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Armenia-Turkey protocols: What is on the scales of the balance?
The Noyan Tapan Highligts, September 14 2009
By Haroutiun Khachatrian
The political figures and parties of Armenia have been divided into
two groups, and some of them say that the published Armenia-Turkey
draft protocols contain preconditions (by Turkey), whereas the others
claim there are no preconditions and recall a calf under an ox (the
Armenian proverb used by foreign minister Edward Nalbandian during his
press conference). They are engaged in mutual recrimination.
The argument is on a wrong subject. There are preconditions by both
sides and preconditions could not but exist. The point is what risks
the two sides are to take and what their goals are. Are the risks
worth the goals?
EACH SIDE PURSUES ITS INTERESTS
Turkey has expressed desire to open the border with Armenia (closed 16
years ago) of its own free will, so it is interested in opening the
border. It would be surprising if Turkey did not strive to satisfy its
interests in this affair - just like any other state does. No one can
claim that by providing credit to Armenia or occupying a borderline
territory, Russia and Georgia, respectively, do not pursue first of
all their own interests.
Well, does Turkey believe that the international recognition of the
Armenian Genocide is contrary to its interests? It certainly does.
Does it believe that the deterioration of its relations with
Azerbaijan contradicts its interests? No doubt it does. Therefore,
Turkey will continue taking actions aimed at protecting its interests
(that is, to hinder recognition of the Genocide and to help
Azerbaijan) also after the above-mentioned protocols are signed and
ratified. Turkey would have continued to protect Azerbaijan's
interests, even if the protocols had contained, according to much
respected by me Mr. Vartan Oskanian, the following sentence: `The
normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations shall take place
irrespective of the Nagorno Karabakh problem resolution process'.
Similarly, does Armenia think that the international recognition of
the Genocide is in line with its interests? Certainly. Does it believe
that protecting Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan's ambitions suits its
interests? It does. Therefore, it will seek achieving these goals also
after signing and ratifying the indicated protocols.
Let us fix these obvious facts and go ahead.
ARMENIA'S INTERESTS A), B), AND C)
Now, I want to consider the most important factor. Armenia is very
much interested in reopening the borders and having diplomatic
relations with Turkey. It is interested to such a degree that many
people do not even realize the importance of that. Indeed, if the
Armenian-Turkish border is open, then
a) Armenia will gain a serious victory in the fight for Karabakh.
Azerbaijan's power will at least halve. Now, we have two physical
fronts in the war against Azerbaijan, and only one will remain after
opening the border. Let's not forget that we have not yet won the
struggle for Karabakh.
b) Armenia will get rid of its unilateral dependence on Georgia.
Usually, only the economic aspect of this dependence is indicated,
namely, that we will have an alternative railway, a reliable and cheap
supply, etc. The political price of this dependence is never
mentioned. I mean, after all, it is for this reason that we turn the
blind eye to (let's call things by their proper names) anti-Armenian
actions of Georgia's government. We are forced to do so. And we will
get rid of it.
c) The economic result is determined not so much by, and even not by
the very fact of opening of communications. Rather, it is determined
by the fact that Turkey's MARKET will open to Armenia. We forget that
we are in a unique situation: goods of 200 million dollars come to
Armenia from Turkey annually, whereas movement in the opposite
direction is CLOSED due to a de facto embargo of Turkey. Some express
fear that our market will open before Turks, even though it has never
been closed. And almost nobody speaks about what will happen if
Armenia's commodity market will have 70 million consumers instead of 3
million now, especially as this market is next to it, rather than
being located thousands of kilometers away as Russia, for example. It
will be a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ARMENIA. It is impossible to forecast
what investors and investments will flow into Armenia. But we can
recall the considerable number of investors who refused to come to
Armenia due to the small size of its market.
I would like to emphasize once again that Turkey is also interested in
the border's opening: it has its own reasons for that, but I will not
dwell upon them now.
THE OTHER SCALE OF THE BALANCE
After stating all this, let's consider the `unacceptable
preconditions' indicated by the critics of the protocols.
The first `precondition' is the commission on historical dimension. It
is said that its existence (according to Vartan Oskanian, the very
fact of the protocols' initiation) will give Turkey a pretext for
declaring at every turn that there is no need for other countries to
recognize the Armenian Genocide because the Turks and Armenians are
clarifying this issue themselves. Suppose Turkey will do so. Armenia
in the person of Serzh Sargsyan has stated that the Genocide is not a
subject for bargaining, but Turkey will undoubtedly say (just as it
has said so far) that the problem of the Genocide should be left to
historians for discussion. Whom will Turkey persuade and whom will
Armenia convince?
As ever, those who want to be persuaded will be `persuaded'. By the
way, are there many people today who `want to be persuaded' that
genocide did take place in 1915? In other words, are there many
parliaments, where the recognition of the Armenian Genocide has been
put on the agenda? As far as I know, currently there is only one such
parliament, that is, the Congress of the United States. Over the past
five years, no other country has had incentives `to be persuaded' in
our favor. And this only parliament, the U.S. Congress, will `be
persuaded' that the genocide was committed only in case when it
proceeds from its interests. No sooner, and no later. And the
protocols on the establishment of relations between Armenia and Turkey
will not play any role in it.
Well, suppose they will play some role. But let's put the indicated
points a), b) and c) on one scale of the balance and the recognition
of the Genocide by the U.S. Congress on the other. What the
present-day Republic of Armenia needs more? We should remember that
such an advocate of the Genocide's recognition as the famous Armenian
American editor Harut Sassounian has repeatedly said that the
recognition of the Genocide by the Congress is of no importance
because the United States recognized it long ago: President Reagan
issued a Presidential Proclamation in 1981, recognizing the Armenian
Genocide.
Finally, let's simplify our problem by reminding that the
international recognition of the Genocide is part of the National
Security Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia. Now, what is more
important for our national security? The uncertain prospect of the
Genocide's recognition by a foreign parliament (even by five
parliaments) is on one scale and on the other are the above mentioned
points a), b), and c) when a real chance has emerged to achieve them?
The second `unacceptable precondition' is that Turkish parliament may
drag out the ratification of the protocols, demanding concessions from
Armenia in the Karabakh problem, even though this problem is not
mentioned in the protocols. This is quite possible, indeed. In
addition to the Karabakh issue, the Turkish parliament may also make
other demands we cannot think of at the present time. So what? Today
too, Turkey is trying to force us to meet Azerbaijan's demands. Today
too, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs are pressuring. What will change
if we sign the protocols, if we make an attempt to reach the above
indicated goals a), b), and c)? Nothing will change. We will just get
a chance to reach these a), b), and c) goals. A chance, which may be
fulfilled, and may be not. That is, things may remain as they are now
when we have no relations with Turkey. Things may remain the same, but
it seems they will not because Turkey appears to be really interested
in changing the situation (otherwise it would not have initiated these
documents). So, we have a chance to achieve the goals a), b), and c).
So it is worth trying.
Vartan Oskanian wrote in this connection: `... if the ratification of
these protocols takes place ... before the date of President Obama's
April 24 message ... it is safe to say that Turkey and Azerbaijan have
received sufficient guarantees regarding the return of the territories
around Karabakh and the status of the NKR'. (168 Zham, September 10).
Well, what are these guarantees, which cannot be received from Armenia
(Armenia's leadership) now, but can be received after the ratification
of the protocols? It is incomprehensible. What will change after the
ratification? Why should the Armenian authorities be inclined to give
the territories in return for ratification? Will foreigners try to
benefit from Serzh Sargsyan's legitimacy problem, as is hinted at some
foreign instances? But this problem exists today as well. It is
difficult to understand the respected former foreign minister.
And the final point is the issue of borders. No doubt, it is the most
painful issue, I will permit myself to say it is even more painful
than the problem of the Genocide for the simple reason that the
victims of the Genocide cannot be brought back to life, but the hope
of changing the border drawn by the Communists and Moustafa Kemal, in
other words, the hope of recovering (at least partially) our
historical lands has been and will always be alive. Do the protocols
establish these borders or not? Diplomats say that the issue of
disputed territories can be raised at any moment, and the
establishment of relations does not necessarily mean the final
recognition of borders. After all, after the ratification of the
protocols, Armenia will always be free to declare this or that
provision invalid (can anybody guarantee that after opening the border
Turkey will not close it some time later?) I don't know. One thing is
obvious: in order to protect our lands, we should not retire into our
shell; at least we should have an open border and normal diplomatic
relations with Turkey. Can those holding the opposite view say what
the Republic of Armenia has done to get back its historical lands? And
what can it do before opening the border: to raise a placard `Give Our
Lands!' at the border; or move the army towards Western Armenia? If
there is a strong desire to act according to the latter version, the
protocols are unlikely to hinder it.
I must respond again to an opinion expressed by Vartan Oskanian. He
wrote about the clause on the borders: `The emphasis on territorial
integrity is an internationally accepted wording that solves the
problem of concern related to borders, at the same time not depriving
us of the right to obtain historical justice. Meanwhile, we should
have avoided at any cost the wording `mutual recognition of the
existing common border between the two countries' which was set down
in the document.' Obviously, he is right. But how realistic was it to
avoid the wording `mutual recognition of the common border' in these
protocols? After all, those representing the Turkish side were not
inexperienced youths, and they knew what the Armenians want from them.
The negotiating countries have quite different `weight classes,'
suffice it to mention the difference in their populations. To all
appearance, this is the precondition which adoption the Armenian side
could not avoid to accept if it wanted to have the above mentioned
points a), b), and ).
TO TRY OR NOT TO TRY?
There is yet another reason that raises a doubt as to these affairs,
and it is related to those who carry out them. It is not for the first
time that I say that the current ruling political elite, to put it
mildly, does not inspire trust. Its definitions are: irresolute,
small-minded, revengeful, and amoral, and the elite infect the society
with these negative characteristics at every turn. With respect to
such a political elite (not to mention the problem of the president's
legitimacy), there are always fears that it may prove insufficiently
reliable. As regards the protocols, as the above-mentioned analysis
shows, up to now the current political leadership of the country has
done its best. There is a hope that it will be so in the future as
well. Especially, as the approaches of the political elite and its
most powerful opponent Levon Ter-Petrosian to Armenian-Turkish
relations are quite similar, and in future Ter-Petrosian will continue
trying to assist Serzh Sargsyan in this issue.
An opportunity should be given so that we will make an attempt to open
the border. If we miss this opportunity, a new one may take long to
arise.
The Noyan Tapan Highligts, September 14 2009
By Haroutiun Khachatrian
The political figures and parties of Armenia have been divided into
two groups, and some of them say that the published Armenia-Turkey
draft protocols contain preconditions (by Turkey), whereas the others
claim there are no preconditions and recall a calf under an ox (the
Armenian proverb used by foreign minister Edward Nalbandian during his
press conference). They are engaged in mutual recrimination.
The argument is on a wrong subject. There are preconditions by both
sides and preconditions could not but exist. The point is what risks
the two sides are to take and what their goals are. Are the risks
worth the goals?
EACH SIDE PURSUES ITS INTERESTS
Turkey has expressed desire to open the border with Armenia (closed 16
years ago) of its own free will, so it is interested in opening the
border. It would be surprising if Turkey did not strive to satisfy its
interests in this affair - just like any other state does. No one can
claim that by providing credit to Armenia or occupying a borderline
territory, Russia and Georgia, respectively, do not pursue first of
all their own interests.
Well, does Turkey believe that the international recognition of the
Armenian Genocide is contrary to its interests? It certainly does.
Does it believe that the deterioration of its relations with
Azerbaijan contradicts its interests? No doubt it does. Therefore,
Turkey will continue taking actions aimed at protecting its interests
(that is, to hinder recognition of the Genocide and to help
Azerbaijan) also after the above-mentioned protocols are signed and
ratified. Turkey would have continued to protect Azerbaijan's
interests, even if the protocols had contained, according to much
respected by me Mr. Vartan Oskanian, the following sentence: `The
normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations shall take place
irrespective of the Nagorno Karabakh problem resolution process'.
Similarly, does Armenia think that the international recognition of
the Genocide is in line with its interests? Certainly. Does it believe
that protecting Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan's ambitions suits its
interests? It does. Therefore, it will seek achieving these goals also
after signing and ratifying the indicated protocols.
Let us fix these obvious facts and go ahead.
ARMENIA'S INTERESTS A), B), AND C)
Now, I want to consider the most important factor. Armenia is very
much interested in reopening the borders and having diplomatic
relations with Turkey. It is interested to such a degree that many
people do not even realize the importance of that. Indeed, if the
Armenian-Turkish border is open, then
a) Armenia will gain a serious victory in the fight for Karabakh.
Azerbaijan's power will at least halve. Now, we have two physical
fronts in the war against Azerbaijan, and only one will remain after
opening the border. Let's not forget that we have not yet won the
struggle for Karabakh.
b) Armenia will get rid of its unilateral dependence on Georgia.
Usually, only the economic aspect of this dependence is indicated,
namely, that we will have an alternative railway, a reliable and cheap
supply, etc. The political price of this dependence is never
mentioned. I mean, after all, it is for this reason that we turn the
blind eye to (let's call things by their proper names) anti-Armenian
actions of Georgia's government. We are forced to do so. And we will
get rid of it.
c) The economic result is determined not so much by, and even not by
the very fact of opening of communications. Rather, it is determined
by the fact that Turkey's MARKET will open to Armenia. We forget that
we are in a unique situation: goods of 200 million dollars come to
Armenia from Turkey annually, whereas movement in the opposite
direction is CLOSED due to a de facto embargo of Turkey. Some express
fear that our market will open before Turks, even though it has never
been closed. And almost nobody speaks about what will happen if
Armenia's commodity market will have 70 million consumers instead of 3
million now, especially as this market is next to it, rather than
being located thousands of kilometers away as Russia, for example. It
will be a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ARMENIA. It is impossible to forecast
what investors and investments will flow into Armenia. But we can
recall the considerable number of investors who refused to come to
Armenia due to the small size of its market.
I would like to emphasize once again that Turkey is also interested in
the border's opening: it has its own reasons for that, but I will not
dwell upon them now.
THE OTHER SCALE OF THE BALANCE
After stating all this, let's consider the `unacceptable
preconditions' indicated by the critics of the protocols.
The first `precondition' is the commission on historical dimension. It
is said that its existence (according to Vartan Oskanian, the very
fact of the protocols' initiation) will give Turkey a pretext for
declaring at every turn that there is no need for other countries to
recognize the Armenian Genocide because the Turks and Armenians are
clarifying this issue themselves. Suppose Turkey will do so. Armenia
in the person of Serzh Sargsyan has stated that the Genocide is not a
subject for bargaining, but Turkey will undoubtedly say (just as it
has said so far) that the problem of the Genocide should be left to
historians for discussion. Whom will Turkey persuade and whom will
Armenia convince?
As ever, those who want to be persuaded will be `persuaded'. By the
way, are there many people today who `want to be persuaded' that
genocide did take place in 1915? In other words, are there many
parliaments, where the recognition of the Armenian Genocide has been
put on the agenda? As far as I know, currently there is only one such
parliament, that is, the Congress of the United States. Over the past
five years, no other country has had incentives `to be persuaded' in
our favor. And this only parliament, the U.S. Congress, will `be
persuaded' that the genocide was committed only in case when it
proceeds from its interests. No sooner, and no later. And the
protocols on the establishment of relations between Armenia and Turkey
will not play any role in it.
Well, suppose they will play some role. But let's put the indicated
points a), b) and c) on one scale of the balance and the recognition
of the Genocide by the U.S. Congress on the other. What the
present-day Republic of Armenia needs more? We should remember that
such an advocate of the Genocide's recognition as the famous Armenian
American editor Harut Sassounian has repeatedly said that the
recognition of the Genocide by the Congress is of no importance
because the United States recognized it long ago: President Reagan
issued a Presidential Proclamation in 1981, recognizing the Armenian
Genocide.
Finally, let's simplify our problem by reminding that the
international recognition of the Genocide is part of the National
Security Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia. Now, what is more
important for our national security? The uncertain prospect of the
Genocide's recognition by a foreign parliament (even by five
parliaments) is on one scale and on the other are the above mentioned
points a), b), and c) when a real chance has emerged to achieve them?
The second `unacceptable precondition' is that Turkish parliament may
drag out the ratification of the protocols, demanding concessions from
Armenia in the Karabakh problem, even though this problem is not
mentioned in the protocols. This is quite possible, indeed. In
addition to the Karabakh issue, the Turkish parliament may also make
other demands we cannot think of at the present time. So what? Today
too, Turkey is trying to force us to meet Azerbaijan's demands. Today
too, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs are pressuring. What will change
if we sign the protocols, if we make an attempt to reach the above
indicated goals a), b), and c)? Nothing will change. We will just get
a chance to reach these a), b), and c) goals. A chance, which may be
fulfilled, and may be not. That is, things may remain as they are now
when we have no relations with Turkey. Things may remain the same, but
it seems they will not because Turkey appears to be really interested
in changing the situation (otherwise it would not have initiated these
documents). So, we have a chance to achieve the goals a), b), and c).
So it is worth trying.
Vartan Oskanian wrote in this connection: `... if the ratification of
these protocols takes place ... before the date of President Obama's
April 24 message ... it is safe to say that Turkey and Azerbaijan have
received sufficient guarantees regarding the return of the territories
around Karabakh and the status of the NKR'. (168 Zham, September 10).
Well, what are these guarantees, which cannot be received from Armenia
(Armenia's leadership) now, but can be received after the ratification
of the protocols? It is incomprehensible. What will change after the
ratification? Why should the Armenian authorities be inclined to give
the territories in return for ratification? Will foreigners try to
benefit from Serzh Sargsyan's legitimacy problem, as is hinted at some
foreign instances? But this problem exists today as well. It is
difficult to understand the respected former foreign minister.
And the final point is the issue of borders. No doubt, it is the most
painful issue, I will permit myself to say it is even more painful
than the problem of the Genocide for the simple reason that the
victims of the Genocide cannot be brought back to life, but the hope
of changing the border drawn by the Communists and Moustafa Kemal, in
other words, the hope of recovering (at least partially) our
historical lands has been and will always be alive. Do the protocols
establish these borders or not? Diplomats say that the issue of
disputed territories can be raised at any moment, and the
establishment of relations does not necessarily mean the final
recognition of borders. After all, after the ratification of the
protocols, Armenia will always be free to declare this or that
provision invalid (can anybody guarantee that after opening the border
Turkey will not close it some time later?) I don't know. One thing is
obvious: in order to protect our lands, we should not retire into our
shell; at least we should have an open border and normal diplomatic
relations with Turkey. Can those holding the opposite view say what
the Republic of Armenia has done to get back its historical lands? And
what can it do before opening the border: to raise a placard `Give Our
Lands!' at the border; or move the army towards Western Armenia? If
there is a strong desire to act according to the latter version, the
protocols are unlikely to hinder it.
I must respond again to an opinion expressed by Vartan Oskanian. He
wrote about the clause on the borders: `The emphasis on territorial
integrity is an internationally accepted wording that solves the
problem of concern related to borders, at the same time not depriving
us of the right to obtain historical justice. Meanwhile, we should
have avoided at any cost the wording `mutual recognition of the
existing common border between the two countries' which was set down
in the document.' Obviously, he is right. But how realistic was it to
avoid the wording `mutual recognition of the common border' in these
protocols? After all, those representing the Turkish side were not
inexperienced youths, and they knew what the Armenians want from them.
The negotiating countries have quite different `weight classes,'
suffice it to mention the difference in their populations. To all
appearance, this is the precondition which adoption the Armenian side
could not avoid to accept if it wanted to have the above mentioned
points a), b), and ).
TO TRY OR NOT TO TRY?
There is yet another reason that raises a doubt as to these affairs,
and it is related to those who carry out them. It is not for the first
time that I say that the current ruling political elite, to put it
mildly, does not inspire trust. Its definitions are: irresolute,
small-minded, revengeful, and amoral, and the elite infect the society
with these negative characteristics at every turn. With respect to
such a political elite (not to mention the problem of the president's
legitimacy), there are always fears that it may prove insufficiently
reliable. As regards the protocols, as the above-mentioned analysis
shows, up to now the current political leadership of the country has
done its best. There is a hope that it will be so in the future as
well. Especially, as the approaches of the political elite and its
most powerful opponent Levon Ter-Petrosian to Armenian-Turkish
relations are quite similar, and in future Ter-Petrosian will continue
trying to assist Serzh Sargsyan in this issue.
An opportunity should be given so that we will make an attempt to open
the border. If we miss this opportunity, a new one may take long to
arise.