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Obama's Policy Toward The Caucasus And U.S. Credibility

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  • Obama's Policy Toward The Caucasus And U.S. Credibility

    OBAMA'S POLICY TOWARD THE CAUCASUS AND U.S. CREDIBILITY

    Global Politician
    http://globalpolitician.com/26432-caucasus-obama
    June 1 2010

    The U.S. image in Azerbaijan has never been as bad as it is now and
    anti-American rhetoric in this predominantly Muslim country bordering
    Iran is unprecedented. President Obama's "reset" policies towards
    Russia can have certain far-reaching implications for the U.S.

    interests and credibility in new democracies of the ex-Soviet Union.

    Azerbaijan is one example where President Obama's "reset" policies
    with Russia can significantly damage U.S. interests in European Union
    energy security, NATO ISAF supply routes and democracy.

    The two conflicts are key and intrinsically linked with these issues:
    Turkey-Armenia borders and Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict. Although
    during the presidential campaign Obama mentioned self-determination
    principles in NK conflict, he did not want to take an active part in
    this conflict because Azerbaijan's prospective solution might not
    be in line with Russia's interests and could damage the spirit of
    "reset" policy. However, when Azerbaijan started actively objecting
    to opening the borders, Turkish PM Erdogan had to visit Azerbaijan
    in May 2009 to assure Baku that Turkey would not open the borders
    until Armenia had withdrawn from the invaded lands.

    The "reset" policy towards Russia was criticized because of its
    conciliatory tone with regard democracy and human rights issues in
    Russia. Obama administration's view of the region as well as the NK
    problem through the prism of reset policy with Russia, which includes
    softened tone on democracy problems, can severely affect the U.S.

    credibility in the former Soviet space. Democracy is an important
    dimension that can be threatened if the U.S. views Azerbaijan solely
    from reset policy (with Russia) standpoint. Unlike Russia, where
    positivism in bilateral U.S.- Russian relations has long been absent
    and where "reset" policy is meant to mend tensed relations, Azerbaijan
    presents a different case. Cooperation on a number of important
    political, economic and military affairs has long been present in the
    U.S.-Azerbaijani relations. Such dual-track approach as, supporting
    and cooperating with Azerbaijan on a number of strategic issues on
    the one hand and monitoring its democratic credentials on the other
    hand, used to provide excellent avenues for preserving U.S. regional
    interests. The U.S. needs to have a positive image in Azerbaijan,
    which it clearly lacks now, in order to support Azerbaijan's democratic
    transition and incentivize it through close cooperation.

    Positive U.S. image would retain American legitimacy for helping
    foster democratic culture for both government and grass roots
    activities, which need to be inspired. Currently, Baku's increasing
    interdependence with Moscow and apparent inactivity of the U.S. in
    NK conflict could automatically place Azerbaijan in the same box with
    Russia for Washington's foreign policy radars. Thus, there is a chance
    that the elements of the U.S. policy of reset, such as tempered U.S.

    tone with regard to democracy issues, can be applied to Azerbaijan
    and affect its democracy at all levels.

    Azerbaijan's further tilt towards Russia not only endangers democracy
    but also threatens strategically important energy projects such as
    NABUCCO gas pipeline. Azerbaijan as a supplier of oil and gas had
    bargaining power over Turkey and EU members. President Ilham Aliyev
    showed his firm reaction by signing natural gas deals with Russia
    and Iran to demonstrate Azerbaijan's flexibility in terms of customer
    selection. Azerbaijan is also an important military partner for the
    U.S. It is the only potentially viable transit route for NATO ISAF
    troops supply, except Russia and the unstable Khyber Pass in Pakistan.

    As a sign of protest, Azerbaijan recently put-off joint military
    exercise with the U.S. Washington's inactivity in NK conflict and
    related fierce criticism of the U.S. in Azerbaijan can put these
    projects in danger.

    NK problem is the key for preserving U.S. interests in European energy
    security, ensuring NATO supply routes and supporting democratic
    transformation in secular Azerbaijan. The U.S. should use its new
    closer relations with Russia to reach a solution in NK conflict through
    updated Madrid principles offered by Minsk group co-chairs and mostly
    accepted by Azerbaijan. A solution in NK will solve Turkish-Armenian
    border problem, too; whereas, insisting to open the borders will solve
    none and furthermore threaten the U.S. interests in the region of the
    South Caucasus; the South Caucasus that combines problematic Iran,
    major power Russia, threat of religious radicalism, authoritarianism
    and energy hydrocarbons destined for the EU markets.

    Tamerlan Vahabov, research fellow, International Management Institute -
    Kyiv, holds MA from Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service
    and MS from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Previously worked as
    an analyst at the Interpol General Secretariat and as a U.S. desk
    officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. Research
    interests include energy, security and domestic politics in Ukraine,
    Russia and the Caucasus. Dr. Fariz Huseynov, assistant professor,
    North Dakota State University, holds PhD from Memphis University and
    MBA from Ball State University.




    From: A. Papazian
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