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US - TURKEY PARTNERSHIP: COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS - TESTIMONY: IAN LESSER
CQ Congressional Testimony
May 14, 2009 Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
TESTIMONY-BY: DR. IAN O. LESSER, SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW
AFFILIATION: GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Statement of Dr. Ian O. Lesser Senior Transatlantic Fellow German
Marshall Fund of the United States
Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe
May 14, 2009
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to be with you today and to share some thoughts on
the state of US-Turkish relations and next steps.
This discussion takes place at an important moment in a relationship
often - and correctly - described as "strategic." After eight years
of pronounced strain in relations with Turkey, President Obama's
April 2009 visit to Ankara and Istanbul has changed the style of our
engagement with Turkey. In his speech to the Turkish parliament, and in
other settings, the President managed to convey genuine appreciation
for Turkey's regional role, and sensitivity to Turkey's own national
interests. To be sure, the President went to Turkey with a set of
requests and preferences, not least on Afghanistan and Iran, and the
President's remarks in Turkey touched on some sensitive issues. But
the difficult discourse of the post-2001 period seems to have been set
aside in an effort to repair America's very badly damaged image with
the Turkish public and policymakers, and a pervasive climate of mutual
suspicion. In the wake of the visit, leaderships on both sides should
look to turn this public diplomacy success to operational advantage.
Both sides should have reasonable expectations. Observers sometimes
characterize the relationship during the Clinton Administration
as a "lost golden age" in US-Turkish relations. Despite the often
troubled relations in recent years, and especially since the Iraq
War, it is important to recognize that the bilateral relationship
has had many periods of real strain, not least in the mid 1990s with
frictions over human rights, northern Iraq, strategy against the PKK,
Cyprus, Aegean stability and other issues. In other critical areas,
including the Balkans and Afghanistan, cooperation with Ankara has
been excellent. On the big picture issues of Turkey-EU relations,
energy security, relations with Russia, and stability in the Middle
East, bilateral relations continue to be "strategic" in the sense
that cooperation between the US and Turkey is essential to the policy
objectives of both sides.
The fact that President Obama scheduled a visit to Turkey so early
in his Administration is significant. Just as significant is the fact
that the visit came as part of a high-profile European tour. Symbolism
counts for a good deal in relations with Ankara, and in this case,
the geopolitical symbolism of visiting Turkey after the G-20 meeting
in London and the NATO Summit in Strasbourg was meaningful. In
subtle ways, the nature of the itinerary has shaped interpretations
of the visit. Many of the key topics on the bilateral agenda may
have been Middle Eastern or Eurasian - Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict - but the policy dialogue in Ankara and
Istanbul was a dialogue with a transatlantic partner. The importance
of this can be demonstrated by a simple thought experiment: imagine
the discussion that would have surrounded a presidential visit to
Turkey as part of a Middle Eastern tour - Riyadh, Baghdad, Cairo,
Jerusalem and Ankara.
An itinerary of this kind might be useful at the working level, but it
would have sent a very different message about the overall character of
US-Turkish relations and Turkey's place in transatlantic institutions.
The US faces three parallel challenges in managing and recalibrating
the relationship with Turkey. First, we must address accumulated
problems of style and perception in the relationship. Second, we need
to address specific, near-term policy issues where US and Turkish
priorities could be more closely aligned. Third, we should understand
and anticipate some longer-term, structural issues affecting the
relationship, including Turkey's own trajectory and future dynamics
in US- Turkish-EU relations.
The Public Diplomacy Challenge
The German Marshall Fund of the United States and others have charted
the marked decline in Turkish public attitudes toward the US in
recent years.1 The scope for revitalizing relations with Ankara will
be determined, in large measure, by the new Administration's ability
to encourage and sustain a more positive image with the Turkish public
and policymakers. This is especially important because public opinion
counts in today's Turkey, and the Turkish leadership pays careful
attention to popular attitudes in shaping foreign policy. In this
sense, Turkey is very much in the European and Western mainstream. The
last few months have seen a marked improvement in Turkish perceptions
of American leadership and, to an extent, American policy (polling
from March 2009 suggests that around 50 percent of the Turkish public
hold positive views of the new US president).2 President Obama's
visit reinforced this warming trend, and opens the way for efforts
to improve cooperation in specific areas of concern. A good deal of
public and political- level suspicion has been defused, and this is
significant given the stresses of recent years.
Turkish observers, including the AKP government and opposition
parties, are interpreting visits by the President, the Secretary
of State and other high-level US officials, in light of their own
preferences, and to support differing visions of Turkey's role and
identity. Turkey's heated debate about secularism and religion,
geopolitical priorities and international affinities, can be a
minefield for bilateral relations, even under normal conditions. In
the context of a high-profile visit only the second strictly bilateral
visit of the Obama presidency the risk of a serious political misstep
was greatly magnified. In recent months, US officials have managed to
steer a skillful course between the widely disliked "Turkey as model
for the Muslim world" discourse, and the equally unrealistic notion
that Turkey's cultural and religious background are irrelevant to
the country's international role. Turks across the political spectrum
will remain highly sensitive to any sign of American interference in
the country's domestic affairs, and US policymakers are well advised
to hold Turkey's internal frictions at arms length.
In Turkish perception, the only evident misstep during the visit was
the President's reference to Turkey's Kurds as a minority. In Western
political vocabulary this is a straightforward observation; not so
in Turkey, where the term "minority" has a specific constitutional
meaning. On the Armenian issue, the approach was nuanced and
non-committal, and therefore open to interpretation by Turks seeking
reassurance that the new administration will oppose passage of the
Armenian "genocide" resolution now pending in Congress. The President's
remarks rightly made the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations
the central factor in the American approach. It is worth noting that
Turks have reacted more critically to President Obama's carefully
worded April 24th statement on Turkih-Armenian relations and the events
of 1915. Turks will continue to be especially sensitive to the style of
American engagement, and will carefully measure Washington's language
and actions where these touch on questions of history and Turkish
sovereignty The key challenge is to prevent the bilateral discourse
on the most sensitive public diplomacy issues from undermining the
basic fabric of US-Turkish relations. Recent interactions with Ankara
have made a good start on changing the style, and this can be turned
to advantage in improving the substance of the relationship.
The Near-Term Policy Agenda
In broad terms, the US and Turkey share a common policy agenda,
but priorities within this agenda continue to differ when seen
from Washington and Ankara. On Iraq, Ankara will continue to seek
assurances regarding cooperation against the PKK, including the
provision of actionable intelligence and renewed pressure on the
Kurdish Regional Government to constrain or end PKK activities in
Northern Iraq. Turkish officials will seek to build on more extensive
intelligence cooperation to acquire new assets for surveillance
and counter-insurgency operations against the PKK. As a NATO ally,
the US should continue to assist Ankara with this leading challenge
to Turkish security. For Washington, the key concern will be Turkish
cooperation in support of American disengagement from Iraq over the
coming months and years, including contributions to Iraqi political
stability and reconstruction, and continued access to Incirlik airbase
and Turkish port facilities.
On Iran, Turkey will seek to confirm that the Obama administration
is serious about dialogue with Tehran. With its enhanced ties to Iran
and close cooperation on energy, the PKK and other issues, Ankara has
a tangible stake in the potential for US-Iranian detente. The AKP
government has offered to play a role in this process. In reality,
it is difficult to imagine the US giving Turkey more than a marginal
facilitation role in an initiative of tremendous potential significance
to American foreign policy. Seen from Washington, the Iran agenda with
Turkey is more narrowly and understandably focused on addressing Iran's
nuclear ambitions. Given Turkey's rotating seat on the UN Security
Council, US policymakers should give first priority to securing
Ankara's support for additional sanctions as required, and to bring
Turkey's close relations with Tehran to bear on the problem. Turkish
territory is already among the most exposed to proliferation trends
in the region, and Ankara has no interest in seeing the emergence of
a nuclear-armed Iran. But the extent to which the AKP government is
willing to deliver tough messages on this score to Tehran is an open
question. This may also be a key test of the priorities of Turkey's
newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and his ability to
balance closer relations in the Middle East with continued strategic
solidarity with the US and Europe. Relations with Hamas, and Ankara's
overall posture toward the Middle East peace process will be another
near-term test.
On Afghanistan, Turkey is no more willing than most of its NATO
partners to contribute new forces for combat missions. Turks agree on
the importance of the mission but tend to argue that Turkey has already
made a strong contribution through its ast command of ISAF and its
ongoing diplomatic role. Even with a revamped and refocused military
strategy, Turkish public opposition to combat operations in Afghanistan
will place strict limits on what can be expected in this sphere. This
aspect of Turkish policy is very much in the European mainstream, and
it is not surprising that President Obama's visit failed to produce
any significant new commitments from Ankara. Rightly or wrongly,
Turkish policymakers and observers are anticipating a general allied
"rush to the exits" in Afghanistan over the coming years.
During his visit, President Obama stressed the importance of Turkey's
EU candidacy and left no doubt that the US would continue to be
a strong supporter of Turkey's European aspirations. This is an
uncontroversial and correct position, very much in line with the
policy of successive Administrations. The key question is whether
Washington can find new ways of making this case in Europe, and whether
any American lobbying on Turkey's behalf can be effective against a
backdrop of deepening European ambivalence and wanting Turkish patience
with the process. An improved climate in transatlantic relations will
surely help as the US continues to make strategic arguments about
Turkey's importance, and better relations with France can also make
a difference. But transatlantic cooperation is likely to be focused
heavily on other issues in the years ahead, not least a more concerted
approach to economic recovery. How much energy and political capital
can be spent on Turkey-EU matters, with a minimum ten or fifteen-year
time horizon? President Sarkozy's prompt and critical response to
President Obama's comments on Turkey's EU candidacy was consistent
with te attitude of many European political leaders. The US simply
does not have the standing to press Turkey's case in the way that it
could at the start of the accession process Geopolitical arguments
about "anchoring" Turkey can go only so far as the Turkish candidacy
moves into a more technical and politicized phase.
After a period of relative neglect, NATO has become more central
to US-Turkish relations, and Alliance issues are set to become even
more prominent over the next few years. President Obama reportedly
played an instrumental role in dissuading the Turkish government from
vetoing the candidacy of Danih Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
for NATO's next Secretary General. Turks across the political spectrum
were genuinely uncomfortable with Rasmussen as a result of his stance
during the Mohammed cartoon" crisis, and his past opposition to Turkish
membership in the EU. In the wake of a disappointing result in local
elections, and pressed by nationalist voices on the right and the left,
the AKP government may have felt itself under particular pressure to
make Turkish objections clear.
Turkey is among the Alliance members most exposed to the risk of
declining political cohesion and strategic drift in NATO. With a
critical review of NATO's strategic concept just getting underway,
and increasingly heated debates about Alliance posture toward
Russia and other issues in which Turkey has a key stake, this is a
particularly bad time to squander Turkish credibility and political
capital. Turkey's acquiescence in the Rasmussen nomination (and
the French return to NATO's integrated military command) are widely
understood to have been secured through a series of murky trade-offs on
NATO appointments and EU-NATO cooperation. Ankara would be well advised
to focus on making its strategic preferences known on questions of
nuclear strategy, missile defense and NATO's capacity to act on the
myriad, tangible security challenges facing Turkey on its northern,
eastern and southern flanks - and the US should take these concerns
seriously. Ankara is likely to favor the reinforcement of traditional
Article V commitments. Americans and Turks may have some lively
differences over the core concepts of territorial defense imbedded
in the Turkish vison, versus more global and expeditionary visions
for Alliance strategy.
The US and Turkey will benefit from a more explicit discussion about
the future uses of Incirlik airbase. This could prove one of the
most important areas for dialogue in the wake of President Obama's
visit. Both the US and Turkey are quick to point to Incirlik as a
badge of strategic cooperation. But a predictable approach to policy
planning for Incirlik has eluded successive American administrations
and has frustrated defense planners on both sides for decades. Since
the days of Operation Provide Comfort (later Northern Watch), an ad
hoc approach to bilateral uses of the base has prevailed. Neither
the Clinton nor the Bush administrations were able to secure Turkish
agreement to use the base for offensive air operaions in Iraq.
The extensive use of Incirlik for logistical support in Iraq and
Afghanistan cannot be taken for granted, and could easily be put in
jeopardy by future political disagreements. Part of the answer may
be to develop new ideas for the use of Incirlik to support a wider
range of regional security tasks, from missile defense to maritime
security in the eastern Mediterranean - in other words, uses that
go beyond the straightforward support of American power projection
in Turkey's neighborhood. Better still, many of these uses could be
developed in a NATO rather than bilateral context, and linked to new
Alliance missions and priorities.
Ankara and Washington have made energy security a key feature
of arguments about the strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey can
certainly play a role in diversifying Europe's gas transport routes,
and in bringing Eurasian oil supplies to global consumers. Turkey is
also a leading conduit for the transport of Iraqi oil, and is part
of an increasingly important and well- integrated Mediterranean
energy market. That said, it is important to recognize Turkey's
own complicated interests in this sphere. These interests include
continued access to Russian oil and especially gas - a critical part
of Turkey's own energy security equation. Turkey's interests looking
north also include a much broader commercial and political stake in
relations with Russia. Despite historic sensitivities to Russia as
a geopolitical competitor, Ankara will be wary of a more assertive
posture toward Moscow, and reluctant to embrace US and NATO initiatives
perceived as impinging on Turkish sovereignty and freedom of action
in the Blck Sea region. To the extent that US relations with Russia
become more competitive and contentious, this could well emerge as
a source of growing friction between Washington and Ankara.
Longer-Term Questions
Beyond the immediate policy agenda, US policymakers will need to
understand and anticipate some longer-term structural issues affecting
Turkey, its international role, and relations with the US.
First, the consequences of the global economic crisis need to be
taken into account. The crisis is now being felt strongly in Turkey
with its export driven economy. This is troubling for Turkey's own
development, but it is also a potentially complicating factor in
US-Turkish relations. In recent years, Turkey's economic dynamism has
broadened the scope for economic engagement with Turkey, and has also
allowed Ankara to deploy its "soft power" effectively in neighboring
regions. With export markets contracting, and the general flight from
risk in emerging markets, Turkey will be a less obvious partner for
American business. As European markets weaken, developing markets in
Iraq, Syria and Iran may become an important hedge for Turkey, with
implications for the balance of Turkish international policy. At the
same time, economic stringency could destabilize societies on Turkey's
Balkan and Eurasian flanks. The US and Turkey will need new vehicles
for regional cooperation in energy, infrastructure and other sectors
to counter these troubling risks.
Second, extending and diversifying the constituency for US-
Turkish relations should be a key facet of a recalibrated
relationship. Turkey's strategic location continues to drive the
logic and substance of the bilateral relationship. But this alone is
an inadequate basis for strategic partnership. Diversification will
be critical to the future of a relationship that has been focused
overwhelmingly on geopolitics and security cooperation. The global
economic crisis complicates the task of expanding the relatively
underdeveloped economic, cultural, and "people-to- people" dimensions
of the relationship. Over the longer-term, a more diverse relationship,
with a broader constituency on all sides, is an essential objective. It
may also foster greater predictability in cooperation on core regional
security issues.
Third, the US should recognize that it has limited leverage over the
evolution of Turkish society and politics. That said, US- Turkish
relations will be influenced by Turkey's political trajectory and
evolving foreign policy interests.
The AKP government is pursuing a more active policy in the Middle
East and elsewhere, driven by commercial interests, and a more
explicit sense of affinity with the Muslim world. These changing
dynamics were clearly displayed in the strong Turkish reaction to
events in Gaza. In some spheres, the "new look" in Turkish foreign
policy has paid dividends in terms of US interests. Turkey's role in
Israeli-Syrian dialogue, and the deepening detente with Greece are key
examples. The rapprochement with Athens is a transforming development,
and American policy in the region is no longer driven by the demands
of crisis management in the Aegean. Cyprus remains on the agenda, of
course, but this is now a political rather than a security dispute -
essential to Turkey's EU candidacy, but no longer a flashpoint for
armed conflict. Turkey's activism in the Middle East and Eurasia
is unlikely to be a strategic alternative to relations with Europe
and the US At the same time, Washington will need to think more
carefully about the potential costs and benefits of Turkey's evolving
international posture.
Finally, the transatlantic, "trilateral" aspect of relations with
Turkey is likely to become more prominent, and this trend should be
encouraged. This can be a positive development for US interests,
lending greater predictability to cooperation on issues that have
traditionally been contentious in a bilateral frame. The progressive
"Europeanization" of policies elsewhere across southern Europe has
paid dividends in terms of political and security cooperation with
Washington A more positive climate in transatlantic relations,
coupled with a reinvigorated Turkish policy toward Europe, would
improve the prospects for cooperation with Ankara in many areas of
importance to the US. Not least, a trilateral approach will allow
American policymakers to support Turkey's EU aspirations in new and
more practical ways.
In sum, President Obama's visit and recent policy initiatives have
managed to dispel some of the pervasive suspicion in US- Turkish
relations - no small accomplishment. Much remains to be done, both
bilaterally and in a transatlantic setting, to give these public
diplomacy gains operational meaning. At the same time, the US will
need to keep an eye on longer trends affecting the relationship and
Turkey's role in transatlantic cooperation.
CQ Congressional Testimony
May 14, 2009 Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
TESTIMONY-BY: DR. IAN O. LESSER, SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW
AFFILIATION: GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Statement of Dr. Ian O. Lesser Senior Transatlantic Fellow German
Marshall Fund of the United States
Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe
May 14, 2009
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to be with you today and to share some thoughts on
the state of US-Turkish relations and next steps.
This discussion takes place at an important moment in a relationship
often - and correctly - described as "strategic." After eight years
of pronounced strain in relations with Turkey, President Obama's
April 2009 visit to Ankara and Istanbul has changed the style of our
engagement with Turkey. In his speech to the Turkish parliament, and in
other settings, the President managed to convey genuine appreciation
for Turkey's regional role, and sensitivity to Turkey's own national
interests. To be sure, the President went to Turkey with a set of
requests and preferences, not least on Afghanistan and Iran, and the
President's remarks in Turkey touched on some sensitive issues. But
the difficult discourse of the post-2001 period seems to have been set
aside in an effort to repair America's very badly damaged image with
the Turkish public and policymakers, and a pervasive climate of mutual
suspicion. In the wake of the visit, leaderships on both sides should
look to turn this public diplomacy success to operational advantage.
Both sides should have reasonable expectations. Observers sometimes
characterize the relationship during the Clinton Administration
as a "lost golden age" in US-Turkish relations. Despite the often
troubled relations in recent years, and especially since the Iraq
War, it is important to recognize that the bilateral relationship
has had many periods of real strain, not least in the mid 1990s with
frictions over human rights, northern Iraq, strategy against the PKK,
Cyprus, Aegean stability and other issues. In other critical areas,
including the Balkans and Afghanistan, cooperation with Ankara has
been excellent. On the big picture issues of Turkey-EU relations,
energy security, relations with Russia, and stability in the Middle
East, bilateral relations continue to be "strategic" in the sense
that cooperation between the US and Turkey is essential to the policy
objectives of both sides.
The fact that President Obama scheduled a visit to Turkey so early
in his Administration is significant. Just as significant is the fact
that the visit came as part of a high-profile European tour. Symbolism
counts for a good deal in relations with Ankara, and in this case,
the geopolitical symbolism of visiting Turkey after the G-20 meeting
in London and the NATO Summit in Strasbourg was meaningful. In
subtle ways, the nature of the itinerary has shaped interpretations
of the visit. Many of the key topics on the bilateral agenda may
have been Middle Eastern or Eurasian - Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict - but the policy dialogue in Ankara and
Istanbul was a dialogue with a transatlantic partner. The importance
of this can be demonstrated by a simple thought experiment: imagine
the discussion that would have surrounded a presidential visit to
Turkey as part of a Middle Eastern tour - Riyadh, Baghdad, Cairo,
Jerusalem and Ankara.
An itinerary of this kind might be useful at the working level, but it
would have sent a very different message about the overall character of
US-Turkish relations and Turkey's place in transatlantic institutions.
The US faces three parallel challenges in managing and recalibrating
the relationship with Turkey. First, we must address accumulated
problems of style and perception in the relationship. Second, we need
to address specific, near-term policy issues where US and Turkish
priorities could be more closely aligned. Third, we should understand
and anticipate some longer-term, structural issues affecting the
relationship, including Turkey's own trajectory and future dynamics
in US- Turkish-EU relations.
The Public Diplomacy Challenge
The German Marshall Fund of the United States and others have charted
the marked decline in Turkish public attitudes toward the US in
recent years.1 The scope for revitalizing relations with Ankara will
be determined, in large measure, by the new Administration's ability
to encourage and sustain a more positive image with the Turkish public
and policymakers. This is especially important because public opinion
counts in today's Turkey, and the Turkish leadership pays careful
attention to popular attitudes in shaping foreign policy. In this
sense, Turkey is very much in the European and Western mainstream. The
last few months have seen a marked improvement in Turkish perceptions
of American leadership and, to an extent, American policy (polling
from March 2009 suggests that around 50 percent of the Turkish public
hold positive views of the new US president).2 President Obama's
visit reinforced this warming trend, and opens the way for efforts
to improve cooperation in specific areas of concern. A good deal of
public and political- level suspicion has been defused, and this is
significant given the stresses of recent years.
Turkish observers, including the AKP government and opposition
parties, are interpreting visits by the President, the Secretary
of State and other high-level US officials, in light of their own
preferences, and to support differing visions of Turkey's role and
identity. Turkey's heated debate about secularism and religion,
geopolitical priorities and international affinities, can be a
minefield for bilateral relations, even under normal conditions. In
the context of a high-profile visit only the second strictly bilateral
visit of the Obama presidency the risk of a serious political misstep
was greatly magnified. In recent months, US officials have managed to
steer a skillful course between the widely disliked "Turkey as model
for the Muslim world" discourse, and the equally unrealistic notion
that Turkey's cultural and religious background are irrelevant to
the country's international role. Turks across the political spectrum
will remain highly sensitive to any sign of American interference in
the country's domestic affairs, and US policymakers are well advised
to hold Turkey's internal frictions at arms length.
In Turkish perception, the only evident misstep during the visit was
the President's reference to Turkey's Kurds as a minority. In Western
political vocabulary this is a straightforward observation; not so
in Turkey, where the term "minority" has a specific constitutional
meaning. On the Armenian issue, the approach was nuanced and
non-committal, and therefore open to interpretation by Turks seeking
reassurance that the new administration will oppose passage of the
Armenian "genocide" resolution now pending in Congress. The President's
remarks rightly made the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations
the central factor in the American approach. It is worth noting that
Turks have reacted more critically to President Obama's carefully
worded April 24th statement on Turkih-Armenian relations and the events
of 1915. Turks will continue to be especially sensitive to the style of
American engagement, and will carefully measure Washington's language
and actions where these touch on questions of history and Turkish
sovereignty The key challenge is to prevent the bilateral discourse
on the most sensitive public diplomacy issues from undermining the
basic fabric of US-Turkish relations. Recent interactions with Ankara
have made a good start on changing the style, and this can be turned
to advantage in improving the substance of the relationship.
The Near-Term Policy Agenda
In broad terms, the US and Turkey share a common policy agenda,
but priorities within this agenda continue to differ when seen
from Washington and Ankara. On Iraq, Ankara will continue to seek
assurances regarding cooperation against the PKK, including the
provision of actionable intelligence and renewed pressure on the
Kurdish Regional Government to constrain or end PKK activities in
Northern Iraq. Turkish officials will seek to build on more extensive
intelligence cooperation to acquire new assets for surveillance
and counter-insurgency operations against the PKK. As a NATO ally,
the US should continue to assist Ankara with this leading challenge
to Turkish security. For Washington, the key concern will be Turkish
cooperation in support of American disengagement from Iraq over the
coming months and years, including contributions to Iraqi political
stability and reconstruction, and continued access to Incirlik airbase
and Turkish port facilities.
On Iran, Turkey will seek to confirm that the Obama administration
is serious about dialogue with Tehran. With its enhanced ties to Iran
and close cooperation on energy, the PKK and other issues, Ankara has
a tangible stake in the potential for US-Iranian detente. The AKP
government has offered to play a role in this process. In reality,
it is difficult to imagine the US giving Turkey more than a marginal
facilitation role in an initiative of tremendous potential significance
to American foreign policy. Seen from Washington, the Iran agenda with
Turkey is more narrowly and understandably focused on addressing Iran's
nuclear ambitions. Given Turkey's rotating seat on the UN Security
Council, US policymakers should give first priority to securing
Ankara's support for additional sanctions as required, and to bring
Turkey's close relations with Tehran to bear on the problem. Turkish
territory is already among the most exposed to proliferation trends
in the region, and Ankara has no interest in seeing the emergence of
a nuclear-armed Iran. But the extent to which the AKP government is
willing to deliver tough messages on this score to Tehran is an open
question. This may also be a key test of the priorities of Turkey's
newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and his ability to
balance closer relations in the Middle East with continued strategic
solidarity with the US and Europe. Relations with Hamas, and Ankara's
overall posture toward the Middle East peace process will be another
near-term test.
On Afghanistan, Turkey is no more willing than most of its NATO
partners to contribute new forces for combat missions. Turks agree on
the importance of the mission but tend to argue that Turkey has already
made a strong contribution through its ast command of ISAF and its
ongoing diplomatic role. Even with a revamped and refocused military
strategy, Turkish public opposition to combat operations in Afghanistan
will place strict limits on what can be expected in this sphere. This
aspect of Turkish policy is very much in the European mainstream, and
it is not surprising that President Obama's visit failed to produce
any significant new commitments from Ankara. Rightly or wrongly,
Turkish policymakers and observers are anticipating a general allied
"rush to the exits" in Afghanistan over the coming years.
During his visit, President Obama stressed the importance of Turkey's
EU candidacy and left no doubt that the US would continue to be
a strong supporter of Turkey's European aspirations. This is an
uncontroversial and correct position, very much in line with the
policy of successive Administrations. The key question is whether
Washington can find new ways of making this case in Europe, and whether
any American lobbying on Turkey's behalf can be effective against a
backdrop of deepening European ambivalence and wanting Turkish patience
with the process. An improved climate in transatlantic relations will
surely help as the US continues to make strategic arguments about
Turkey's importance, and better relations with France can also make
a difference. But transatlantic cooperation is likely to be focused
heavily on other issues in the years ahead, not least a more concerted
approach to economic recovery. How much energy and political capital
can be spent on Turkey-EU matters, with a minimum ten or fifteen-year
time horizon? President Sarkozy's prompt and critical response to
President Obama's comments on Turkey's EU candidacy was consistent
with te attitude of many European political leaders. The US simply
does not have the standing to press Turkey's case in the way that it
could at the start of the accession process Geopolitical arguments
about "anchoring" Turkey can go only so far as the Turkish candidacy
moves into a more technical and politicized phase.
After a period of relative neglect, NATO has become more central
to US-Turkish relations, and Alliance issues are set to become even
more prominent over the next few years. President Obama reportedly
played an instrumental role in dissuading the Turkish government from
vetoing the candidacy of Danih Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
for NATO's next Secretary General. Turks across the political spectrum
were genuinely uncomfortable with Rasmussen as a result of his stance
during the Mohammed cartoon" crisis, and his past opposition to Turkish
membership in the EU. In the wake of a disappointing result in local
elections, and pressed by nationalist voices on the right and the left,
the AKP government may have felt itself under particular pressure to
make Turkish objections clear.
Turkey is among the Alliance members most exposed to the risk of
declining political cohesion and strategic drift in NATO. With a
critical review of NATO's strategic concept just getting underway,
and increasingly heated debates about Alliance posture toward
Russia and other issues in which Turkey has a key stake, this is a
particularly bad time to squander Turkish credibility and political
capital. Turkey's acquiescence in the Rasmussen nomination (and
the French return to NATO's integrated military command) are widely
understood to have been secured through a series of murky trade-offs on
NATO appointments and EU-NATO cooperation. Ankara would be well advised
to focus on making its strategic preferences known on questions of
nuclear strategy, missile defense and NATO's capacity to act on the
myriad, tangible security challenges facing Turkey on its northern,
eastern and southern flanks - and the US should take these concerns
seriously. Ankara is likely to favor the reinforcement of traditional
Article V commitments. Americans and Turks may have some lively
differences over the core concepts of territorial defense imbedded
in the Turkish vison, versus more global and expeditionary visions
for Alliance strategy.
The US and Turkey will benefit from a more explicit discussion about
the future uses of Incirlik airbase. This could prove one of the
most important areas for dialogue in the wake of President Obama's
visit. Both the US and Turkey are quick to point to Incirlik as a
badge of strategic cooperation. But a predictable approach to policy
planning for Incirlik has eluded successive American administrations
and has frustrated defense planners on both sides for decades. Since
the days of Operation Provide Comfort (later Northern Watch), an ad
hoc approach to bilateral uses of the base has prevailed. Neither
the Clinton nor the Bush administrations were able to secure Turkish
agreement to use the base for offensive air operaions in Iraq.
The extensive use of Incirlik for logistical support in Iraq and
Afghanistan cannot be taken for granted, and could easily be put in
jeopardy by future political disagreements. Part of the answer may
be to develop new ideas for the use of Incirlik to support a wider
range of regional security tasks, from missile defense to maritime
security in the eastern Mediterranean - in other words, uses that
go beyond the straightforward support of American power projection
in Turkey's neighborhood. Better still, many of these uses could be
developed in a NATO rather than bilateral context, and linked to new
Alliance missions and priorities.
Ankara and Washington have made energy security a key feature
of arguments about the strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey can
certainly play a role in diversifying Europe's gas transport routes,
and in bringing Eurasian oil supplies to global consumers. Turkey is
also a leading conduit for the transport of Iraqi oil, and is part
of an increasingly important and well- integrated Mediterranean
energy market. That said, it is important to recognize Turkey's
own complicated interests in this sphere. These interests include
continued access to Russian oil and especially gas - a critical part
of Turkey's own energy security equation. Turkey's interests looking
north also include a much broader commercial and political stake in
relations with Russia. Despite historic sensitivities to Russia as
a geopolitical competitor, Ankara will be wary of a more assertive
posture toward Moscow, and reluctant to embrace US and NATO initiatives
perceived as impinging on Turkish sovereignty and freedom of action
in the Blck Sea region. To the extent that US relations with Russia
become more competitive and contentious, this could well emerge as
a source of growing friction between Washington and Ankara.
Longer-Term Questions
Beyond the immediate policy agenda, US policymakers will need to
understand and anticipate some longer-term structural issues affecting
Turkey, its international role, and relations with the US.
First, the consequences of the global economic crisis need to be
taken into account. The crisis is now being felt strongly in Turkey
with its export driven economy. This is troubling for Turkey's own
development, but it is also a potentially complicating factor in
US-Turkish relations. In recent years, Turkey's economic dynamism has
broadened the scope for economic engagement with Turkey, and has also
allowed Ankara to deploy its "soft power" effectively in neighboring
regions. With export markets contracting, and the general flight from
risk in emerging markets, Turkey will be a less obvious partner for
American business. As European markets weaken, developing markets in
Iraq, Syria and Iran may become an important hedge for Turkey, with
implications for the balance of Turkish international policy. At the
same time, economic stringency could destabilize societies on Turkey's
Balkan and Eurasian flanks. The US and Turkey will need new vehicles
for regional cooperation in energy, infrastructure and other sectors
to counter these troubling risks.
Second, extending and diversifying the constituency for US-
Turkish relations should be a key facet of a recalibrated
relationship. Turkey's strategic location continues to drive the
logic and substance of the bilateral relationship. But this alone is
an inadequate basis for strategic partnership. Diversification will
be critical to the future of a relationship that has been focused
overwhelmingly on geopolitics and security cooperation. The global
economic crisis complicates the task of expanding the relatively
underdeveloped economic, cultural, and "people-to- people" dimensions
of the relationship. Over the longer-term, a more diverse relationship,
with a broader constituency on all sides, is an essential objective. It
may also foster greater predictability in cooperation on core regional
security issues.
Third, the US should recognize that it has limited leverage over the
evolution of Turkish society and politics. That said, US- Turkish
relations will be influenced by Turkey's political trajectory and
evolving foreign policy interests.
The AKP government is pursuing a more active policy in the Middle
East and elsewhere, driven by commercial interests, and a more
explicit sense of affinity with the Muslim world. These changing
dynamics were clearly displayed in the strong Turkish reaction to
events in Gaza. In some spheres, the "new look" in Turkish foreign
policy has paid dividends in terms of US interests. Turkey's role in
Israeli-Syrian dialogue, and the deepening detente with Greece are key
examples. The rapprochement with Athens is a transforming development,
and American policy in the region is no longer driven by the demands
of crisis management in the Aegean. Cyprus remains on the agenda, of
course, but this is now a political rather than a security dispute -
essential to Turkey's EU candidacy, but no longer a flashpoint for
armed conflict. Turkey's activism in the Middle East and Eurasia
is unlikely to be a strategic alternative to relations with Europe
and the US At the same time, Washington will need to think more
carefully about the potential costs and benefits of Turkey's evolving
international posture.
Finally, the transatlantic, "trilateral" aspect of relations with
Turkey is likely to become more prominent, and this trend should be
encouraged. This can be a positive development for US interests,
lending greater predictability to cooperation on issues that have
traditionally been contentious in a bilateral frame. The progressive
"Europeanization" of policies elsewhere across southern Europe has
paid dividends in terms of political and security cooperation with
Washington A more positive climate in transatlantic relations,
coupled with a reinvigorated Turkish policy toward Europe, would
improve the prospects for cooperation with Ankara in many areas of
importance to the US. Not least, a trilateral approach will allow
American policymakers to support Turkey's EU aspirations in new and
more practical ways.
In sum, President Obama's visit and recent policy initiatives have
managed to dispel some of the pervasive suspicion in US- Turkish
relations - no small accomplishment. Much remains to be done, both
bilaterally and in a transatlantic setting, to give these public
diplomacy gains operational meaning. At the same time, the US will
need to keep an eye on longer trends affecting the relationship and
Turkey's role in transatlantic cooperation.