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Explaining Azerbaijan's War Rhetoric and Consequences of Appeasement

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  • Explaining Azerbaijan's War Rhetoric and Consequences of Appeasement

    Yerevan Report, Armenia
    Dec 29 2009


    Explaining Azerbaijan's War Rhetoric and Consequences of Appeasement
    Dec 29th, 2009

    BY GRIGOR HAKOBYAN

    Background

    As 2009 comes to a close, Azerbaijani war rhetoric does not seem to
    abate. Mr. Aliyev uses every public opportunity to threaten Armenia
    and the Armenians of Artsakh with resumption of full scale hostilities
    in the region.

    To substantiate his claims the Azerbaijani president continues to
    pressure his parliament into vast increases of budget allocations to
    the Azerbaijani war machine and encourages widespread acquisitions of
    offensive weapons, military equipment and munitions from every country
    in the world willing to sell their weapons to them.

    Furthermore, Azerbaijan continues to hold numerically the largest army
    in the region despite the fact that active confrontations with the
    Armenian side over Artsakh have predominately ended nearly 16 years
    ago.

    Despite the fact that billions of dollars in revenues are flowing into
    state coffers from international operation of oil and gas fields the
    vast numbers of Azerbaijani people are barely making their ends meet
    and live in continuous poverty and neglect.

    Considering that war can only bring destructions, death and suffering
    to vast majority of its people, the Azerbaijani leadership doesn't shy
    away from making public declarations about their intent to start one
    in the region.

    So the question arises whether the Azerbaijani government could be
    really trusted in securing a lasting peace with Armenia and what could
    explain their eagerness to resume hostilities in Artsakh.

    Analysis

    The Azerbaijani war rhetoric can be explained by a number of factors
    that will eventually contribute to its decline and the coming collapse
    of the ruling regime in Baku.

    There is a high likelihood that the collapse of the regime in Baku
    will be accompanied by a civil war within the country that will put
    against each other the majority of Azerbaijani people who are
    disenchanted and repulsed by the corruption in the country. They feel
    the same about the oppressive monarchial rule of a tyrannical dynasty
    for the last 16 years and the small minority of people who have been
    benefiting from the inglorious corruption reigning the county and the
    oppressive regime that fuels it.

    First of all, the continued decline of Azerbaijani's economy that
    began in 2008 as a result of a lower demand for its oil and gas didn't
    yet finish its free fall. Careful analysis of Azerbaijani's economic
    indicators will reveal a shrinking GDP and slowing economic growth.

    Specifically, in 2006 Azerbaijan's GDP stood at 26.4 percent, in 2007
    it rose to 34.5 percent and in 2008 it declined to 23.4 percent. While
    in 2009, it stood at 10.8 percent. With very little indication for the
    final end of economic recession throughout the world and the much
    anticipated economic rebound, Azerbaijan's oil sector will not be able
    to produce any more revenues than what it has generated before.

    Azerbaijan's economic growth is set to decline even further by
    bottoming out in 2012, when the production of oil in the country will
    peak and become no longer attractive to foreign investments and
    further development.

    With no serious projections of a growing demand for its oil in 2010
    and the failure of the Azerbaijani government to diversify its
    economy, the gap between those who have and those who have not in
    Azerbaijan will continue to accelerate causing mass outrage and
    discontent among the populace. As such public protests on the streets
    of Baku and throughout the Azerbaijan are more than likely to increase
    in their frequency and intensity.

    Second of all, the massive corruption in the country is eroding the
    public trust into its public institutions of power. According to a
    2009 Transparency International report, 46 percent of respondents in
    Azerbaijan have reported to having bribed various authorities as part
    of their daily affairs. In comparison only 43 percent did so in
    Armenia, 2 percent in Georgia and 31 percent in Russia. Furthermore,
    only 14 percent of Azerbaijani respondents have assessed the actions
    of their government in fighting corruption as effective in comparison
    to 38 percent in Armenia, 57 percent in Georgia and 22 percent in
    Russia.

    Such growing public distrust of their authorities opens room for
    emergence of a parallel regime in the likeness of the Taliban that is
    slowly shimmering in the south of Azerbaijan. In the coming years a
    number of religious leaders advocating their own form of pure Islam
    and social justice will emerge that countries like Iran or Saudi
    Arabia will be very eager to influence and bring to power. In order to
    consolidate his base among the common populace and save their
    allegiance from shifting over to another center of traditional
    authority, the Islam, Mr. Aliyev's leadership is tirelessly portraying
    Armenia as the outside threat to the Azerbaijani state and its people.

    Conclusion

    The eagerness of Azerbaijan's leadership to resolve this issue by
    means of military force does nothing else but to undermine the
    stability in the region and further show the unconstructive approach
    taken by the Azerbaijani authorities toward international efforts to
    resolve this conflict through peaceful means.

    Furthermore, the recent remarks by various Azerbaijani government
    officials in the media about reclaiming the province of Zangezur from
    Armenia proper indicates that they have chosen the route of escalation
    that, if implemented, will not only harm the countries which are
    directly involved in this conflict, but also jeopardize the
    international security and internal stability of all the neighboring
    states as well.

    It is more than apparent that any efforts to resolve this conflict by
    forcing Artsakh to remain as part of Azerbaijan or pressure Armenia to
    make unilateral concessions on this matter are more than futile ' they
    are ill conceived, unrealistic and extremely dangerous. Such
    irresponsible actions will put in jeopardy not only the security of
    every person in the region but also undermine the greater security
    architecture of the Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia.

    Azerbaijan must be made to understand that retaking Artsakh by force
    is not an option. Moreover, contemplating to put their hands on any
    portion of Armenia proper will spell the end of the Azerbaijani state
    as it stands right now.

    Grigor Hakobyan is a special contributor to Yerevan Report. He is an
    independent political analyst residing in Los Angeles and the founder
    of Caucasus Watch Public Research Initiative. He is a freelance writer
    for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of John Hopkins University. He
    has interned at the US House of Representatives where he engaged in
    research of ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Russia, the Caucasus and
    Central Asia. He also interned at the International Center for
    Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies where he
    researched international terrorism networks operating in the Caucasus
    and Central Asia and prepared congressional briefings for the Director
    of ICTS on WMDs. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Arizona
    State University.
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