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Azerbaijan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004

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  • Azerbaijan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004

    U.S Dept of State
    Azerbaijan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004
    Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
    February 28, 2005

    Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of government. The
    Constitution provides for a division of powers between a strong presidency
    and parliament (Milli Majlis), which has authority to approve the budget and
    to impeach the President. The President dominated the executive,
    legislative, and judicial branches of government. Ilham Aliyev, the son of
    former president Heydar Aliyev, was elected President in October 2003 in a
    ballot that did not meet international standards for a democratic election
    due to numerous, serious irregularities. There were similar irregularities
    during parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2003, and some domestic groups
    regarded the Parliament as illegitimate. Only 5 of the Parliament's 125
    members were opposition members. The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it was corrupt, inefficient, and did not
    function independently.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and Ministry of National Security are
    responsible for internal security and report directly to the President.
    Civilian authorities maintained effective control of security forces.
    Members of the security forces committed numerous human rights abuses.
    The Government continued programs to develop a market economy; however, the
    pace of reforms was uneven. The population was approximately 8 million, of
    which an estimated 2 million lived and worked abroad. Widespread corruption
    and patronage reduced competition. The slow pace of reform limited
    development outside the oil and gas sector, which accounted for more than 80
    percent of export revenues. Private commercial agriculture remained weak;
    subsistence farming dominated the rural economy. Economic growth was
    approximately 10 percent. Nationwide poverty decreased, although 44 percent
    of the population lived below the poverty level. Unemployment estimates
    ranged from 15 to 20 percent.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to
    commit numerous abuses. The Government continued to restrict the right of
    citizens to peacefully change their government. There were four deaths that
    occurred in custody allegedly due to beatings. Police tortured and beat
    persons in custody, and used excessive force to extract confessions. In most
    cases, the Government took no action to punish abusers. Prison conditions
    remained harsh and life threatening, and some prisoners died as a result of
    these conditions; however, the Government permitted independent monitoring
    of prison conditions by local and international humanitarian groups.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pretrial detention continued to
    be problems. After the October 2003 presidential elections, authorities
    conducted a wave of politically motivated arrests of more than 700 persons,
    including, opposition members, journalists and election officials. According
    to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers,
    many of the trials of those accused of post-election violence did not meet
    OSCE and other international standards. In a series of presidential pardons,
    a number of political prisoners, as defined by the Council of Europe (COE),
    were released. Authorities interfered with privacy rights.
    The Government continued to restrict freedom of speech and of the press.
    Defamation lawsuits brought by officials against independent journalists and
    newspapers and high court fines for libel remained significant problems for
    the media. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and did not
    sanction any demonstrations by opposition political parties during the year.
    The Government continued to restrict freedom of association by harassing
    domestic human rights activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
    There were some restrictions and abuses of religious freedom, and low-level
    and local government officials continued to harass minority religious
    groups. Violence against women, societal discrimination against women and
    certain ethnic minorities, trafficking in persons, and limitations of some
    worker rights remained problems.
    Despite a cease-fire in effect since 1994, minor outbreaks of fighting with
    Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh occurred, resulting in six deaths of civilians
    and combatants during the year. Armenian forces continued to occupy an
    estimated 16 percent of the country's territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh.
    The occupation dominated national politics and undermined democratic and
    economic development in the country. The Government did not exercise any
    control over developments in territories occupied by Armenian forces, and
    little verifiable information was available on the human rights situation
    there. Approximately 800,000 Azerbaijanis remained refugees or internally
    displaced persons (IDPs) after fleeing or having been forced from their
    homes between 1988 and 1993.
    RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
    Section 1
    Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom from:
    a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
    There were no reports of politically motivated killings by the Government or
    its agents; however, during the year there were four deaths in custody due
    to alleged abuse and mistreatment. Authorities did not prosecute suspected
    abusers in these cases (see Section 1.d.).
    In March, Etibar Najafov was arrested on misdemeanor charges and taken to
    Sabayil District Police Department. Authorities allegedly beat him during
    questioning, but the Government reported that he died while trying to escape
    from a 2nd floor window. In April, Akif Mirzayev died in a prison hospital
    after allegedly being beaten in the Organized Crime Department of the
    Ministry of Internal Affairs while serving a 5-year sentence for kidnapping.
    The Government said he was a drug addict who had cirrhosis of the liver. In
    May, Azer Safarov died after allegedly being beaten at the Sumgayit City
    Police Station. Authorities acknowledged arresting Safarov on burglary
    charges but denied responsibility for his death. In December, Badal Babayev
    died after allegedly being beaten in an Absheron police station. His body
    was covered in bruises. Authorities said Babayev died of a heart attack
    after he left the police station. Authorities did not conduct further
    investigations into any of these cases.
    In October 2003, law enforcement officials beat to death one person at a
    post-election demonstration that turned violent (see Section 2.b.). There
    was no development in this case or in the 2002 death of Beylar Kuliyev, who
    died in police custody after 10 days of interrogation.
    During the year, the press reported that four army conscripts died of causes
    attributed to military hazing.
    Occasional cease-fire violations by both sides in the conflict with Armenia
    over Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in six deaths and injuries to civilians and
    soldiers during the year. According to the National Agency for Mine Actions,
    landmines killed 13 persons and injured 21 during the year.
    b. Disappearance
    There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to urge the
    Government and Armenia to provide information on the fate of persons missing
    in action since the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh began. Since the early
    1990s, the ICRC has collected the names of approximately 3,100 individuals
    of various ethnic backgrounds that remain missing because of the conflict.
    However, the Government estimated that approximately 4,850 citizens remained
    missing and were allegedly held by Armenia.
    During the year, the ICRC assisted in the return of four Azerbaijani
    citizens from Armenia at the request of the Government.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
    Treatment or Punishment
    The law prohibits such practices and provides for punishment of up to 10
    years in jail; during the year, there were fewer credible reports that
    security forces beat and tortured detainees and used excessive force to
    extract confessions during interrogations and pretrial detention. However,
    torture remained a problem.
    Following post-election disturbances that turned violent in Baku in October
    2003, MIA personnel detained, tortured, and beat three leading opposition
    leaders: Hope Party Chairman Iqbal Agazade, Azerbaijan Democratic Party
    (ADP) Secretary General Sardar Jalaloglu, and the ADP's election secretary
    Natiq Jabiyev (see Section 3).
    In 2003, Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented numerous cases of beatings,
    torture, and verbal abuse, including threats of rape, by the MIA's organized
    crime unit following the post-election violence in October 2003 (see Section
    1.d.). HRW reported that police also severely beat and tortured detainees to
    extract confessions and pressured them to sign false statements to denounce
    and implicate opposition leaders in the post-election violence. For example,
    during the trial of seven opposition leaders accused of organizing and
    participating in the post-election violence, some witnesses testified that
    they were coerced into giving false depositions (see Section 1.e.). By
    year's end, there had been no investigation into these abuses.
    Police also harassed members of certain religious groups, such as Baptists,
    Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Muslim Juma Mosque Community, and
    there were reports of several beatings of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses
    (see Section 2.c.). No measures were taken against police who detained and
    beat Haji Jubrail Alizade following clashes in 2002 in Nardaran between
    protesters and police.
    Prison conditions remained harsh and sometimes life threatening.
    Overcrowding and poor medical care combined to make the spread of infectious
    diseases a serious problem. Tuberculosis (TB) remained the primary cause of
    death in prisons. The Government reported that 774 prisoners were treated
    for TB during the year. However, due to the absence of systematic medical
    screening, prisoners often started TB treatment when already seriously ill.
    Many prisoners relied on families for food and medicine, who often paid
    bribes to gain access to imprisoned relatives.
    Harsh prison conditions resulted in deaths during the year
    There were separate facilities for men, women, juveniles, convicts, and
    pretrial detainees.
    In maximum-security facilities, authorities limited physical exercise for
    prisoners, as well as visits by attorneys and family members. Some pretrial
    detainees were kept in "separation cells," often located in basements, to
    conceal evidence of physical abuse and where food and sleep reportedly were
    denied to elicit confessions.
    During the year, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), which oversees the prison
    system, continued a program to improve prison conditions and renovated five
    prisons. In 2003, the Government built five new prisons and several were
    renovated.
    The government permitted visits by international and local humanitarian and
    human rights groups. In 2002, the Government extended the ICRC's access to
    all detainees and prisoners. The ICRC also had access to prisoners of war
    (POWs) and to civilians held in connection with the conflict over
    Nagorno-Karabakh. Foreign observers were allowed to enter maximum-security
    prisons and to meet with alleged political prisoners. During the year, human
    rights activists worked with the MOJ to create a monitoring group that could
    visit prisons regularly and report on conditions. The group worked with the
    MOJ's Deputy Minister to increase accountability of prison staff and to
    improve prison conditions. In September, the head of one Baku prison was
    dismissed after the monitoring group complained to the MOJ about his
    conduct. Domestic observers' access to police stations remained restricted.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
    The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
    Government generally did not observe these prohibitions in practice, and
    impunity remained a problem.
    The MIA and Ministry of National Security are responsible for internal
    security and report directly to the President. The MIA oversees local police
    forces and maintains internal civil defense troops. The Ministry of National
    Security has a separate security force.
    Police corruption mainly consisted of levying spurious and informal fines
    for traffic and other minor violations and extracting protection money from
    local residents. Police officers received a pay raise during the year;
    however, low wages of law enforcement officials continued to contribute to
    police corruption.
    In most cases, the Government took little or no action to investigate
    reports of arbitrary arrest or detention; however, the Government reported
    that during the year, it took disciplinary action against 78 police officers
    for 57 cases of abuse of human rights and civil liberties. Of these, 11
    officers were dismissed from the Ministry of Interior, 12 officers were
    charged criminally, 6 officers were dismissed from their positions, and 1
    officer was demoted.
    By year's end, the Government did not arrest any police officers or announce
    the results of an investigation into election-related police clashes with
    journalists and opposition activists in September and October 2003.
    The Government did not investigate or take any punitive action against
    individuals named in a 2003 HRW report that documented numerous cases of
    torture and abuse of opposition supporters that were detained by the MIA's
    Organized Crime Department following the post-election violence in October
    2003. Several of the officers allegedly involved in the abuses received
    promotions during the year, including the Chief of the Organized Crime
    Department, who was promoted from Colonel to General (see Sections 1.c. and
    2.b.).
    During the year, an international foundation trained more than 160 security
    officers attached to the Special State Protective Service (SSPS) in human
    rights theory, standards, and practices. The officers who participated in
    the training were recruited from the SSPS, the State Border Guard, the Army,
    and police. The SSPS, a government agency responsible for protecting the
    Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, coordinates pipeline security with different
    ministries.
    Authorities often arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without legal
    warrants. The law allows police to detain and question individuals for 3
    hours without a warrant. The Constitution also states that persons who are
    detained, arrested, or accused of a crime should be advised immediately of
    their rights, reason for arrest, and should be accorded due process of law;
    however, authorities did not respect these provisions in practice.
    The Constitution also provides for access to a lawyer from the time of
    detention; however, access to lawyers was poor, particularly outside of Baku
    (see Section 1.e.). Authorities often restricted family visits and withheld
    information from family members; frequently, days passed before they could
    obtain any information about detained relatives. Bail was commonly denied
    and lengthy pretrial detention was a serious problem.
    Police detained more than 700 persons across the country in October 2003,
    most of whom were members of the opposition Musavat party, following
    post-election demonstrations in Baku that turned violent. Of 126 persons
    found guilty, 41 were given prison terms, 79 others received suspended
    sentences, and 6 received limited liberty sentences. The trial for the
    remaining 10 defendants continued at year's end. Other opposition parties
    also reported numerous brief detentions before the October 2003 presidential
    election.
    In August, authorities again detained ADP Secretary Taliyat Aliyev following
    an incident outside the trial of seven opposition leaders charged with
    participating and organizing the October 2003 post-election violence (see
    Section 1.e.). Authorities charged Aliyev with pressuring a witness to give
    false testimony and with assaulting and injuring a police officer and
    detained him while the charges were investigated. At year's end, the case
    had not been tried and Aliyev remained in detention. Authorities had also
    detained Aliyev in September 2003.
    As compared with the previous year, there were fewer incidents of police
    harassing members of opposition political parties or their families.
    In August, police reportedly threatened the family of Gabil Rzayev, Deputy
    Chairman of the Umid ("Hope") Party, to disclose his whereabouts. According
    to party officials, Rzayev sought political asylum outside the country after
    he alleged that police tortured him in detention in September 2003.
    On April 2, a three-judge panel convicted Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, the Imam of the
    independent Juma Mosque, of inciting and committing violence in connection
    with a post-election demonstration in October 2003 that turned violent. He
    was given a 5-year suspended sentence and released immediately, having
    served 4 months in pre-trial detention. On July 30, authorities detained the
    Imam again together with 25 members of the Juma Mosque in connection with
    activities of the Juma Mosque but released him the same day (see Sections
    2.c. and 4).
    Two relatives of former Speaker of Parliament and exiled ADP leader Rasul
    Guliyev remained in jail at year's end after convictions for crimes related
    to corruption during Guliyev's term in office. In September, authorities
    pardoned one other relative who was jailed in 2003.
    During the year, President Aliyev pardoned 810 prisoners, including 55
    prisoners considered political prisoners by local activists. For example, in
    March, 33 persons accused of participating in 2 coup attempts against the
    late President Heydar Aliyev were freed. They included former Prime Minister
    Surat Huseynov. In May, Faina Kunqurova, an ADP member convicted on
    hooliganism charges in 2002, and Jan Mirza-Mirzoyev, who publicly criticized
    the Minister of Defense and was convicted of murder in 2001, were both
    pardoned. In September, former separatist leader Alikram Humbatov and four
    other persons connected with coup attempts against the late President were
    freed. None of the 126 persons convicted on charges stemming from the
    October 2003 post-election violence were pardoned. Forty-one remained in
    prison, and the others were either on suspended sentences or limited
    liberty.
    Also during the year, authorities reportedly released three POWs from
    Armenia taken in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
    e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial
    The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
    practice, judges did not function independently of the executive branch. The
    judiciary was corrupt and inefficient.
    The executive branch exerts a strong influence over the judiciary. The
    President appoints Supreme and Constitutional Court judges, whom Parliament
    confirms. The President appoints lower-court judges without confirmation, as
    well as the Prosecutor General and the Deputy Prosecutor General, both of
    whom Parliament confirms. The Prosecutor General hires prosecutors at the
    district and republic level.
    Judges' salaries have steadily increased over several years; however, there
    continued to be credible allegations that judges accepted bribes, which
    contributed to the overall lack of respect for the rule of law. There were
    also credible reports that judges and prosecutors took instruction from the
    Presidential Administration and the MOJ, particularly in cases that drew
    attention from international observers.
    Judges preside over and direct trials. Courts of general jurisdiction may
    hear criminal, civil, and juvenile cases. District courts try the majority
    of cases. The Supreme Court may not act as the court of first instance. One
    judge hears cases at the district court level, while a three-judge panel
    hears cases at the Court of Appeals, the Court of Grave Crimes, and the
    Supreme Court. The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to
    appeal to the Constitutional Court. Citizens also have the right to appeal
    to the European Court of Human Rights.
    The Constitution provides for public trials except in cases involving state,
    commercial, or professional secrets or matters involving confidential,
    personal, or family matters. The Constitution provides for the presumption
    of innocence in criminal cases, pretrial discovery, a defendant's rights to
    confront witnesses and present evidence at trial, a court-approved attorney
    for indigent defendants, and appeal for both defendants and prosecutors;
    however, these provisions were not generally respected in practice. Foreign
    and domestic observers usually were allowed to attend trials. Although the
    Constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors and defense attorneys,
    in practice prosecutors' prerogatives outweighed those of the defense.
    The law limits representation in criminal cases to members of a
    state-controlled Collegium of Lawyers (bar association), thereby restricting
    the public's access to legal representation. In August, the Government
    enacted a law that was expected to reform the legal profession and establish
    a more independent bar association by allowing independent lawyers to join
    the Collegium automatically. However, by year's end, there was still no
    independent bar association. The Government retained control over the
    Collegium by using a narrow and questionable interpretation of the new law
    that prevented most independent lawyers from joining the bar. Instead, the
    state-controlled Collegium instituted examinations for new members and for
    the right to argue cases before the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. In
    December, several groups of independent lawyers filed lawsuits against the
    Collegium and the MOJ challenging the membership rules. At year's end, one
    case was decided against the lawyers, and two others were pending.
    The Constitution prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence; however,
    investigations often focused on obtaining confessions rather than gathering
    physical evidence against suspects. Despite defendants' claims that
    testimony was obtained through torture or abuse, no cases based on claims of
    abuse were dismissed, and there was no independent forensic investigator to
    determine the occurrence of abuse (see Section 1.c.). Serious crimes that
    were brought before the courts were likely to end in conviction; this was a
    result of judges requiring only a minimal level of proof and the close
    collaboration between prosecutors and judges. In the rare instance when a
    judge determined the evidence presented was not sufficient to convict a
    defendant, judges could and did return cases to the prosecutor for
    additional investigation, in effect giving the prosecution a "second chance"
    for a conviction.
    On October 22, the Court of Grave Crimes found seven opposition leaders
    guilty of inciting post-election violence in October 2003 and sentenced them
    to prison terms ranging from 30 months to 5 years. On November 19, the Court
    of Appeals upheld the convictions. At year's end, the defendants' appeal was
    pending with the Supreme Court. The defendants were: Rauf Arifoglu, Deputy
    Chairman of the Musavat Party and Editor-in-Chief of Yeni Musavat newspaper;
    Arif Hajili, Deputy Chairman of Musavat Party; Ibrahim Ibrahimli, Deputy
    Chairman of Musavat Party; Panah Huseynov, Chairman of the People's Party;
    Sardar Jalaloglu, General Secretary of the ADP; Igbal Agazade, Chairman of
    the Hope Party; and Etimad Asadov, Chairman of the Karabakh Veterans
    Association.
    The trial began with pretrial testimony in May and was marked by lengthy
    delays and questionable court decisions. In August, several witnesses
    testified that they either had been beaten or pressured to give false
    depositions against the defendants (see Section 1.c.). However, the judges
    neither requested a thorough investigation into the allegations of torture,
    nor gave the witnesses' testimony serious consideration in the conviction
    and sentencing. The OSCE, in its report issued after the trials, stated that
    many of the international rights that defendants were entitled to were
    violated, from the time of arrest through the right to a public and reasoned
    judgment. Specifically, officials did not adequately investigate pervasive,
    credible claims of torture; the seven defendants did not have adequate
    access to the prosecution's evidence or time to prepare a defense once they
    were given the materials; there were questions as to the impartiality of the
    judges; and the judgment, which rejected the defense's witnesses on spurious
    grounds and did not address inconsistencies in witness testimonies, was not
    reasoned.
    The country also has a military court system with civilian judges. Cases go
    either to the Court of Grave Crimes on Military Cases or to the Collegium on
    Military Cases under the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
    Local NGOs maintained that the Government continued to hold political
    prisoners. However, NGO estimates of the number of political prisoners
    varied, due in part to differing definitions of what constitutes a political
    prisoner. For example, some reported that the Government held more than 200
    political prisoners, including those sentenced in connection with the
    post-election violence in October 2003. During the year, NGO activists
    forwarded to the COE more than 170 names for consideration as political
    prisoners.
    In 2002, the COE tasked 2 independent experts to examine 716 cases of
    individuals whom local NGO activists said were political prisoners. Using a
    definition of political prisoners developed by the COE for Azerbaijan and
    Armenia, independent experts eliminated 504 names for lack of accurate
    information, such as a person was not actually detained or a person's case
    had already been investigated. Of the remaining 212 cases, the COE experts
    rendered decisions on 104 and released those findings in July. The COE
    report stated that the experts determined that 45 persons were actual
    political prisoners. Of these 45, 11 were retried (in retrials later
    determined not to meet international standards), 34 were pardoned either in
    2003 or during the year, 2 were released following a retrial, and 4 others
    were released 2 months after a retrial.
    At year's end, 9 persons deemed to be political prisoners by the COE,
    together with approximately 170 other persons who NGO activists said were
    political prisoners, remained in prison.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence
    The Constitution prohibits arbitrary invasions of privacy and monitoring of
    correspondence and other private communications; however, in practice, the
    Government restricted privacy rights.
    The Constitution allows for searches of residences only with a court order
    or in cases provided by law; however, authorities often conducted searches
    without warrants, particularly after the October 2003 election.
    It was widely believed that the Ministry of National Security and MIA
    monitored telephone and Internet communications, particularly those of
    foreigners and prominent political and business figures; however, there was
    no evidence to support this claim.
    Police continued to intimidate and harass family members of suspected
    criminals. In comparison to the previous year, there were fewer allegations
    that the authorities interfered with opposition members and members of their
    families (see Section 1.d).
    Some local officials continued to prevent Muslims from wearing headscarves
    (see Section 2.a.).
    Section 2
    Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press
    The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press and
    specifically prohibits press censorship; however, the Government did not
    respect these rights in practice.
    The Government intimidated and harassed the media, primarily through
    defamation suits, prohibitively high court fines for libel, and through
    measures that hampered printing and distribution of independent newspapers
    and magazines. The print media enjoyed more freedom than the broadcast
    media, and there was lively public debate of government policies. However,
    the Government continued to control state-run television and radio, which
    was the primary source of news and information for most of the population.
    A large number of opposition and independent media outlets operated during
    the year. There were more than 40 active independent newspapers and
    magazines and 24 television and radio stations. There also were 10
    "national" state newspapers and 80 newspapers funded by city or
    district-level officials.
    Most newspapers and magazines were printed in government publishing houses
    or on private printing presses owned by individuals close to the Government.
    The majority of independent and opposition newspapers remained in a
    precarious financial position; they continued to have problems paying wages,
    taxes, and court fines. These financial difficulties were worsened by the
    Government's practice of prohibiting state businesses from buying
    advertising in opposition newspapers and pressuring private business to do
    the same. In January 2003, the late President Aliyev suspended until the end
    of 2005 an estimated $300,000 (1.5 billion manat) in debt that newspapers
    owed to the state-owned publishing house. These unpaid debts continued to
    put indirect pressure on opposition newspapers by influencing their decision
    to shut down temporarily.
    Government-run and independent kiosks distributed most newspapers and
    periodicals. Distribution of independent and opposition newspapers outside
    of Baku was sporadic. Baku-based journalists reported that authorities in
    the exclave of Nakchivan continued to block distribution of opposition
    newspapers.
    In Baku, the Government tightened enforcement on unregistered, independent
    newspaper vendors who mainly distributed opposition newspapers. Authorities
    claimed that the illegal vendors created traffic hazards on city streets. In
    December, the administrator for the Baku subway system prohibited the sale
    of opposition newspapers within the subway system; however,
    government-affiliated newspapers continued to be sold. The country's largest
    independent newspaper distributor, Gaya, did not report any new closures of
    its kiosks during the year. However, it was unable to reopen any of its
    newsstands that were torn down in 2002 in an effort to run the company out
    of business. Gaya reported that of the 55 newspaper stands it once operated
    throughout the country, it retained 36. In June, the Economic Court ruled
    that the 13 Gaya newsstands dismantled in Baku should be re-opened. The Baku
    Executive Authority appealed the court's ruling, and both the Court of
    Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld the appeal against Gaya. There were no
    independent newsstands in Nakchivan or other parts of the country.
    The Hurriyet newspaper closed in March, and the financial situation of most
    other opposition newspapers remained precarious due to government
    harassment, high court fines, libel lawsuits, and declining readership.
    Unlike previous years, the courts began collecting libel fines primarily
    through freezing bank accounts and collecting profits through distribution
    agencies, which increased the financial burdens of some opposition
    newspapers. During the year, many opposition and government-run newspapers
    reduced circulation and several, including prominent opposition paper Yeni
    Musavat, reduced periodicity and stopped printing for short periods because
    of lack of funds. Other publications like Monitor Magazine stopped printing
    at times during the year because of technical difficulties. However, some
    government newspapers also reduced circulation and moderate independent
    newspapers like Echo, Zerkalo, and Ayna either maintained their circulation
    or slightly increased it.
    In addition, Monitor magazine, Yeni Musavat, and Baki Kheber endured
    additional difficulties when they were forced to relocate after landlords
    threatened them with eviction due to government pressure. Other opposition
    newspapers endured threats from the state-owned publishing house, which
    stated that it would not print opposition newspapers with unpaid debts.
    Government-controlled radio and television remained the main sources of news
    and information for much of the population. The Government periodically used
    state-run television to denounce and harass political parties and leaders
    who criticized the Government. Private television channels broadcast the
    views of both government and opposition officials, but their programs were
    not available in all parts of the country. A total of 36 television and
    radio channels were registered with the MOJ, although only 15 television
    stations and 9 radio stations operated. Most television stations were either
    controlled by the Government or by individuals close to the Government.
    Radio was oriented largely to entertainment programming. Radio Free
    Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and the Voice of America operated without
    restriction; however, in January, the MOJ rejected RFE/RL's October 2003
    registration application because the paperwork was not in order. In April,
    RFE/RL reapplied, and the MOJ approved the application in May. There were no
    restrictions on satellite broadcasts by foreign stations.
    Harassment and violence against journalists continued. The Azerbaijan
    Committee for the Protection of Journalists (RUH) reported 81 incidents of
    physical attacks or harassment during the year, in contrast to 170 during
    2003.
    In July, unknown persons allegedly kidnapped and beat Aydin Guliyev, editor
    of the Baki Kheber newspaper. He was subsequently released. On July 25, two
    unknown assailants struck Eynulla Fatulliyev, a staff writer for Monitor
    magazine, on the head with a lead pipe. Both journalists had written
    articles critical of presidential chief of staff Ramiz Mekhdiyev; however,
    there was no evidence to suggest the attack on Fatulliyev was connected with
    his work. The Government continued its investigation into the incidents at
    year's end.
    In 2003, police injured and detained many journalists at various
    election-related events (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Most of the injuries
    occurred at election-related demonstration in October 2003. According to the
    Azerbaijan Journalists Confederation and RUH, police beat 54 journalists,
    detained or arrested 18, and damaged the equipment of 6 others.
    There is no transparent or independent mechanism to issue licenses for
    television or radio stations. The National Council for Television and Radio,
    which was created in 2002, was responsible for issuing licenses and for
    monitoring television and radio broadcasts. However, it was inefficient and
    did not function independently of the Government. Because the Government had
    not established a fee structure to obtain a broadcast license, no new
    television stations could be licensed within the provisions of the law
    during the year. At year's end, nine applications for license renewals from
    entertainment-oriented television stations remained pending.
    In March, the President vetoed a bill on Public Television and Radio
    Broadcasting, sending it back to Parliament for revisions that would bring
    it more in line with international requirements set out by the COE. In
    September, the President signed a new version of the law, which provides for
    a public television channel to be created on the basis of a second,
    state-run channel, AZTV2. The primary state-run channel, AZTV1, would
    continue operating. International and local NGOs expressed concern that
    without abolishing AZTV1, a public television channel would not have the
    resources to become an effective alternative source for news and
    information.
    Libel is a criminal offense; the law allows for large fines and up to 3
    years' imprisonment. According to the RUH, 13 lawsuits were successfully
    brought against 7 print media outlets during the year. Six of these cases
    resulted in monetary fines, totaling approximately $69,000 (345 million
    manat). In contrast, in 2003, 40 libel suits were brought against 18
    journalists and media outlets for total fines of $325,000 (1,592.5 million
    manat). In 2002 and 2003, the popular opposition newspaper Yeni Musavat was
    successfully sued for libel 22 times with fines totaling approximately
    $100,000 (500 million manat).
    In February, a libel suit brought against the Mukhalifat newspaper in 2003,
    ended with a 2-year suspended sentence against the editor and
    editor-in-chief. Two of three criminal charges brought in 2002 against Yeni
    Musavat's Editor-in-Chief Rauf Arifoglu were pending at year's end. Arifoglu
    himself was found guilty in October of inciting post-election violence in
    October 2003 (see Section 1.e.).
    In August, Baki Kheber editor Aydin Guliyev was sentenced to a 1-year
    suspended sentence as a result of a libel suit brought by Jalal Aliyev, the
    brother of former president Heydar Aliyev. Guliyev had reprinted an article
    from Alternative newspaper; however, Aliyev did not bring a lawsuit against
    Alternative newspaper.
    In October a district court in Baku ordered Eynulla Fatulliyev to begin
    paying a $2,000 (10 million manat) fine for libeling two high-ranking
    Ministry of Defense officers in a Monitor Magazine article in 2002 about
    military hazing. Under the court order, Fatulliyev was required to pay $2
    (10,000 manat) every month for 30 years. In addition, court executors
    inventoried Fatulliyev's parents' apartment. The court also impounded
    Monitor Magazine's profits from distribution agencies to pay for its portion
    of the same libel fine.
    The Government required Internet Service Providers to have licenses and
    formal agreements with the Ministry of Communications and Information
    Technologies. At year's end, there were 21 licensed providers. Public
    Internet access at a wide variety of Internet clubs and cafes cost less than
    50 cents (1,500-2,000 manat) per hour; however, home connectivity and access
    to affordable computers were still cost-prohibitive for the average user.
    Internet usage grew significantly in Baku, Sumgayit, Ganja, Mingechevir,
    Lenkoran, and Sheki, but it was less common in other parts of the country.
    There was no evidence to support the widely held belief that the Government
    monitored Internet traffic of foreign businesses and opposition leaders (see
    Section 1.f.).
    The Government generally did not restrict academic freedom. Several tenured
    professors were active in opposition parties; however, some faculty and
    students did experience political pressure. Following the October 2003
    election, some professors and teachers said they were dismissed because of
    their membership in opposition political parties. Also in 2003, police
    harassed and detained Elnur Sadikhov, a university student and correspondent
    for the Popular Front Party's (PFP) Azadliq newspaper in Ganja. Ganja State
    University subsequently suspended his enrollment; press reports said
    Sadikhov had left the country.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
    The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government
    restricted this right in practice. While the law allows individuals and
    political parties to assemble and organize demonstrations, it also requires
    prior notification and in some cases a permit from government authorities.
    During the year, the Government sanctioned only 1 rally, a gathering of some
    250 persons in September in Baku to protest the planned arrival of Armenian
    officers for a NATO exercise.
    In May, the PFP applied several times for a permit to hold a demonstration.
    The Baku Executive Authority (BEA) repeatedly denied the requests stating
    that the issues the PFP wanted to protest were either being addressed by the
    Government or were not true. In June, the PFP sought to overturn the BEA's
    denials in district court, but the court upheld the BEA's actions. However,
    the Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's ruling and remanded the
    case back to the district court. The case remained pending at year's end.
    The BEA also repeatedly denied requests from other opposition political
    parties during the year for permits, and police frequently broke up pickets
    and demonstrations, at times detaining protestors.
    In June, members of the Organization of Karabakh Liberation (OKL) protested
    the Armenian military presence at a planning conference for a NATO exercise.
    Several protestors shoved their way into the conference room by breaking a
    glass door. Authorities arrested 15 protestors. In August, six OKL members
    were convicted of hooliganism and disrupting public order; they were
    sentenced from 3 to 5 years' imprisonment. In September, the Court of
    Appeals reversed the jail terms and issued suspended sentences.
    In the months before and after the October 2003 election, the Government
    routinely and forcibly disrupted unsanctioned protests. Police and MIA
    officers harassed, beat, and detained opposition party members,
    demonstrators, and journalists who took part in mostly peaceful
    demonstrations and political meetings in Baku, Lenkoran, and Nardaran.
    Authorities injured and detained many persons, some of whom were beat in
    detention (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.a.). On October 22, the trial of
    seven opposition leaders arrested in connection with the post-election
    demonstrations in October 2003 ended with guilty verdicts (see Section
    1.e.). They were sentenced to imprisonment of up to 5 years for inciting
    clashes between police and protestors.
    Following the election, Musavat Party supporters gathered outside party
    headquarters to protest election results; security forces broke up the
    meeting, harassing and beating many participants. The following day a large
    crowd gathered in downtown Baku for an unsanctioned demonstration that
    turned violent. Security forces used excessive force, beating demonstrators,
    killing 1 person, and injuring at least 300 persons. Several hundred persons
    were arrested. Of that number, 41 were convicted of crimes related to the
    disturbances and given moderate prison terms. Another 79 were found guilty
    but given suspended sentences (see Sections 1.c., 1.d. and 1.e.). The trial
    of the remaining 10 defendants continued at year's end.
    A joint monitoring group, created by an NGO and the MIA in 2003, continued
    to work to improve police-journalist interactions at demonstrations. During
    the year, the monitoring group distributed personal identification cards,
    vehicle identification cards, and special clothing to distinguish
    journalists from demonstrators.
    During the year, the Government took no action to investigate or prosecute
    MIA officers who reportedly beat villagers in Nardaran in 2002.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, in practice,
    the Government continued to restrict this right. A number of provisions
    allowed the Government to regulate the activities of political parties,
    religious groups, businesses, and NGOs, including a requirement that all
    organizations register either with the MOJ or the State Committee on Work
    with Religious Associations (SCWRA). Registration was required to rent
    property, open a bank account, and function as a legal entity. However, the
    vague, cumbersome, and nontransparent registration procedures resulted in
    long delays that, in effect, limited citizens' right to associate. There
    were more than 40 registered political parties (see Section 3).
    c. Freedom of Religion
    The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the law expressly
    prohibits the Government from interfering in the religious activities of any
    individual or group except in cases where public order and stability may be
    threatened; however, several legal provisions allow the Government to
    regulate religious groups. There were some abuses, restrictions, and
    instances of discrimination against minority religions.
    In the northern city of Khachmaz, community members reported that on several
    occasions police harassed and detained some Muslims who had disrupted public
    order. The police allegedly shaved the detainee's beards; however, police
    officials denied detaining anyone for religious reasons.
    The Law on Religion requires religious organizations to register with the
    SCWRA. Government authorities gave SCWRA and its chairman, Rafiq Aliyev,
    sweeping powers over registration; control over the publication, import, and
    distribution of religious literature; and the power to suspend the
    activities of religious groups that violate the law. The registration
    process was burdensome; there were frequent, lengthy delays to obtain
    registration. Religious groups may appeal registration denials to the
    courts. Since SCWRA was established in 2001, more than 350 groups have
    successfully registered. Only registered religious groups may maintain a
    bank account, rent property, and act as a legal entity. Unregistered
    organizations were vulnerable to closure as a result of charges that they
    were engaged in illegal activities. These restrictions made it difficult,
    but usually not impossible, for groups to function.
    Several religious groups reported that they were still not registered
    despite repeated applications; however, they continued to function.
    Unregistered churches included the Greater Grace Baptist Church, the Baptist
    community in Neftchala, and Protestant churches in Sumgayit.
    On January 16, authorities ordered the Juma Mosque congregation in Baku to
    vacate its premises because of Imam Ilgar Ibrahimoglu's and the community's
    political activities. The law prohibits a religious organization from
    directly involving itself in political activities, and Ibrahimoglu was a
    human rights activist with DEVAMM and head of the Baku Chapter of the
    International Religious Liberty Association. The Juma Mosque congregation,
    which registered with the MOJ in 1993, has refused to reregister with SCWRA
    amid concerns that the new process might allow the Government to interfere
    with its practices. On March 1, the Sabayil District court ordered the
    mosque to be turned over to the Icheri Sheher Historical and Architectural
    National Reserve. The mosque belongs to city of Baku. On March 11, the
    community appealed the eviction. In April, the Court of Appeals upheld the
    Sabayil District Court Decision. On June 30, MOJ officials and police began
    the court-ordered eviction of the Juma Mosque community from its premises.
    The Caucasus Muslim Board, which approves Muslim religious groups, appointed
    a new religious leader to replace Ibrahimoglu. The mosque remained open for
    worship with the new Imam leading prayers. On July 8, authorities closed the
    building for renovation. The following day, approximately 30 members of the
    Juma Mosque community started afternoon prayers on the steps of the mosque.
    Police used excessive force in arresting five worshippers. On July 30,
    police detained 26 members of the Juma Mosque community, including
    Ibrahimoglu, who had gathered at a private home for funeral rites. They were
    all released several hours later. On August 11, the Supreme Court upheld the
    decision to evict the Juma Mosque community from the historic mosque.
    In April, following a flawed trial, a court convicted Ibrahimoglu of
    participating in post-election demonstrations in October 2003 and sentenced
    him to a 5-year suspended sentence; Ibrahimoglu had already spent 4 months
    in pretrial detention (see Section 1.d.). Since his conviction, Ibrahimoglu
    has not been allowed to travel outside the country, including to several
    OSCE meetings as an official NGO participant because the law prohibits
    citizens convicted of criminal offenses and with suspended sentences from
    traveling abroad.
    Some local authorities at times discriminated against members of minority
    religions and harassed nontraditional religious groups. In many instances,
    abuses by authorities reflected the popular prejudice against conversion to
    Christianity and other nontraditional religions (see Section 5).
    Members of Jehovah's Witnesses also reported that authorities regularly
    interfered with their ability to rent public halls for religious assemblies
    and, on occasion, fined or detained and beat individuals for meeting in
    private homes.
    The Government remained concerned about "foreign," primarily Iranian and
    Wahhabi Muslim, missionary activity. There were reports that the Government
    closed Muslim groups and organizations with alleged ties to terrorists. In
    April and September 2003, the Court for Grave Crimes sentenced six Muslim
    clerics in Ganja to between 3 and 7½ years' imprisonment for allegedly
    preparing a forcible seizure of power.
    The law prohibits religious proselytizing by foreigners, and this was
    strictly enforced. Authorities deported several Iranian and other foreign
    clerics operating independently of the organized Muslim community for
    alleged violations of the law. Although there were no legal restrictions on
    large religious gatherings, authorities interfered with attempts by the
    Jehovah's Witnesses and the Pentecostal "Cathedral of Praise" to rent halls
    for religious assemblies.
    Some local officials continued to discourage Muslim women from wearing
    headscarves in schools. The International Religious Liberty Association
    reported that women were still prohibited from wearing them for
    identification and passport photos, which complicated voter registration. In
    December, a group of women appealed to the European Court of Human Rights to
    protest the ban.
    Some religious groups, including the Union of Baptists, the Adventist
    Church, and the Jehovah's Witnesses reported that some government ministries
    continued to restrict and delay the importation of certain religious
    literature. However, at the same time, the SCWRA facilitated the import of
    some religious materials.
    Cases of prejudice and discrimination against Jews in the country were very
    limited, and in the few instances of anti-Semitic activity, the Government
    was quick to respond. Jewish community leaders consistently remarked on the
    positive relationship they have with the Government and leaders of other
    religious communities. In April, however, a rabbi in Baku received a
    threatening letter prior to the start of Passover. Authorities responded
    quickly and took security precautions to ensure that the festival proceeded
    without incident. In July, a new Jewish Community Center was opened in Baku
    with high-level government participation. Authorities also reserved one wing
    of a Baku school for secular and religious classes for 200 Jewish students.
    During the year, several newspapers and television broadcasts depicted
    nontraditional religious groups as a threat to the country's identity. Some
    of these highly critical reports extended to humanitarian organizations in
    the country that had links with foreign religious organizations. Such
    hostility was also directed toward foreign Iranian and Wahhabi Muslim
    missionary activity, which was viewed as a threat to stability and peace and
    an attempt to politicize Islam. Pro-government media targeted some Muslim
    communities that the Government claimed were involved in illegal activities.
    In those parts of the country controlled by Armenians, all ethnic
    Azerbaijanis have fled, and mosques not already destroyed did not function.
    Animosity toward ethnic Armenians elsewhere in the country forced most
    Armenians to emigrate, and all Armenian churches, many of which were damaged
    in riots that took place more than a decade ago, remained closed. As a
    consequence, the estimated 20,000 ethnic Armenians who remained in the
    country were unable to attend services at their traditional places of
    worship.
    The Constitution provides the right to alternative military service;
    however, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses continued to have difficulties
    exercising this right since there is no legal mechanism to implement this
    provision. At year's end, the case of Mahir Baguirov, a Jehovah's Witness
    called into military service in 2000 and again during the year, remained
    pending with the Supreme Court.
    For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International Religious Freedom
    Report.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
    Repatriation
    The Constitution provides for these rights; however, at times, the
    Government limited freedom of movement. IDPs were required to register their
    place of residence with authorities and could live only in approved areas.
    This so-called "propiska," a carryover from Soviet times, was imposed mainly
    on persons forced from homes after the Armenian occupation of western parts
    of the country. The Government asserted that registration was needed to keep
    track of IDPs to provide them with assistance.
    Residents of border areas in both the country and Iran traveled across the
    border without visas. There were no exit visa requirements. The law required
    men of draft-age to register with military officials before traveling
    abroad; some travel restrictions were placed on military personnel with
    access to national security information. Citizens charged with criminal
    offenses were not permitted to travel abroad. Officials regularly extracted
    bribes from individuals who applied for passports.
    There were approximately 800,000 refugees and IDPs in the country. The vast
    majority fled their homes between 1988 and 1993 as a result of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to the State Statistics Committee,
    approximately 200,000 were refugees and 572,000 were IDPs. There were
    credible reports that Armenians from outside of the country, including
    ethnic Armenian immigrants from the Middle East had settled in parts of
    Nagorno-Karabakh and possibly other Azerbaijani territories occupied by
    Armenian forces. The Government appealed to the U.N. and the COE regarding
    those reports, and an OSCE Fact-Finding Commission was established to
    investigate the matter.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not use it
    in practice.
    There were no prohibitions against the return of citizens who left the
    country. However, the government agency responsible for reintegrating
    citizens who were refused asylum in other countries lacked the capacity to
    accommodate these individuals upon their return.
    Approximately 20,000 Armenians, almost all of mixed parentage or in mixed
    marriages, continued to live in the country. This total does not include
    Armenians living in the occupied territories. According to unofficial
    estimates, between 200 and 250 ethnic Armenians of mixed marriages leave the
    country each year. While official government policy allowed ethnic Armenians
    to travel, low-level officials often extracted bribes or harassed Armenians
    who applied for passports. According to the International Organization for
    Migration (IOM), 43 Armenians of mixed descent reported to an Azerbaijani
    NGO that they had problems with officials in the passport and registration
    department when applying for identification cards; applicants who applied
    with Azerbaijani surnames encountered no problems except for having to pay
    bribes.
    The Armenian Government continued to prevent the hundreds of thousands of
    Azerbaijanis forced out of their homes in the occupied territories from
    returning; however, the Armenian Government did permit the return of some
    ethnic Armenians.
    In July, the President issued a decree to improve living conditions and to
    increase employment for refugees and IDPs. Under the state-run program, all
    IDPs are expected to be resettled from camps to newly constructed housing.
    According to the Government, it directed $3.14 million (15.7 billion manat)
    from the State Oil Fund to build housing and to improve socio-economic
    conditions of refugees and IDPs. At year's end, the Government began
    construction of 5 new settlements in Agdam and 1 in Agjabedi for 3,600
    families.
    During the year, the Government received $34 million (170 billion manat) in
    assistance from international and domestic humanitarian organizations for
    refugees and IDPs. According to the Government, it also allocated $18
    million (88 billion manat) from the country's oil fund to improve living
    conditions for IDPs and refugees. In August, the IDP and Refugee Committee's
    estimated expenditures were $60.8 million (297.7 billion manat).
    According to the IOM, approximately 40,000 IDPs continued to live in camps,
    60,000 in underground dugout shelters, and 20,000 in railway cars; however,
    the Government took steps to relocate 40,000 IDPs out of railway cars and
    camps to special settlements. Still, the majority of IDPs lived at
    below-subsistence levels, without adequate food, shelter, education,
    sanitation, and medical care. At the same time, approximately 40,000 IDPs
    lived in settlements provided by the EU, while another 40,000 lived in
    housing provided by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The
    remainder were scattered among unfinished buildings, hostels, public health
    facilities, and the homes of relatives.
    The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in accordance
    with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
    1967 Protocol, and the Government has established a system for providing
    protection for refugees. In practice, the Government provided some
    protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where
    they faced persecution, and granted refugee status during the year.
    The Government cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers. These organizations
    reported full and unrestricted access to the refugee population. Unlike in
    previous years, all asylum applications were now sent directly to the
    Refugee Status Determination Department (RSD) of the State Committee for
    Refugees instead of through the UNHCR. By year's end, a total of 177
    residual cases of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq (161 Afghans and
    16 Iraqis) were handed over to the RSD. The UNHCR in Baku continued to
    provide assistance to asylum seekers while monitoring the RSD's processing
    of asylum cases and providing referrals to legal assistance for those whose
    claims were rejected.
    At year's end, the RSD had received 235 applications for refugee status for
    432 individuals. Of that number, 117 applications came from the UNHCR; the
    remaining were new applications. The RSD granted refugee status to 18
    persons during the year.
    By year's end, the UNHCR registered 10,764 asylum seekers or refugees,
    including the 8,669 Chechens who fled from Russia and 581 Afghans. However,
    according to re-registration figures, there were only 161 long-term Afghan
    residents in the country. A small number of new refugees and asylum seekers
    from Iran, Iraq, and other countries also registered during the year.
    Under the non-visa regime with Russia, Russian citizens can enter, exit, and
    move through the country without a visa, but they were expected to register
    with the Baku Police Department within 3 days of their arrival. However, in
    practice the majority of asylum seekers from the Russian Federation did not
    register and remained in the country illegally. During the year, the UNHCR
    received no information regarding expulsions or deportation of asylum
    seekers from Russia.
    Arbitrary harassment, detention, and arrests of undocumented Chechens
    continued to be a problem; however, the UNHCR noted fewer cases than in the
    previous year. The laws on residence, registration, and the status of
    refugees and IDPs did not apply to Chechens, who were required to register
    with the police and not entitled to residence permits. Chechens may receive
    a 3-month visa. Chechen children were allowed to attend public schools. As
    of September, approximately 700 Chechen children out of an estimated 3,000
    attended public schools. Access to medical services improved for Chechen
    refugees; however, access to specialized medical assistance remained
    problematic.
    During the year, the UNHCR reported that police arrested seven Chechens: Six
    on suspicion of criminal activity and one for not having a residence permit.
    Chechens accused of criminal offenses and wanted by Russian authorities were
    extradited to Russia.
    The RSD did not accept applications for refugee status from Chechens.
    Instead, the UNHCR carried out all functions to provide Chechens with
    required assistance and protection to remain in the country legally.
    Pursuant to UNHCR guidelines and to the Government's policy, most refugees
    from Russia that originate from Chechnya were considered persons of concern.
    Only Chechens who registered with the UNHCR were provided letters of
    concern, which protected them from forced repatriation to their homeland.
    These letters were not travel documents and were valid for a limited time.
    According to IOM, the Government continued to deport illegal Iranian
    immigrants, many of whom were economic migrants who continued to return to
    the country even after they were deported.
    Section 3
    Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
    Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government
    peacefully; however, the Government continued to restrict this right by
    interfering in local elections. The Constitution provides for an independent
    legislature; however, in practice, Parliament's independence was minimal,
    and it exercised little legislative initiative independent of the executive
    branch.
    The October 2003 presidential election, which formally brought Ilham Aliyev
    to power, failed to meet international standards for democratic elections
    due to a number of serious irregularities. These included the lack of a
    level playing field in the pre-election campaign, police violence in the
    pre- and post-election periods, and partisan election commissions.
    Serious irregularities noted by observers included disenfranchisement of
    voters because of inaccurate voter lists, intimidation of voters and
    election commission members, ballot box stuffing, and irregularities in vote
    counting and tabulation. The Government accredited approximately 2,000
    domestic election observers but banned domestic NGOs that receive foreign
    assistance from observing the election.
    However, there were some improvements in the October 2003 election,
    including application of parts of the Unified Election Code (UEC), which the
    President signed into law in May 2003 and is scheduled to take full effect
    in 2005. The Government also promptly posted election results on the
    Internet; however, the observed irregularities and insufficient transparency
    in vote counting and tabulation led to serious doubts about the accuracy of
    the 77 percent of the vote officially recorded for Ilham Aliyev. In the days
    prior to the announcement of preliminary results from the October 2003
    presidential elections, the CEC denied OSCE/ODIHR observers access to its
    documents and activities, resulting in a lack of transparency during the
    final vote count (see Section 4). By year's end, the Government still had
    not investigated the irregularities.
    In December, nation-wide municipal elections were marred by widespread fraud
    and serious irregularities. These included ballot-box stuffing, forging
    voters' signatures, multiple voting, voting without proper identification,
    and intimidation of election officials and voters by local government
    authorities appointed by the presidential administration. There were also
    technical problems. For example, in some districts, up to 110 candidates
    competed for 19 municipal seats, which presented precinct commission members
    with the difficult task of accurately counting all votes, and many
    commissions failed to do so.
    Most prominent opposition political parties boycotted the election due to an
    uneven playing field; however, many opposition candidates registered as
    independents. In a positive step to acknowledge the gravity of the
    irregularities, the Central Election Commission (CEC) for the first time
    forwarded 95 complaints of election fraud to the Prosecutor General's office
    for criminal investigation. The law stipulates up to 1 year in prison for
    election-related fraud.
    The October parliamentary by-elections were also marked by serious
    irregularities such as ballot-box stuffing, fraudulent voter lists, and
    falsification of figures on precinct protocols. Some voters received ballots
    without providing valid identification or by showing invalid documents, and
    election observers witnessed poll workers forging signatures on voter
    registration lists. Unauthorized persons, including representatives of local
    governments, were present in many precincts during the vote counting and in
    some cases directed the counting.
    Two amendments passed in the 2002 referendum continued to be controversial.
    One eliminated the proportional representation system required for 25 of the
    125 seats in Parliament; the second replaced the Chairman of the Parliament
    with the Prime Minister in the line of succession to the presidency, a
    change that makes it easier for the President to designate his successor. In
    August 2003, then President Heydar Aliyev named his son, Ilham, Prime
    Minister, which allowed him to assume unofficially the responsibilities of
    acting president because of his father's ill health, and to run as the
    incumbent in the October 2003 election.
    During the year, authorities harassed and evicted opposition political
    parties from their offices. Limitations on opposition activities were
    particularly acute in certain remote regions, including Nakchivan where
    opposition activities were severely limited. The Government also applied
    organized pressure against opposition party members to limit their business
    activities and dismiss opposition-linked persons from state-funded jobs.
    Throughout the summer, local authorities around the country interfered with
    a study on religious freedom conducted by the FAR Center, a Baku-based
    research organization. The interference allegedly occurred because the
    director of the center had close political ties to the opposition Musavat
    party.
    In 2003, HRW documented more than 100 job dismissals around the country of
    either opposition members or their relatives. Many of those who were
    dismissed said their employers warned them before the election and
    explicitly told them afterwards that they were dismissed because of their
    opposition activity or the activity of their relatives. There were also
    credible reports that some election commission members who refused to sign
    falsified vote tallies were also dismissed.
    At least 20 of the 42 registered political parties were considered
    opposition parties (see Section 2.b.). Unregistered political parties
    continued to function; however, authorities prevented them, as well as
    registered opposition parties, from conducting outdoor gatherings (see
    Section 2.b.). Registered parties were able to hold indoor meetings. Members
    of unregistered political parties may run for president but must be
    sponsored by a registered party or by an independent "voters' initiative
    group." Members of unregistered parties also may run for Parliament,
    although none was represented in the Parliament. Opposition members occupied
    5 seats in the 125-member Parliament.
    The 2003 UEC includes provisions for a new CEC, District Election
    Commissions, and Precinct Election Commissions that will come into force
    based on the results of parliamentary elections in 2005. The UEC, which
    combines four existing election laws and referenda, was drafted in
    consultation with international election advisers, including IFES, the COE,
    and OSCE/ODIHR. However, the UEC permits establishment of election
    commissions structured in favor of the ruling party, and did not change
    provisions contained in other legislation that prohibit domestic NGOs that
    receive foreign funding from observing elections.
    The laws penalizes corruption by outlawing bribery; however, there was
    widespread public perception of corruption throughout all facets of society,
    including the civil service, government ministries, and the highest levels
    of government. The law on bribery carries a sentence of 2 to 7 years for
    receiving a bribe, and up to 5 years for offering a bribe. Presentation of a
    bribe to an official is punishable by 3 to 8 years' imprisonment. According
    to the General Prosecutor's office, 120 criminal cases related to corruption
    were opened during the year, with 10 specifically on bribery charges;
    however, these cases had little or no impact overall on the prevalence of
    bribery and corruption in the country.
    In March, the President enacted a new law on corruption by decree, which is
    scheduled to take effect in January 2005. It requires public officials to
    report annual income, sources of income, property owned, and financial
    liabilities. It also prohibits nepotism and limits giving gifts and direct
    or indirect financial benefits to public officials or third parties.
    The law provides for public access to government information by individuals
    and organizations; however, it does not specify procedures for obtaining
    government information.
    Although government ministries have separate procedures on how to request
    information, they routinely denied requests, claiming not to possess the
    information. Individuals have the right to appeal the denials in court;
    however, the courts generally upheld the decisions of the ministries.
    There were no legal restrictions on the participation of women in politics;
    however, traditional social norms limited women's political roles, and they
    were underrepresented in elective offices. The practice of "family voting,"
    whereby men voted on behalf of their wives and other female family members,
    continued. There were 14 women in the 125-seat Parliament. Several women
    held senior government positions, including Deputy Chair of Parliament,
    Chairperson of the Supreme Court, and Deputy Chair of the CEC.
    Lezghins, Talysh, and Avars continued to serve in Parliament and Government.
    Section 4
    Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
    Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
    Many domestic and international human rights groups generally operated
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings
    on human rights cases. Although the Government maintained ties with some
    human rights NGOs and responded to their inquiries, on occasion, the
    Government criticized and intimidated some human rights NGOs and activists,
    and the MOJ routinely denied or failed to register some human rights NGOs
    (see Section 2.b.).
    Several NGOs reported that the Government and police at times refused to
    protect them from so-called "provocateurs" who harassed and attacked NGO
    activists and vandalized their property. The NGOs accused authorities of
    inciting the harassment and attacks in some cases. For example, in June
    authorities in the exclave of Nakchivan allegedly beat and detained Avaz
    Hasanov, coordinator for an international working group on prisoners,
    hostages, and lost persons in Karabakh, after he returned from
    Nagorno-Karabakh. Also in June, the Ministry of Taxes and MOJ in Nakchivan
    threatened to close the NGO Resource Center because it was not registered.
    The Resource Center had applied for registration but was denied. However, in
    October, Nakchivan authorities approved the Resource Center's registration,
    making it the first registered NGO in the exclave. In May, Mahammad Rzayev,
    a lawyer working for the resource center who also worked part-time as a
    regional correspondent for opposition newspaper Azadliq, was kidnapped and
    beaten by police.
    In September, in Baku, provocateurs disrupted a major, high-level NGO
    conference on coordinating NGO activity for December municipal elections by
    shutting off the power and removing tables and chairs. The same NGO also had
    problems holding similar conferences throughout the regions in the weeks
    leading up to the municipal elections. In November, Akifa Aliyeva,
    coordinator of the Ganja branch of the Azerbaijan Helsinki Citizens'
    Assembly (HCA) was presented on television as an enemy of the state after
    her interview on a peace-building project between Azerbaijanis and Armenians
    was edited to purposely distort her remarks. Individuals subsequently
    protested at the HCA offices in Baku and in Ganja.
    In early 2003, Leyla Yunus, Director of the Institute of Peace and
    Democracy, and Eldar Zeynalov, Chairman of the Human Rights Center of
    Azerbaijan, were harassed for their work on Nagorno-Karabakh. In September
    2003, the Committee for the Protection of Women's Rights reported that
    security officials at the Nakchivan airport refused to assist a group of
    human rights activists who were assaulted with eggs and tomatoes.
    In April, the President issued a decree to implement the law on registering
    NGOs; however, the registration law remained cumbersome, and some provisions
    related to the liquidation of NGOs were vague. For example, amendments
    passed in 2003 complicated requirements to register grants from foreign
    entities and subjected the funds to a social security tax of 27 percent on
    employee salaries. However, grants from a few countries, which had bilateral
    agreements with the Government, were subject to a 2 percent tax on employee
    salaries. NGOs remained exempt from value added tax (VAT).
    In December, the President issued another decree to establish a central
    registration point and eliminate artificial impediments to registration and
    other technical improvements. By year's end, no information was available on
    whether this decree eased the registration process. During the year, 168
    NGOs were registered.
    In September 2003, the MOJ revoked the registration of a Muslim NGO,
    Islam-Ittihad, on charges of spreading religious propaganda and attempting
    to establish a religious regime. The NGO focused on preventing alcoholism,
    narcotics abuse, and helping orphans and children with thalassemia. The
    Islam-Ittihad directors, Azer Ramizoglu and Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, who were both
    outspoken religious freedom activists, appealed the decision (see Section
    2.c.). In July, the Supreme Court upheld the MOJ decision.
    Foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and COE delegations all had access to prisons
    to meet with prisoners (see Section 1.c.). The Government met with COE
    rapporteurs who visited the country to monitor political conditions, and
    allowed OSCE/ODIHR and other international observers to monitor the October
    2003 election. However, in the days prior to the announcement of preliminary
    results from the October 2003 presidential elections, the CEC denied
    OSCE/ODIHR observers access to its documents and activities, resulting in a
    lack of transparency during the final vote count (see Section 3).
    In 2002, Parliament established the office of an Ombudswoman for human
    rights. Citizens may appeal violations committed by the state or by
    individuals. The Ombudswoman may refuse to accept cases of abuse that
    occurred more than 1 year ago, anonymous complaints, and cases that are
    being handled by the judiciary. During the year, the Ombudswoman traveled
    around the country to hear human rights complaints and cooperated with
    foreign diplomats working on human rights activities. However, according to
    local human rights NGOs and activists, the Ombudswoman's work was
    ineffective. In December, the Ombudswoman presented her annual report to
    Parliament, which was not made public by year's end.
    The Parliament and MOJ also had human rights offices that heard complaints
    and followed up with investigations and recommendations to relevant
    government bodies. Officials of the human rights office with the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs met with the diplomatic community to discuss issues of
    concern to the international community.
    Section 5
    Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
    The Constitution provides for equal rights without respect to gender, race,
    national origin, language, social status, or political affiliation; however,
    in practice the Government did not always respect some of these provisions.
    Women
    Violence against women, including domestic violence, continued to be a
    problem. In rural areas, women had no effective recourse against assaults by
    their husbands or others; there are no laws on spousal abuse or rape. Rape
    is illegal and carries a maximum 15-year prison sentence. The Government
    stated that 25 rapes and attempted rapes had been reported during the year.
    Most rape victims reportedly knew their assailants but did not report
    incidents out of fear and shame.
    There were no government-sponsored programs for victims of domestic violence
    or rape. In Baku a women's crisis center operated by the Institute for Peace
    and Democracy provided free medical, psychological, and legal assistance for
    women. Since 2001, the center has provided services to more than 4,200
    women, including 1,700 during the year. An additional 4,700 women have
    called the center's hotline. During the year, the Institute also completed
    work with Internews on a television series on women's rights,
    anti-trafficking, and gender issues, which was broadcast on regional
    channels and in Baku.
    Prostitution is not a crime; it is an administrative offense punishable by a
    fine of up to $100 (500,000 manat). Pimps and brothel-owners may be
    sentenced to prison for up to 6 years. The legal age of consent was 16.
    Prostitution was a serious problem, particularly in Baku.
    Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men; however, societal
    discrimination and trafficking in women for sexual exploitation were
    problems (see Section 5, Trafficking).
    Traditional social norms and poor economic conditions continued to restrict
    women's roles in the economy, and there were reports that women had
    difficulty exercising their legal rights due to gender discrimination. For
    example, women were underrepresented in high-level jobs, including top
    business positions. The law prohibits pregnant women and women with children
    under the age of 3 from working at night; pregnant women and women with
    children under 18 months of age cannot work more than 36 hours per week.
    There were approximately 50 registered NGOs that focused on problems
    affecting women. One of the most active, the Society for the Defense of
    Women's Rights, provided speech and communication training for women in
    politics, and urged political party leaders to appoint women to high-ranking
    positions.
    Children
    The law requires the Government to protect the rights of children with
    regard to education and health care; however, difficult economic
    circumstances limited the Government's ability to fulfill its commitments.
    Public education was compulsory, free, and universal until the age of 17.
    According to the Ministry of Education, 100 percent of school-age children
    attended school during the year; however, UNICEF reported that the figure
    was approximately 88 percent. The Government provided a minimum standard of
    health care for children, but the overall quality of medical care was very
    low.
    The law prescribes severe penalties for crimes against children, and
    children were generally treated with respect, regardless of gender; however,
    there were some reports of abuse of children, including trafficking (see
    Section 5, Trafficking).
    A large number of refugee and IDP children lived in substandard conditions
    in camps and public buildings (see Section 2.d.). In some cases, children
    were unable to attend school. In impoverished rural areas, large families
    sometimes placed a higher priority on the education of male children and
    kept girls to work in the home. Some poor families forced their children to
    beg (see Section 6.d.).
    A coalition of more than 30 local and international NGOs worked with the
    Government, the local community, and international organizations such as
    UNICEF and the World Bank, to raise awareness of children's needs and to
    build capacity to meet those needs. During the year, the coalition worked
    with the World Bank to redistribute the social benefit package for children
    and families in need, and began work on the alternative report to the
    Government's spring submission on the status of its obligations under the
    U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
    >>From June through December, the coalition taught street children about
    healthy lifestyle choices, brought in an occupational therapist to assess
    conditions for children with disabilities in orphanages, and completed a
    public awareness campaign on the rights of children with disabilities. The
    coalition also met routinely with government officials for talks on the
    rights of children.
    Trafficking in Persons
    The law does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, although
    existing provisions of the law are used to prosecute trafficking cases, and
    there were reports that men, women, and children were primarily trafficked
    from the country for sexual exploitation and forced labor. Corruption in
    some government agencies facilitated trafficking.
    While trafficking is not a criminal offense, traffickers may be prosecuted
    under laws prohibiting rape, forced prostitution and labor, and forgery of
    travel documents. Most trafficking-related crimes prosecuted during the year
    carried maximum penalties between 3 and 6 years' imprisonment, except for
    rape and sexual violence, which both carry maximum 15-year prison sentences.
    There also are criminal penalties for enslaving, raping, and forcing
    children into prostitution. During the year, the Government convicted 10
    individuals on trafficking-related crimes. It also arrested 48 individuals
    and opened 32 trafficking-related criminal cases.
    Numerous government officials and ministries were involved in efforts to
    combat trafficking in persons; however, problems remained with providing
    formal assistance for victims, corruption, and adopting anti-trafficking
    laws. In May, the President signed a decree that ordered all government
    bodies to implement a new national action plan to combat trafficking in
    persons. The decree named a Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs as the
    national coordinator for anti-trafficking efforts. Since then, the
    Government created a special anti-trafficking police unit and began drafting
    legislation and Criminal Code amendments to specifically criminalize
    trafficking in persons.
    The MIA improved its capacity to track potential traffickers and victims
    transiting through the country's international airport. The Government
    regularly collaborated with neighboring countries on anti-trafficking
    investigations.
    The country was primarily a country of origin and transit for trafficked
    women, men, and children for sexual exploitation and forced labor.
    Azerbaijani, Russian, and Central Asian women and girls were trafficked from
    or through the country to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and
    Pakistan for work in the sex industry. In addition, 162 Azerbaijani
    trafficking victims were identified in other countries, including 63 in
    Pakistan, 45 in the UAE, 40 in Turkey, and 14 in India.
    Women and girls were trafficked internally from rural areas to the capital
    for sexual exploitation. Men were trafficked to Turkey and Russia for forced
    labor and boys were trafficked internally for begging. Iranians, Iraqis,
    Afghans, and migrants from South Asia were smuggled through the country to
    Europe-- particularly Germany, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands--and
    possibly the United States where they at times had their passports
    confiscated and were subjected to forced labor. Traffickers generally
    targeted women.
    Traffickers were either foreigners or ethnic Azerbaijanis who acted in loose
    concert with international networks. They approached victims directly and
    indirectly through friends and relatives. Traffickers also used deceptive
    newspaper advertisements that offered false work abroad.
    Traffickers also used fraudulent marriage proposals from men posing as
    Iranian businessmen to lure women into prostitution in neighboring Iran.
    Traffickers approached some families who willingly married their daughters
    to wealthy Iranians without concern for the actual outcome.
    There was no evidence of government complicity in facilitating trafficking
    in persons; however, NGOs suspected that low-level government workers and
    police officers accepted bribes from traffickers to overlook their
    activities. During the year, the Government dismissed the chief of a
    regional passport registration office and two inspectors for issuing illegal
    citizenship identification cards to several individuals.
    There were no government-sponsored anti-trafficking public education
    campaigns, and no standardized mechanism to return trafficked women to the
    country; however, during the year Azerbaijani consular officials began to
    work on an ad hoc basis with international organizations to repatriate
    trafficking victims to the country.
    The Government reported that by year's end it had sent 150 trafficking
    victims (141 Azerbaijanis, 6 Uzbeks, 2 Russians, and 1 Georgian) to a
    special healthcare center.
    According to IOM, some Azerbaijanis and third country nationals who were
    either victims of trafficking or engaged in prostitution were deported to
    the country, primarily from Turkey and the UAE. However, the Government had
    no program to assist them.
    Several NGOs, like the Institute for Peace and Democracy and Clean World,
    and bodies such as the State Committee for Women's Issues, worked on
    anti-trafficking activities and programs to prevent prostitution. The IOM
    and OSCE provided training for domestic NGOs on how to operate emergency
    hotlines, conduct awareness campaigns, and secure housing for trafficking
    victims.
    Persons with Disabilities
    There was social discrimination against persons with disabilities in
    employment; however, there were no credible reports of discrimination in
    education or access to health care.
    The law gives priority to persons with disabilities to obtain housing,
    pension supplements, and discounts for public transportation; however, the
    Government did not have the means to fulfill these commitments. There are no
    special provisions in the law mandating access to public or other buildings
    for persons with disabilities, and improving access was not a government
    priority.
    Depending on the severity of the mental illness, some individuals were
    denied the right to vote.
    The Ministries of Health and Labor and Social Welfare were responsible for
    protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. Care in facilities for
    the mentally ill and persons with disabilities varied. Some provided
    adequate care but others lacked qualified caregivers, equipment, and
    supplies to maintain sanitary conditions, and provisions to provide a proper
    diet. There were no credible reports of cruel treatment of patients in
    government-run mental health facilities. The Ministry of Health continued a
    program to renovate state mental health facilities in recognition of the
    need to provide better care for persons with mental disabilities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
    Numerous indigenous ethnic groups lived in the country, and the Constitution
    provides them with the right to maintain their culture and language, and the
    Government generally respected these rights; however, there were some
    problems.
    For example, some groups complained that authorities restricted their
    ability to teach or print materials in their native languages.
    Farsi-speaking Tallish in the south of the country, Caucasian Lezghins in
    the north, displaced Meskhetian Turks from Central Asia, and displaced Kurds
    from the Armenian-occupied Lachin region reported incidents of
    discrimination, restrictions on the ability to teach in their native
    languages, and harassment by local authorities.
    Some Armenians and persons of mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani descent said they
    were denied work, medical care, and education and could not register their
    residences due to their ethnicity. The approximately 20,000 citizens of
    Armenian descent also complained of discrimination in employment, schooling,
    housing, and other areas. They said they experienced discrimination and
    harassment at work and that local authorities refused to pay their pensions.
    Most Armenians concealed their ethnicity, legally changed the ethnic
    designation in their passports, or tried to leave the country. However, some
    persons of mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani descent held government jobs. Public
    figures in mixed marriages or of mixed-Armenian and Azerbaijani parentage
    were at times openly criticized by colleagues in newspapers and on
    television and radio.
    There was one senior government official responsible for ethnic minority
    policy; however, preventing discrimination was not a government priority.
    In the area occupied by ethnic Armenian forces, approximately 600,000 ethnic
    Azerbaijanis were forced to flee their homes during the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict (see Section 2.d.). The authorities who controlled the occupied
    areas effectively banned ethnic Azerbaijanis from all spheres of civil,
    political, and economic life.
    Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination
    The Government did not officially condone discrimination based on sexual
    orientation; however, there was societal prejudice against homosexuals,
    especially with regard to housing.
    Section 6
    Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, including the right to
    form labor unions; however, there were some restrictions on this right in
    practice.
    Uniformed military and police were prohibited from participating in trade
    unions, although civilians working in the Interior and Defense Ministries
    were allowed to do so. The law also prohibits managerial staff from joining
    a trade union; however, in practice, managers in state industries often had
    union dues automatically deducted from their paychecks. During the year, the
    Government refused to register a trade union in the transportation sector
    because the Government alleged that it had engaged in criminal activity.
    The law prohibits unions from engaging in political activity; however, some
    government-aligned unions ignored this prohibition. Individual members of
    trade unions were not restricted from political activity. Trade unions were
    allowed to draft legislation on labor, social, and economic matters, but
    most did not take part in such activity.
    Many of the state-owned enterprises that dominate the formal economy
    withheld union dues from workers' pay but did not deliver the dues to the
    unions. As a result, unions did not have resources to carry out their
    activities effectively.
    The overwhelming majority of labor unions continued to operate as they did
    under the Soviet system, and remained tightly linked to the Government;
    exceptions were independent journalists' unions.
    The Azerbaijani Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) had approximately 1.5
    million members, including 26 labor federations in various industrial
    sectors. Although registered independently, some workers considered the ATUC
    a "yellow union" because of its close alignment with the Government.
    The Union of Oil and Gas Industry Workers continued to operate without a
    vote by rank and file workers, and membership remained mandatory for the
    State Oil Company's (SOCAR) 60,000 workers, whose union dues (1 percent of
    each worker's salary) were automatically deducted from their paychecks.
    There were no reports of government anti-union discrimination; however,
    labor disputes were primarily handled by local courts, which were widely
    considered corrupt. There were reports of anti-union discrimination by
    foreign companies operating in Baku. Most foreign oil companies did not
    allow union membership; however, in July free trade unions were established
    in one foreign company and one joint venture involving a foreign company.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
    The law allows trade unions to conduct their activities without government
    interference; however, in practice, most trade unions were not independent.
    The law also provides for collective bargaining agreements to set wages in
    state enterprises, and trade unions actively negotiated with employers,
    particularly in the formal sector. However, unions could not effectively
    participate in negotiating wage levels because government-appointed boards
    ran major state-owned firms and set wages according to a unified tariff
    schedule. In addition, the Ministry of Labor reported that the government
    continued to have limited success in addressing worker-related issues with
    foreign companies.
    The law provides most workers with the right to strike. Categories of
    workers prohibited from striking include high-ranking executive and
    legislative officials, law enforcement officers and court employees, health,
    electric power, water supply, telephone, fire fighters, and railway and air
    traffic control workers. Striking workers who disrupt public transportation
    can be sentenced up to 3 years' imprisonment.
    The law prohibits retribution against strikers such as, dismissal or
    replacement. In July, police twice prevented workers from striking at Baku
    Tram Park.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
    The Constitution allows forced or compulsory labor only under states of
    emergency and martial law, or in court decisions affecting condemned
    persons; although there were no reports of slavery or prison labor imposed
    by government authorities, there were reports of forced or compulsory labor,
    including trafficking in persons (see Section 5, Trafficking).
    The law also permits compulsory labor in connection with the military or
    extreme situations based on legislative authorization and under governmental
    supervision.
    Two departments in the General Prosecutor's Office were responsible for
    enforcing the prohibition on forced or compulsory labor.
    There were continued reports that some military officers used conscripts as
    unpaid laborers on construction projects.
    d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for
    Employment
    The law provides for the protection of children from economic exploitation
    and from work that is dangerous to their health, and there were few
    complaints of abuses of child labor laws.
    The minimum age for employment depended on the type of work. In most
    instances, the law permits children to begin work at age 15; however, with
    the consent of their parents, 14-year-olds may work in family businesses or
    at after-school jobs during the day that pose no hazard to their health.
    Children under 16 may not work more than 24 hours per week; children between
    16 and 18 may not work more than 36 hours per week. The law prohibits
    employing persons younger than 18 in jobs with difficult and hazardous work
    conditions. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security was responsible for
    enforcing child labor laws.
    During the year, the Government ratified the ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor. The country also joined the European Charter Article
    on Protecting Child and Youth Rights.
    There were reports that some parents forced their children to beg.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
    In December, a presidential decree raised the minimum monthly wage from $20
    (100,000 manat) to $25 (125,000 manat). The move followed an increase in
    July that raised the minimum from $12 (60,000 manat) to $20 (100,000 manat).
    The $25 minimum wage was slightly above the official poverty level of $24
    (120,000 manat) set by the Government. However, it was not sufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Most workers earned more than the minimum wage, with the average monthly
    wage reaching $93 (467,300 manat) during the first 8 months of the year.
    Many citizens also relied on extended families or on remittances from
    relatives working in Russia for support. The combination of these funds and
    other strategies allowed most urban dwellers to attain a subsistence income
    level.
    The law provides for a 40-hour work week; the maximum daily work shift is 12
    hours. Workers in hazardous occupations may not work more than 36 hours per
    week. The law requires lunch and rest periods, which are determined by labor
    contracts and collective agreements. The Government attempted to enforce the
    contracts and agreements; however, the Ministry of Labor reported little
    success in the informal sector, where most individuals were employed,
    because of poor cooperation from private companies.
    The law set health and safety standards, but they were widely ignored;
    government inspections of working conditions were weak and ineffective. The
    ATUC also monitored compliance with labor and trade regulations, including
    safety and health conditions. Between 1997 and year's end, the ATUC reported
    that it inspected 2,000 enterprises and organizations and found 28,432 legal
    and technical violations. The ATUC said that virtually all of the violations
    were addressed, and no official complaints were registered.
    Workers could not leave jobs that endangered their health and safety without
    fear of losing their jobs. According to the Oil Workers Rights Defense
    Council (ORDC), an NGO dedicated to protecting worker rights in the oil
    sector, six State Oil Company workers were lost at sea due to workplace
    accidents during the year. Another three oil workers died in other
    industry-related accidents. Workplace accidents were also a problem in other
    sectors of the economy. The law provides equal rights to foreign and
    domestic workers, though local human rights groups, including ORDC,
    maintained that disparities existed, particularly in foreign oil companies.

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