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ARMENIA TELLS DIASPORA: WE DIDN'T SELL THE COUNTRY
Today's Zaman
Feb 11 2010
Turkey
Aside from the Turkish and Armenian public, the Armenian diaspora and
Azerbaijan have objected to the protocols signed between Armenia and
Turkey on Oct. 20.
The rapprochement process between Turkey and Armenia, which started
with Switzerland's mediation in 2007, entered the public agenda
with President Abdullah Gul's "soccer diplomacy" and finally became
official with the signing of protocols, is facing a serious crisis
following the Armenian Constitutional Court's "justified" decision.
Aside from the Turkish and Armenian public, the Armenian diaspora
and Azerbaijan have objected to the protocols signed between the
countries in the process that began on April 23 and concluded with
the signing of the protocols on Oct. 20. The Armenian diaspora's
attitude in particular put Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan in a
difficult position during his diaspora tour. The reaction against
Sarksyan inside the country was much weaker than the reaction shown
by the diaspora. While everyone thought Turkey's Nagorno-Karabakh
condition would be the cause of deadlock in the process, Armenia
turned out to be the side that blocked the process.
Following the justified decision the Armenian Constitutional
Court announced on Jan. 12, 2010, it became clear that the Yerevan
administration was disinclined for real peace in the region and
attempted to make a move and launch an operation against Turkey
by way of the court. In an interesting "political" decision, the
Armenian Constitutional Court determined that, in the final analysis,
the protocols were compatible with the constitution; however, it
issued a reasoned decision stating that the implementation of some
items could not conflict with the Armenian Constitution and the 1991
Armenian Declaration of Independence.
With this decision, which cannot be appealed or revised by government
decree, the Armenian Constitutional Court basically rewrote the
protocols that were signed by Turkey and Armenia, with the US,
Russia, France, the EU and Switzerland as witnesses during the signing
ceremony. The reasoned decision not only abolished everything Turkey
achieved in the protocols but also formalized some provisions against
Turkey which the Armenian government did not have the courage to
openly introduce.
First of all, Armenia turned its rejection of Turkey's Nagorno-Karabakh
condition to open borders into a constitutional court decision. Second,
by noting that "genocide" is undisputable for Armenians, the court
determined that the joint history commission mentioned in the
"Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" and the
"Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations" is against the
Armenian Constitution and that a commission can therefore not be set
up. Moreover, with this decision the court underlined that it will
continue accusing Turkey of "genocide," which is referred to in the
Armenian Declaration of Independence. Third, by stating that the "March
16, 1921 Treaty of Moscow and the Oct. 13, 1921 Treaty of Kars is
invalid," it abolishes Turkey's gains in these protocols as well. The
decision also disregards agreements that affirm Turkey's right as a
guarantor of Nakhchivan's status and Azerbaijan's sovereignty over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Lastly, it stipulates that the fifth item in the
protocols about Turkey's eastern Anatolian region (and partially
southeast Anatolia) cannot contradict provisions of the preamble to
the Armenian Constitution and the requirements of paragraph 11 of
its Declaration of Independence.
With this decision, the Armenian Constitutional Court is expressing
that it does not recognize Turkey's borders and is demanding land
from Turkey. In the wake of this Armenian move, Ankara immediately
showed its discontent and the Foreign Ministry made an announcement
stating that "the decision in question has preconditions and
restrictive provisions which are contrary to the letter and spirit
of the protocols." Turkey launched initiatives demanding assurances
from the Armenian government and the international community that the
Armenian Constitutional Court's ruling is invalid. That said, it is
clear that the court's ruling that the protocols are "compatible with
the constitution" and its efforts to make the same demands and classic
accusations against Turkey by virtually rewriting the protocols in
its reasoned decision are Yerevan's attempts to make another move
over Turkey.
Why and how did Armenia, which is in an economically difficult position
in the region, which has suffered a major population decline (currently
at 1.8 million people) and which faces a power balance that is working
in favor of its biggest rival, Azerbaijan, enter this path?
What does Armenia seek to achieve with this move? Until now, the
lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was always shown
as the biggest obstacle to the approval of the protocols. Turkey's
Nagorno-Karabakh precondition and the global pressure over Armenia to
fulfill the condition placed Armenia in a tight spot. But with this
move Armenia made via the constitutional court, the Nagorno-Karabakh
precondition was instantly placed at the bottom of the agenda.
Furthermore, Armenia knows very well that Turkey is the first side that
will be blamed if any problem arises during the process of normalizing
relations and of opening Turkish-Armenian borders. As you will recall,
the day the protocols were signed, on Oct. 10, Armenia changed its
mind about a part of the text that was agreed upon by both sides
in advance and a small-scale crisis erupted. Nevertheless, Armenia
continued to chase after small plans, to put Turkey in a difficult
position on the international arena and to push for the US Congress to
approve accusations of genocide committed by Turkey despite Turkey's
peaceful efforts. Meanwhile, Yerevan is sending the message to the
diaspora that it did not "sell the Armenian case" while the Sarksyan
administration tries to protect itself from troublesome allegations.
Lastly, we need to focus on the increasing initiatives Turkey has
launched on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. During his visit to the US
and Russia, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked both President
Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev to put pressure on Armenia.
In the aftermath of these efforts, Russia, which holds the "key to
Nagorno-Karabakh," made a noticeable increase in the level of its
efforts. Russia and Armenia are now trying to construct a "road map"
with a general framework to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem during
this period. But even if a road map to be signed between Armenia and
Azerbaijan does not solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in the short
term, it will be an effective way for the international community
to put pressure on Turkey to open its borders. It is for this reason
that plans being made about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue today are more
to ensure that Turkey opens its borders and not so much to find a
lasting solution.
*Sinan Ogan is the president of the Turkish Center for International
and Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM).
Today's Zaman
Feb 11 2010
Turkey
Aside from the Turkish and Armenian public, the Armenian diaspora and
Azerbaijan have objected to the protocols signed between Armenia and
Turkey on Oct. 20.
The rapprochement process between Turkey and Armenia, which started
with Switzerland's mediation in 2007, entered the public agenda
with President Abdullah Gul's "soccer diplomacy" and finally became
official with the signing of protocols, is facing a serious crisis
following the Armenian Constitutional Court's "justified" decision.
Aside from the Turkish and Armenian public, the Armenian diaspora
and Azerbaijan have objected to the protocols signed between the
countries in the process that began on April 23 and concluded with
the signing of the protocols on Oct. 20. The Armenian diaspora's
attitude in particular put Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan in a
difficult position during his diaspora tour. The reaction against
Sarksyan inside the country was much weaker than the reaction shown
by the diaspora. While everyone thought Turkey's Nagorno-Karabakh
condition would be the cause of deadlock in the process, Armenia
turned out to be the side that blocked the process.
Following the justified decision the Armenian Constitutional
Court announced on Jan. 12, 2010, it became clear that the Yerevan
administration was disinclined for real peace in the region and
attempted to make a move and launch an operation against Turkey
by way of the court. In an interesting "political" decision, the
Armenian Constitutional Court determined that, in the final analysis,
the protocols were compatible with the constitution; however, it
issued a reasoned decision stating that the implementation of some
items could not conflict with the Armenian Constitution and the 1991
Armenian Declaration of Independence.
With this decision, which cannot be appealed or revised by government
decree, the Armenian Constitutional Court basically rewrote the
protocols that were signed by Turkey and Armenia, with the US,
Russia, France, the EU and Switzerland as witnesses during the signing
ceremony. The reasoned decision not only abolished everything Turkey
achieved in the protocols but also formalized some provisions against
Turkey which the Armenian government did not have the courage to
openly introduce.
First of all, Armenia turned its rejection of Turkey's Nagorno-Karabakh
condition to open borders into a constitutional court decision. Second,
by noting that "genocide" is undisputable for Armenians, the court
determined that the joint history commission mentioned in the
"Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" and the
"Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations" is against the
Armenian Constitution and that a commission can therefore not be set
up. Moreover, with this decision the court underlined that it will
continue accusing Turkey of "genocide," which is referred to in the
Armenian Declaration of Independence. Third, by stating that the "March
16, 1921 Treaty of Moscow and the Oct. 13, 1921 Treaty of Kars is
invalid," it abolishes Turkey's gains in these protocols as well. The
decision also disregards agreements that affirm Turkey's right as a
guarantor of Nakhchivan's status and Azerbaijan's sovereignty over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Lastly, it stipulates that the fifth item in the
protocols about Turkey's eastern Anatolian region (and partially
southeast Anatolia) cannot contradict provisions of the preamble to
the Armenian Constitution and the requirements of paragraph 11 of
its Declaration of Independence.
With this decision, the Armenian Constitutional Court is expressing
that it does not recognize Turkey's borders and is demanding land
from Turkey. In the wake of this Armenian move, Ankara immediately
showed its discontent and the Foreign Ministry made an announcement
stating that "the decision in question has preconditions and
restrictive provisions which are contrary to the letter and spirit
of the protocols." Turkey launched initiatives demanding assurances
from the Armenian government and the international community that the
Armenian Constitutional Court's ruling is invalid. That said, it is
clear that the court's ruling that the protocols are "compatible with
the constitution" and its efforts to make the same demands and classic
accusations against Turkey by virtually rewriting the protocols in
its reasoned decision are Yerevan's attempts to make another move
over Turkey.
Why and how did Armenia, which is in an economically difficult position
in the region, which has suffered a major population decline (currently
at 1.8 million people) and which faces a power balance that is working
in favor of its biggest rival, Azerbaijan, enter this path?
What does Armenia seek to achieve with this move? Until now, the
lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was always shown
as the biggest obstacle to the approval of the protocols. Turkey's
Nagorno-Karabakh precondition and the global pressure over Armenia to
fulfill the condition placed Armenia in a tight spot. But with this
move Armenia made via the constitutional court, the Nagorno-Karabakh
precondition was instantly placed at the bottom of the agenda.
Furthermore, Armenia knows very well that Turkey is the first side that
will be blamed if any problem arises during the process of normalizing
relations and of opening Turkish-Armenian borders. As you will recall,
the day the protocols were signed, on Oct. 10, Armenia changed its
mind about a part of the text that was agreed upon by both sides
in advance and a small-scale crisis erupted. Nevertheless, Armenia
continued to chase after small plans, to put Turkey in a difficult
position on the international arena and to push for the US Congress to
approve accusations of genocide committed by Turkey despite Turkey's
peaceful efforts. Meanwhile, Yerevan is sending the message to the
diaspora that it did not "sell the Armenian case" while the Sarksyan
administration tries to protect itself from troublesome allegations.
Lastly, we need to focus on the increasing initiatives Turkey has
launched on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. During his visit to the US
and Russia, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked both President
Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev to put pressure on Armenia.
In the aftermath of these efforts, Russia, which holds the "key to
Nagorno-Karabakh," made a noticeable increase in the level of its
efforts. Russia and Armenia are now trying to construct a "road map"
with a general framework to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem during
this period. But even if a road map to be signed between Armenia and
Azerbaijan does not solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in the short
term, it will be an effective way for the international community
to put pressure on Turkey to open its borders. It is for this reason
that plans being made about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue today are more
to ensure that Turkey opens its borders and not so much to find a
lasting solution.
*Sinan Ogan is the president of the Turkish Center for International
and Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM).