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BAKU PROMOTES STABILITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Gulshan Pashayeva
Jamestown Foundation
Feb 24 2010
Armenian President Serzh Sargsian (L) with his Azerbaijani counterpart
Ilham Aliyev in Sochi on January 25, 2010 It appears that both
processes surrounding the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh
and the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement intensified almost immediately
after the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, which established a new
geopolitical environment, with implications not only for Georgia,
but also for the South Caucasus and beyond. Moscow's increased
interest in playing a more active broker's role in this negotiation
process, was shown in the Moscow Declaration signed in November 2008
by Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, adding fresh impetus
to efforts aimed at resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over
Karabakh. This marked the second document signed since May 1994, when
the ceasefire agreement was also reached due to Russian mediation
efforts.
Two years ago, an Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, mediated in
secret by Switzerland, also intensified after the Russian invasion
of Georgia. The effort began with "soccer diplomacy" in September
2008 and ended with the protocols signed by Armenia and Turkey on
October 10, 2009, in Zurich. Indeed, 2009 marked an intensification
of these negotiation processes. However, concrete results have only
been achieved in the latter case, after the October 2009 signing
of two protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations and
developing bilateral relations between Yerevan and Ankara, still
awaiting ratification by the parliaments of both countries. On the
other hand, despite the six meetings held in 2009, the presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan only reached agreement on the wording of
the preamble of the updated version of the 2007 Madrid Principles in
Sochi on January 25, 2010 (Radio Free Europe, January 26).
Nonetheless, in a broader sense the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is
one of the consequences of the ruling Turkish Justice and Development
Party's (AKP) foreign policy initiative "zero problems with neighbors,"
introduced by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Within this
new foreign policy framework, Ankara has already achieved positive
results in developing bilateral relations with various neighboring
countries such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece and Russia.
Relations between Armenia and Turkey have their own peculiarities due
to historical and contemporary issues. These peculiarities relate to
continued contradictions with regard to the events of 1915, Armenia's
territorial claims to Turkish provinces in Eastern Anatolia and its
rigid stance and unwillingness to withdraw its armed forces from the
occupied Azerbaijani districts located outside the former autonomous
Karabakh region. However, Turkish-Armenian relations were especially
complicated after the recent decision by the Armenian constitutional
court to approve the Turkish-Armenian protocols. The references
made by the Armenian court to the preamble to the constitution and
Article 11 of the Declaration of Independence by Armenia created
serious controversies on a number of issues, considered by the Turkish
foreign ministry as setting preconditions and restrictive provisions
on the protocols before their ratification (Journal of Turkish Weekly,
January, 28).
Baku has always been grateful for the solidarity shown by Turkey
since 1993, when it closed its borders with Armenia in response to
the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar, one of the adjacent Azerbaijani
districts located outside Karabakh, as well as for Ankara's
insistence on the return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan
as a precondition for opening the border and establishing diplomatic
relations with Armenia. The Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu in a
keynote lecture on the "converging interests of Turkey and the UK
in an enlarged EU and beyond," at King's College, London, during
his latest working visit to Britain, emphasized that the only way
to reach a sustainable peace in the region is through the liberation
of the occupied Azerbaijani territories. He also added that without
a substantial breakthrough in the resolution of the Karabakh issue,
it will be extremely difficult to persuade members of parliament to
ratify the protocols (Davutoglu's lecture at King's College London,
January 13, transcript provided by the Embassy of Republic of
Azerbaijan to the UK).
Both the Turkish public and the main opposition parties demonstrate
their full support on this issue and regard the conflict over Karabakh
and Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as closely connected. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drawn attention to this linkage of
both processes in his latest official visits to Washington and Moscow.
He informed journalists during his return from Moscow, according to the
Hurriyet newspaper that the process of normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations and the resolution of Karabakh are inter-linked. He also
added that these processes may be going on separately, but they are
interconnected behind the scenes. On the other hand, arguing that
neither protocol makes any reference to the Karabakh settlement,
Armenia, as well as the US, the EU and Russia consider the Karabakh
issue and Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as two separate processes.
However, as Azerbaijan's major strategic ally, Turkey's stance on
this issue is capable of resisting the policy of global and regional
powers and might prove helpful in applying strong pressure on Armenia
to withdraw from some occupied territories. Similarly, due to the
fact that Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is one of the key issues on
the current international agenda it also draws greater attention to
the conflict over Karabakh.
Noting that Ankara cannot separate the Karabakh issue from its
relations with Yerevan and risk its strategic interests with Baku,
retired Ambassador James Holmes, the President of the American-Turkish
Council (ATC), said on February 5 that "new steps were needed in these
two issues, rather than expecting Turkey to assess them separately"
(www.turkishny.com). In order to prevent any further exaggeration
of US-Turkey relations, especially taking into account an intention
announced by Howard L. Berman, the Chairman of the US House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs to call a committee vote
on the non-binding Armenian Genocide Resolution on March 4 (Today's
Zaman, February 19), the Obama Administration could play a more
active role as a catalyst to make necessary changes to this complex
situation. Furthermore, without the genuine interest and serious
responsibility shown by mediators and the international community,
as well as some mutual positive steps to be taken not only towards
progress on Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, but also on Karabakh,
it will be impossible to secure long lasting peace, sustainable
development, and prosperity to the wider South Caucasus region. Thus,
the Azerbaijani-Armenian and the Turkish-Armenian borders might one
day be re-opened.
Gulshan Pashayeva
Jamestown Foundation
Feb 24 2010
Armenian President Serzh Sargsian (L) with his Azerbaijani counterpart
Ilham Aliyev in Sochi on January 25, 2010 It appears that both
processes surrounding the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh
and the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement intensified almost immediately
after the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, which established a new
geopolitical environment, with implications not only for Georgia,
but also for the South Caucasus and beyond. Moscow's increased
interest in playing a more active broker's role in this negotiation
process, was shown in the Moscow Declaration signed in November 2008
by Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, adding fresh impetus
to efforts aimed at resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over
Karabakh. This marked the second document signed since May 1994, when
the ceasefire agreement was also reached due to Russian mediation
efforts.
Two years ago, an Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, mediated in
secret by Switzerland, also intensified after the Russian invasion
of Georgia. The effort began with "soccer diplomacy" in September
2008 and ended with the protocols signed by Armenia and Turkey on
October 10, 2009, in Zurich. Indeed, 2009 marked an intensification
of these negotiation processes. However, concrete results have only
been achieved in the latter case, after the October 2009 signing
of two protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations and
developing bilateral relations between Yerevan and Ankara, still
awaiting ratification by the parliaments of both countries. On the
other hand, despite the six meetings held in 2009, the presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan only reached agreement on the wording of
the preamble of the updated version of the 2007 Madrid Principles in
Sochi on January 25, 2010 (Radio Free Europe, January 26).
Nonetheless, in a broader sense the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is
one of the consequences of the ruling Turkish Justice and Development
Party's (AKP) foreign policy initiative "zero problems with neighbors,"
introduced by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Within this
new foreign policy framework, Ankara has already achieved positive
results in developing bilateral relations with various neighboring
countries such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece and Russia.
Relations between Armenia and Turkey have their own peculiarities due
to historical and contemporary issues. These peculiarities relate to
continued contradictions with regard to the events of 1915, Armenia's
territorial claims to Turkish provinces in Eastern Anatolia and its
rigid stance and unwillingness to withdraw its armed forces from the
occupied Azerbaijani districts located outside the former autonomous
Karabakh region. However, Turkish-Armenian relations were especially
complicated after the recent decision by the Armenian constitutional
court to approve the Turkish-Armenian protocols. The references
made by the Armenian court to the preamble to the constitution and
Article 11 of the Declaration of Independence by Armenia created
serious controversies on a number of issues, considered by the Turkish
foreign ministry as setting preconditions and restrictive provisions
on the protocols before their ratification (Journal of Turkish Weekly,
January, 28).
Baku has always been grateful for the solidarity shown by Turkey
since 1993, when it closed its borders with Armenia in response to
the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar, one of the adjacent Azerbaijani
districts located outside Karabakh, as well as for Ankara's
insistence on the return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan
as a precondition for opening the border and establishing diplomatic
relations with Armenia. The Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu in a
keynote lecture on the "converging interests of Turkey and the UK
in an enlarged EU and beyond," at King's College, London, during
his latest working visit to Britain, emphasized that the only way
to reach a sustainable peace in the region is through the liberation
of the occupied Azerbaijani territories. He also added that without
a substantial breakthrough in the resolution of the Karabakh issue,
it will be extremely difficult to persuade members of parliament to
ratify the protocols (Davutoglu's lecture at King's College London,
January 13, transcript provided by the Embassy of Republic of
Azerbaijan to the UK).
Both the Turkish public and the main opposition parties demonstrate
their full support on this issue and regard the conflict over Karabakh
and Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as closely connected. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drawn attention to this linkage of
both processes in his latest official visits to Washington and Moscow.
He informed journalists during his return from Moscow, according to the
Hurriyet newspaper that the process of normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations and the resolution of Karabakh are inter-linked. He also
added that these processes may be going on separately, but they are
interconnected behind the scenes. On the other hand, arguing that
neither protocol makes any reference to the Karabakh settlement,
Armenia, as well as the US, the EU and Russia consider the Karabakh
issue and Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as two separate processes.
However, as Azerbaijan's major strategic ally, Turkey's stance on
this issue is capable of resisting the policy of global and regional
powers and might prove helpful in applying strong pressure on Armenia
to withdraw from some occupied territories. Similarly, due to the
fact that Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is one of the key issues on
the current international agenda it also draws greater attention to
the conflict over Karabakh.
Noting that Ankara cannot separate the Karabakh issue from its
relations with Yerevan and risk its strategic interests with Baku,
retired Ambassador James Holmes, the President of the American-Turkish
Council (ATC), said on February 5 that "new steps were needed in these
two issues, rather than expecting Turkey to assess them separately"
(www.turkishny.com). In order to prevent any further exaggeration
of US-Turkey relations, especially taking into account an intention
announced by Howard L. Berman, the Chairman of the US House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs to call a committee vote
on the non-binding Armenian Genocide Resolution on March 4 (Today's
Zaman, February 19), the Obama Administration could play a more
active role as a catalyst to make necessary changes to this complex
situation. Furthermore, without the genuine interest and serious
responsibility shown by mediators and the international community,
as well as some mutual positive steps to be taken not only towards
progress on Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, but also on Karabakh,
it will be impossible to secure long lasting peace, sustainable
development, and prosperity to the wider South Caucasus region. Thus,
the Azerbaijani-Armenian and the Turkish-Armenian borders might one
day be re-opened.