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TURKISH PRESS REACTS TO TURKISH-ARMENIAN NORMALIZATION
Saban Kardas
Jamestown Foundation
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac he=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35459&tx_ttnew s%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=4842707614
Sept 8 2009
President of Turkey Abdullah Gul with his Armenian counterpart Serzh
Sargsyan during Gul's historic visit to Yerevan in 2008 On August 31
a joint statement issued by Turkey and Armenia announced that both
had agreed to start talks on the establishment of diplomatic ties
and the development of bilateral relations. The parties initialed
two protocols to regulate these issues, and the consultations on
these will be finalized within six weeks before being forwarded to
their national parliaments for ratification (www.mfa.gov.tr, August
31). The announcement generated a heated debate on the future of
Turkish-Armenian relations as well as its implications for Azerbaijan
and the involvement of other international actors.
The content of the protocols show that the parties built on the
progress they had achieved by April, which was interrupted by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's intervention to allay the concerns
of Azerbaijan. Following intense bilateral contacts, secret diplomacy
and pressure from the United States and European countries, Turkey and
Armenia announced a roadmap for normalization in April, the contents
of which remained undisclosed. Due to mounting domestic opposition
and protests from Azerbaijan, Erdogan reiterated unequivocally that
the progress of Turkish-Armenian relations would be contingent upon
Armenia's constructive attitude in its dispute with Azerbaijan. To
relieve Azeri concerns, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey would not
proceed with normalization, without an end to the Armenian occupation
of Karabakh (EDM, May 14). Although there were concerns that the
normalization process might have come to a premature end, the parties
maintained their secret dialogue facilitated by Switzerland (EDM,
June 30).
By reiterating their commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional
disputes, the parties implicitly recognize the Karabakh issue, but
the protocols make no mention of it, nor set it as a precondition
for opening the Turkish-Armenian border. In taking this step despite
this "missing element," the Turkish government again raised concerns
as to whether it might accelerate the rapprochement with Armenia
by decoupling it from the Karabakh issue. Consequently, opposition
both domestically and in Azerbaijan expressed discomfort with these
developments. In response, Erdogan reconnected the two processes
politically, by arguing that the ratification of the protocols would
depend on the resolution of Karabakh issue, reflecting Ankara's
concern to keep Baku on board (Vatan, September 2).
The leverage Azerbaijan exerts over Turkish foreign policy led to
different interpretations from the Turkish press. The nationalist
media continued to express their unconditional support for Azerbaijan's
position and criticized the government's recent initiatives (Ortadogu,
September 3)
Many mainstream commentators, however, maintain that returning to
the status quo ante might be difficult, and that instead of seeking
to restore Karabakh through military means, Baku should focus on
diplomatic measures to free the occupied Azeri territories, and in
return grant greater autonomy to the area and open a corridor between
Armenia and Karabakh (Milliyet, September 3). Although Erdogan might
ideally prefer a maximalist position on the return of Karabakh, other
actors within the Turkish government also seem to be ready to settle
for such an arrangement recognizing the new reality in the region. In
fact, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Abdullah Gul are
interested in seeing the process through and opening the border by the
end of the year (Radikal, September 2), despite Erdogan's occasional
nationalistic outbursts.
Other commentators view the rapprochement as a partly American
project and believe that both Turkey and Azerbaijan are urged, if not
pressured, by the Obama administration to solve their problems with
Armenia. They even suggest that the mediation services provided by
Swiss diplomats might only represent a cover for American facilitation
between the Turkish and Armenian delegations, which is partly shared by
the opposition parties, mainly the Republican People's Party (Milliyet,
September 4; Hurriyet, September 2). The pro-government press, in
contrast, challenges these arguments and maintains that searching
for foreign actors behind such initiatives reflects a problematic
attitude on the part of the Turkish opposition. It presents these
recent developments as an achievement of the AKP government and treats
them as affirmation of Turkey's expanding role in regional diplomacy
(Star, September 4).
Explaining the normalization with reference to the involvement of
outside actors inevitably raises questions about the motivations
of "outsiders." At this juncture, the role of energy issues is
emphasized by the Turkish media. There is a perception that the
process is promoted by the West as part of its energy policies. They
speculate that Turkish-Armenian normalization is promoted in order that
Armenia might emerge as an alternative route to Georgia for the future
transportation of Caspian basin resources (Milliyet, September 3).
Such analyses inevitably ignore the issue of the Russian
position. There is already a process underway between Azerbaijan and
Armenia toward the resolution of the Karabakh dispute, facilitated
by Russia and supported by the United States. Although the Russian
side claims that it is playing a constructive role, the Turkish
media maintains some skepticism toward Moscow's intentions. There
are media reports maintaining that Russian intelligence found out
about the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan and passed this
information to Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, which led him
to distance himself from Turkey in April (Milliyet, September 3). If
such reports are correct, they might indicate Russian efforts to sow
seeds of distrust between Baku and Ankara, and undermine policies to
integrate Yerevan into a Western orbit.
It is unclear whether Aliyev was aware in advance of the signing
of the recent protocols, but Ankara apparently made efforts to
inform Baku. Indeed, it has been a growing concern for Ankara to
comfort Baku about the secret talks with Yerevan, and regain Azeri
confidence since the bitter episode in April. A few days before the
recent announcement to sign the protocols, Erdogan spoke to Aliyev on
the telephone and sent two special envoys to Baku to brief him on the
progress in Turkish-Armenian talks (Zaman, August 28). Azerbaijan's
Ambassador in Ankara Zakir Hashimov said that Davutoglu reassured
his Azeri counterpart that the border would not be opened before the
resolution of the Karabakh issue (Hurriyet Daily News, September 6).
In the days ahead, a new domestic and foreign policy challenge will
confront the AKP government, as it seeks to refine the details of
the normalization with Armenia. A breakthrough in Azeri-Armenian
talks might untie the knot, but it remains to be seen whether the
international and regional pressures on Baku and Yerevan will produce
such an outcome.
Saban Kardas
Jamestown Foundation
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac he=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35459&tx_ttnew s%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=4842707614
Sept 8 2009
President of Turkey Abdullah Gul with his Armenian counterpart Serzh
Sargsyan during Gul's historic visit to Yerevan in 2008 On August 31
a joint statement issued by Turkey and Armenia announced that both
had agreed to start talks on the establishment of diplomatic ties
and the development of bilateral relations. The parties initialed
two protocols to regulate these issues, and the consultations on
these will be finalized within six weeks before being forwarded to
their national parliaments for ratification (www.mfa.gov.tr, August
31). The announcement generated a heated debate on the future of
Turkish-Armenian relations as well as its implications for Azerbaijan
and the involvement of other international actors.
The content of the protocols show that the parties built on the
progress they had achieved by April, which was interrupted by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's intervention to allay the concerns
of Azerbaijan. Following intense bilateral contacts, secret diplomacy
and pressure from the United States and European countries, Turkey and
Armenia announced a roadmap for normalization in April, the contents
of which remained undisclosed. Due to mounting domestic opposition
and protests from Azerbaijan, Erdogan reiterated unequivocally that
the progress of Turkish-Armenian relations would be contingent upon
Armenia's constructive attitude in its dispute with Azerbaijan. To
relieve Azeri concerns, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey would not
proceed with normalization, without an end to the Armenian occupation
of Karabakh (EDM, May 14). Although there were concerns that the
normalization process might have come to a premature end, the parties
maintained their secret dialogue facilitated by Switzerland (EDM,
June 30).
By reiterating their commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional
disputes, the parties implicitly recognize the Karabakh issue, but
the protocols make no mention of it, nor set it as a precondition
for opening the Turkish-Armenian border. In taking this step despite
this "missing element," the Turkish government again raised concerns
as to whether it might accelerate the rapprochement with Armenia
by decoupling it from the Karabakh issue. Consequently, opposition
both domestically and in Azerbaijan expressed discomfort with these
developments. In response, Erdogan reconnected the two processes
politically, by arguing that the ratification of the protocols would
depend on the resolution of Karabakh issue, reflecting Ankara's
concern to keep Baku on board (Vatan, September 2).
The leverage Azerbaijan exerts over Turkish foreign policy led to
different interpretations from the Turkish press. The nationalist
media continued to express their unconditional support for Azerbaijan's
position and criticized the government's recent initiatives (Ortadogu,
September 3)
Many mainstream commentators, however, maintain that returning to
the status quo ante might be difficult, and that instead of seeking
to restore Karabakh through military means, Baku should focus on
diplomatic measures to free the occupied Azeri territories, and in
return grant greater autonomy to the area and open a corridor between
Armenia and Karabakh (Milliyet, September 3). Although Erdogan might
ideally prefer a maximalist position on the return of Karabakh, other
actors within the Turkish government also seem to be ready to settle
for such an arrangement recognizing the new reality in the region. In
fact, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Abdullah Gul are
interested in seeing the process through and opening the border by the
end of the year (Radikal, September 2), despite Erdogan's occasional
nationalistic outbursts.
Other commentators view the rapprochement as a partly American
project and believe that both Turkey and Azerbaijan are urged, if not
pressured, by the Obama administration to solve their problems with
Armenia. They even suggest that the mediation services provided by
Swiss diplomats might only represent a cover for American facilitation
between the Turkish and Armenian delegations, which is partly shared by
the opposition parties, mainly the Republican People's Party (Milliyet,
September 4; Hurriyet, September 2). The pro-government press, in
contrast, challenges these arguments and maintains that searching
for foreign actors behind such initiatives reflects a problematic
attitude on the part of the Turkish opposition. It presents these
recent developments as an achievement of the AKP government and treats
them as affirmation of Turkey's expanding role in regional diplomacy
(Star, September 4).
Explaining the normalization with reference to the involvement of
outside actors inevitably raises questions about the motivations
of "outsiders." At this juncture, the role of energy issues is
emphasized by the Turkish media. There is a perception that the
process is promoted by the West as part of its energy policies. They
speculate that Turkish-Armenian normalization is promoted in order that
Armenia might emerge as an alternative route to Georgia for the future
transportation of Caspian basin resources (Milliyet, September 3).
Such analyses inevitably ignore the issue of the Russian
position. There is already a process underway between Azerbaijan and
Armenia toward the resolution of the Karabakh dispute, facilitated
by Russia and supported by the United States. Although the Russian
side claims that it is playing a constructive role, the Turkish
media maintains some skepticism toward Moscow's intentions. There
are media reports maintaining that Russian intelligence found out
about the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan and passed this
information to Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, which led him
to distance himself from Turkey in April (Milliyet, September 3). If
such reports are correct, they might indicate Russian efforts to sow
seeds of distrust between Baku and Ankara, and undermine policies to
integrate Yerevan into a Western orbit.
It is unclear whether Aliyev was aware in advance of the signing
of the recent protocols, but Ankara apparently made efforts to
inform Baku. Indeed, it has been a growing concern for Ankara to
comfort Baku about the secret talks with Yerevan, and regain Azeri
confidence since the bitter episode in April. A few days before the
recent announcement to sign the protocols, Erdogan spoke to Aliyev on
the telephone and sent two special envoys to Baku to brief him on the
progress in Turkish-Armenian talks (Zaman, August 28). Azerbaijan's
Ambassador in Ankara Zakir Hashimov said that Davutoglu reassured
his Azeri counterpart that the border would not be opened before the
resolution of the Karabakh issue (Hurriyet Daily News, September 6).
In the days ahead, a new domestic and foreign policy challenge will
confront the AKP government, as it seeks to refine the details of
the normalization with Armenia. A breakthrough in Azeri-Armenian
talks might untie the knot, but it remains to be seen whether the
international and regional pressures on Baku and Yerevan will produce
such an outcome.