Tweet
THE EU-TURKEY-CYPRUS TRIANGLE: "TIME FOR TURKEY TO BE VISIONARY IN S. CAUCASUS"
By Sabine Freizer
Greek News
http://www.greeknewsonline.com/modules.php?na me=News&file=article&sid=10439
May 25 2009
Optimism about the normalisation of Turkey-Armenia bilateral relations,
so prevalent on 22 April when the two countries announced that they had
agreed on a comprehensive framework for reconciliation, has suddenly
faded. Normalisation would include opening of the Turkey-Armenia
border, establishing diplomatic relations, and setting up of bilateral
commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical
dimension of their relations. It first seemed that these steps could
be accomplished by Autumn 2009. Now they may be delayed for years.
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan put a brake on the reconciliation
effort when in Baku on 13 May, he did not mince his words: "the
closure of the [Turkey-Armenia] border is a result of the [Armenian]
occupation in Karabakh [...] until the occupation ends, the border
gates will remain closed."
The occupation of some 13.5 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory by
Armenian-backed forces started in 1992, when Armenia and Azerbaijan
went to war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave which was
an Armenian majority autonomous region of Azerbaijan in Soviet
times. Since the signing of a 1994 ceasefire, there has been no pulling
back by any of the armed forces, and the ceasefire line remains an
active front line where there are regular casualties.
Since 1993, Turkey has maintained a policy of keeping its border
with Armenia closed until Armenian forces withdraw largely due to
its wish to express its respect for historical and ethnic ties with
Azerbaijan. The closed-border policy had no impact on Armenia's
Nagorno-Karabakh stance, and arguably made Armenia less likely
to withdraw in exchange for peace; Turkey's threatening posture
did however cost it considerable political capital in the U.S. and
Europe. But in 2008, after several years of secretive talks between
Turkey and Armenia, it seemed as though Ankara had foresightedly
de-linked its relations with Armenia from the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Turkey appeared ready to re-open its border with Armenia as
part of a broader normalization package with its immediate neighbour --
in exchange for Yerevan's recognition of Turkey's current borders and
participation in a commission to analyze their historical differences,
including about the great massacre of Ottoman Armenians of 1915.
This visionary policy shift not only had the potential to help resolve
one of the most strained relationships between two European countries
since World War I but also to open new transport and communication
links in the strategic South Caucasus. It was backed by Russia,
and even more strongly by U.S. President Obama during his visit to
Turkey in March.
For Turkey, breaking with its former tried and failed policy,
normalising with Armenia offers an opportunity to become a strategic
player in the South Caucasus. It has had success in establishing
discussions through a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,
but it will have difficulty promoting and leading this as long as
it blockades one of the countries that participates. It wants to
cooperate as equal partners with Russia in the South Caucasus, in
political and economic spheres, but it will be limited unless it is
seen as even handed.
Russia, which has signed a collective security arrangement with
Armenia, has understood this over the past several months and
repeated its overtures to Azerbaijan in a host of fields. Turkey is
interested in supporting the ongoing OSCE Minsk Process to resolve
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it cannot be a neutral broker
while it openly supports one of the conflicting sides. Finally an
open Turkey-Armenia border is likely to have the immediate effect
of ending Armenian perceptions of encirclement by hostile Turkic
peoples, and making them more likely to withdraw from territories
around Nagorno-Karabakh now retained as security guarantees. These
are the messages that Turkey's leaders should be sending to their
Azerbaijani counterparts, rather than nationalist pledges to remain
"one nation in two states."
Instead, Turkey seems on the verge of giving up these benefits,
halting the momentum towards reconciliation and returning to its
traditional positions. This strengthens arguments that it only
used the promise of normalisation in its talks with Armenia to
delay U.S. genocide recognition, especially by President Obama,
on 24 April. But Turkey should not allow its Armenia policy to be
held hostage to the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate or to Azerbaijani
blackmail. Baku is now threatening to sell natural gas from its
still-to-be-developed Shahdeniz 2 field to Russia, instead of Turkey,
but it is likely to do this regardless of Turkey's relations with
Armenia, if Russia offers it a better pricing and transit deal.
There is no doubt that progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict would enhance Turkey's ability to normalise relations with
Armenia and stability in the South Caucasus. But Ankara's best chance
of bringing a new positive momentum to the process is precisely by
normalising with Armenia. It is quite wrong in believing that with
its traditional policy it can have any impact on the talks mediated
since 1992 by the OSCE Minsk Group, led by its French, Russian and
U.S. co-chairs, and more specifically since 2005 with the aim of
obtaining agreement on a 2-3 page document on basic principles.
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the best that can be expected any time
this year is agreement on these basic principles, and the mediators
sound optimistic about a possible breakthrough. Another meeting of the
Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents is expected in Saint Petersburg
around 4-6 June. But there is a long-running stalemate over several
issues, including the modalities of a plan to hold a referendum to
determine Nagorno-Karabakh's final status and the status and size
of a possible corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia in the
Lachin district. Once an agreement on basic principles is signed,
lengthy and difficult talks await the sides to reach a comprehensive
settlement leading to the start of actual withdrawals.
If Turkey plans to wait until this occurs, it will remain on the
sidelines for many years to come in the South Caucasus, allowing
the U.S., EU and especially Russia to maintain the lead in its own
backyard.
By Sabine Freizer
Greek News
http://www.greeknewsonline.com/modules.php?na me=News&file=article&sid=10439
May 25 2009
Optimism about the normalisation of Turkey-Armenia bilateral relations,
so prevalent on 22 April when the two countries announced that they had
agreed on a comprehensive framework for reconciliation, has suddenly
faded. Normalisation would include opening of the Turkey-Armenia
border, establishing diplomatic relations, and setting up of bilateral
commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical
dimension of their relations. It first seemed that these steps could
be accomplished by Autumn 2009. Now they may be delayed for years.
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan put a brake on the reconciliation
effort when in Baku on 13 May, he did not mince his words: "the
closure of the [Turkey-Armenia] border is a result of the [Armenian]
occupation in Karabakh [...] until the occupation ends, the border
gates will remain closed."
The occupation of some 13.5 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory by
Armenian-backed forces started in 1992, when Armenia and Azerbaijan
went to war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave which was
an Armenian majority autonomous region of Azerbaijan in Soviet
times. Since the signing of a 1994 ceasefire, there has been no pulling
back by any of the armed forces, and the ceasefire line remains an
active front line where there are regular casualties.
Since 1993, Turkey has maintained a policy of keeping its border
with Armenia closed until Armenian forces withdraw largely due to
its wish to express its respect for historical and ethnic ties with
Azerbaijan. The closed-border policy had no impact on Armenia's
Nagorno-Karabakh stance, and arguably made Armenia less likely
to withdraw in exchange for peace; Turkey's threatening posture
did however cost it considerable political capital in the U.S. and
Europe. But in 2008, after several years of secretive talks between
Turkey and Armenia, it seemed as though Ankara had foresightedly
de-linked its relations with Armenia from the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Turkey appeared ready to re-open its border with Armenia as
part of a broader normalization package with its immediate neighbour --
in exchange for Yerevan's recognition of Turkey's current borders and
participation in a commission to analyze their historical differences,
including about the great massacre of Ottoman Armenians of 1915.
This visionary policy shift not only had the potential to help resolve
one of the most strained relationships between two European countries
since World War I but also to open new transport and communication
links in the strategic South Caucasus. It was backed by Russia,
and even more strongly by U.S. President Obama during his visit to
Turkey in March.
For Turkey, breaking with its former tried and failed policy,
normalising with Armenia offers an opportunity to become a strategic
player in the South Caucasus. It has had success in establishing
discussions through a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,
but it will have difficulty promoting and leading this as long as
it blockades one of the countries that participates. It wants to
cooperate as equal partners with Russia in the South Caucasus, in
political and economic spheres, but it will be limited unless it is
seen as even handed.
Russia, which has signed a collective security arrangement with
Armenia, has understood this over the past several months and
repeated its overtures to Azerbaijan in a host of fields. Turkey is
interested in supporting the ongoing OSCE Minsk Process to resolve
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it cannot be a neutral broker
while it openly supports one of the conflicting sides. Finally an
open Turkey-Armenia border is likely to have the immediate effect
of ending Armenian perceptions of encirclement by hostile Turkic
peoples, and making them more likely to withdraw from territories
around Nagorno-Karabakh now retained as security guarantees. These
are the messages that Turkey's leaders should be sending to their
Azerbaijani counterparts, rather than nationalist pledges to remain
"one nation in two states."
Instead, Turkey seems on the verge of giving up these benefits,
halting the momentum towards reconciliation and returning to its
traditional positions. This strengthens arguments that it only
used the promise of normalisation in its talks with Armenia to
delay U.S. genocide recognition, especially by President Obama,
on 24 April. But Turkey should not allow its Armenia policy to be
held hostage to the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate or to Azerbaijani
blackmail. Baku is now threatening to sell natural gas from its
still-to-be-developed Shahdeniz 2 field to Russia, instead of Turkey,
but it is likely to do this regardless of Turkey's relations with
Armenia, if Russia offers it a better pricing and transit deal.
There is no doubt that progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict would enhance Turkey's ability to normalise relations with
Armenia and stability in the South Caucasus. But Ankara's best chance
of bringing a new positive momentum to the process is precisely by
normalising with Armenia. It is quite wrong in believing that with
its traditional policy it can have any impact on the talks mediated
since 1992 by the OSCE Minsk Group, led by its French, Russian and
U.S. co-chairs, and more specifically since 2005 with the aim of
obtaining agreement on a 2-3 page document on basic principles.
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the best that can be expected any time
this year is agreement on these basic principles, and the mediators
sound optimistic about a possible breakthrough. Another meeting of the
Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents is expected in Saint Petersburg
around 4-6 June. But there is a long-running stalemate over several
issues, including the modalities of a plan to hold a referendum to
determine Nagorno-Karabakh's final status and the status and size
of a possible corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia in the
Lachin district. Once an agreement on basic principles is signed,
lengthy and difficult talks await the sides to reach a comprehensive
settlement leading to the start of actual withdrawals.
If Turkey plans to wait until this occurs, it will remain on the
sidelines for many years to come in the South Caucasus, allowing
the U.S., EU and especially Russia to maintain the lead in its own
backyard.