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THE NEO OTTOMANS: LOOKING EAST WITHOUT LOOKING BACK
Assyrian International News Agency AINA
June 15 2010
As the lone Islamic NATO member and a keen aspirant to the European
Union, Turkey was long seen as the bridge dividing the East from the
West. The metaphor was not lost on President Obama, who chose it as
the site to launch his administration's outreach to the Muslim world,
but mere months later, the infatuation has begun to wear thin.
Vocal Turkish fury at Israel's ill-fated assault on the Turkish-led
Gaza flotilla has reignited the decade-old question of whether
Turkey is shifting its axis eastwards. Yet today, with Turko-Israeli
relations at their lowest ebb in history, with Turkish popularity
and presence in the Middle East at an all-time high and with Turkey
confident enough to formally oppose American-led sanctions on Iran,
the question has deservedly resurfaced and merits keen attention.
Much of the worry has centered on Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the powerful
leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist party
that has dominated the Turkish political landscape for the past 8
years. Its perceived overturn of the cherished secularist ideals of
post-Ottoman Turkey have led to dire predictions of an Islamicized
Turkey that bears little resemblance to the Pentagon's frontline
gendarme during the Cold War. Truth be told, despite Western hysteria
and Erdogan's decidedly Islamist leanings, Turkey has not made a
calibrated decision to turn from the West. The AKP has, however,
demonstrated ambition unparalleled amongst its predecessors and has
implemented an extremely aggressive multi-dimensional foreign policy
designed to turn Turkey into a "central power," radiating influence
in all directions.
Currently a Western partnership with Turkey continues to hold
significant dividends for both sides. Turkey's unique position affords
it growing credibility in the Middle East, even as it sits astride
a major energy crossroad for Caspian and Middle Eastern exports to
Europe. Furthermore, its overarching foreign policy goal of 'zero
problems' is predicated on a peaceful Middle East. The difference,
however, as is being made abundantly clear, will be in a Turkish
approach that is willing to pander to anti-Western sentiment.
Primarily, this stems from the acknowledgment of a new post-Cold War
security environment in which the majority of threats to Turkey lie
on its southern periphery. Consequently, the utility in the Turkish
perception as a NATO lackey or Israeli ally is fast fading.
In the end, the onus on the long-term direction of Turkey may
lie on the United States and Europe, which retain enormous levers
of influence. It remains an open question as to whether Western
strategic planners will remain willing to demonstrate the same
level of engagement as they have done in the past, despite Turkey's
strategic sync diverging on some key interests. However, contrary
to popular belief, Turkey's newfound independence is not nearly as
omnipotent as is often presumed. In actual fact, today more than
ever, Turkey is being forced between poles with the difficult task
of balancing multiple different factions, many with diametrically
opposed viewpoints.
A prominent accusation is that frustration at the lengthy EU accession
process Turkey has been put through is driving its drift. U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates has voiced his concurrence, stating recently
that Turkey is looking eastwards because "some in Europe (are)
refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that
Turkey sought."[1] There is some merit to this assessment. In a
March 2010 interview, Erdogan noted that Turkey first applied for
membership in the European Economic Community in 1959. "That was 51
years ago. No other country was subjected to such a procedure, and yet
we have remained patient." He also equated the recent proposals put
forward by Germany and France to offer Turkey a 'strategic partnership'
instead of full membership as "strange as someone changing the penalty
rule in the middle of a football match."[2]
Changing domestic prerogatives in Turkey and Europe have also begun to
sour the accession dream. Contrary to common perception, the AKP came
to power with EU accession as its primary objective and did more than
all its predecessors to reform Turkey to EU standards. They continue
to insist that their commitment to accession has never wavered with
Erdogan dismissing such claims as "dirty propaganda."[3] However the
E.U. fixation on Cyprus in late 2005 became a sticky issue with many
Turks equating it as a demand for unilateral withdrawal. The upshot was
a drastic decline in support for the EU falling from 73% in 2004 to 40%
in 2007. Public opinion in the EU too was unenthusiastic for Turkish
integration, holding at a measly 21% across the E.U. in 2007.[4]
It is unfortunate for Turkey that its accession has raised serious
questions about the E.U.'s identity and future direction. On the
security front, it is feared that Turkish accession will shift
European borders from the more defensible Bosphorus to one straddling
the Middle Eastern arc of instability and force the import of Middle
Eastern security including thorny issues such as the Kurdish problem.
It is also worried that Turkish accession will provide momentum for
Georgia and Ukraine to renew their accession pleas, exacerbating
tensions with Russia. But mostly worries have centered around
social and cultural differences between Turkey and mainstream Europe
including the Turkish penchant for military coups and issues of gender
inequalities, minority rights and union organization. Immigration
concerns have also mobilized European xenophobia as has the Islamic
nature of Turkey, made starker with Erdogan's decidedly Islamist
leanings.
European politicians, particularly in France and Germany, have pandered
to this public opposition. French President Sarkozy has frequently
invited Turkish ire, provocatively stating that he was "always opposed"
because "Turkey is not in Europe."[5] That these aggravations may have
added impetus to Turkey's eastern drift is revealingly illuminated
in a closed door meeting where Ahmed Davutoglu, the architect of the
AKP foreign policy, stated he was purposely putting Turkish embassies
in prominent sites across North Africa so that "wherever Sarkozy goes
he'll see a Turkish flag."[6] Erdogan himself has not been averse to
pandering to domestic opinion choosing a lower gear of engagement with
the EU in 2007, when nationalism and anti-US sentiment became electoral
issues. Yet AKP supporters have derided Western attention to these
issues, stating that it reflects Turkey's enhanced democratization,
where unlike previous military governments they are forced to
acknowledge public opinion and diversify their foreign policy.
Economic interdependence has been the central component of the
new Turkish foreign policy codified in 'Strategic Depth: Turkey's
International Position,' a book written by Turkey's highly influential
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. In it Davutoglu blends together his
'zero problems' policy with his intention to recapture 'strategic
depth' in the region. This multi-dimensional policy is predicated on
the notion of stabilization through integration, the idea that Turkey
can leverage its shared religiosity, "multiple regional identities"[7]
and substantial economic clout to facilitate political convergence and
economic interdependence with its Arab neighbors. The desired outcome
is to secure a Turkish zone of economic and cultural influence that
overrides historical grievances greatly enhancing Turkish prestige
and influence in the region.
With this in mind, it is important to note that at present Turkey
remains firmly tethered to Europe. The EU27 accounted for 75%
of Turkish FDI inflows in 2008[8] and held a resounding 41.7%
share of Turkish trade, bounds ahead of Turkey's second largest
partnership with Russia and its 11.4%. Similar proportions are seen
in Turkey's export partners with the EU27 accounting for 48.3% of
exports while the next largest, the UAE, accounted for a mere 6.1%.[9]
A closer look at macroeconomic trends however shows a clear attempt at
diversification, with Asian and Middle Eastern countries beginning to
nibble at the E.U.'s preponderance. 2008 marked the first year where
the E.U.'s export share fell below 50% to 41%, departing starkly from
their traditional average of 56-58%. Import shares have also been in
steady decline, falling in three years to 37% in 2008 from 42.55%.[10]
These figures are particularly surprising given that Turkish trade has
been booming from $116.5bn in 2003 to $334bn in 2008. Middle Eastern
countries have been the primary beneficiaries of this diversification
with their export and import shares reaching record highs of 19.3%
and 8.7% respectively.
The outreach to the Middle East has already reaped substantial
dividends, allowing for the normalization of relations with
historically hostile neighbors, including unprecedented diplomatic
initiatives with the Iraqi Kurds, Syrians, and Iran. To Western
critics, this outreach predicated on the basis of shared religion
has been deeply alarming, amounting to an Islamization of Turkish
foreign policy. Their bewilderment has not been assuaged by Erdogan's
frequent touting of controversy as when he grandly declared Sudanese
Prime Minister Omar al-Bashir to be innocent of Western charges,
arguing, "no Muslim could perpetrate a genocide"[11] or by stating
on Ahmadinejad that "there is no doubt that he is our friend."[12]
Turks themselves have sought to downplay these concerns, denouncing
the West's obsession with "limiting paradigms" and insisting, "one
side of Turkey's face is looking to the West, and the other to the
East."[13] They argue that Turkey is merely seeking to break out
of a self-imposed exile from the Arab world, which is to the direct
benefit of their Western allies by affording them access to actors
they would otherwise be unable to reach. Hugh Pope, a Turkish expert
with the International Crisis Group shares this belief arguing that
as Turkish links with 'rogue elements' in the Middle East increases,
so does their utility to the West. "They have open channels of dialogue
with everybody. A lot of people underestimate how much Turkey can do
behind the scenes."[14]
Furthermore, while Erdogan has often played the 'Islam card,' a brief
glance through history shows that this 'Eastward' policy began not
with the AKP but in the 1980s and intensified in the post-Cold War
era. Staunchly secular elites such as Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem laid the groundwork for the AKP,
brainstorming means to reduce Turkish dependence on their Western
allies and beginning engagement with the Palestinians and Syrians.
Nonetheless it is indisputable that it has been the eight years of
AKP rule that has rapidly catalyzed this process, transforming Turkey
regionally from a "tepid observer to influential player."[15]
So far these attempts to court Arab support coupled with an unremitting
barrage of criticism at Israel has played well to its intended
audience. A recent survey sampling various groups across the Arab
world demonstrated that 75% held favorable views of Turkey and 61% saw
Turkey as a positive role model, despite its secularism. In a dramatic
turnaround from the traditional antipathy towards Turkey's Ottoman
past, 78% also saw Turks today as friendly to their countries.[16]
This watershed has been facilitated by Turkey's cultural exports,
most notably their wildly popular soap operas that have introduced the
Bosphorus to the Middle East. The most notable example of this 'soft
power' is the show 'Noor' that drew over 85 million Arab viewers for
its finale. It is credited with securing a significant increase in Gulf
Arab tourists to Turkey, as well as introducing Turkish secularism
with its unveiled women, alcohol, and premarital sex, apparently
tremendously intriguing when placed in an Islamic context.[17]
Turkish engagement has also helped enrich its coffers. Trade with
Lebanon leapt from $225 million in 2002 to $900 million today,[18]
while in the first year alone, Turkish rapprochement with Syria saw
Turkish exports jump from $1.1bn to $1.4bn.[19] With Iraq bilateral
trade rose from $3.7bn in 2007 to $9bn in 2009 and excluding oil
deals, Turkey is already Iraq's largest commercial partner[20]
and looking to further increase trade volume to $20bn by 2013.[21]
Trade with Iran increased six-fold between 2002 and 2007, reaching
$7.5bn with agreements inked in May 2009 to attempt to raise the
number to $20bn.[22] The Turks have also been proactive in Africa,
building mosques, madrassas, and schools. Their deepening links have
facilitated a rise in Turkish exports to the continent from $1.5bn in
2001 to $10bn in 2009.[23] Trade with Sudan in particular has tripled
from 2006.[24] The AKP government has also lifted visa requirements
with many Arab countries including Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia,
Jordan and Syria, with Erdogan to create a "regional schengen system"
to facilitate trade.[25]
In the Iraqi vacuum created by the U.S. invasion, Turkey has made
strong advances with its influence rivaled by only Iran. It has
forged good terms with all Iraqi factions and urged Sunni groups to
participate in the electoral process. Most surprising has been the
pragmatic nature with which the Turks have engaged with the Iraqi
Kurds. The traditional fear that autonomy for Iraqi Kurds would
inspire its own Kurdish minority has driven Turkish strategic doctrine
for decades and was a major contributor to its vocal opposition to
the 2003 U.S. invasion. Today, they have overridden these fears to
facilitate stability along its Iraqi border and secure Iraqi energy.
Erdogan ended the demonization of Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani,
allowing him an unprecedented trip to Ankara in 2010 in reciprocation.
The Turks have also opened a consulate in the Kurdish capital of Irbil
and secured Iraqi inclusion in the Nabucco pipeline exporting oil to
Europe and Istanbul-based Cukorava and Dogan Holdings are investing
in Iraqi oilfields in Kurdistan.[26] Plans are underway for a $1bn
oil pipeline shipping oil from Kirkuk to the port city of Ceyhan where
Turkey hopes to create a major energy export hub for Caspian and Middle
Eastern oil. This policy has been mutually beneficial with the Iraqi
Kurds seeing Turkey as their door to the West and a diplomatic ally in
defending their interests should Iraq disintegrate along ethnic lines.
In Syria, traditionally acrimonious relations that almost saw
the countries go to war in the late 90s have been normalized to
the point where Syrian President Bashar al-Assad now calls Turkey
"Syria's best friend."[27] Admittedly this recalibration has largely
been spearheaded by Assad himself in an attempt to break out of
his diplomatic isolation, but renewed outreach has allowed Turkey
to resolve key lingering issues such as Turkish sovereignty over
the disputed Hatay province and securing Syrian support against
Iraqi Kurdish rebels in 2007. In addition to burgeoning trade, joint
industrial projects have been initiated and joint military exercises
conducted, all helping resolve one of Turkey's thorniest borders.
In Lebanon, the Hariri government and their Hezbollah allies have
found a gracious partner in Turkey with Saad Hariri affectionately
referring to Erdogan's Turkey as "big brother" during a trip to
Ankara. With Saudi Arabia, Turkey has signed protocols agreeing to
military cooperation as well as announced its intention to invest
as much as $400bn in Turkey over the next four years while boosting
their bilateral trade to $10bn.[28]
It has been in Iran, however, where cooperation has garnered the most
attention. Erdogan was one of the first politicians to congratulate
Ahmadinejad's disputed June 2009 electoral victory and has declined to
comment on the subsequent crackdown on the opposition Green Movement,
arguing it would represent "interference" in Iranian domestic
affairs.[29] Much of this placatory outlook may stem from pragmatism.
With Turkey importing over 70% of its energy needs, and 17% of it from
Iran, efforts to increase that share have been a priority. The policy
is, however, fraught with problems. Iran is a technical mess. The South
Pars field is not yet fully operational despite constant reassurances
and in the winter Iranian oil exports are tenuous at best as outflow
is diverted to meet their own domestic shortfall.
Erdogan has, however, sought to go significantly beyond these concerns
in utilizing Iran as the centerpiece of a Turkish diplomatic revival.
He recently persuaded Iran to accept a uranium exchange deal that would
take place in Turkey. The deal would see Iran send out low enriched
uranium in exchange for higher-enriched fuel rods needed for Iran's
aging medical reactor. To Western -- namely American and Israeli --
critics, this deal is a non-starter today, being that the amount
negotiated is believed to be insufficient, still leaving Iran with
a nuclear breakout capability. They have lamented perceived Turkish
naivety in their seemingly genuine interpretation of Iranian goodwill,
seeing it instead as a hijack offering the Iranians a face-saving
opportunity to circumvent Western sanctions pressure.
The subsequent decision to vote against American-led sanctions has
exacerbated American frustration with Turkey, compounded by Erdogan's
rhetoric that continually asserts that Iran's nuclear program is
"peaceful and humanitarian."[30] Yet here too, Turkish policy may be
led by a degree of pragmatism; namely their belief that regardless
of the choice of coercive tools, neither the U.S. nor Israel will
be able to permanently stop the Iranian nuclear program. Engagement
then becomes a necessity to avoid a nuclear-armed enemy along the
Southern periphery. This quiet appreciation of Iranian intentions has
been voiced by Turkish President Abdullah Gul who privately stated,
"I do believe their final intention is to have a nuclear weapon,
because it is related to their national pride."[31]
Despite controversy over the exact intention of Turkey's Middle
Eastern policy, what is abundantly clear is that Israel will be the
sacrificial lamb to help in its realization. Turkey was once one of
the first countries to recognize Israel and saw it as a strategic
ally critical for ambitious defense modernization aims and a source
of solidarity against troublesome neighbors. The winds have shifted
substantially since then, with many of those same neighbors becoming
the benefactors of Turkish courtship. As a result the utility of the
Israeli alliance has diminished considerably, leading the Israelis
to correctly lament that Turkey is "seeking to integrate with the
Muslim world at Israel's expense."[32]
With the primacy of economic interdependence foremost in the
AKP's foreign policy mindset, Turkish-Israeli bilateral trade has
declined 30% from the record high of $3.5bn in 2008 to stand at a
relatively measly $2.5bn in 2009, two thirds of which constitute
Israeli defense exports.[33] Here, too, strains have emerged, as
Turkey grows increasingly dissatisfied with Israeli military tenders,
leading a former Israeli Ambassador to profess concern that "military
ties will fade away." [34] Technical issues, delayed deliveries,
and failed commitments have all been problems, seen most recently
in the failure of Israel's IAI-Elbit to deliver the Heron system in
line with the Turkish Air Force's specifications.[35] Even without
this lingering discontent, quite simply put, the economic costs of
severing ties with Israel are vastly outweighed by the benefits of
rapprochement with its enemies. The specialized nature of Israeli
defense technology is an issue, but the United States remains Turkey's
largest arms supplier, and Erdogan has dismissed any ideas that its
tensions with Israel affect its U.S. relations, stating, "America's
policy in the region is not dictated by Israel."[36]
On broader strategic issues too, Israel and Turkey have diverged.
Scarcely a decade ago, common hostility towards Syria helped glue an
alliance together. In 1998, as Turkey threatened Syrians with military
intervention for their intervention of PKK rebel leader Abdullah
Ocalan, Turkish editorials conveyed their sense of solidarity with
Israel, famously stating, "We will say shalom to the Israelis on the
Golan Heights."[37] Today, with normalized relations and growing trade
between Turkey and Syria, the divergence in Israeli-Turkish strategic
sync is palpable, and Erdogan has not shied away from declaring
Israel "the principal threat to peace" in the Middle East.[38] In
an indication of the times, it was from the Syrian city of Aleppo
that Davutoglu launched a blistering criticism of Israeli policies
in October 2009. Turkish overtures towards Israeli arch-nemesis Iran
have not helped matters either. Tel Aviv has frostily met Erdogan's
linking of Iranian nuclear ambitions with Israeli nuclear capability
and Gazan policies, while staunchly opposing any action besides
diplomacy in tackling the Iranian nuclear issue.
Erdogan's ideological slant has also resulted in a re-assessed
understanding of the Palestinian plight, as has the colder recognition
of the issue's resonance across the Muslim world. Viewing Israel's
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza as a betrayal of his attempt to broker
mediation between Israel and Syria, Erdogan has since shown little
regard for Israeli sensibilities. He termed the Gaza incursion as
"genocide" and publicly lambasted Israeli President Shimon Peres at
the World Economic Forum in Davos, calling him a "liar" and declaring
"when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill."[39] Days later,
in an unprecedented development, Turkey abruptly disinvited Israel from
Anatolian Eagle, a joint air-force exercise. Adding insult to injury,
the Turks then promptly invited Syria for joint military exercises
and urged the creation of a joint Strategic Coordination Council.
Erdogan has shown a penchant for solidarity with Hamas, comparing
it to the AKP and its own history of being banned and sidelined
from mainstream politics. Turkey was a prominent supporter of Hamas
after its electoral victory in 2006 and has hosted Hamas leader
Khaled Mashaal in Ankara, granting him an audience with then Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul. Furthermore, the AKP has called Western-backed
Mahmoud Abbas, the "head of an illegitimate government."[40] Erdogan
has defended this outreach, stating Turkish beliefs that Hamas is a
political reality whose sidelining is counterproductive.
Thin skins on both sides have not allowed the tension to ebb. The new
Netanyahu government has often reacting to Turkish provocations, such
as Erdogan's description of the city of Jerusalem as the "apple of the
eye of each and every Muslim"[41] with undiplomatic and unnecessary
snubs of their own. They include the public humiliation of Turkish
Ambassador Oguz Celikkol by Israeli Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon,
who seated the Ambassador in a much lower chair in full view of news
cameras. The Israeli raid on the Gaza flotilla has further widened the
Gulf between the two countries. The Turks have termed Israeli actions
"state terrorism" and "banditry",[42] while a recent opinion poll in
Israel demonstrated 78% regarding Turkey as an "enemy state."[43]
Another source of Western concern has centered around the Turkish
embrace of Russia, ignoring that it is driven less by ideology than
whole-scale Turkish dependence on Russian energy exports. As Turkey's
single largest trading partner, constituting 11.4% of the Turkish
trade balance, Russo-Turkish economic links are on the upswing with
protocols signed to bring the trade volume to $100bn over the next 5
years.[44] Currently, however, the Turkish export share is a small
$3bn slice of the aggregate $22bn trade volume[45], with the vast
majority centering around the 64% strangehold that Russia exerts
on Turkish energy imports. The Russians have also agreed to build
Turkey's first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.[46] Consequently, Turkey
has found itself in a tough bargaining position, with its energy needs
forecasted to double over the next decade and price renegotiations due
in 2011 with a supplier not averse to manipulating prices for political
reasons. The point was hammered home in the aftermath of the Russian
invasion of Georgia. Pushed hard to act by the West, Turkey found
itself on the receiving end of Russian anger, with Russian-imposed
customs checks and export restrictions as well as the closure of the
BTC pipeline imposing significant economic costs upon the Turks.[47]
Resultantly, when it comes to the Russians, Turkish overtures are less
an attempt to re-balance eastward than an attempt to mitigate their
dependence. But historical mistrust lingering from Turkey's NATO
allegiance and its frontline anti-Soviet role during the Cold War
is an obstacle. Moreover, Russia has rarely hidden its intention to
thwart Turkish ambitions in reinventing themselves as a major energy
transit corridor for Caspian and Middle Eastern energy exports to
Europe. Turkish-sponsored pipelines such as Nabucco would ease the
Russian monopoly on European energy enhancing price competitiveness
in an arena that upends much of the Russian budget. In past years
the Russians have gone as far as making attractive offers to Azeri
energy suppliers in an attempt to tweak them off Nabucco.[48]
Despite this hierarchy in relations, Turkey and Russia do have a
level of strategic sync in their relations that they have attempted to
leverage. They shared an interest against the Bush Administration's
promotion of democracy in Central Asia, worrying on it being
potentially destabilizing. They also share an interest in retaining
the Black Sea as a 'Turkish lake' without NATO intrusion. And both
see in each other sizeable markets ripe for exploitation. With these
interests in mind, Erdogan has made several trips to Moscow and in 2004
hosted President Putin, the first visit by a Russian head of state
in 32 years. Subsequent visits have resulted in the mutual lifting
of short-term visas to facilitate tourism and trade.[49]Any recent
concessions, however, are driven primarily by Russian strategic
concerns; namely their newfound interest in transit routes that
traverse Turkey. The South Stream pipeline is intended as both a
counterweight to Nabucco as well to circumvent Ukraine and Belarus,
whose long-term reliability is a concern for Russia. In this vein
the Russians have also found it in their interest to collaborate
on other pipelines such as the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline as well
as Blue Stream 2 that would ship Russian oil to countries such as
Lebanon. Certainly Turkey stands to gain sizeable transit fees from all
these investments, but the idea that they reflect a complete revamp of
the Russo-Turkish relationship is entirely misplaced. This is noted
in Turkey's explicit attempts to wean themselves off Russian oil,
codified in their 2010-2014 strategic energy plan which seeks to
increase domestic reserves and diversify supply so a to ensure no
single supplier contributes more than 50% of Turkish needs.[50]
Beyond the Russians, the Turks are also straddling a fine line
in their relations with the Arabs. The oft-touted advantage that
Turkish secularism and its economic and technological advances
can be exported to the Arab world can cut both ways. The Kemalist
mistrust that erected that firewalled Turkey from the Middle East
was predicated on the exact worry that influence can run the other
way. Without sufficient care, over time authoritarianism and the
'cultural swamp' of Middle Eastern politics and security dynamics
can be imported instead, ruining Turkey's most cherished values.
This aggressive adoption of the Palestinian cause while politically
advantageous at home and further afield in the Muslim world is not
a riskless strategy either.
Turkey is essentially stealing Iran's mantle as the primary champion
of the Palestinian cause[51] and while the Iranians may presently
benefit from a vocal supporter like Turkey, in time the usurping of
their influence in Palestine and Iraq is bound to irritate.
Simultaneously, Turkish efforts have exposed the impotence of
many Arab regimes in delivering on their rhetorical support for
Palestinians. Erdogan's celebrity and the steady advance of progressive
Turkish culture into the Arab mainstream threatens to expose the
authoritarian unpopularity of many Arab regimes and their legitimacy
deficits, all unlikely to have endeared Turkey to ruling Arab elites.
The Turkish swing has also begun to cost its credibility in its
cherished role as an unbiased regional interlocutor. Its embrace of
Hamas has earned it the mistrust of Fatah factions and Egypt, making
its role in Hamas-Fatah talks significantly more challenging.[52]
Its previous ability to bring together Syria and Israel for talks are
unlikely to be replicated in the near future, given the prevailing
Israeli belief that Turkey has swung decisively against its favor. The
U.S., too, is viewing Turkey with alarm in the aftermath of its
unilateral uranium exchange deal with Iran and public opposition to
sanctions and coercive pressure.
Similarly, many Sunni Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia have
found themselves being forced to inadvertently compete with Turkey
for regional influence. They remain suspicious of Turkish intentions
viewing its 'neo-Ottoman' rhetoric and growing friendliness with their
Shia rivals, Iran and Syria, with considerable trepidation. All this
has led critics to charge that Turkey, contrary to popular belief,
is not a diplomatic heavyweight in the region, but rather one with
too many balls in the air spreading itself thin and heading for a
significant loss of credibility. As one Egyptian official put it,
"Turkey is a large and clumsy player... They haven't been well versed
in Middle Eastern affairs for a long time... They would like to prove
to the West they are an effective player. But I have my doubts about
concrete impact"[53]
Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute is undoubtedly
correct when he succinctly notes "Turkey in 2010 is not the same
Turkey as a decade ago."[54] It has made vast strides in extending
its economic and political weight far beyond its traditional sphere
of influence. Yet Turks themselves would do well to remember they
remain vulnerable, caught between poles and not yet unbound of their
Western shackles. Eastern outreach has real tangible benefits for the
United States and Europe with Turkish potential to serve as a European
energy corridor erode the Russian monopoly as well as a real bridge
in promoting a democratic and technically advanced Islamic model
that the Middle East has continually failed to provide. It can also
use its economic clout to make inroads into tackling the economic
backwardness in the region, while simultaneously enriching itself
and becoming an increasingly attractive partner for accession.
Turkey would do well, however, to remember that its attractiveness
in the Middle East stems largely from its political and social
modernity that owe much to its European partners. It remains a
regional military force few will tangle with precisely because of
its NATO security blanket and its close American partnership. The
U.S. retains strong levers of influence it can utilize with relative
ease, given that the US-Turkish relationship is predominantly a
"state-to-state relationship," with relatively small volumes of trade
and cultural exchange.[55] These include cutting back on arms sales,
ratcheting down support in Brussels, cutting Turkey out of Western-led
Middle Eastern peace initiatives and reassessing support for Turkey
on contentious positions such as Cyprus and Armenia, all enormously
damaging for Turkish ambitions.
In international politics perceptions often guide reality. While Turkey
may not seek to alienate the West, its demagoguery of Israel raises
concerns. If it truly aspires to regional leadership, it must dispense
of the hypocrisy that allows it to criticize Israel but not Hamas,
Hezbollah, and other terrorist outfits. It may be its prerogative
to criticize the U.S. operation in Fallujah as "genocide,"[56] but
then it must too recognize the atrocities so nakedly apparent in the
Sudan, Iran, and its own heavy-handedness against its homegrown Kurdish
insurgency. Playing to domestic or regional xenophobia in the East is
little more than an act of brinksmanship for the West. Balancing is
never an easy task, but Turkey would do well to look back occasionally
as it marches forward.
By Varun Vira www.foreignpolicyjournal.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Adam Entous, "US concerned at Turkey shift:
Gates," Reuters, June 9, 2010. Available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6581I220100609?type=politicsNews
[2] "SPIEGEL Interview with Turkey's Prime Minister: "There can
be no talk of genocide," Der Spiegel, March 29, 2010. Available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,686131,00.html
[3] "Turkey calls charges turning from West "dirty
propaganda" Agence France Presse, June 10, 2010. Available at
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j4s-_zfUNJstHc_43PycrkglqjzQ
[4] Seda Ciftci, "Reviving Turkey's Stalled EU Drive" Center for
Strategic and International Studies, April 30, 2008.
[5] "Sarkozy gets Italy, Spain on board for "Mediterranean
Union," Deutsche Welle, December 21, 2007. Available at
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3016610,00.html
[6] "Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,"
International Crisis Group, Europe Report N203, April 7, 2010.
[7] Ioannis Grigoriadis, "The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign
Policy," Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy,
April 2010.
[8] Oxford Analytica, "Turkish trade shifts from
Europe," Forbes, February 20, 2009. Available at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/19/turkey-europe-eu-business_oxford_turkey.html
[9] "Turkey: EU Bilateral trade and Trade with the World," DG Trade,
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Turkey?" Middle East Online, April 12, 2010. Available at
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[12]"Turkey turns against Israel," Wall
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[13] "Erdogan rejects reports Turkey drifting from
West," Asbarez, October 29, 2009. Available at
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[14] Greg Bruno, "Turkey's Rising Star," Council
on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2008. Available at
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[15]Steven A. Cook, "How do you say "frenemy" in
Turkish?" Foreign Policy, June 1, 2010. Available at
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[16] Mensur Akgun, Gokce Percinoglu and Sabiha Senyucel Gundogar,
"Perception of Turkey in the Middle East" Tesev Publications,
December 2009.
[17] Alexandra Buccianti, "Dubbed Turkish soap operas
conquering the Arab world: social liberation or cultural
alienation?" Arab Society Media, March 30, 2010. Available
atwww.arabmediasociety.com/.../20100330130359_Buccianti_-_for_PDF.pdf
[18] Sami Moubayed, "Turkey embraces role as Arab 'Big
Brother," Asia Times, January 14, 2010. Available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LA14Ak01.html
[19]"Turkey expands economic ties with the East,"
Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2010. Available at
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=177743
[20] "Iraq-Turkey trade up 50 percent in past
year," Hurriyet, June 12, 2010. Available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=iraq-turkey-trade-up-50-percent-in-past-year-2010-04-11
[21] "Turkey-Iraq focus on improving trade ties,"
Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 23, 2010. Available at
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/100212/turkey-iraq-focus-on-improving-trade-ties.html
[22] Ariel Farrar- Wellman, "Turkey-Iran Foreign Relations," Iran
Tracker (American Enterprise Institute), May 20, 2010. Available at
http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/turkey-iran-foreign-relations
[23] "Turkey and Africa: Ottoman Dreaming," The Economist, March 25,
2010. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/15772860
[24] Nick Danforth, "How the West lost Turkey,"
Foreign Policy, November 25, 2009. Available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how_the_west_lost_turkey
[25] Sami Moubayed, "Turkey embraces role as Arab 'Big
Brother," Asia Times, January 14, 2010. Available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LA14Ak01.html
[26] Ayla Jean Yackley, "Iraqi Kurdish leader in Turkey
for landmark visit," Reuters, June 2, 2010. Available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6515B820100602
[27] Chris Phillips, "Turkey, Syria's new best
friend" The Guardian, October 1, 2009. Available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/01/turkey-syria-friendship
[28] "Saudi Arabia to invest $400bn in
Turkey," Press TV, April 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=122233§ionid=351020204
[29] Robert Tait, "Iran is out friend, says Turkish PM Recep
Tayyip Erdogan," The Guardian, October 26, 2009. Available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/26/turkey-iran1
[30] Abdulhamit Bilci, "Iran's nuke program for humanitarian ends,
Erdogan says," Today's Zaman, October 28, 2009. Available at
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/mobile.do?load=wapDetay&link=191248
[31] David Kenner, "Is Turkey trying to sink or save
Iran?" Foreign Policy, April 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/01/is_turkey_trying_to_sink_or_save_iran?page=0,1
[32] Tulin Daloglu, "Turkey takes sides,"
Foreign Policy, April 16, 2010. Available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/16/turkey_takes_sides
[33] Daniel Steinvorth, "Outage in Turkey: Gaza Raid spells end of
Turkish-Israeli alliance," Der Spiegel, June 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,698115,00.html
[34] Delphine Strauss and Tobias Buck, "Business counts cost of
Turkish-Israel spat," Financial Times, June 10, 2010. Available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/32f834ce-74a9-11df-aed7-00144feabdc0.html
[35] Halil M. Karaveli and M.K. Kaya, "Islamist and Nationalist
Views on Jews and Israel: Another Convergence of Perceptions?" Turkey
Analyst, November 9, 2009.
[36] "Erdogan says Lieberman threatened Gaza with
nukes," YNet News, October 26, 2009. Available at
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3795365,00.html
[37]"The Turkish Temptation," Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2009.
Available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703363704574503460584848456.html
[38]Marc Champion, "Erdogan calls Israel 'threat' to
peace," Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2010. Available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303591204575169980169518418.html
[39] James Joyner, "Turkey's Erdogan storms out of
Davos," Atlantic Council, January 30, 2009. Available at
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/turkeys-erdogan-storms-out-davos
[40] Soner Cagaptay, "Is Turkey leaving the West,"
Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2009. Available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west
[41] "Arab League eyes alternatives to peace
process," Al Arabiya, March 27, 2010. Available at
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/03/27/104185.html
[42] "Transcript of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's speech during the AK
Party Meeting," Political Theatrics, June 6, 2010. Available at
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[43] "78 pct of Israelis view Turkey as enemy: poll,"
Agence France Presse, June 10, 2010. Available at
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h-VvhgxjVcleA21QBUCJULnxU0gg
[44] Delphine Strauss, "Russia to build Turkey's nuclear
plant" Financial Times, May 13, 2010. Available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ba891592-5de4-11df-8153-00144feab49a.html
[45] Hassan Selim Ozertem, "Interview: The Future of Turkey-Russia
relations," Journal of Turkish Weekly, January 23, 2010. Available at
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96359/-jtw-interview-the-future-of-turkey-russia-relations.html
[46] "Turkey, Russia sign nuclear power plant, visa removal
deals," European Dialogue, May 14, 2010. Available at
http://eurodialogue.org/energy-security/Turkey-Russia-sign-nuclear-power-plant-visa-removal-deals
[47] Reva Bhalla, Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan, "Turkey
and Russia on the Rise," STRATFOR, March 17, 2009. Available at
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317_turkey_and_russia_rise
[48] "Turkey, Russia and Regional Energy Strategies," Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C., July 15, 2009.
[49] Saban Kardas, "Turkey prioritizes independent
regional policies in the Middle East and South Caucasus,"
Jamestown Foundation, June 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36444&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid% 5D=27&cHash=620916fe5a
[50] Saban Kardas, "Turkey unveils energy
plan," Asia Times, May 13, 2010. Available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LE13Ag01.html
[51] Gary Thomas, "Iran, Turkey vie to be Palestinian's
champion," Voice of America, June 4, 2010. Available at
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[52] Khaled Abu Toameh, "Turkey's support of Hamas
worries PA," Jerusalem Post, June 8, 2010. Available at
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=177779
[53] Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,"
International Crisis Group, Europe Report N203, April 7, 2010.
[54] Michael Rubin, "Erdogan's Turkey is not a friend,"
American Enterprise Institute, June 11, 2010. Available at
http://www.aei.org/article/102138
[55] "Turkey Update: A Discussion on Turkey's foreign policy,"
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., March 30, 2010.
[56] Karl Vick, "In many Turks eyes, US remains the
enemy," Washington Post, April 10, 2005. Available at
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http://www.aina.org/news/20100615030047.htm
From: A. Papazian
Assyrian International News Agency AINA
June 15 2010
As the lone Islamic NATO member and a keen aspirant to the European
Union, Turkey was long seen as the bridge dividing the East from the
West. The metaphor was not lost on President Obama, who chose it as
the site to launch his administration's outreach to the Muslim world,
but mere months later, the infatuation has begun to wear thin.
Vocal Turkish fury at Israel's ill-fated assault on the Turkish-led
Gaza flotilla has reignited the decade-old question of whether
Turkey is shifting its axis eastwards. Yet today, with Turko-Israeli
relations at their lowest ebb in history, with Turkish popularity
and presence in the Middle East at an all-time high and with Turkey
confident enough to formally oppose American-led sanctions on Iran,
the question has deservedly resurfaced and merits keen attention.
Much of the worry has centered on Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the powerful
leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist party
that has dominated the Turkish political landscape for the past 8
years. Its perceived overturn of the cherished secularist ideals of
post-Ottoman Turkey have led to dire predictions of an Islamicized
Turkey that bears little resemblance to the Pentagon's frontline
gendarme during the Cold War. Truth be told, despite Western hysteria
and Erdogan's decidedly Islamist leanings, Turkey has not made a
calibrated decision to turn from the West. The AKP has, however,
demonstrated ambition unparalleled amongst its predecessors and has
implemented an extremely aggressive multi-dimensional foreign policy
designed to turn Turkey into a "central power," radiating influence
in all directions.
Currently a Western partnership with Turkey continues to hold
significant dividends for both sides. Turkey's unique position affords
it growing credibility in the Middle East, even as it sits astride
a major energy crossroad for Caspian and Middle Eastern exports to
Europe. Furthermore, its overarching foreign policy goal of 'zero
problems' is predicated on a peaceful Middle East. The difference,
however, as is being made abundantly clear, will be in a Turkish
approach that is willing to pander to anti-Western sentiment.
Primarily, this stems from the acknowledgment of a new post-Cold War
security environment in which the majority of threats to Turkey lie
on its southern periphery. Consequently, the utility in the Turkish
perception as a NATO lackey or Israeli ally is fast fading.
In the end, the onus on the long-term direction of Turkey may
lie on the United States and Europe, which retain enormous levers
of influence. It remains an open question as to whether Western
strategic planners will remain willing to demonstrate the same
level of engagement as they have done in the past, despite Turkey's
strategic sync diverging on some key interests. However, contrary
to popular belief, Turkey's newfound independence is not nearly as
omnipotent as is often presumed. In actual fact, today more than
ever, Turkey is being forced between poles with the difficult task
of balancing multiple different factions, many with diametrically
opposed viewpoints.
A prominent accusation is that frustration at the lengthy EU accession
process Turkey has been put through is driving its drift. U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates has voiced his concurrence, stating recently
that Turkey is looking eastwards because "some in Europe (are)
refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that
Turkey sought."[1] There is some merit to this assessment. In a
March 2010 interview, Erdogan noted that Turkey first applied for
membership in the European Economic Community in 1959. "That was 51
years ago. No other country was subjected to such a procedure, and yet
we have remained patient." He also equated the recent proposals put
forward by Germany and France to offer Turkey a 'strategic partnership'
instead of full membership as "strange as someone changing the penalty
rule in the middle of a football match."[2]
Changing domestic prerogatives in Turkey and Europe have also begun to
sour the accession dream. Contrary to common perception, the AKP came
to power with EU accession as its primary objective and did more than
all its predecessors to reform Turkey to EU standards. They continue
to insist that their commitment to accession has never wavered with
Erdogan dismissing such claims as "dirty propaganda."[3] However the
E.U. fixation on Cyprus in late 2005 became a sticky issue with many
Turks equating it as a demand for unilateral withdrawal. The upshot was
a drastic decline in support for the EU falling from 73% in 2004 to 40%
in 2007. Public opinion in the EU too was unenthusiastic for Turkish
integration, holding at a measly 21% across the E.U. in 2007.[4]
It is unfortunate for Turkey that its accession has raised serious
questions about the E.U.'s identity and future direction. On the
security front, it is feared that Turkish accession will shift
European borders from the more defensible Bosphorus to one straddling
the Middle Eastern arc of instability and force the import of Middle
Eastern security including thorny issues such as the Kurdish problem.
It is also worried that Turkish accession will provide momentum for
Georgia and Ukraine to renew their accession pleas, exacerbating
tensions with Russia. But mostly worries have centered around
social and cultural differences between Turkey and mainstream Europe
including the Turkish penchant for military coups and issues of gender
inequalities, minority rights and union organization. Immigration
concerns have also mobilized European xenophobia as has the Islamic
nature of Turkey, made starker with Erdogan's decidedly Islamist
leanings.
European politicians, particularly in France and Germany, have pandered
to this public opposition. French President Sarkozy has frequently
invited Turkish ire, provocatively stating that he was "always opposed"
because "Turkey is not in Europe."[5] That these aggravations may have
added impetus to Turkey's eastern drift is revealingly illuminated
in a closed door meeting where Ahmed Davutoglu, the architect of the
AKP foreign policy, stated he was purposely putting Turkish embassies
in prominent sites across North Africa so that "wherever Sarkozy goes
he'll see a Turkish flag."[6] Erdogan himself has not been averse to
pandering to domestic opinion choosing a lower gear of engagement with
the EU in 2007, when nationalism and anti-US sentiment became electoral
issues. Yet AKP supporters have derided Western attention to these
issues, stating that it reflects Turkey's enhanced democratization,
where unlike previous military governments they are forced to
acknowledge public opinion and diversify their foreign policy.
Economic interdependence has been the central component of the
new Turkish foreign policy codified in 'Strategic Depth: Turkey's
International Position,' a book written by Turkey's highly influential
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. In it Davutoglu blends together his
'zero problems' policy with his intention to recapture 'strategic
depth' in the region. This multi-dimensional policy is predicated on
the notion of stabilization through integration, the idea that Turkey
can leverage its shared religiosity, "multiple regional identities"[7]
and substantial economic clout to facilitate political convergence and
economic interdependence with its Arab neighbors. The desired outcome
is to secure a Turkish zone of economic and cultural influence that
overrides historical grievances greatly enhancing Turkish prestige
and influence in the region.
With this in mind, it is important to note that at present Turkey
remains firmly tethered to Europe. The EU27 accounted for 75%
of Turkish FDI inflows in 2008[8] and held a resounding 41.7%
share of Turkish trade, bounds ahead of Turkey's second largest
partnership with Russia and its 11.4%. Similar proportions are seen
in Turkey's export partners with the EU27 accounting for 48.3% of
exports while the next largest, the UAE, accounted for a mere 6.1%.[9]
A closer look at macroeconomic trends however shows a clear attempt at
diversification, with Asian and Middle Eastern countries beginning to
nibble at the E.U.'s preponderance. 2008 marked the first year where
the E.U.'s export share fell below 50% to 41%, departing starkly from
their traditional average of 56-58%. Import shares have also been in
steady decline, falling in three years to 37% in 2008 from 42.55%.[10]
These figures are particularly surprising given that Turkish trade has
been booming from $116.5bn in 2003 to $334bn in 2008. Middle Eastern
countries have been the primary beneficiaries of this diversification
with their export and import shares reaching record highs of 19.3%
and 8.7% respectively.
The outreach to the Middle East has already reaped substantial
dividends, allowing for the normalization of relations with
historically hostile neighbors, including unprecedented diplomatic
initiatives with the Iraqi Kurds, Syrians, and Iran. To Western
critics, this outreach predicated on the basis of shared religion
has been deeply alarming, amounting to an Islamization of Turkish
foreign policy. Their bewilderment has not been assuaged by Erdogan's
frequent touting of controversy as when he grandly declared Sudanese
Prime Minister Omar al-Bashir to be innocent of Western charges,
arguing, "no Muslim could perpetrate a genocide"[11] or by stating
on Ahmadinejad that "there is no doubt that he is our friend."[12]
Turks themselves have sought to downplay these concerns, denouncing
the West's obsession with "limiting paradigms" and insisting, "one
side of Turkey's face is looking to the West, and the other to the
East."[13] They argue that Turkey is merely seeking to break out
of a self-imposed exile from the Arab world, which is to the direct
benefit of their Western allies by affording them access to actors
they would otherwise be unable to reach. Hugh Pope, a Turkish expert
with the International Crisis Group shares this belief arguing that
as Turkish links with 'rogue elements' in the Middle East increases,
so does their utility to the West. "They have open channels of dialogue
with everybody. A lot of people underestimate how much Turkey can do
behind the scenes."[14]
Furthermore, while Erdogan has often played the 'Islam card,' a brief
glance through history shows that this 'Eastward' policy began not
with the AKP but in the 1980s and intensified in the post-Cold War
era. Staunchly secular elites such as Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem laid the groundwork for the AKP,
brainstorming means to reduce Turkish dependence on their Western
allies and beginning engagement with the Palestinians and Syrians.
Nonetheless it is indisputable that it has been the eight years of
AKP rule that has rapidly catalyzed this process, transforming Turkey
regionally from a "tepid observer to influential player."[15]
So far these attempts to court Arab support coupled with an unremitting
barrage of criticism at Israel has played well to its intended
audience. A recent survey sampling various groups across the Arab
world demonstrated that 75% held favorable views of Turkey and 61% saw
Turkey as a positive role model, despite its secularism. In a dramatic
turnaround from the traditional antipathy towards Turkey's Ottoman
past, 78% also saw Turks today as friendly to their countries.[16]
This watershed has been facilitated by Turkey's cultural exports,
most notably their wildly popular soap operas that have introduced the
Bosphorus to the Middle East. The most notable example of this 'soft
power' is the show 'Noor' that drew over 85 million Arab viewers for
its finale. It is credited with securing a significant increase in Gulf
Arab tourists to Turkey, as well as introducing Turkish secularism
with its unveiled women, alcohol, and premarital sex, apparently
tremendously intriguing when placed in an Islamic context.[17]
Turkish engagement has also helped enrich its coffers. Trade with
Lebanon leapt from $225 million in 2002 to $900 million today,[18]
while in the first year alone, Turkish rapprochement with Syria saw
Turkish exports jump from $1.1bn to $1.4bn.[19] With Iraq bilateral
trade rose from $3.7bn in 2007 to $9bn in 2009 and excluding oil
deals, Turkey is already Iraq's largest commercial partner[20]
and looking to further increase trade volume to $20bn by 2013.[21]
Trade with Iran increased six-fold between 2002 and 2007, reaching
$7.5bn with agreements inked in May 2009 to attempt to raise the
number to $20bn.[22] The Turks have also been proactive in Africa,
building mosques, madrassas, and schools. Their deepening links have
facilitated a rise in Turkish exports to the continent from $1.5bn in
2001 to $10bn in 2009.[23] Trade with Sudan in particular has tripled
from 2006.[24] The AKP government has also lifted visa requirements
with many Arab countries including Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia,
Jordan and Syria, with Erdogan to create a "regional schengen system"
to facilitate trade.[25]
In the Iraqi vacuum created by the U.S. invasion, Turkey has made
strong advances with its influence rivaled by only Iran. It has
forged good terms with all Iraqi factions and urged Sunni groups to
participate in the electoral process. Most surprising has been the
pragmatic nature with which the Turks have engaged with the Iraqi
Kurds. The traditional fear that autonomy for Iraqi Kurds would
inspire its own Kurdish minority has driven Turkish strategic doctrine
for decades and was a major contributor to its vocal opposition to
the 2003 U.S. invasion. Today, they have overridden these fears to
facilitate stability along its Iraqi border and secure Iraqi energy.
Erdogan ended the demonization of Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani,
allowing him an unprecedented trip to Ankara in 2010 in reciprocation.
The Turks have also opened a consulate in the Kurdish capital of Irbil
and secured Iraqi inclusion in the Nabucco pipeline exporting oil to
Europe and Istanbul-based Cukorava and Dogan Holdings are investing
in Iraqi oilfields in Kurdistan.[26] Plans are underway for a $1bn
oil pipeline shipping oil from Kirkuk to the port city of Ceyhan where
Turkey hopes to create a major energy export hub for Caspian and Middle
Eastern oil. This policy has been mutually beneficial with the Iraqi
Kurds seeing Turkey as their door to the West and a diplomatic ally in
defending their interests should Iraq disintegrate along ethnic lines.
In Syria, traditionally acrimonious relations that almost saw
the countries go to war in the late 90s have been normalized to
the point where Syrian President Bashar al-Assad now calls Turkey
"Syria's best friend."[27] Admittedly this recalibration has largely
been spearheaded by Assad himself in an attempt to break out of
his diplomatic isolation, but renewed outreach has allowed Turkey
to resolve key lingering issues such as Turkish sovereignty over
the disputed Hatay province and securing Syrian support against
Iraqi Kurdish rebels in 2007. In addition to burgeoning trade, joint
industrial projects have been initiated and joint military exercises
conducted, all helping resolve one of Turkey's thorniest borders.
In Lebanon, the Hariri government and their Hezbollah allies have
found a gracious partner in Turkey with Saad Hariri affectionately
referring to Erdogan's Turkey as "big brother" during a trip to
Ankara. With Saudi Arabia, Turkey has signed protocols agreeing to
military cooperation as well as announced its intention to invest
as much as $400bn in Turkey over the next four years while boosting
their bilateral trade to $10bn.[28]
It has been in Iran, however, where cooperation has garnered the most
attention. Erdogan was one of the first politicians to congratulate
Ahmadinejad's disputed June 2009 electoral victory and has declined to
comment on the subsequent crackdown on the opposition Green Movement,
arguing it would represent "interference" in Iranian domestic
affairs.[29] Much of this placatory outlook may stem from pragmatism.
With Turkey importing over 70% of its energy needs, and 17% of it from
Iran, efforts to increase that share have been a priority. The policy
is, however, fraught with problems. Iran is a technical mess. The South
Pars field is not yet fully operational despite constant reassurances
and in the winter Iranian oil exports are tenuous at best as outflow
is diverted to meet their own domestic shortfall.
Erdogan has, however, sought to go significantly beyond these concerns
in utilizing Iran as the centerpiece of a Turkish diplomatic revival.
He recently persuaded Iran to accept a uranium exchange deal that would
take place in Turkey. The deal would see Iran send out low enriched
uranium in exchange for higher-enriched fuel rods needed for Iran's
aging medical reactor. To Western -- namely American and Israeli --
critics, this deal is a non-starter today, being that the amount
negotiated is believed to be insufficient, still leaving Iran with
a nuclear breakout capability. They have lamented perceived Turkish
naivety in their seemingly genuine interpretation of Iranian goodwill,
seeing it instead as a hijack offering the Iranians a face-saving
opportunity to circumvent Western sanctions pressure.
The subsequent decision to vote against American-led sanctions has
exacerbated American frustration with Turkey, compounded by Erdogan's
rhetoric that continually asserts that Iran's nuclear program is
"peaceful and humanitarian."[30] Yet here too, Turkish policy may be
led by a degree of pragmatism; namely their belief that regardless
of the choice of coercive tools, neither the U.S. nor Israel will
be able to permanently stop the Iranian nuclear program. Engagement
then becomes a necessity to avoid a nuclear-armed enemy along the
Southern periphery. This quiet appreciation of Iranian intentions has
been voiced by Turkish President Abdullah Gul who privately stated,
"I do believe their final intention is to have a nuclear weapon,
because it is related to their national pride."[31]
Despite controversy over the exact intention of Turkey's Middle
Eastern policy, what is abundantly clear is that Israel will be the
sacrificial lamb to help in its realization. Turkey was once one of
the first countries to recognize Israel and saw it as a strategic
ally critical for ambitious defense modernization aims and a source
of solidarity against troublesome neighbors. The winds have shifted
substantially since then, with many of those same neighbors becoming
the benefactors of Turkish courtship. As a result the utility of the
Israeli alliance has diminished considerably, leading the Israelis
to correctly lament that Turkey is "seeking to integrate with the
Muslim world at Israel's expense."[32]
With the primacy of economic interdependence foremost in the
AKP's foreign policy mindset, Turkish-Israeli bilateral trade has
declined 30% from the record high of $3.5bn in 2008 to stand at a
relatively measly $2.5bn in 2009, two thirds of which constitute
Israeli defense exports.[33] Here, too, strains have emerged, as
Turkey grows increasingly dissatisfied with Israeli military tenders,
leading a former Israeli Ambassador to profess concern that "military
ties will fade away." [34] Technical issues, delayed deliveries,
and failed commitments have all been problems, seen most recently
in the failure of Israel's IAI-Elbit to deliver the Heron system in
line with the Turkish Air Force's specifications.[35] Even without
this lingering discontent, quite simply put, the economic costs of
severing ties with Israel are vastly outweighed by the benefits of
rapprochement with its enemies. The specialized nature of Israeli
defense technology is an issue, but the United States remains Turkey's
largest arms supplier, and Erdogan has dismissed any ideas that its
tensions with Israel affect its U.S. relations, stating, "America's
policy in the region is not dictated by Israel."[36]
On broader strategic issues too, Israel and Turkey have diverged.
Scarcely a decade ago, common hostility towards Syria helped glue an
alliance together. In 1998, as Turkey threatened Syrians with military
intervention for their intervention of PKK rebel leader Abdullah
Ocalan, Turkish editorials conveyed their sense of solidarity with
Israel, famously stating, "We will say shalom to the Israelis on the
Golan Heights."[37] Today, with normalized relations and growing trade
between Turkey and Syria, the divergence in Israeli-Turkish strategic
sync is palpable, and Erdogan has not shied away from declaring
Israel "the principal threat to peace" in the Middle East.[38] In
an indication of the times, it was from the Syrian city of Aleppo
that Davutoglu launched a blistering criticism of Israeli policies
in October 2009. Turkish overtures towards Israeli arch-nemesis Iran
have not helped matters either. Tel Aviv has frostily met Erdogan's
linking of Iranian nuclear ambitions with Israeli nuclear capability
and Gazan policies, while staunchly opposing any action besides
diplomacy in tackling the Iranian nuclear issue.
Erdogan's ideological slant has also resulted in a re-assessed
understanding of the Palestinian plight, as has the colder recognition
of the issue's resonance across the Muslim world. Viewing Israel's
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza as a betrayal of his attempt to broker
mediation between Israel and Syria, Erdogan has since shown little
regard for Israeli sensibilities. He termed the Gaza incursion as
"genocide" and publicly lambasted Israeli President Shimon Peres at
the World Economic Forum in Davos, calling him a "liar" and declaring
"when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill."[39] Days later,
in an unprecedented development, Turkey abruptly disinvited Israel from
Anatolian Eagle, a joint air-force exercise. Adding insult to injury,
the Turks then promptly invited Syria for joint military exercises
and urged the creation of a joint Strategic Coordination Council.
Erdogan has shown a penchant for solidarity with Hamas, comparing
it to the AKP and its own history of being banned and sidelined
from mainstream politics. Turkey was a prominent supporter of Hamas
after its electoral victory in 2006 and has hosted Hamas leader
Khaled Mashaal in Ankara, granting him an audience with then Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul. Furthermore, the AKP has called Western-backed
Mahmoud Abbas, the "head of an illegitimate government."[40] Erdogan
has defended this outreach, stating Turkish beliefs that Hamas is a
political reality whose sidelining is counterproductive.
Thin skins on both sides have not allowed the tension to ebb. The new
Netanyahu government has often reacting to Turkish provocations, such
as Erdogan's description of the city of Jerusalem as the "apple of the
eye of each and every Muslim"[41] with undiplomatic and unnecessary
snubs of their own. They include the public humiliation of Turkish
Ambassador Oguz Celikkol by Israeli Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon,
who seated the Ambassador in a much lower chair in full view of news
cameras. The Israeli raid on the Gaza flotilla has further widened the
Gulf between the two countries. The Turks have termed Israeli actions
"state terrorism" and "banditry",[42] while a recent opinion poll in
Israel demonstrated 78% regarding Turkey as an "enemy state."[43]
Another source of Western concern has centered around the Turkish
embrace of Russia, ignoring that it is driven less by ideology than
whole-scale Turkish dependence on Russian energy exports. As Turkey's
single largest trading partner, constituting 11.4% of the Turkish
trade balance, Russo-Turkish economic links are on the upswing with
protocols signed to bring the trade volume to $100bn over the next 5
years.[44] Currently, however, the Turkish export share is a small
$3bn slice of the aggregate $22bn trade volume[45], with the vast
majority centering around the 64% strangehold that Russia exerts
on Turkish energy imports. The Russians have also agreed to build
Turkey's first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.[46] Consequently, Turkey
has found itself in a tough bargaining position, with its energy needs
forecasted to double over the next decade and price renegotiations due
in 2011 with a supplier not averse to manipulating prices for political
reasons. The point was hammered home in the aftermath of the Russian
invasion of Georgia. Pushed hard to act by the West, Turkey found
itself on the receiving end of Russian anger, with Russian-imposed
customs checks and export restrictions as well as the closure of the
BTC pipeline imposing significant economic costs upon the Turks.[47]
Resultantly, when it comes to the Russians, Turkish overtures are less
an attempt to re-balance eastward than an attempt to mitigate their
dependence. But historical mistrust lingering from Turkey's NATO
allegiance and its frontline anti-Soviet role during the Cold War
is an obstacle. Moreover, Russia has rarely hidden its intention to
thwart Turkish ambitions in reinventing themselves as a major energy
transit corridor for Caspian and Middle Eastern energy exports to
Europe. Turkish-sponsored pipelines such as Nabucco would ease the
Russian monopoly on European energy enhancing price competitiveness
in an arena that upends much of the Russian budget. In past years
the Russians have gone as far as making attractive offers to Azeri
energy suppliers in an attempt to tweak them off Nabucco.[48]
Despite this hierarchy in relations, Turkey and Russia do have a
level of strategic sync in their relations that they have attempted to
leverage. They shared an interest against the Bush Administration's
promotion of democracy in Central Asia, worrying on it being
potentially destabilizing. They also share an interest in retaining
the Black Sea as a 'Turkish lake' without NATO intrusion. And both
see in each other sizeable markets ripe for exploitation. With these
interests in mind, Erdogan has made several trips to Moscow and in 2004
hosted President Putin, the first visit by a Russian head of state
in 32 years. Subsequent visits have resulted in the mutual lifting
of short-term visas to facilitate tourism and trade.[49]Any recent
concessions, however, are driven primarily by Russian strategic
concerns; namely their newfound interest in transit routes that
traverse Turkey. The South Stream pipeline is intended as both a
counterweight to Nabucco as well to circumvent Ukraine and Belarus,
whose long-term reliability is a concern for Russia. In this vein
the Russians have also found it in their interest to collaborate
on other pipelines such as the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline as well
as Blue Stream 2 that would ship Russian oil to countries such as
Lebanon. Certainly Turkey stands to gain sizeable transit fees from all
these investments, but the idea that they reflect a complete revamp of
the Russo-Turkish relationship is entirely misplaced. This is noted
in Turkey's explicit attempts to wean themselves off Russian oil,
codified in their 2010-2014 strategic energy plan which seeks to
increase domestic reserves and diversify supply so a to ensure no
single supplier contributes more than 50% of Turkish needs.[50]
Beyond the Russians, the Turks are also straddling a fine line
in their relations with the Arabs. The oft-touted advantage that
Turkish secularism and its economic and technological advances
can be exported to the Arab world can cut both ways. The Kemalist
mistrust that erected that firewalled Turkey from the Middle East
was predicated on the exact worry that influence can run the other
way. Without sufficient care, over time authoritarianism and the
'cultural swamp' of Middle Eastern politics and security dynamics
can be imported instead, ruining Turkey's most cherished values.
This aggressive adoption of the Palestinian cause while politically
advantageous at home and further afield in the Muslim world is not
a riskless strategy either.
Turkey is essentially stealing Iran's mantle as the primary champion
of the Palestinian cause[51] and while the Iranians may presently
benefit from a vocal supporter like Turkey, in time the usurping of
their influence in Palestine and Iraq is bound to irritate.
Simultaneously, Turkish efforts have exposed the impotence of
many Arab regimes in delivering on their rhetorical support for
Palestinians. Erdogan's celebrity and the steady advance of progressive
Turkish culture into the Arab mainstream threatens to expose the
authoritarian unpopularity of many Arab regimes and their legitimacy
deficits, all unlikely to have endeared Turkey to ruling Arab elites.
The Turkish swing has also begun to cost its credibility in its
cherished role as an unbiased regional interlocutor. Its embrace of
Hamas has earned it the mistrust of Fatah factions and Egypt, making
its role in Hamas-Fatah talks significantly more challenging.[52]
Its previous ability to bring together Syria and Israel for talks are
unlikely to be replicated in the near future, given the prevailing
Israeli belief that Turkey has swung decisively against its favor. The
U.S., too, is viewing Turkey with alarm in the aftermath of its
unilateral uranium exchange deal with Iran and public opposition to
sanctions and coercive pressure.
Similarly, many Sunni Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia have
found themselves being forced to inadvertently compete with Turkey
for regional influence. They remain suspicious of Turkish intentions
viewing its 'neo-Ottoman' rhetoric and growing friendliness with their
Shia rivals, Iran and Syria, with considerable trepidation. All this
has led critics to charge that Turkey, contrary to popular belief,
is not a diplomatic heavyweight in the region, but rather one with
too many balls in the air spreading itself thin and heading for a
significant loss of credibility. As one Egyptian official put it,
"Turkey is a large and clumsy player... They haven't been well versed
in Middle Eastern affairs for a long time... They would like to prove
to the West they are an effective player. But I have my doubts about
concrete impact"[53]
Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute is undoubtedly
correct when he succinctly notes "Turkey in 2010 is not the same
Turkey as a decade ago."[54] It has made vast strides in extending
its economic and political weight far beyond its traditional sphere
of influence. Yet Turks themselves would do well to remember they
remain vulnerable, caught between poles and not yet unbound of their
Western shackles. Eastern outreach has real tangible benefits for the
United States and Europe with Turkish potential to serve as a European
energy corridor erode the Russian monopoly as well as a real bridge
in promoting a democratic and technically advanced Islamic model
that the Middle East has continually failed to provide. It can also
use its economic clout to make inroads into tackling the economic
backwardness in the region, while simultaneously enriching itself
and becoming an increasingly attractive partner for accession.
Turkey would do well, however, to remember that its attractiveness
in the Middle East stems largely from its political and social
modernity that owe much to its European partners. It remains a
regional military force few will tangle with precisely because of
its NATO security blanket and its close American partnership. The
U.S. retains strong levers of influence it can utilize with relative
ease, given that the US-Turkish relationship is predominantly a
"state-to-state relationship," with relatively small volumes of trade
and cultural exchange.[55] These include cutting back on arms sales,
ratcheting down support in Brussels, cutting Turkey out of Western-led
Middle Eastern peace initiatives and reassessing support for Turkey
on contentious positions such as Cyprus and Armenia, all enormously
damaging for Turkish ambitions.
In international politics perceptions often guide reality. While Turkey
may not seek to alienate the West, its demagoguery of Israel raises
concerns. If it truly aspires to regional leadership, it must dispense
of the hypocrisy that allows it to criticize Israel but not Hamas,
Hezbollah, and other terrorist outfits. It may be its prerogative
to criticize the U.S. operation in Fallujah as "genocide,"[56] but
then it must too recognize the atrocities so nakedly apparent in the
Sudan, Iran, and its own heavy-handedness against its homegrown Kurdish
insurgency. Playing to domestic or regional xenophobia in the East is
little more than an act of brinksmanship for the West. Balancing is
never an easy task, but Turkey would do well to look back occasionally
as it marches forward.
By Varun Vira www.foreignpolicyjournal.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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http://www.aina.org/news/20100615030047.htm
From: A. Papazian