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Translating the ARF Roadmap to Regime Change into Action Part II
By Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
Dec 11th, 2009
The roadmap to regime change is a response to conditions that were
crystallized by the recently signed protocols which represent the
first step in the process of rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey.
The ARF has properly viewed these documents as being detrimental to
Armenia's present and future national interests. In response to this
assessment, the party has announced its formal opposition to the
protocols. In Part I an explanation was offered as to how the ARF can
deliver on its roadmap to regime change. Although this is a gargantuan
task for which the ARF has the necessary experience to undertake, it
is the how of the undertaking that is crucial. The response by the
ARF, if it is to be effective, must be multi-faceted in its objectives
and multi-operational in its implementation. The use of demonstrations
and rallies within Armenia and throughout the Armenian Diaspora are
means to address the first objective: to prevent ratification of the
protocols by the Armenian Parliament. The need for an information
gathering and distribution system, and the convening of conferences
where the objectives of the roadmap are presented to selected
audiences, were suggested as vital components of the effort at regime
change. The need to develop a program that would assist journalists,
legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen to hear and view
firsthand the conditions in Javakhk and to understand the how and why
of the Karabaghtsis' demand for independence were discussed.
Part II considers the remaining two objectives of the roadmap: a
viable socio-economic program and preparing for the forthcoming
elections. The need to create a cadre of field workers to develop
grassroots support for the ARF's initiatives to improve the standard
of living of the workers and their families, and to win their support
for the ARF candidates for president and parliament in the forthcoming
elections, is an absolute necessity to ensure a reasonable certainty
of success.
The program to improve the quality of life of the worker and his
family must be doable and not campaign pie-in-the-sky rhetoric that
will appeal only to the most desperate members of society. Again, the
participation of Armenian men and women with expertise in the fields
of education, medical delivery systems, agrarian reform, housing,
rural infrastructure, etc. must be enlisted to formulate practical
programs that are not only on target, but can be achieved with the
limited resources that will be initially available. Promising more
than can be delivered is anathema to the long-term support that the
ARF requires. The Armenian worker has become cynical by having relied
on too many promises made and not kept. The inadequacies of the
oligarchic Sarkisian government in failing to include the workers in
an equitable sharing of the wealth that they have produced must be
relentlessly hammered home. More importantly, the ARF must
explain - point by point - how the Sarkisian Administration's failures
will be effectively addressed by the program proposed by the ARF to
improve the workers' quality of life.
The remaining objectives demand that the ARF prepares for the
forthcoming Armenian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011
and 2013, respectively. The ARF must begin the task of selecting
viable candidates for president and parliament. These potential
candidates must become the face of this roadmap to regime change. They
should become household names and faces, and appear at rallies,
demonstrations, and conferences. The presidential candidate must tour
the diaspora explaining why the roadmap to regime change is important
for Armenia's political viability, how it will be implemented, and its
relationship to the legitimate objectives of Hai Tahd (the Armenian
Cause). The candidate's presence should be used to raise funds to
underwrite what will be an expensive program if regime change is to be
achieved. The presidential candidate should meet with sympathetic
journalists, business leaders, advocacy leaders, and legislators
(especially members of the United States Congressional Armenian
Caucus) wherever
The ARF has influence in the diaspora.
Winning the presidency must be viewed as achievable. Should the party
fail to elect the president, at the very least the ARF must win a
sufficient number of parliamentary seats to be able to advance its
legislative program for the benefit of the citizens and the state.
Working from a position of strength within the administration
(assuming the ARF is not the administration) is more effective than
working outside the government structure. However, being part of the
administration has its potential liabilities should the ARF be unable
to deliver on its program or is cast as part of the problems that
continue to persist. In a related note, the ARF's recent participation
in the Sarkisian Administration did not earn it any accolades.
The Sarkisian Administration must be aggressively attacked on its
record of having failed to improve the condition of workers and their
families; on having failed to ensure the basic norms of free,
democratic elections; of having failed to have Karabagh recognized as
a member of the negotiation process; and of having failed to
effectively represent to the Georgian government the issues
confronting the Javakheti Armenians. This is a battle for the
political survival of the jomeland (Armenia, Artsakh, and Javakhk) for
a better day for workers and their families and for the Armenian
Cause. There will be no second chance. Given the enormity of what is
at stake, no one should doubt that the present administration and its
supporters will seek to create obstacles to hinder the ARF from
holding political rallies, having access to television time and media
coverage, and importantly, organizing grassroots support. The ARF must
be prepared to respond immediately and effectively to any counter
efforts by Yerevan, Ankara,
and possibly by the Minsk Group should attempts be made to undermine
its efforts at regime change.
Organizing grassroots support is a vital component in gaining the
necessary public support for the ARF's roadmap to regime change and to
ensure voter support for its candidates in the forthcoming elections.
Winning the `heart and soul' of the Armenian worker and his family is
a sine qua non if there is any hope of achieving this fundamental
change. The results of the parliamentary election in 2007 (winning 16
of 131 seats) and the presidential election of 2008 (where the ARF
candidate received under 7 percent of the total votes cast) indicate
what needs to be done if regime change is to be successful. To sell
its program and to develop the required grassroots support required
for electoral victories, the ARF must train a cadre of paid field
representatives who will live and work with the people they seek to
influence. Their pay would be in the form of a stipend in addition to
required expenses for travel, food, and lodging, which would also be
underwritten by the party. Working in pairs for moral support and
safety (should that become a factor), these field workers could live
with local families who would in turn receive payment for their room
and board. The ARF field representatives must be properly trained,
provided with relevant materials, and adequately monitored and
supported.
It is vital that these field representatives operate under the
supervision of district committees for each of Armenia's 10 districts
and the capital district of Yerevan. Monthly progress reports would be
filed by each team with their respective district committee, who would
then file a summary report to be sent to the Central Committee. The
Central Committee would compile a summary report for distribution to
ARF regional central committees and from there to their local
gomidehs. Appropriate authorities would decide what material would be
released for public distribution. Being informed is a key requirement
to keep members and all segments of the Armenian community within the
homeland and the diaspora energized. These field workers would be on
the front line and would form an indispensible component in
implementing the roadmap. The field workers would be responsible for
explaining the roadmap's objectives, to link the inadequacies of the
present administration with the solutions proposed by the ARF, and to
gai
n support for the ARF candidates for parliament and president in the
forthcoming elections.
The republic is at a critical moment in its history. The roadmap for
regime change demands a full scale offensive that requires harnessing
human resources and fund raisingefforts far beyond anything the ARF
has ever attempted.
It must be recognized that Armenia is being pressured to normalize
relations with a government whose leaders remain unrepentant and as
anti-Armenian as their political progenitors who carried out the
systematic murder of some 1.5 million innocent Armenian men, women,
and children using the most heinous methods conceivable. The protocols
are documents that speak to Turkish interests, are supported by the
Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States), and are
detrimental to Armenia's interests - dismissive of the injustices
expressed in Hai Tahd and contemptuous of Armenia's sovereignty. That
should be sufficient to motivate any Armenian.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
Dec 11th, 2009
The roadmap to regime change is a response to conditions that were
crystallized by the recently signed protocols which represent the
first step in the process of rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey.
The ARF has properly viewed these documents as being detrimental to
Armenia's present and future national interests. In response to this
assessment, the party has announced its formal opposition to the
protocols. In Part I an explanation was offered as to how the ARF can
deliver on its roadmap to regime change. Although this is a gargantuan
task for which the ARF has the necessary experience to undertake, it
is the how of the undertaking that is crucial. The response by the
ARF, if it is to be effective, must be multi-faceted in its objectives
and multi-operational in its implementation. The use of demonstrations
and rallies within Armenia and throughout the Armenian Diaspora are
means to address the first objective: to prevent ratification of the
protocols by the Armenian Parliament. The need for an information
gathering and distribution system, and the convening of conferences
where the objectives of the roadmap are presented to selected
audiences, were suggested as vital components of the effort at regime
change. The need to develop a program that would assist journalists,
legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen to hear and view
firsthand the conditions in Javakhk and to understand the how and why
of the Karabaghtsis' demand for independence were discussed.
Part II considers the remaining two objectives of the roadmap: a
viable socio-economic program and preparing for the forthcoming
elections. The need to create a cadre of field workers to develop
grassroots support for the ARF's initiatives to improve the standard
of living of the workers and their families, and to win their support
for the ARF candidates for president and parliament in the forthcoming
elections, is an absolute necessity to ensure a reasonable certainty
of success.
The program to improve the quality of life of the worker and his
family must be doable and not campaign pie-in-the-sky rhetoric that
will appeal only to the most desperate members of society. Again, the
participation of Armenian men and women with expertise in the fields
of education, medical delivery systems, agrarian reform, housing,
rural infrastructure, etc. must be enlisted to formulate practical
programs that are not only on target, but can be achieved with the
limited resources that will be initially available. Promising more
than can be delivered is anathema to the long-term support that the
ARF requires. The Armenian worker has become cynical by having relied
on too many promises made and not kept. The inadequacies of the
oligarchic Sarkisian government in failing to include the workers in
an equitable sharing of the wealth that they have produced must be
relentlessly hammered home. More importantly, the ARF must
explain - point by point - how the Sarkisian Administration's failures
will be effectively addressed by the program proposed by the ARF to
improve the workers' quality of life.
The remaining objectives demand that the ARF prepares for the
forthcoming Armenian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011
and 2013, respectively. The ARF must begin the task of selecting
viable candidates for president and parliament. These potential
candidates must become the face of this roadmap to regime change. They
should become household names and faces, and appear at rallies,
demonstrations, and conferences. The presidential candidate must tour
the diaspora explaining why the roadmap to regime change is important
for Armenia's political viability, how it will be implemented, and its
relationship to the legitimate objectives of Hai Tahd (the Armenian
Cause). The candidate's presence should be used to raise funds to
underwrite what will be an expensive program if regime change is to be
achieved. The presidential candidate should meet with sympathetic
journalists, business leaders, advocacy leaders, and legislators
(especially members of the United States Congressional Armenian
Caucus) wherever
The ARF has influence in the diaspora.
Winning the presidency must be viewed as achievable. Should the party
fail to elect the president, at the very least the ARF must win a
sufficient number of parliamentary seats to be able to advance its
legislative program for the benefit of the citizens and the state.
Working from a position of strength within the administration
(assuming the ARF is not the administration) is more effective than
working outside the government structure. However, being part of the
administration has its potential liabilities should the ARF be unable
to deliver on its program or is cast as part of the problems that
continue to persist. In a related note, the ARF's recent participation
in the Sarkisian Administration did not earn it any accolades.
The Sarkisian Administration must be aggressively attacked on its
record of having failed to improve the condition of workers and their
families; on having failed to ensure the basic norms of free,
democratic elections; of having failed to have Karabagh recognized as
a member of the negotiation process; and of having failed to
effectively represent to the Georgian government the issues
confronting the Javakheti Armenians. This is a battle for the
political survival of the jomeland (Armenia, Artsakh, and Javakhk) for
a better day for workers and their families and for the Armenian
Cause. There will be no second chance. Given the enormity of what is
at stake, no one should doubt that the present administration and its
supporters will seek to create obstacles to hinder the ARF from
holding political rallies, having access to television time and media
coverage, and importantly, organizing grassroots support. The ARF must
be prepared to respond immediately and effectively to any counter
efforts by Yerevan, Ankara,
and possibly by the Minsk Group should attempts be made to undermine
its efforts at regime change.
Organizing grassroots support is a vital component in gaining the
necessary public support for the ARF's roadmap to regime change and to
ensure voter support for its candidates in the forthcoming elections.
Winning the `heart and soul' of the Armenian worker and his family is
a sine qua non if there is any hope of achieving this fundamental
change. The results of the parliamentary election in 2007 (winning 16
of 131 seats) and the presidential election of 2008 (where the ARF
candidate received under 7 percent of the total votes cast) indicate
what needs to be done if regime change is to be successful. To sell
its program and to develop the required grassroots support required
for electoral victories, the ARF must train a cadre of paid field
representatives who will live and work with the people they seek to
influence. Their pay would be in the form of a stipend in addition to
required expenses for travel, food, and lodging, which would also be
underwritten by the party. Working in pairs for moral support and
safety (should that become a factor), these field workers could live
with local families who would in turn receive payment for their room
and board. The ARF field representatives must be properly trained,
provided with relevant materials, and adequately monitored and
supported.
It is vital that these field representatives operate under the
supervision of district committees for each of Armenia's 10 districts
and the capital district of Yerevan. Monthly progress reports would be
filed by each team with their respective district committee, who would
then file a summary report to be sent to the Central Committee. The
Central Committee would compile a summary report for distribution to
ARF regional central committees and from there to their local
gomidehs. Appropriate authorities would decide what material would be
released for public distribution. Being informed is a key requirement
to keep members and all segments of the Armenian community within the
homeland and the diaspora energized. These field workers would be on
the front line and would form an indispensible component in
implementing the roadmap. The field workers would be responsible for
explaining the roadmap's objectives, to link the inadequacies of the
present administration with the solutions proposed by the ARF, and to
gai
n support for the ARF candidates for parliament and president in the
forthcoming elections.
The republic is at a critical moment in its history. The roadmap for
regime change demands a full scale offensive that requires harnessing
human resources and fund raisingefforts far beyond anything the ARF
has ever attempted.
It must be recognized that Armenia is being pressured to normalize
relations with a government whose leaders remain unrepentant and as
anti-Armenian as their political progenitors who carried out the
systematic murder of some 1.5 million innocent Armenian men, women,
and children using the most heinous methods conceivable. The protocols
are documents that speak to Turkish interests, are supported by the
Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States), and are
detrimental to Armenia's interests - dismissive of the injustices
expressed in Hai Tahd and contemptuous of Armenia's sovereignty. That
should be sufficient to motivate any Armenian.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress