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BAKU'S FRUSTRATIONS WITH ANKARA MAY GIVE RUSSIA NEW OPENING IN AZERBAIJAN
news.az
Nov 13 2009
Azerbaijan
Sabina Freizer News.Az interviews Sabina Freizer, director of the
Brussels-based International Crisis Group's Europe programme.
Official Baku thinks that the normalization of diplomatic
relations between Armenia and Turkey may result in Yerevan taking an
unconstructive position on the negotiations over Karabakh. Why then
did the United States, Russia and the EU work so hard to improve
Armenian-Turkish ties?
While Baku is concerned that the normalization of relations between
Armenia and Turkey will cause Armenia to become more recalcitrant in
the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, the feeling amongst many in the US and
the European Union is that Armenia will actually become more flexible.
Many Armenians say that they are surrounded by hostile Turkic
countries and claim that they need to retain control over the occupied
territories as a security guarantee. Once relations with Turkey are
normalized, this argument will no longer be even remotely credible.
Also within Armenia itself the whole normalization process gives
support to those inside the country who are open to the outside,
to contacts with Turkey, relations with the European Union, the US,
while undermining the arguments of extreme nationalists who continue
to play an important role in the country.
If the protocols are not signed in Turkey, there will once again be
strong pressure in the US next April to recognize the events of 1915
as genocide
Sabina FreizerThe high level involvement of US, French and Russian
officials in the Turkey-Armenia reconciliation process, and especially
at the time of the signing of the protocols, is extremely important
for the South Caucasus. It shows that even though this region rarely
makes it into the news in these countries (with the exception of
Russia perhaps), the South Caucasus can still attract the attention
of major leaders. It is a rare example of cooperation between the
US-EU and Russia.
In one of your previous interviews you said the normalization
of relations with Turkey will make Armenia more flexible in the
negotiation process with Azerbaijan. You also said that Armenia and
Azerbaijan have already agreed on the need to withdraw the armed
forces from the seven occupied districts. Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev said in an interview that the issues concerning the
unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from all the occupied
lands around Nagorno Karabakh have been coordinated. Yet, after
signing the Armenia-Turkey protocls in Zurich Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan dismissed the statement, saying the withdrawal of the Armenian
forces from seven occupied districts had not been discussed with the
Azerbaijani president. Is this not proof of Yerevan's unconstructive
position after signing the protocols in Zurich?
In June 2005 your foreign minister explained that in the
Nagorno-Karabakh talks the sides are addressing issues one by one,
resolving one before moving to another, "like pearls knotted on a
silk thread". No issue can be resolved on its own, and no agreements
are final until the whole negotiations end. Of course, the withdrawal
and return of all displaced persons are necessary, but based on the
current form of the negotiations this will occur only within the
context of a comprehensive settlement.
The Crisis Group never said that an agreement on withdrawal from all
seven territories was sealed. In our October report Nagorno-Karabakh:
Getting to a Breakthrough, we recommended that "Armenia, together
with the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and Azerbaijan, should
begin contingency planning on the mechanisms and procedures for the
withdrawal of Armenian forces from the districts of Azerbaijan outside
of Nagorno-Karabakh they continue to occupy."
We also noted that Aliyev and Sargsyan have reportedly inched closer
to agreement on a timetable for Armenian withdrawal from seven
occupied districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. This claim is based
on statements from former OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Matt Bryza,
according to whom, provided everything else is agreed, Armenian
forces would pull out immediately from five districts adjacent to
Nagorno-Karabakh and then in five years time from Kelbajar and Lachin.
President Sargsyan would be deceiving his public if he is claiming
that within the current OSCE Minsk Group sponsored talks one of
the principles being discussed is not withdrawal from the occupied
territories. But withdrawal is conditional on many other of the
principles under discussion.
The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs state clearly that there is no
linkage to be made between the Karabakh conflict and Turkey-Armenia
reconciliation. Politicians in Turkey and Azerbaijan who are making
that link and saying that withdrawal is necessary before reconciliation
are also mixing two parallel but separate processes.
There is no mention of withdrawal in the protocols.
What could be the results of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and how
can Russia and the United States benefit from it?
Russia is now supporting Turkey-Armenia reconciliation, even though
previously, Russian reactions to improvement in the bilateral
relationship were lukewarm at best. The closed border was seen as
helping Russia maintain dominance over Armenia and as securing the old
Cold War border, backed up with a military alliance in which Armenia
was very much the junior partner, a base in Gyumri and Russian guards
on the Turkish border and supervising international entry points like
Yerevan airport.
Moscow also seeks to further isolate, marginalise and surround
Georgia. Baku's frustrations with Ankara may likewise give Russia a new
opening in Azerbaijan. But Russia can also benefit directly if there
is access to Turkey from Armenia. It needs a transit route to supply
its military base in Gyumri, and its companies now control or own
key parts of Armenian infrastructure, including mobile phone firms,
energy production and distribution, pipelines and railways. An open
border and free trade between Turkey and Armenia would increase the
value of these holdings.
What does Nagorno-Karabakh mean for Russia, the United States, Europe
and even for Turkey now?
Nagorno-Karabakh is not of primary importance to any of the countries
that you mention. In the region, as you well know, even the conflicts
in Georgia get more attention.
Of course if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was solved and the regions'
borders were once again entirely open, it could serve as a much more
effective transit corridor for gas, oil, trade and people. But if
the conflict is not resolved, it continues to place a heavy drain
on Azerbaijan which is accommodating very large numbers of displaced
persons. It forces Azerbaijan and Armenia to maintain extremely high
military budgets. Indirectly the non-resolution of the conflict also
blocks democratization and firm establishment of the rule of law. The
possibility of a return to war is a prospect of concern to Russia,
the US and the EU.
Could the recent events in the region be assessed as a crisis that may
form a new situation in the negotiation process over Nagorno Karabakh?
Turkey-Armenia reconciliation can have a positive impact on the
Nagorno-Karabakh talks, as mentioned above, but similarly if the
reconciliation fails, if the protocols are not ratified in the national
parliaments for example, this will have a very negative backlash in
the region. Those who made steps towards reconciliation and supported
the process will be seen as failures, and this will be a victory for
hardline nationalists.
If the protocols are not signed in Turkey, for example, there will
once again be strong pressure in the US next April to recognize the
events of 1915 as genocide. The Justice and Development Party's foreign
policy and attempts to play a leading role in the region will suffer
a serious blow. Alternatively, if the protocols fail to pass through
the Armenian parliament, this will show the weakness of President
Sargsyan. If he is unable to muster enough domestic support for a
deal with Turkey, it is even less likely that he will successfully
sell a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to his people.
news.az
Nov 13 2009
Azerbaijan
Sabina Freizer News.Az interviews Sabina Freizer, director of the
Brussels-based International Crisis Group's Europe programme.
Official Baku thinks that the normalization of diplomatic
relations between Armenia and Turkey may result in Yerevan taking an
unconstructive position on the negotiations over Karabakh. Why then
did the United States, Russia and the EU work so hard to improve
Armenian-Turkish ties?
While Baku is concerned that the normalization of relations between
Armenia and Turkey will cause Armenia to become more recalcitrant in
the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, the feeling amongst many in the US and
the European Union is that Armenia will actually become more flexible.
Many Armenians say that they are surrounded by hostile Turkic
countries and claim that they need to retain control over the occupied
territories as a security guarantee. Once relations with Turkey are
normalized, this argument will no longer be even remotely credible.
Also within Armenia itself the whole normalization process gives
support to those inside the country who are open to the outside,
to contacts with Turkey, relations with the European Union, the US,
while undermining the arguments of extreme nationalists who continue
to play an important role in the country.
If the protocols are not signed in Turkey, there will once again be
strong pressure in the US next April to recognize the events of 1915
as genocide
Sabina FreizerThe high level involvement of US, French and Russian
officials in the Turkey-Armenia reconciliation process, and especially
at the time of the signing of the protocols, is extremely important
for the South Caucasus. It shows that even though this region rarely
makes it into the news in these countries (with the exception of
Russia perhaps), the South Caucasus can still attract the attention
of major leaders. It is a rare example of cooperation between the
US-EU and Russia.
In one of your previous interviews you said the normalization
of relations with Turkey will make Armenia more flexible in the
negotiation process with Azerbaijan. You also said that Armenia and
Azerbaijan have already agreed on the need to withdraw the armed
forces from the seven occupied districts. Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev said in an interview that the issues concerning the
unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from all the occupied
lands around Nagorno Karabakh have been coordinated. Yet, after
signing the Armenia-Turkey protocls in Zurich Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan dismissed the statement, saying the withdrawal of the Armenian
forces from seven occupied districts had not been discussed with the
Azerbaijani president. Is this not proof of Yerevan's unconstructive
position after signing the protocols in Zurich?
In June 2005 your foreign minister explained that in the
Nagorno-Karabakh talks the sides are addressing issues one by one,
resolving one before moving to another, "like pearls knotted on a
silk thread". No issue can be resolved on its own, and no agreements
are final until the whole negotiations end. Of course, the withdrawal
and return of all displaced persons are necessary, but based on the
current form of the negotiations this will occur only within the
context of a comprehensive settlement.
The Crisis Group never said that an agreement on withdrawal from all
seven territories was sealed. In our October report Nagorno-Karabakh:
Getting to a Breakthrough, we recommended that "Armenia, together
with the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and Azerbaijan, should
begin contingency planning on the mechanisms and procedures for the
withdrawal of Armenian forces from the districts of Azerbaijan outside
of Nagorno-Karabakh they continue to occupy."
We also noted that Aliyev and Sargsyan have reportedly inched closer
to agreement on a timetable for Armenian withdrawal from seven
occupied districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. This claim is based
on statements from former OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Matt Bryza,
according to whom, provided everything else is agreed, Armenian
forces would pull out immediately from five districts adjacent to
Nagorno-Karabakh and then in five years time from Kelbajar and Lachin.
President Sargsyan would be deceiving his public if he is claiming
that within the current OSCE Minsk Group sponsored talks one of
the principles being discussed is not withdrawal from the occupied
territories. But withdrawal is conditional on many other of the
principles under discussion.
The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs state clearly that there is no
linkage to be made between the Karabakh conflict and Turkey-Armenia
reconciliation. Politicians in Turkey and Azerbaijan who are making
that link and saying that withdrawal is necessary before reconciliation
are also mixing two parallel but separate processes.
There is no mention of withdrawal in the protocols.
What could be the results of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and how
can Russia and the United States benefit from it?
Russia is now supporting Turkey-Armenia reconciliation, even though
previously, Russian reactions to improvement in the bilateral
relationship were lukewarm at best. The closed border was seen as
helping Russia maintain dominance over Armenia and as securing the old
Cold War border, backed up with a military alliance in which Armenia
was very much the junior partner, a base in Gyumri and Russian guards
on the Turkish border and supervising international entry points like
Yerevan airport.
Moscow also seeks to further isolate, marginalise and surround
Georgia. Baku's frustrations with Ankara may likewise give Russia a new
opening in Azerbaijan. But Russia can also benefit directly if there
is access to Turkey from Armenia. It needs a transit route to supply
its military base in Gyumri, and its companies now control or own
key parts of Armenian infrastructure, including mobile phone firms,
energy production and distribution, pipelines and railways. An open
border and free trade between Turkey and Armenia would increase the
value of these holdings.
What does Nagorno-Karabakh mean for Russia, the United States, Europe
and even for Turkey now?
Nagorno-Karabakh is not of primary importance to any of the countries
that you mention. In the region, as you well know, even the conflicts
in Georgia get more attention.
Of course if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was solved and the regions'
borders were once again entirely open, it could serve as a much more
effective transit corridor for gas, oil, trade and people. But if
the conflict is not resolved, it continues to place a heavy drain
on Azerbaijan which is accommodating very large numbers of displaced
persons. It forces Azerbaijan and Armenia to maintain extremely high
military budgets. Indirectly the non-resolution of the conflict also
blocks democratization and firm establishment of the rule of law. The
possibility of a return to war is a prospect of concern to Russia,
the US and the EU.
Could the recent events in the region be assessed as a crisis that may
form a new situation in the negotiation process over Nagorno Karabakh?
Turkey-Armenia reconciliation can have a positive impact on the
Nagorno-Karabakh talks, as mentioned above, but similarly if the
reconciliation fails, if the protocols are not ratified in the national
parliaments for example, this will have a very negative backlash in
the region. Those who made steps towards reconciliation and supported
the process will be seen as failures, and this will be a victory for
hardline nationalists.
If the protocols are not signed in Turkey, for example, there will
once again be strong pressure in the US next April to recognize the
events of 1915 as genocide. The Justice and Development Party's foreign
policy and attempts to play a leading role in the region will suffer
a serious blow. Alternatively, if the protocols fail to pass through
the Armenian parliament, this will show the weakness of President
Sargsyan. If he is unable to muster enough domestic support for a
deal with Turkey, it is even less likely that he will successfully
sell a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to his people.