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BREAKTHROUGH ON KARABAKH UNLIKELY - ARMENIAN EXPERT
Kamala Mammadova
News.Az
Thu 10 December 2009 | 12:57 GMT
Richard Giragosian News.Az interviews Richard Giragosian, director
of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies.
The Turkish side constantly links the opening of the Armenian-Turkish
border with the normalization of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was also confirmed during the Erdogan-Obama meeting. Will
Armenia's position change after the Turkish prime minister's remarks
in the White House?
The Armenian position on the course of its diplomacy with Turkey
remains unchanged. The Armenian government is committed to the terms
outlined in the two diplomatic protocols that were signed between
Armenia and Turkey on 10 October. There was no reference to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the protocols in any way and, at this
stage, it is not acceptable for any side to try to re-connect the
issue of Armenian-Turkish diplomacy with the Karabakh issue. In
fact, the decision to remove the Karabakh issue as a precondition
for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey was
a Turkish decision, reflecting their need to pursue a new foreign
policy toward the region. This Turkish decision also in part reflected
Ankara's frustration at having its foreign policy options limited by
Baku's virtual "veto" on any new policy. Thus, Turkey was, and is,
seeking to chart its own course of engagement in the region based on
its own national interests and no longer simply to support or follow
Azerbaijan's strategic agenda. And this is why it may work this time,
because Turkey's strategic plan is no longer simply to please the
US or appease the EU, but reflects its own goals and aims in the
South Caucasus.
In this way, Turkey's engagement of Armenia, with no formal requirement
for any concession over Karabakh, reflects a Turkish attempt to
correct what has become a failed policy. And during the recent White
House meeting, this is why the American position is to remind Turkey
that there cannot be any preconditions at this stage and the US
is demanding that Turkey fulfil the protocols "within a reasonable
timeframe". But as recently as 8 December, Armenian parliamentarian
Naira Zohrabyan said that Armenia would wait until March 2010 for
Turkey to move on the protocols, but warned that "if, by that time,
Turkey remains uncertain about ratifying the protocols, Armenia will
undertake relevant steps." Thus, the real test is coming early next
year, and by March 2010, the final outcome will become apparent for
all sides. Yet this is a chance that Turkey may lose, and if it fails
to adopt the protocols, Turkey will be in danger of being seen as an
unreliable and insincere partner. That danger will only be bolstered
by the shared expectations of the Americans, Europeans and even the
Russians, who on this issue, are all in agreement and seek a deal
between Armenia and Turkey.
What do you think of the more frequent visits to the region of the
co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group? Are they productive?
Clearly, the OSCE Minsk Group has accelerated its diplomatic mediation
and is seeking to leverage the new momentum from Armenian-Turkish
diplomacy. Yet although the Minsk Group has now reactivated and
reinvigorated its efforts, any real breakthrough on Karabakh seems
unlikely, especially as the two sides are simply too far apart. In
addition, the Armenian-Turkish issue actually makes any concession
on Karabakh even more difficult, especially for the Armenian side,
which would be politically vulnerable if it attempted to deliver
any real concession on Karabakh too soon after the risky diplomatic
engagement with Turkey.
You have described Edward Nalbandian as the worst foreign minister
in the history of Armenia. Do you think Armenia's current situation
is the result of his policy?
The performance of Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian should
be rated according to the structural dynamics of Armenian foreign
policy, which now are firmly controlled and led by the Armenian
president. Although Foreign Minister Nalbandian has not demonstrated
any real success, he is "hostage to the system" and seems powerless to
institute any real initiative in Armenian foreign policy. But the real
issue, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, is that the institutions and
not simply the individuals that are most important for the formulation
of responsible and modern foreign policy are not functioning well.
Having said that, Armenia's unresolved domestic problems, including a
lack of legitimacy and deficiencies in democratic reform, pose serious
obstacles and suggest that without deeper democracy in Armenia, there
can be no real expectations for any resolution to the Karabakh conflict
in the near term. But Azerbaijan is equally weakened by its own lack
of legitimacy and absence of democracy, in addition to Baku's rather
unrealistic maximal demands on Karabakh, which, at least in my opinion,
cannot be expected to be returned to Azerbaijani control.
The OSCE foreign ministers welcomed the positive dynamic in the
Karabakh peace process after the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Minsk
Group foreign ministers met in Athens. What do you think caused the
positive dynamic at this particular juncture?
Again, the OSCE seeks to leverage the momentum in Armenian-Turkish
diplomacy, but also seeks to work with Russia in pressuring all sides
to make some sort of breakthrough. But a central obstacle remains
the absence of any negotiators from Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which
is also a fundamental problem.
What do you think is the solution to the 20-year-old conflict?
The real key to resolving the Karabakh conflict may be something
that has not been addressed or emphasized enough - the need for true
democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan prior to any real peace deal
over Karabakh. Perhaps the Karabakh conflict should remain "frozen"
and efforts should focus on building durable and deeper democracy
in the states themselves first; only then perhaps can a true peace
deal be reached. For this reason, the Karabakh situation seems likely
to remain locked in the same status for the next five to ten years,
despite the best efforts of the OSCE mediators. But at the same time,
although Azerbaijani officials may not like to recognize the reality
of the situation, it is impossible and destabilizing for Karabakh
realistically to ever be returned to Azerbaijan. Any forcible attempt
to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan may actually trigger the war that
Azerbaijani leaders have been threatening for so long.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Kamala Mammadova
News.Az
Thu 10 December 2009 | 12:57 GMT
Richard Giragosian News.Az interviews Richard Giragosian, director
of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies.
The Turkish side constantly links the opening of the Armenian-Turkish
border with the normalization of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was also confirmed during the Erdogan-Obama meeting. Will
Armenia's position change after the Turkish prime minister's remarks
in the White House?
The Armenian position on the course of its diplomacy with Turkey
remains unchanged. The Armenian government is committed to the terms
outlined in the two diplomatic protocols that were signed between
Armenia and Turkey on 10 October. There was no reference to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the protocols in any way and, at this
stage, it is not acceptable for any side to try to re-connect the
issue of Armenian-Turkish diplomacy with the Karabakh issue. In
fact, the decision to remove the Karabakh issue as a precondition
for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey was
a Turkish decision, reflecting their need to pursue a new foreign
policy toward the region. This Turkish decision also in part reflected
Ankara's frustration at having its foreign policy options limited by
Baku's virtual "veto" on any new policy. Thus, Turkey was, and is,
seeking to chart its own course of engagement in the region based on
its own national interests and no longer simply to support or follow
Azerbaijan's strategic agenda. And this is why it may work this time,
because Turkey's strategic plan is no longer simply to please the
US or appease the EU, but reflects its own goals and aims in the
South Caucasus.
In this way, Turkey's engagement of Armenia, with no formal requirement
for any concession over Karabakh, reflects a Turkish attempt to
correct what has become a failed policy. And during the recent White
House meeting, this is why the American position is to remind Turkey
that there cannot be any preconditions at this stage and the US
is demanding that Turkey fulfil the protocols "within a reasonable
timeframe". But as recently as 8 December, Armenian parliamentarian
Naira Zohrabyan said that Armenia would wait until March 2010 for
Turkey to move on the protocols, but warned that "if, by that time,
Turkey remains uncertain about ratifying the protocols, Armenia will
undertake relevant steps." Thus, the real test is coming early next
year, and by March 2010, the final outcome will become apparent for
all sides. Yet this is a chance that Turkey may lose, and if it fails
to adopt the protocols, Turkey will be in danger of being seen as an
unreliable and insincere partner. That danger will only be bolstered
by the shared expectations of the Americans, Europeans and even the
Russians, who on this issue, are all in agreement and seek a deal
between Armenia and Turkey.
What do you think of the more frequent visits to the region of the
co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group? Are they productive?
Clearly, the OSCE Minsk Group has accelerated its diplomatic mediation
and is seeking to leverage the new momentum from Armenian-Turkish
diplomacy. Yet although the Minsk Group has now reactivated and
reinvigorated its efforts, any real breakthrough on Karabakh seems
unlikely, especially as the two sides are simply too far apart. In
addition, the Armenian-Turkish issue actually makes any concession
on Karabakh even more difficult, especially for the Armenian side,
which would be politically vulnerable if it attempted to deliver
any real concession on Karabakh too soon after the risky diplomatic
engagement with Turkey.
You have described Edward Nalbandian as the worst foreign minister
in the history of Armenia. Do you think Armenia's current situation
is the result of his policy?
The performance of Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian should
be rated according to the structural dynamics of Armenian foreign
policy, which now are firmly controlled and led by the Armenian
president. Although Foreign Minister Nalbandian has not demonstrated
any real success, he is "hostage to the system" and seems powerless to
institute any real initiative in Armenian foreign policy. But the real
issue, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, is that the institutions and
not simply the individuals that are most important for the formulation
of responsible and modern foreign policy are not functioning well.
Having said that, Armenia's unresolved domestic problems, including a
lack of legitimacy and deficiencies in democratic reform, pose serious
obstacles and suggest that without deeper democracy in Armenia, there
can be no real expectations for any resolution to the Karabakh conflict
in the near term. But Azerbaijan is equally weakened by its own lack
of legitimacy and absence of democracy, in addition to Baku's rather
unrealistic maximal demands on Karabakh, which, at least in my opinion,
cannot be expected to be returned to Azerbaijani control.
The OSCE foreign ministers welcomed the positive dynamic in the
Karabakh peace process after the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Minsk
Group foreign ministers met in Athens. What do you think caused the
positive dynamic at this particular juncture?
Again, the OSCE seeks to leverage the momentum in Armenian-Turkish
diplomacy, but also seeks to work with Russia in pressuring all sides
to make some sort of breakthrough. But a central obstacle remains
the absence of any negotiators from Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which
is also a fundamental problem.
What do you think is the solution to the 20-year-old conflict?
The real key to resolving the Karabakh conflict may be something
that has not been addressed or emphasized enough - the need for true
democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan prior to any real peace deal
over Karabakh. Perhaps the Karabakh conflict should remain "frozen"
and efforts should focus on building durable and deeper democracy
in the states themselves first; only then perhaps can a true peace
deal be reached. For this reason, the Karabakh situation seems likely
to remain locked in the same status for the next five to ten years,
despite the best efforts of the OSCE mediators. But at the same time,
although Azerbaijani officials may not like to recognize the reality
of the situation, it is impossible and destabilizing for Karabakh
realistically to ever be returned to Azerbaijan. Any forcible attempt
to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan may actually trigger the war that
Azerbaijani leaders have been threatening for so long.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress