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Turkey's leadership is more than ready for a solution
By Jasper Mortimer
24 May 09
Cyprus Mail
Letter from Ankara
A NEW momentum seems to be developing. In the past four weeks, Turkey
has sent a series of signals that it wants a settlement in Cyprus; that
the negotiators haven't got `all day', they must move.
Cypriots have seen so many initiatives to resolve their division that
they've grown sceptical. `We've been here before,' is the standard
response. But the latest signals are interesting.
April 21: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan tells reporters
he wants to see a solution in Cyprus `by the end of 2009'.
April 22: Erdogan says he will not brook any interference in the
settlement negotiations by the winning party in the Turkish Cypriot
elections whose leader, Dervis Eroglu, has long championed partition.
`A new government has emerged,' Erdogan said. `It will be a wrong
approach to say that this government will end the talks or that the
talks will be conducted on a different basis. We will not be
supporting any step that will weaken the hand of the (Turkish Cypriot)
president.'
May 5: President Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot
counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat decide that their aides, George Iacovou
and Ozdil Nami, will meet more often in a bid to expedite the
problem-solving.
May 6: Turkey's new foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flies to north
Cyprus for talks with Talat only 24 hours after being sworn in.
It is traditional for Turkey's foreign minister to go to Cyprus on his
first trip abroad, but my colleague, Simon Bahceli, who covered the
visit for this publication, said Davutoglu distinguished himself by not
taking a swipe at Greek Cypriots.
`All sides should be especially careful to avoid negatively affecting
the talks,' Davutoglu told reporters in north Nicosia.
`Our final aim is to bring peace to Cyprus and make it a centre of
peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.'
In an editorial, this paper commended Davutoglu for avoiding the
political phrases that annoy Greek Cypriots, and described his comments
as `the most moderate and reasonable ever made by a Turkish foreign
minister.'
Davutoglu is an Istanbul-educated professor of international relations
who earned the nickname of Turkey's Henry Kissinger for his role in
reviving foreign policy as a prime ministerial adviser.
He believes Turkey can enhance its stature in the world by greater
engagement in its own region ` making peace with Armenia, shuttling
between Israel and Hamas, etc. As an advocate of EU membership,
Davutoglu would see big advantages for Turkey from promoting a
settlement in Cyprus.
I asked Hugh Pope, the author of the International20Crisis Group's
report on Cyprus last year, what he thought of these developments.
`There is a sense of urgency, and it will increase chances of success,'
he replied.
Two factors contribute to the urgency. First, Talat faces election for
the Turkish Cypriot presidency in April next year. His party's defeat
in last month's legislative elections showed his domestic policies have
been judged a failure ` primarily on economic grounds.
The negotiations with Christofias have become the last standing pillar
of his presidency. If the talks fail, he will have little to point to
at election time.
Ankara also knows that Talat is its best option for a settlement. If
Talat loses the elections, his likely successor ` probably Eroglu `
would raise the bar of Turkish Cypriot demands. Christofias knows this
too.
The second factor impelling Ankara towards a settlement is its own
agenda with the European Union. Of the 35 chapters that Turkey must
work through in its accession process, eight are frozen because of the
refusal to open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic; two are
frozen by Cypriot veto and five by French veto, according to the EU
office in Ankara.
Moreover, a further 10 chapters ` where Turkey has fulfilled the
criteria ` cannot be officially closed until Ankara agrees to admit
Cypriot ships and planes. This is what the EU decided in20December 2006
when it penalised Turkey for discriminating against Cypriot traffic.
The EU is due to review that decision in December, and it may impose
additional penalties. Whatever is decided, Turkey will survive, but the
day is approaching when Turkey `is not going to have any chapters to
talk about with the EU', as Pope put it, unless there is a settlement
in Cyprus.
What often strikes me is the tremendous scepticism, if not cynicism,
about the negotiations. A Turkish diplomatic correspondent told me this
month that Christofias was dragging out the talks. When I asked a
Turkish diplomat about the recent signals, he said Ankara wanted a
solution in Cyprus `as soon as possible' and it was only because of
Christofias' `trickery' that the talks would not be finishing in June,
as the Turkish side had originally intended.
As I write this, Christofias is meeting Talat for the 28th session of
negotiations. As one of many reporters, I covered three of their
meetings last year and my favourite memory is of Christofias taking
Talat by the arm for a private word off-microphone on September 3.
Talat put his head down and listened. There was more hope for a
settlement in their body language at that moment than in what they said
at the press conference.
I try to tell my Turkish colleagues that Talat wouldn't tolerate
Christofias' taking his arm if Demetris were stringing him along. But
the fact is the 2004 Annan Plan is embedded in Turkish minds as a fair
and balanced settlement.
Turks believe the current talks should only fine-tune `Annan 7' to make
it acceptable to Greek Cypriots. And 28 meetings are quite enough for
that.
Turks do not appreciate that Christofias has to make significant
changes to the Annan Plan to get a package that will make Greek
Cypriots overturn their massive `No' vote of 2004 and vote for a
settlement.
South of the Green Line are thousands of Greek Cypriots who profoundly
distrust Turkey. They believe Ankara's generals have the final say, and
the generals will never agree to leave the unsinkable aircraft carrier
that is north Cyprus.
Proponents of this view can point to the Admiral Ozden Ornek diaries.
In these, the commander of the Turkish navy recorded meetings in early
2004 in which generals opposed to the chief of staff and Erdogan spoke
of plotting a coup. One motive was to pre-empt a troop withdrawal from
Cyprus in compliance with the Annan Plan.
The plot never went far ` Ornek found the principal plotters `overly
ambitious' ` but when the diaries were published in 2007, they were
seen as revealing just how strongly the military objected to leaving
Cyprus.
I asked Pope if, once Talat and Christofias had reached a settlement,
Erdogan would be able to get the generals to implement it.
`Definitely,' he replied. `The 2004 deal showed that once there is a
decision made, and it's a good one that everyone's comfortable with,
the Turkish Army does not object. It can't object. Yes, there were some
generals who were absolutely delighted that the Greek Cypriots voted
down the Annan Plan, but they had agreed to go along with it.'
In a way, the Ornek diaries confirm what Pope is saying. The plotting
generals realised that the only way to stop the Annan Plan was to seize
power. They saw that the government and their chief of staff were
serious. In that sense, the plotters had more faith in Turkey's ability
to withdraw than many Greek Cypriots.
By Jasper Mortimer
24 May 09
Cyprus Mail
Letter from Ankara
A NEW momentum seems to be developing. In the past four weeks, Turkey
has sent a series of signals that it wants a settlement in Cyprus; that
the negotiators haven't got `all day', they must move.
Cypriots have seen so many initiatives to resolve their division that
they've grown sceptical. `We've been here before,' is the standard
response. But the latest signals are interesting.
April 21: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan tells reporters
he wants to see a solution in Cyprus `by the end of 2009'.
April 22: Erdogan says he will not brook any interference in the
settlement negotiations by the winning party in the Turkish Cypriot
elections whose leader, Dervis Eroglu, has long championed partition.
`A new government has emerged,' Erdogan said. `It will be a wrong
approach to say that this government will end the talks or that the
talks will be conducted on a different basis. We will not be
supporting any step that will weaken the hand of the (Turkish Cypriot)
president.'
May 5: President Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot
counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat decide that their aides, George Iacovou
and Ozdil Nami, will meet more often in a bid to expedite the
problem-solving.
May 6: Turkey's new foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flies to north
Cyprus for talks with Talat only 24 hours after being sworn in.
It is traditional for Turkey's foreign minister to go to Cyprus on his
first trip abroad, but my colleague, Simon Bahceli, who covered the
visit for this publication, said Davutoglu distinguished himself by not
taking a swipe at Greek Cypriots.
`All sides should be especially careful to avoid negatively affecting
the talks,' Davutoglu told reporters in north Nicosia.
`Our final aim is to bring peace to Cyprus and make it a centre of
peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.'
In an editorial, this paper commended Davutoglu for avoiding the
political phrases that annoy Greek Cypriots, and described his comments
as `the most moderate and reasonable ever made by a Turkish foreign
minister.'
Davutoglu is an Istanbul-educated professor of international relations
who earned the nickname of Turkey's Henry Kissinger for his role in
reviving foreign policy as a prime ministerial adviser.
He believes Turkey can enhance its stature in the world by greater
engagement in its own region ` making peace with Armenia, shuttling
between Israel and Hamas, etc. As an advocate of EU membership,
Davutoglu would see big advantages for Turkey from promoting a
settlement in Cyprus.
I asked Hugh Pope, the author of the International20Crisis Group's
report on Cyprus last year, what he thought of these developments.
`There is a sense of urgency, and it will increase chances of success,'
he replied.
Two factors contribute to the urgency. First, Talat faces election for
the Turkish Cypriot presidency in April next year. His party's defeat
in last month's legislative elections showed his domestic policies have
been judged a failure ` primarily on economic grounds.
The negotiations with Christofias have become the last standing pillar
of his presidency. If the talks fail, he will have little to point to
at election time.
Ankara also knows that Talat is its best option for a settlement. If
Talat loses the elections, his likely successor ` probably Eroglu `
would raise the bar of Turkish Cypriot demands. Christofias knows this
too.
The second factor impelling Ankara towards a settlement is its own
agenda with the European Union. Of the 35 chapters that Turkey must
work through in its accession process, eight are frozen because of the
refusal to open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic; two are
frozen by Cypriot veto and five by French veto, according to the EU
office in Ankara.
Moreover, a further 10 chapters ` where Turkey has fulfilled the
criteria ` cannot be officially closed until Ankara agrees to admit
Cypriot ships and planes. This is what the EU decided in20December 2006
when it penalised Turkey for discriminating against Cypriot traffic.
The EU is due to review that decision in December, and it may impose
additional penalties. Whatever is decided, Turkey will survive, but the
day is approaching when Turkey `is not going to have any chapters to
talk about with the EU', as Pope put it, unless there is a settlement
in Cyprus.
What often strikes me is the tremendous scepticism, if not cynicism,
about the negotiations. A Turkish diplomatic correspondent told me this
month that Christofias was dragging out the talks. When I asked a
Turkish diplomat about the recent signals, he said Ankara wanted a
solution in Cyprus `as soon as possible' and it was only because of
Christofias' `trickery' that the talks would not be finishing in June,
as the Turkish side had originally intended.
As I write this, Christofias is meeting Talat for the 28th session of
negotiations. As one of many reporters, I covered three of their
meetings last year and my favourite memory is of Christofias taking
Talat by the arm for a private word off-microphone on September 3.
Talat put his head down and listened. There was more hope for a
settlement in their body language at that moment than in what they said
at the press conference.
I try to tell my Turkish colleagues that Talat wouldn't tolerate
Christofias' taking his arm if Demetris were stringing him along. But
the fact is the 2004 Annan Plan is embedded in Turkish minds as a fair
and balanced settlement.
Turks believe the current talks should only fine-tune `Annan 7' to make
it acceptable to Greek Cypriots. And 28 meetings are quite enough for
that.
Turks do not appreciate that Christofias has to make significant
changes to the Annan Plan to get a package that will make Greek
Cypriots overturn their massive `No' vote of 2004 and vote for a
settlement.
South of the Green Line are thousands of Greek Cypriots who profoundly
distrust Turkey. They believe Ankara's generals have the final say, and
the generals will never agree to leave the unsinkable aircraft carrier
that is north Cyprus.
Proponents of this view can point to the Admiral Ozden Ornek diaries.
In these, the commander of the Turkish navy recorded meetings in early
2004 in which generals opposed to the chief of staff and Erdogan spoke
of plotting a coup. One motive was to pre-empt a troop withdrawal from
Cyprus in compliance with the Annan Plan.
The plot never went far ` Ornek found the principal plotters `overly
ambitious' ` but when the diaries were published in 2007, they were
seen as revealing just how strongly the military objected to leaving
Cyprus.
I asked Pope if, once Talat and Christofias had reached a settlement,
Erdogan would be able to get the generals to implement it.
`Definitely,' he replied. `The 2004 deal showed that once there is a
decision made, and it's a good one that everyone's comfortable with,
the Turkish Army does not object. It can't object. Yes, there were some
generals who were absolutely delighted that the Greek Cypriots voted
down the Annan Plan, but they had agreed to go along with it.'
In a way, the Ornek diaries confirm what Pope is saying. The plotting
generals realised that the only way to stop the Annan Plan was to seize
power. They saw that the government and their chief of staff were
serious. In that sense, the plotters had more faith in Turkey's ability
to withdraw than many Greek Cypriots.