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  • The Turkish-Israeli Alliance Over

    THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE OVER

    Global Politician
    http://globalpolitician.com/26019-israe l-turkey
    Nov 3 2009

    The Turkey-Israel alliance is over. After two decades plus of
    close cooperation, the Turkish government is no longer interested in
    maintaining close cooperation with Israel nor is it--for all practical
    purposes--willing to do anything much to maintain its good relations
    with Israel.

    The U.S.-Turkish alliance, which goes back about six decades, is
    also over but much less visibly so, though the two relationships
    are interlinked.

    And that's one important point in the first development. If the
    Turkish government was really concerned about protecting the kind of
    tight links with America that have existed for so long, it would be
    far more cautious about jettisoning the old policy toward Israel.

    But let's take a step back and talk about the nature of the bilateral
    relationship and why it has come to an end. Basically, there were
    four important reasons for the close cooperation between the two
    countries which made eminent sense in the 1980s and 1990s.

    First, Turkey and Israel had common enemies, or at least threats. Iraq
    and Syria were radical Arab nationalist regimes which had problems with
    both countries. Syria claimed part of Turkey's territory--Hatay--and
    was backing Armenian and Kurdish terrorists against Turkey. Iraq's
    ambitions under President Saddam Hussein were also chilling for
    Ankara. Iran, as an Islamist state, was hostile to Kemalism and
    promoted subversion within Turkey.

    If Arab states were unhappy about Turkey's growing proximity to
    Israel, they weren't prepared to do anything about it, and had not
    given Ankara any great benefits previously. Moreover, as devotees of
    realpolitik, Turkey's leaders thought that if Arab regimes and Iran
    were upset or fearful of this new alignment, it would give Turkey
    more leverage. While Turkish leaders complained that Israel didn't
    do more actively to help Ankara win its confrontation with Syria
    over its safe haven for the PKK leadership, Damascus's willingness
    to give in was surely related to the fact that it knew neighbors to
    both north and south were working together against it.

    Second, and related to the previous point, was the preference of
    Turkey's powerful military which wanted the close relationship with
    Israel. Aside from the threat assessment, the Turkish armed forces saw
    Israel as a source of advanced equipment and technology that would
    be quite useful for itself. Especially useful was Israel's ability
    to upgrade existing equipment at a relatively low price.

    Third, it was believed in Ankara that the relationship with Israel
    would help its vital connections to the United States, given the
    perceived strength of the pro-Israel forces there. This benefitted
    Turkey in regard to Greek and Armenian criticisms of the U.S.-Turkey
    relationship.

    Finally, there were mutual economic benefits. Commerce rose to high
    levels. Tourism from Israel brought a lot of money into Turkey. And
    there was the prospect of water sales, though these have never really
    materialized.

    But perhaps more important it related to Turkey's need for a new
    strategy as the Cold War ground to an end. Turkey's big asset, and the
    basis of its NATO membership, was Ankara's value in confronting the
    USSR and its Balkan satellite states. How could Turkey replace this
    lost rationale and maintain its value to the West, whose approval
    it sought and whose aid it needed? The road to Washington thus was
    seen as going through Jerusalem (though Turkish policymakers might
    have said "Tel Aviv.")

    These three factors have all eroded, in part due to objective changes
    in the world though to a very large degree due to the AKP taking
    Turkey down an Islamist path. I would suggest that while previous
    governments had their criticisms of Israel, if the AKP were not in
    power, the bilateral link would continue rather than being terminated.

    Basically, of the four reasons cited above, the armed forces' and
    commercial interests have not changed at all. The same applies,
    to a slightly lesser degree, of Ankara's need and desire for good
    relations with Washington. Under a non-AKP government, all these
    would remain pretty constant.

    The one change has been the collapse of one previous threat--Iraq--and
    the weakening of another, Syria, which no longer poses a Kurdish
    problem either, to the point that it wanted to avoid antagonizing
    Turkey. Yet even these external changes would not have been sufficient
    to sabotage the relationship.

    >From the AKP regime's standpoint, however, all but the commercial
    factor are of limited value and, of course, it is ideologically
    hostile to Israel. The government uses anti-Israel and even antisemitic
    sentiment to build its base of support. It is not so sympathetic to
    "Arabs" or even "Muslims" as such but to fellow Islamists. Thus, for
    example, the AKP regime's passion for Hamas in the Gaza Strip is not
    matched by any profound concern toward the Palestinian Authority in
    the West Bank.

    Let's go through the three non-commercial factors to see how they've
    changed for the AKP. Rather than view Syria and Iran as threats, the
    AKP government sees them as allies. Relations with both countries have
    steadily tightened. Turkish-Syrian relations have become a virtual
    love fest with regular visits, agreements, and cooperation.

    Rather than have common enemies, then, it could be suggested that
    the new alignment of Turkey with Iran and Syria have a common enemy
    in Israel.

    The Turkish military, of course, has faced a steady weakening of its
    political influence, due both to European Union pressure and to the
    AKP's strenuous efforts. Symbolic here, is the cancellation of the
    planned Anatolian Eagle joint military maneuvers after six successful
    such exercises. The armed forces may be very unhappy with the Turkish
    government's behavior and prefer the close alignment continue but
    has far less say in the matter.

    Especially intriguing is the U.S. angle. The AKP regime has the
    enviable situation of being able to show disrespect and a lack of
    cooperation with U.S. interests without paying a price for this
    behavior. The situation began in the Bush administration and the
    2003 invasion of Iraq but has grown more intense with the Obama
    Administration. Since the new president views Turkey as the very
    model of a modern, moderate Islamist government and is reluctant to
    use pressure on anyone, the White House lets Turkey get away with it.

    The AKP thus no longer needs Israel as help in maintaining Ankara's
    standing in Washington. On one hand, its status with the United States
    is secure; on the other hand, that connection is far less important
    for the Turkish regime.

    Israel is not in a good position to inflict costs on Turkey for
    Ankara's hostile, even insulting, behavior though Israeli policymakers
    have no illusions about the end of the special relationship. There is
    serious consideration of cancelling some major arms sales, especially
    given new fears that the technology could find its way to Iran
    and Syria. In addition, Israeli tourism fell off sharply, at least
    temporarily, and Turkish Jews knew their future in Turkey is uncertain.

    It should be understood that Israel does not want to respond to the
    AKP's hostility by taking steps that would be seen as "anti-Turkey,"
    such as vigorously backing Armenian genocide resolutions or conducting
    an anti-Turkey campaign in the United States. There must be some
    hope that in a post-AKP future--if any--more moderate forces in the
    country would prevail and at least make the bilateral relationship
    a good one even if they did not return to the past alignment.

    Like all politicians, those of the AKP would like to have their kebab
    and eat it, too. They still want to play a role as mediator between
    Israel and Syria as well as Israel and Hamas, yet Jerusalem is not
    going to play along with magnifying the importance and treating as
    a fair-minded adjudicator a country which it knows is so hostile. At
    the same time, Israeli leaders will avoid if possible any confrontation
    with Turkey which Ankara would use as an excuse to turn the temperature
    down even further.

    It would be nice to be able to suggest some way in which the
    relationship could be salvaged. Given, however, the AKP's ideology
    and redefinition of Turkish interests, the weakness of the Obama
    Administration, and Israel's lack of leverage, this is unlikely to
    happen. The sole real question is how fast and obviously the AKP will
    move to express publicly--and sometimes demagogically--its hostility
    in the way that was done during the Gaza War of early 2009.

    There is some reason to believe that the Turkish military could play
    some continuing role as a restraining factor, while American criticism
    (more likely from Congress than from the White House), and the desire
    to maintain Israel's trade and tourism might also restrain the AKP
    government. Perhaps the most powerful issue in this regard is any
    lingering hope by the Turkish government that it could play a major
    diplomatic role in Israel-Palestinian, Arab-Israeli issues.

    Finally, there is a gap between Israel and U.S. perceptions. (The
    Turkish-Israel issue plays no role with EU countries.) Israeli
    decisionmakers and opinionmakers--except for a very small group
    of marginal voices whose influence might well be overestimated in
    Ankara--understand precisely what's happening. In contrast, U.S.

    counterparts are barely aware of any problem with Turkey for their
    own interests. One can expect that the conflict will force itself
    into their attention in future.

    The Turkish-Israel alignment played an important and productive role
    in regional stability as well as for the economic well-being of both
    countries for some years. It was a good situation, but clearly not
    a permanent one.

    Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International
    Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary university. His new book
    is The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).

    You can buy his latest book The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary
    History of the Middle East Conflict on Amazon.com here.
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