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A RESET IN THE CAUCASUS
Vartan Oskanian
Project Syndicate
2010-03-08
YEREVAN - Will Turkey's current turmoil between Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and the country's powerful army complicate and delay
the country's boldest initiatives in years - the moves to address
decades-old tensions with both Armenians and Kurds?
Restructuring the role of Turkey's army is vital, but if Turkey cannot
follow through with the Armenian and Kurdish openings, the country's
own domestic situation, its relations with the two peoples, as well
as tensions in the Caucasus, will undoubtedly worsen. Of the several
flashpoints in the region, including that between Georgia and Russia
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the tension between Armenians and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is among the most challenging.
As to Georgia and Russia, the disproportionate size, weight, and power
on one side are enough to deter any return to violence. Moreover,
there are no entangling alliances complicating the matter. Georgia
is not a NATO member, and the United States, it is clear, will not
go to war with Russia over Georgia.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle is more precarious. It is no longer
a two-way tug-of-war between two small post-Soviet republics, but part
of an Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle. This triangle is the direct
consequence of the process of normalization between Armenia and Turkey,
which began when both countries' presidents met at a football game.
That process now hinges on protocols for establishing diplomatic
relations that have been signed by both governments but unratified
by either parliament. Completing the process depends directly and
indirectly on how Armenians and Azerbaijan work to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
This snarled three-way dispute, if not carefully untangled, holds
many dangers. Turkey, which for nearly two decades has proclaimed
its support for Azerbaijan, publicly conditioned rapprochement with
Armenia on Armenian concessions to Azerbaijan.
Turkey, a NATO member, is thus a party to this conflict now, and any
military flare-up between Armenians and Azerbaijanis might draw it
in - possibly triggering Russia's involvement, either through its
bilateral commitments to Armenia, or through the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, of which Armenia and Russia are members.
Given energy-security concerns, any Azerbaijani conflict would also
seriously affect Europe. Iran, too would be affected, since it is a
frontline state with interests in the region.
Armenians and Azerbaijanis have not clashed militarily for more than
a decade and a half. But this is only because there has been the
perception of a military balance and a hope that ongoing negotiations
would succeed.
Today, both factors have changed. The perception of military parity
has altered. With Azerbaijan having spent extravagantly on armaments
in recent years it may now have convinced itself that it now holds
the upper hand. At the same time, there is less hope in negotiations,
which appear to be stalled, largely because they have been linked to
the Armenia-Turkey process, which also seems to be in limbo.
The diplomatic protocols awaiting ratification by the two countries'
parliaments have fallen victim to miscalculations on both sides. The
Armenians came to believe that Turkey would find a way to reconcile
Azerbaijan's interests with the Turkish opening to Armenia, and would
open the border with Armenia regardless of progress on resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The problem is that Turkey initially closed
the border precisely because of Nagorno-Karabakh, rather than any
bilateral issue.
Turkey believed that by signing protocols with Armenia and clearly
indicating its readiness to open the border, the Armenians could
somehow be cajoled or pressured into resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem more quickly or cede territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.
But this has always been unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive
settlement that addresses Armenians' greatest fear - security -
and fulfils their basic political requirement, namely a definition
of Nagorno-Karabakh's status.
Both sides seem to be somewhat surprised by the other's expectations.
Indeed, there is a growing fear that a settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is more distant now, because Turkey's public
backing has raised Azerbaijan's expectations, while some Armenians fear
collusion between neighbors out to railroad them into an unsustainable
agreement.
This is Turkey's moment of truth. The Armenia-Turkey diplomatic process
has stalled, and the Turkish government's effort at reconciliation
with the country's large Kurdish minority has soured.
Just as a loss of confidence among Kurds and Turks in eastern Turkey
will rock the shaky stability that they have recently enjoyed, a loss
of hope for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute may end the
tentative military calm between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
But the situation is not irretrievable. Endless public sparring between
Turkish and Armenian officials through the media is not helping. It
is time for both countries' leaders to speak privately and directly
with each other, with an understanding of the instability that could
result from any failure to complete the diplomatic opening that the
two sides initiated.
So, even as Turkey tries to deal with the consequences of its history
at home, and redefine the army's role in society, it must reset its
tortured relationship with Armenia. The recent resolution passed by
the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress, which called
upon President Obama to ensure that US foreign policy reflects an
"appropriate understanding and sensitivity" concerning the Armenian
Genocide, should serve as a wake-up call to both Turkish and Armenian
governments that Armenians are not about to question the historical
veracity of the genocide. After all, if France and Germany can face
their tortured history, Turkey should be able to do so as well.
The two sides must step back, look at the situation dispassionately,
acknowledge the deficiencies in the protocols, address the other
side's minimum requirements, and bear in mind that a single document
will not heal all wounds or wipe out all fears.
The international community must support this effort. The problem
should not be dismissed as a mere settling of old scores. What is at
stake is the future of a region critical to Eurasia's peace.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Vartan Oskanian
Project Syndicate
2010-03-08
YEREVAN - Will Turkey's current turmoil between Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and the country's powerful army complicate and delay
the country's boldest initiatives in years - the moves to address
decades-old tensions with both Armenians and Kurds?
Restructuring the role of Turkey's army is vital, but if Turkey cannot
follow through with the Armenian and Kurdish openings, the country's
own domestic situation, its relations with the two peoples, as well
as tensions in the Caucasus, will undoubtedly worsen. Of the several
flashpoints in the region, including that between Georgia and Russia
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the tension between Armenians and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is among the most challenging.
As to Georgia and Russia, the disproportionate size, weight, and power
on one side are enough to deter any return to violence. Moreover,
there are no entangling alliances complicating the matter. Georgia
is not a NATO member, and the United States, it is clear, will not
go to war with Russia over Georgia.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle is more precarious. It is no longer
a two-way tug-of-war between two small post-Soviet republics, but part
of an Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle. This triangle is the direct
consequence of the process of normalization between Armenia and Turkey,
which began when both countries' presidents met at a football game.
That process now hinges on protocols for establishing diplomatic
relations that have been signed by both governments but unratified
by either parliament. Completing the process depends directly and
indirectly on how Armenians and Azerbaijan work to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
This snarled three-way dispute, if not carefully untangled, holds
many dangers. Turkey, which for nearly two decades has proclaimed
its support for Azerbaijan, publicly conditioned rapprochement with
Armenia on Armenian concessions to Azerbaijan.
Turkey, a NATO member, is thus a party to this conflict now, and any
military flare-up between Armenians and Azerbaijanis might draw it
in - possibly triggering Russia's involvement, either through its
bilateral commitments to Armenia, or through the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, of which Armenia and Russia are members.
Given energy-security concerns, any Azerbaijani conflict would also
seriously affect Europe. Iran, too would be affected, since it is a
frontline state with interests in the region.
Armenians and Azerbaijanis have not clashed militarily for more than
a decade and a half. But this is only because there has been the
perception of a military balance and a hope that ongoing negotiations
would succeed.
Today, both factors have changed. The perception of military parity
has altered. With Azerbaijan having spent extravagantly on armaments
in recent years it may now have convinced itself that it now holds
the upper hand. At the same time, there is less hope in negotiations,
which appear to be stalled, largely because they have been linked to
the Armenia-Turkey process, which also seems to be in limbo.
The diplomatic protocols awaiting ratification by the two countries'
parliaments have fallen victim to miscalculations on both sides. The
Armenians came to believe that Turkey would find a way to reconcile
Azerbaijan's interests with the Turkish opening to Armenia, and would
open the border with Armenia regardless of progress on resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The problem is that Turkey initially closed
the border precisely because of Nagorno-Karabakh, rather than any
bilateral issue.
Turkey believed that by signing protocols with Armenia and clearly
indicating its readiness to open the border, the Armenians could
somehow be cajoled or pressured into resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem more quickly or cede territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.
But this has always been unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive
settlement that addresses Armenians' greatest fear - security -
and fulfils their basic political requirement, namely a definition
of Nagorno-Karabakh's status.
Both sides seem to be somewhat surprised by the other's expectations.
Indeed, there is a growing fear that a settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is more distant now, because Turkey's public
backing has raised Azerbaijan's expectations, while some Armenians fear
collusion between neighbors out to railroad them into an unsustainable
agreement.
This is Turkey's moment of truth. The Armenia-Turkey diplomatic process
has stalled, and the Turkish government's effort at reconciliation
with the country's large Kurdish minority has soured.
Just as a loss of confidence among Kurds and Turks in eastern Turkey
will rock the shaky stability that they have recently enjoyed, a loss
of hope for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute may end the
tentative military calm between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
But the situation is not irretrievable. Endless public sparring between
Turkish and Armenian officials through the media is not helping. It
is time for both countries' leaders to speak privately and directly
with each other, with an understanding of the instability that could
result from any failure to complete the diplomatic opening that the
two sides initiated.
So, even as Turkey tries to deal with the consequences of its history
at home, and redefine the army's role in society, it must reset its
tortured relationship with Armenia. The recent resolution passed by
the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress, which called
upon President Obama to ensure that US foreign policy reflects an
"appropriate understanding and sensitivity" concerning the Armenian
Genocide, should serve as a wake-up call to both Turkish and Armenian
governments that Armenians are not about to question the historical
veracity of the genocide. After all, if France and Germany can face
their tortured history, Turkey should be able to do so as well.
The two sides must step back, look at the situation dispassionately,
acknowledge the deficiencies in the protocols, address the other
side's minimum requirements, and bear in mind that a single document
will not heal all wounds or wipe out all fears.
The international community must support this effort. The problem
should not be dismissed as a mere settling of old scores. What is at
stake is the future of a region critical to Eurasia's peace.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress