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A NORMALIZED QUARREL
By Sergey Markedonov
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1272477702
April 29 2010
Armenian-Turkish Normalization Process Appears to Have Reached
an Impasse, but This Difficulty Is Natural For the Next Stage of
Negotiations
On the eve of the 95th anniversary of the genocide of Armenians by
the Ottoman Empire, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan delivered a
momentous address to his nation. Complaining of Turkish foot-dragging
and insistence on preconditions, he announced the suspension of
two protocols establishing diplomatic ties and developing bilateral
relations signed by Armenia and Turkey in October last year. "We have
stated that, if Turkey ratified the Protocols, as agreed, without
preconditions and in a reasonable timeframe, failure by the Armenian
Parliament to ratify them would be precluded," said Sargsyan. "Now,
the time has come to gauge the notion of a 'reasonable timeframe'
and whether this conduct is 'without preconditions.'"
The process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations has become one
the biggest political sensations of recent years. At first Ankara and
Yerevan moved rapidly from the level of "football diplomacy" to the
language of legal obligation. But, the signing of the two protocols
in Zurich in October turned out to be the peak of that success,
after which relations between the two counties began to worsen. The
two legally binding documents are stuck at the stage of ratification,
which turned out not to be as simple as experts almost unanimously
said it would be in October last year. The Turkish Parliament began to
consider the two protocols almost immediately after they were signed.
By October 21, 2009 deputies had already had the opportunity to
express their attitudes to these historically significant documents.
They didn't elicit any ovation or enthusiasm; on the contrary, the
opposition walked out of the debating chamber in protest, and although
many representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party showed
great restraint, it gave the impression that swift ratification was
not among their priorities.
The Turkish elite used precisely that fact to justify a pause in the
process of normalizing relations between the two neighbors. Naturally,
the "Karabakh factor" was evident in Ankara's position. This topic,
which Turkey ignored during the signing of the two protocols, has seen
something of a second birth since the Zurich ceremony. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated the necessity of combining
the two peace processes in meetings with U.S. President Barack Obama
(in December 2009) and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (in
January this year).
In Armenia, the beginnings of the "stagnation" phase have also
been accompanied by fierce arguments and mass demonstrations of
public discontent. Be that as it may, on January 12, 2010 the
Constitutional court (Armenia's highest court) recognized that the
two Armenian-Turkish protocols are in accordance with the fundamental
law of the country. It would seem that this is a long-awaited step
in establishing Armenian-Turkish peace in the mass consciousness of
Armenian citizens. And indeed, it was welcomed by the Armenian public.
However, the decision has elicited a tough reaction from Turkey. The
fact of the matter is that Armenian law enshrines the necessity of
gaining international recognition for the Armenian genocide. Article
11 of the Declaration of Armenian Independence, which was adopted
on August 23, 1990 and is considered the fundamental basis for the
Constitution, talks about supporting the recognition of the Armenian
genocide "in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."
"Western Armenia" in Armenian historical and political thinking
is the territory of the Turkish Republic bordering the present day
Republic of Armenia (which they call Eastern Armenia). In this way,
the protocols signed by Ankara and Yerevan correspond to the demands
not only of recognition of the genocide, but also specifically the
recognition of "Western Armenia," - i.e. the territorial problem.
However, the Armenian-Turkish peace process has never been a problem
exclusively related to domestic politics between two neighboring
countries. Equally, this process cannot be resolved simply in the
format of mutual relations between Yerevan and Ankara. It is part of
the grand Caucasus game, in which the "great powers" have their own
considerations. And both the United States and Russia have their own
reasons for taking part in the Armenian-Turkish "reset."
In contrast to their positions on Georgia, Washington and Moscow are
not polar opposites on this matter. The United States and Russia both
have their reasons for cooperating with Turkey. If the United States
has the highest level of cooperation with Turkey in the sphere of
security, then Russia has serious interests in the development of joint
energy projects ("South Stream" is a good example). Because of this,
Armenia is an important partner for Washington and Moscow, and in both
cases the position of the Armenian lobby has to be taken into account.
In practical terms, this means looking for an appropriate solution
from all the available options. Consequently, the more that American
and Russian politicians speak about the impossibility of integrating
the Armenian-Turkish peace plan and the settlement of the "frozen
conflict" between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
more these two processes impact on one another. In other words,
each issue exacerbates the existing problems of the other.
In this sense, Serzh Sargsyan's statement shouldn't be seen as
politically sensational. The Armenian-Turkish expert Rubin Melkonyan
is right to note that the president has only expressed out loud the
existent decline in the process of normalization. And while we may
note a certain decline in the complex dynamic of Armenian-Turkish
normalization, it would be wrong to speak of a total suspension of the
entire process. The Armenian leader stopped the ratification of the
protocols, but he did not abandon the peace process all together;
the two legal documents have not been annulled; and the head of
Armenia is ready to continue dialogue.
In the end, peace processes practically never develop in a linear
fashion. More than a year is needed for the "nullification" of
relations with neighbors, as expressed by Turkish President Turgut
Ozal, to work (as for example in Turkish relations with Syria, or to
a lesser extent Iran and Greece). With regard to the Cypriot conflict,
a breakthrough has not been reached, in spite of the positive dynamic
which began in the early 2000s. The recent victory in presidential
elections in the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of
Dervish Eroglu, an opponent of reunification, is evidence of this.
It is the same story with the Armenian-Turkish process. Crisis and
decline do not mean political death. The ideas of normalization and
peace with neighbors have already become a part of the domestic
discussion in both Armenia and Turkey. Today it is not Armenians
arguing with Turks. Rather the Armenians are arguing amongst
themselves, and the Turks are arguing with each other, about what
should be done to reach peace - while sustaining the least cost and
losses to themselves, of course.
In any case, mutual relations have reached another level. The delight,
camera flashing and eulogizing directed at the signatories of the
protocols is now in the past. The process of normalizing relations
has entered the stage of difficult negotiations and bargaining -
both between the "peace making" countries themselves, and beyond their
borders, between the "great powers." And remembering the basic trends
of this new stage (which began after the Zurich ceremony) is crucial
for a more adequate conception of the prospects of the peace process.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Sergey Markedonov
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1272477702
April 29 2010
Armenian-Turkish Normalization Process Appears to Have Reached
an Impasse, but This Difficulty Is Natural For the Next Stage of
Negotiations
On the eve of the 95th anniversary of the genocide of Armenians by
the Ottoman Empire, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan delivered a
momentous address to his nation. Complaining of Turkish foot-dragging
and insistence on preconditions, he announced the suspension of
two protocols establishing diplomatic ties and developing bilateral
relations signed by Armenia and Turkey in October last year. "We have
stated that, if Turkey ratified the Protocols, as agreed, without
preconditions and in a reasonable timeframe, failure by the Armenian
Parliament to ratify them would be precluded," said Sargsyan. "Now,
the time has come to gauge the notion of a 'reasonable timeframe'
and whether this conduct is 'without preconditions.'"
The process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations has become one
the biggest political sensations of recent years. At first Ankara and
Yerevan moved rapidly from the level of "football diplomacy" to the
language of legal obligation. But, the signing of the two protocols
in Zurich in October turned out to be the peak of that success,
after which relations between the two counties began to worsen. The
two legally binding documents are stuck at the stage of ratification,
which turned out not to be as simple as experts almost unanimously
said it would be in October last year. The Turkish Parliament began to
consider the two protocols almost immediately after they were signed.
By October 21, 2009 deputies had already had the opportunity to
express their attitudes to these historically significant documents.
They didn't elicit any ovation or enthusiasm; on the contrary, the
opposition walked out of the debating chamber in protest, and although
many representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party showed
great restraint, it gave the impression that swift ratification was
not among their priorities.
The Turkish elite used precisely that fact to justify a pause in the
process of normalizing relations between the two neighbors. Naturally,
the "Karabakh factor" was evident in Ankara's position. This topic,
which Turkey ignored during the signing of the two protocols, has seen
something of a second birth since the Zurich ceremony. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated the necessity of combining
the two peace processes in meetings with U.S. President Barack Obama
(in December 2009) and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (in
January this year).
In Armenia, the beginnings of the "stagnation" phase have also
been accompanied by fierce arguments and mass demonstrations of
public discontent. Be that as it may, on January 12, 2010 the
Constitutional court (Armenia's highest court) recognized that the
two Armenian-Turkish protocols are in accordance with the fundamental
law of the country. It would seem that this is a long-awaited step
in establishing Armenian-Turkish peace in the mass consciousness of
Armenian citizens. And indeed, it was welcomed by the Armenian public.
However, the decision has elicited a tough reaction from Turkey. The
fact of the matter is that Armenian law enshrines the necessity of
gaining international recognition for the Armenian genocide. Article
11 of the Declaration of Armenian Independence, which was adopted
on August 23, 1990 and is considered the fundamental basis for the
Constitution, talks about supporting the recognition of the Armenian
genocide "in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."
"Western Armenia" in Armenian historical and political thinking
is the territory of the Turkish Republic bordering the present day
Republic of Armenia (which they call Eastern Armenia). In this way,
the protocols signed by Ankara and Yerevan correspond to the demands
not only of recognition of the genocide, but also specifically the
recognition of "Western Armenia," - i.e. the territorial problem.
However, the Armenian-Turkish peace process has never been a problem
exclusively related to domestic politics between two neighboring
countries. Equally, this process cannot be resolved simply in the
format of mutual relations between Yerevan and Ankara. It is part of
the grand Caucasus game, in which the "great powers" have their own
considerations. And both the United States and Russia have their own
reasons for taking part in the Armenian-Turkish "reset."
In contrast to their positions on Georgia, Washington and Moscow are
not polar opposites on this matter. The United States and Russia both
have their reasons for cooperating with Turkey. If the United States
has the highest level of cooperation with Turkey in the sphere of
security, then Russia has serious interests in the development of joint
energy projects ("South Stream" is a good example). Because of this,
Armenia is an important partner for Washington and Moscow, and in both
cases the position of the Armenian lobby has to be taken into account.
In practical terms, this means looking for an appropriate solution
from all the available options. Consequently, the more that American
and Russian politicians speak about the impossibility of integrating
the Armenian-Turkish peace plan and the settlement of the "frozen
conflict" between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
more these two processes impact on one another. In other words,
each issue exacerbates the existing problems of the other.
In this sense, Serzh Sargsyan's statement shouldn't be seen as
politically sensational. The Armenian-Turkish expert Rubin Melkonyan
is right to note that the president has only expressed out loud the
existent decline in the process of normalization. And while we may
note a certain decline in the complex dynamic of Armenian-Turkish
normalization, it would be wrong to speak of a total suspension of the
entire process. The Armenian leader stopped the ratification of the
protocols, but he did not abandon the peace process all together;
the two legal documents have not been annulled; and the head of
Armenia is ready to continue dialogue.
In the end, peace processes practically never develop in a linear
fashion. More than a year is needed for the "nullification" of
relations with neighbors, as expressed by Turkish President Turgut
Ozal, to work (as for example in Turkish relations with Syria, or to
a lesser extent Iran and Greece). With regard to the Cypriot conflict,
a breakthrough has not been reached, in spite of the positive dynamic
which began in the early 2000s. The recent victory in presidential
elections in the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of
Dervish Eroglu, an opponent of reunification, is evidence of this.
It is the same story with the Armenian-Turkish process. Crisis and
decline do not mean political death. The ideas of normalization and
peace with neighbors have already become a part of the domestic
discussion in both Armenia and Turkey. Today it is not Armenians
arguing with Turks. Rather the Armenians are arguing amongst
themselves, and the Turks are arguing with each other, about what
should be done to reach peace - while sustaining the least cost and
losses to themselves, of course.
In any case, mutual relations have reached another level. The delight,
camera flashing and eulogizing directed at the signatories of the
protocols is now in the past. The process of normalizing relations
has entered the stage of difficult negotiations and bargaining -
both between the "peace making" countries themselves, and beyond their
borders, between the "great powers." And remembering the basic trends
of this new stage (which began after the Zurich ceremony) is crucial
for a more adequate conception of the prospects of the peace process.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress