nationalism. It is
    discouraging all forms of nationalism. And even if a new European
    identity were high on the agenda of its leaders, identities, no
    matter how artificially construed they are, are still a product of
    long histories, not laboratory experiments, elaborate international
    treatises, and Brussels seminars.

    Thus, in its devotion to an abstract notion of European identity that
    is devoid of any nationalist or patriotic tinge, Europe is creating
    an impossible dilemma that is liable to tear the very fabric of the
    European project.

    The weakening of national identities--and the lack of a meaningful
    and more inclusive replacement--means that new immigrants have no
    compelling identity to embrace. The success of their integration
    relies exclusively on societies' ability to show inclusiveness
    based on abstract notions of common humanity, something that,
    given Europe's historical record of minorities' treatment and recent
    record of interethnic relations, does not offer a solid foundation. As
    national identities are pushed to the margins, their ability to command
    loyalty will wane and lose their appeal to immigrants who have little
    inclination to feel "British" or "French" or "Belgian" when old-timers
    themselves and the society around them discourages such identification
    in the first place. But lacking a strong pan-European alternative
    identity that immigrants can embrace, newcomers are likely to turn
    to their ethnic and religious backgrounds as their primary identities.

    This problem is particularly acute because while Europe is slowly
    developing into a politically unified continent, with a shared
    currency, a coordinated foreign policy, joint institutions, open
    borders, and a free movement of workers and goods--all means
    to transcend local identities and forge a sense of a new common
    destiny--Europe is also absorbing an unprecedented wave of immigrants
    from the Arab and Muslim worlds. Both trends present formidable
    challenges: Can Europe convince Latvians and Portuguese, Poles and
    Greeks alike to see themselves first and foremost as Europeans and
    identify with the political institutions and values of a united
    Europe? Can this identity appeal enough to Muslim immigrants to
    overcome their strong ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds
    and to help them integrate within the fabric of Europe? And are the
    Europeans ready to fully welcome an alien culture in their midst?

    Critics of nationalism are quick to dismiss it as an exclusive
    ideology. In an age of globalization and universal human rights,
    doctrines of exclusion have a hard time selling. No doubt, to command
    loyalty from newcomers, societies need to be inclusive. No doubt,
    nationalism may manifest intolerant strains and, if too narrowly
    defined, can engender exclusion. But inclusion cannot be achieved
    at the price of renouncing collective identity: not only would that
    be a humiliating act of cultural self-negation, but it would also
    be counterproductive. Newcomers would be left without a tool to
    encourage their integration into their host societies. Old-timers,
    feeling threatened in their core allegiances, would react by resorting
    to stronger versions of their nationalism, something that is already
    happening across Europe with the rise of anti-immigration parties
    and the swelling of xenophobic incidents.

    Renouncing nationalism would deprive societies of a vital component
    of social cohesion, namely a common narrative both old-timers and
    newcomers can relate to and identify with. No doubt, in an age of
    increased diversity within societies, Europe needs to encourage the
    expansion of its boundaries of inclusion while at the same time
    recognizing that its commitment to liberal universal values need
    not be so broad as to become meaningless. Ultimately though, people
    still need to identify and feel they belong. Identity matters, and the
    future of Europe will largely depend on which identity will ultimately
    command the allegiance and loyalty of Europe's citizens. This is
    a task that member states and their national identities are better
    equipped to perform.

    Therein emerges Europe's central challenge of the day: Europe's
    institutions and leaders make opposition to nationalism central
    to European integration. This opposition may generate two opposite
    but equally dangerous types of reaction. Muslim immigrants have no
    incentive to develop an allegiance to their home countries in Europe
    because Europe discourages that behavior and the general social
    tendency is to denigrate nationalism and patriotism as forms of
    reactionary and dangerous ideologies. They might turn to Islam instead
    as a result. Old-timers who prize their ethnic and national allegiances
    may react to the pressures of Europe's post-national utopia by seeing a
    causal correlation between immigration and loss of national identity,
    with the consequent anti-immigrant backlash. The push for a Europe
    devoid of nationalism might ironically beget a Europe where unbridled
    nationalism and radical Islam will ultimately clash.

    Denigrating national identity leaves another question unsolved. Lacking
    a real, rather than artificial, imaginary European "common destiny,"
    can people coexist in societies that offer no cohesive identity? The
    answer is no. Faced with unprecedented immigration from the Muslim
    world, Europe is not offering its newcomers a European equivalent of
    the American dream with its powerful mix of liberal rules and national
    narratives that form the American way to patriotism.

    Islam's history should also offer a cautionary tale. The historical
    track record of Islam is not one of inclination to assimilate. European
    Muslim communities live for the first time as minorities in a
    society that encourages them to take residence and citizenship while
    granting them the freedom to remain culturally alien to the host
    country. Meanwhile, integration has largely failed, as Euro-Muslims are
    underrepresented among the cultural, economic, and political elites,
    and over-represented among prison inmates and the unemployed across
    Europe. One of the central and most urgent challenges for Europe will
    be to promote their integration. In a continent of close to 500 million
    citizens and twenty-five countries, there are today approximately 15
    million Muslims. In twenty years, with European demographic trends
    showing little growth, the size of Europe's Muslim minority will
    rise significantly--in both absolute and relative terms. A return
    to strong national identities within member states is the immediate
    answer. Nationalism can be conjugated with liberal values; Europe can
    live with both universal rights and local identities; and its citizens
    can feel loyalty and commitment to, and appreciation of, both their
    local national identity and a broader sense of "being Europeans."

    Integrating Islam?

    Related to the success of the above vision is the answer to a pressing
    question in Europe today: what identity will Euro-Muslims ultimately
    embrace? Varied geographic origins still account for marked differences
    among them, but as time passes their ties with their lands of origin
    could fade. Both Islam and more ominously its radical variant are
    competing for the primary loyalty of Euro-Muslims. That prize must be
    won over by their host-societies instead. In the absence of successful
    absorption policies, the alternative to a weak and unappealing
    European identity will increasingly be Islam. The mosque will offer
    a meeting point for immigrant communities to mingle and share the two
    elements they have in common--the immigrant experience and Islam--in
    their efforts, and often in their failure, to fully integrate into
    Europe. If radicals gain control of mosques, their primary goal will
    be to heighten grievances and channel them to violent action.

    Islam has always been a key component to Muslims, both within and
    outside the Arab world. But as Steven Simon argues, while religious
    allegiance competed with other loyalties in the past, "Muslims are
    now increasingly inclined to stress their religious identity over
    other affiliations, whether citizenship, tribe or class."[9] Simon
    also suggests that "this globalisation of Muslim identity is helping
    to fuel a revival of a shared interest in which North Africans are
    more likely to identify with the struggles of Muslims in Central
    Asia and European Muslims with conflicts in the Middle East."[10]
    This should worry Europeans. In the post-9/11 and 3/11 era, a key
    component of this global Muslim identity--which travels fast through
    Internet and satellite TV, making Muslims in Marseille and Brixton,
    Jakarta and Jedda, Cairo and Mazara del Vallo all members of a virtual
    global community--is a sense of grievance toward the West and a feeling
    that Western nations and Western values are at war against Islam.[11]

    Identification with Muslim causes abroad goes hand in hand with a
    sense of grievance for Muslim issues at home. Since 9/11, a string
    of high-profile incidents in Europe heightened public awareness to
    the risk that radical Islam poses to the fabric of Europe. For many,
    the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004 became
    a symbol of the simmering "clash of civilizations" that is about to
    play out in Europe's restless suburbia. Others have interpreted the
    clash over the headscarf in France as a sign that Islam can hardly
    be assimilated into French mainstream. And while other episodes
    have earned less attention, the list is long. Nevertheless, such
    high-profile incidents obscure a harder truth. At a socioeconomic
    level, Muslims have failed to integrate, and Europe has fallen short
    of absorbing them into the mainstream:

    In less than a decade, there has been a radical shift in France's
    prison population, a shift that officials and experts say poses
    a monumental challenge. Despite making up only 10 percent of the
    population, Muslims account for most of the country's inmates
    and a growing percentage of the prison populations in many other
    European countries, an indication of their place at the bottom of
    the Continent's hierarchy.[12]

    Recent reports agree that this phenomenon poses three troublesome
    challenges. A disproportionate Muslim component among criminals is a
    reflection of a failure to integrate (and be integrated); the growing
    Muslim prison population is targeted by radical Islam as a recruiting
    ground for potential terror operatives;[13] and the growing resentment
    of imprisoned Muslims over lack of proper services to the Muslim
    prison population spills over to Muslims outside prison, as lack of
    concern for Muslim inmates and their religious needs is seen as a
    reflection of a broader social neglect of Muslims.[14] An explosive
    cocktail emerges: "The growing Muslim prison population is evidence
    of an Islamic underclass that is developing across Europe and, at
    its margins, is increasingly sympathetic to the coalescing ideologies
    of political Islam," a French scholar of Islam recently told the New
    York Times.[15] This difficulty is compounded by the lack, so far, of
    a locally bred version of Islam that is at ease with European values
    and culture: "France has 1,200 imams, or preachers, of which more than
    one third don't speak French and about 75 percent are foreigners who
    remain ignorant of French culture."[16] Efforts are underway across
    Europe to address this issue, but the underlying problem remains:
    a growing sense of alienation that is the product of both a sense of
    socio-economic inequality and a lack of an appealing identity.

    That Euro-Muslims and mainstream European values may be at loggerheads
    is further demonstrated by the recent refusal by several mainstream
    Muslim associations across Europe to participate in Holocaust Memorial
    Day commemorations on January 27, 2005.

    Holocaust remembrance is a central theme to a new European identity
    slowly taking shape in the continent. It affirms a commitment to
    memory, a rejection of violence, and a dedication to pluralism
    and respect for minorities. It could reasonably become part of the
    shared European legacy on which "European-ness" may develop over
    time. Since 2001, January 27 has been an official day of remembrance,
    where government officialdom and civil society join to pay tribute
    to the dead and pledge never again to foster the culture that made
    Auschwitz possible on European soil.

    This year though, representatives for the Muslim Council of Britain
    (MCB), the Union of French Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF),
    the Union of Italian Muslims (UMI), and the Union of Islamic
    Communities and Organizations of Italy (UCOII) refused to attend
    official commemorations.[17] The UOIF leader, Lhaj Thami Breze,
    and the head of the MCB, Iqbal Sacranie, expressly chose not to
    attend commemorations, arguing that Holocaust Memorial Day was not
    inclusive and therefore not worthy of their presence. Objecting to
    the uniqueness of the Jewish genocide, Sacranie supported instead a
    "Genocide Memorial Day," where all victims of genocides, past and
    present, would be commemorated,[18] and where "peace with justice"
    was to be promoted for those continuing to suffer in the world,
    especially "in Palestine":

    In order to help ensure that such crimes against humanity do not recur
    and repeat themselves we believe that the Memorial Day can better be
    observed by making it inclusive to cover the ongoing mass killings
    and human rights abuses around the world, notably, in the occupied
    Palestinian Territories, Chechnya and Kashmir and also recent mass
    killings and genocide on Bosnia, Kosova and Rwanda. Genocide is the
    most abhorrent and outrageous crime and we are not going to prevent
    it by selectively remembering only some of its victims.[19]

    This argument was disingenuous: as alleged victims of genocide,
    Sacranie mentioned only Palestinians, Chechnyans, and Kashmiris, the
    three emotional issues feeding into a strong sense of pan-Islamic
    grievance within Europe and across the Islamic world. As genocides
    past and present, he quoted Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. His agenda
    thus was clear both in its sins of omission and of commission.

    Omission of Armenia and Sudan from the list of genocides past
    and present aimed to shroud in silence those two tragedies where
    the murderers were (and still are) Muslim armies and Muslim
    governments. Mention of Palestine as a place where genocide is
    allegedly taking place is a trivialization of the Holocaust that
    also borders on denial. Inclusion of Bosnia and Kosovo--where ethnic
    cleansing on a large scale took place--Kashmir--where interethnic
    conflict is happening--and Chechnya--where vast human rights abuses
    and massacres still do not amount to genocide--is meant to blur all
    differences and make all suffering become genocide.

    Blurring differences and omitting tragedies is meant to cloak
    Muslims in a mantle of victimization and to force Europe to accept
    such distortions for the sake of accommodation. But those who pursue
    this line are sorely mistaken. Refusal to recognize the Holocaust
    as central to Europe's painful past and to its new identity will
    only broaden the already worrisome gap between Europe and its Muslim
    minorities and their alienation from the mainstream.

    Fortunately, not all of Europe's Muslim leaders agreed with the MCB. In
    fact, many condemned, criticized, or contradicted their decision. Dalil
    Boubakeur, the head of the French Council for Muslim Faith (CFCM)
    attended a commemoration ceremony in Paris. Mario Scialoja, Italy's
    representative for the World Muslim League expressed strongly worded
    criticism at the MCB's stance, and many Imams in Italy rejected
    the positions taken by the UCOII and the UMI and joined in the
    commemorations.

    Finally, Albania, a European secular Muslim nation, was the first
    Muslim country to pass legislation making January 27 an official
    day of remembrance of the Holocaust. Official ceremonies in Tirana
    were well attended, and Albania's prime minister flew to Auschwitz
    to attend the sixtieth anniversary official commemorations.

    National Identity as a Tool of Integration

    Turning Europe's national identities into instruments of social
    cohesion is not a lost cause. Neither is Islam in Europe. But both can
    become so if Muslims are left to be an easy prey to radical Islam. Deep
    divisions and the cultural alienation of Muslim minorities, if left
    unchecked, may threaten the very fabric of Europe. This trend must
    be countenanced--the future of Europe is at stake. For integration
    to succeed, promoting moderate Islam is not enough; narrowing
    socioeconomic inequalities is also not enough. Both are necessary
    steps Europe and European Muslim leaders--secular and religious
    alike--must undertake in close cooperation. But as an overarching
    and transnational Muslim identity grows, no countervailing force
    is yet on the horizon. Currently, Europe discourages integrationist
    policies, offering only a stark alternative between assimilationism
    and multiculturalism. There are grave consequences to this state of
    affairs: "Large numbers of [young Muslims] believe they are Muslims
    first and European citizens only as a matter of administrative
    necessity rather than cultural allegiance."[20] If Islam, and not
    Europe, commands the allegiance of young Euro-Muslims, how will this
    serve the fabric of Europe?

    Herein emerges the challenge of identity in Europe today. While
    Europe actively discourages nationalism and patriotism, it does not
    offer a strong pan-European identity and a successful and functioning
    model for harmonious integration. It is imperative for Europe to turn
    Euro-Muslims into fully integrated Europeans, living in harmony with
    other groups within European societies and fully sharing a common
    identity. In order for Europe to succeed, European institutions and
    governments must realize that if the European project cannot offer a
    compelling common identity--shared values for all citizens of Europe
    old and new--a set of compelling alternatives must be provided
    instead. Failure to provide a European identity that creates the
    conditions for a common citizenship based on shared values would
    create a vacuum for narrower identities to reassert themselves.

    Hence, Europe must realize that nationalism is not necessarily a
    force of evil. Identities matter, as they form the indispensable
    glue that cements societies. Unless European elites can confidently
    say that a new ready-made pan-European identity is in the making--an
    artificial blend of symbols, narratives, and memories that will somehow
    appeal to almost 500 million citizens of twenty-five countries--they
    should be careful about the consequences of abandoning nationalism
    and ponder instead the need to both strengthen national identities
    and encourage Muslim immigrants to identify with their newly adopted
    countries. National identity is not only a dividing force: it can
    be a powerful tool of integration. And nowhere is integration needed
    more than in Europe today, as the continent is set to see its Muslim
    minority more than double in the course of the next two decades.

    Emanuele Ottolenghi is the Leone Ginzburg Research Fellow in Israeli
    Law, Politics, and Society at St. Antony's College, Oxford. He
    contributed this essay during a sabbatical term spent at AEI in the
    winter of 2005.

    Notes

    1. European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
    preamble, 10.

    2. John O'Sullivan, "In Defense of Nationalism," The National Interest,
    no. 78 (Winter 2004-2005): 33-40.

    3. Ibid.

    4. David Goodhart, "Discomfort with Strangers," Guardian (London),
    February 24, 2004.

    5. Ibid.

    6. Ibid.

    7. O'Sullivan, "In Defense of Nationalism."

    8. Juergen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, "El 15 febrero o lo que une
    a los europeos," El País, June 4, 2003.

    9. Steven Simon, "Unavoidable Clash of Islam and the West?" Newsweek
    Polska, January 23, 2005.

    10. Ibid.

    11. Ibid.

    12. Craig S. Smith, "Growing Muslim Prison Population Poses Huge
    Risks; France's Struggle with Radical Islam," New York Times, December
    9, 2004.

    13. Renwick McLean, "Terrorists Recruiting in Prisons; Common Criminals
    in Spain Transformed into Islamic Militants," International Herald
    Tribune, November 1, 2004.

    14. Ibid.

    15. Ibid.

    16. Claude Salhani, "Europe's Tolerance under Stress," United Press
    International, December 9, 2004.

    17. Muslim Council of Britain, "Muslim Council of Britain and
    the Holocaust Memorial Day," January 23, 2005; available through
    www.mcb.org.uk.

    18. Iqbal Sacranie, letter to the editor, Guardian, January
    27, 2005. Sacranie writes: "The view held by the MCB since the
    inception of Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001 is that the subtext of
    the Memorial Day--'Never Again'--is diluted by the exclusive nature
    of the event. The memorial day would in our opinion be better served
    by covering the ongoing mass killings and human rights abuses in our
    world, and thus make the cry 'Never Again' real for all people who
    suffer, even now."

    19. Muslim Council of Britain, "Muslim Council of Britain Statement
    on Holocaust Memorial Day," January 24, 2005; available through
    www.mcb.org.uk.

    20. Simon, "Unavoidable Clash."
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