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SOUTH CAUCASUS LACKS 'REGIONAL IDENTITY'
news.az
June 17 2010
Azerbaijan
Kornely K. Kakachia News.Az interviews Kornely K. Kakachia, visiting
fellow on the Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government.
What are the main threats to security and development in the Southern
Caucasus region?
Regional unity and the unresolved 'frozen and unfrozen conflicts'
remain the biggest hurdle to fully developing regional security
architecture in the South Caucasus. In order to survive, each state
has chosen to align itself with external powers and these powers
sometimes misuse regional states for their own geopolitical interests.
But the biggest challenge to regional development and the region itself
is the absence of 'regional identity'. With its ill-defined borders,
weak economic links and lack of the 'us' feeling of a shared identity,
the South Caucasus could not yet be called a coherent region. In
this sense, the 'region' exists only for outside players which to
some degree undermines regional development and security.
Do you think that Turkish peacemaking activity in the South Caucasus
can bring positive results?
The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia struck a nerve in Ankara
and catalysed Turkey's further expansion in the South Caucasus. As it
seems now, Turkey has a new vision of becoming an independent regional
soft power with zero problems with its neighbours. In particular,
Turkey, is struggling to balance its strategic interest in forging
ties with Armenia with its loyalties to historic ally Azerbaijan.
However, it remains to be seen how Ankara can manage to proceed with
rapprochement with Armenia without 'sacrificing' Azerbaijani interest.
Regional states, including Georgia, carefully observe how Turkey
is dealing with its main strategic allies in the region. In order
to be considered a 'legitimate' conflict manager in the Caucasus,
Turkish foreign policy must be tuned with that of the US and EU which
is not quite the case at present. Provided strong western backing,
Turkish diplomacy can have some success in peacemaking activities in
the region.
Do you believe that Tbilisi can restore its control over Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, and what would this require?
After the war, Russian diplomacy is trying to create a 'new reality'
in which two 'sovereign' states should become independent and Georgia
should put up with it, beginning its relations with Russia from
scratch. However, the Kremlin knows that this mission is impossible
in the foreseeable future, as the international community will
not accept forcible changes of borders based on ethnic cleansing
and a unilateral declaration of cessation. Moreover, neither the
Georgian people nor any Georgian leader will agree to recognize the
'independence' of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or engage in talks related
to dismemberment of the country. In addition, the status quo based on
'injustice' cannot be maintained for a long period. I think in the
short term it will be difficult, but in the long term Georgia could
be able to 'win the hearts and minds' of the Abkhaz and Ossetians,
provided it continues to develop democracy and economic reform at
home. There are also some signs that Moscow realized that it is not
in its interest to support the 'Balkanization' of the Caucasus, as
it has its own stake in the region. So all these factors in the long
run may change the dynamics of these conflicts.
What is the likelihood of a new war in Georgia over these secessionist
regions?
Critical analysis of Russian-Georgian interstate relations over the
last two decades suggests that there has never been an independent
Georgian government that was acceptable to Russia, and it is unlikely
that there will be one any time soon. So taking this fact into account,
one must never exclude a new Russian military adventure in Georgia,
as Russia's rulers probably see a good deal of unfinished business
there. Moreover, Russia has failed to achieve the desired outcome in
regard to Georgia's NATO membership. Although the prospect of Georgia's
membership might seem more distant now than it would have been without
the Russian military aggression, it is not at all taken by NATO's
enlargement agenda. However, for the time being Georgia's highest
priority is to settle these conflicts peacefully, using direct dialogue
with local populations and impartial mediation by the international
community and it is unlikely that there will be any conflict.
How likely is a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh,
because the Azerbaijani authorities say that it could be the only
way to solve the occupation problem if the negotiations fail?
I think that notwithstanding the increasingly harsh military rhetoric,
both the Azerbaijani and Armenian leadership realize that war is the
last resort. As the Russian-Georgian conflict highlighted, escalation
of conflict may not change much on the ground. While seeking mutual
concession, both sides should be aware of the pressure exerted by
IDPs and refugees on political decision makers that may spark a new,
undesirable confrontation. I am convinced that a new conflict would
not have a winner; only external powers would benefit from it.
Can Azerbaijan and Georgia's membership of NATO or establishment of
NATO bases in their territories enhance regional security?
NATO membership, if granted to Azerbaijan and Georgia in the future,
may straighten the position of these countries in the region. However,
as of today, it looks that neither NATO nor its member states are
ready to take the risks associated with their involvement in frozen
conflicts in the South Caucasus. So while NATO is trying to redefine
its new global priorities, it is important to realize that peace and
economic prosperity in the South Caucasus are possible only when one
country of the region starts regarding the threat to its neighbour as
a threat to itself and protects the interests of its neighbours as it
would protect its own. Sadly enough, this sort of security perception
is lacking at the moment.
Kornely K. Kakachia is the Associate Professor of Political Science
Department at Tbilisi State University and Visiting fellow of the
Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University's Kennedy School
of Government..
From: A. Papazian
news.az
June 17 2010
Azerbaijan
Kornely K. Kakachia News.Az interviews Kornely K. Kakachia, visiting
fellow on the Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government.
What are the main threats to security and development in the Southern
Caucasus region?
Regional unity and the unresolved 'frozen and unfrozen conflicts'
remain the biggest hurdle to fully developing regional security
architecture in the South Caucasus. In order to survive, each state
has chosen to align itself with external powers and these powers
sometimes misuse regional states for their own geopolitical interests.
But the biggest challenge to regional development and the region itself
is the absence of 'regional identity'. With its ill-defined borders,
weak economic links and lack of the 'us' feeling of a shared identity,
the South Caucasus could not yet be called a coherent region. In
this sense, the 'region' exists only for outside players which to
some degree undermines regional development and security.
Do you think that Turkish peacemaking activity in the South Caucasus
can bring positive results?
The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia struck a nerve in Ankara
and catalysed Turkey's further expansion in the South Caucasus. As it
seems now, Turkey has a new vision of becoming an independent regional
soft power with zero problems with its neighbours. In particular,
Turkey, is struggling to balance its strategic interest in forging
ties with Armenia with its loyalties to historic ally Azerbaijan.
However, it remains to be seen how Ankara can manage to proceed with
rapprochement with Armenia without 'sacrificing' Azerbaijani interest.
Regional states, including Georgia, carefully observe how Turkey
is dealing with its main strategic allies in the region. In order
to be considered a 'legitimate' conflict manager in the Caucasus,
Turkish foreign policy must be tuned with that of the US and EU which
is not quite the case at present. Provided strong western backing,
Turkish diplomacy can have some success in peacemaking activities in
the region.
Do you believe that Tbilisi can restore its control over Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, and what would this require?
After the war, Russian diplomacy is trying to create a 'new reality'
in which two 'sovereign' states should become independent and Georgia
should put up with it, beginning its relations with Russia from
scratch. However, the Kremlin knows that this mission is impossible
in the foreseeable future, as the international community will
not accept forcible changes of borders based on ethnic cleansing
and a unilateral declaration of cessation. Moreover, neither the
Georgian people nor any Georgian leader will agree to recognize the
'independence' of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or engage in talks related
to dismemberment of the country. In addition, the status quo based on
'injustice' cannot be maintained for a long period. I think in the
short term it will be difficult, but in the long term Georgia could
be able to 'win the hearts and minds' of the Abkhaz and Ossetians,
provided it continues to develop democracy and economic reform at
home. There are also some signs that Moscow realized that it is not
in its interest to support the 'Balkanization' of the Caucasus, as
it has its own stake in the region. So all these factors in the long
run may change the dynamics of these conflicts.
What is the likelihood of a new war in Georgia over these secessionist
regions?
Critical analysis of Russian-Georgian interstate relations over the
last two decades suggests that there has never been an independent
Georgian government that was acceptable to Russia, and it is unlikely
that there will be one any time soon. So taking this fact into account,
one must never exclude a new Russian military adventure in Georgia,
as Russia's rulers probably see a good deal of unfinished business
there. Moreover, Russia has failed to achieve the desired outcome in
regard to Georgia's NATO membership. Although the prospect of Georgia's
membership might seem more distant now than it would have been without
the Russian military aggression, it is not at all taken by NATO's
enlargement agenda. However, for the time being Georgia's highest
priority is to settle these conflicts peacefully, using direct dialogue
with local populations and impartial mediation by the international
community and it is unlikely that there will be any conflict.
How likely is a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh,
because the Azerbaijani authorities say that it could be the only
way to solve the occupation problem if the negotiations fail?
I think that notwithstanding the increasingly harsh military rhetoric,
both the Azerbaijani and Armenian leadership realize that war is the
last resort. As the Russian-Georgian conflict highlighted, escalation
of conflict may not change much on the ground. While seeking mutual
concession, both sides should be aware of the pressure exerted by
IDPs and refugees on political decision makers that may spark a new,
undesirable confrontation. I am convinced that a new conflict would
not have a winner; only external powers would benefit from it.
Can Azerbaijan and Georgia's membership of NATO or establishment of
NATO bases in their territories enhance regional security?
NATO membership, if granted to Azerbaijan and Georgia in the future,
may straighten the position of these countries in the region. However,
as of today, it looks that neither NATO nor its member states are
ready to take the risks associated with their involvement in frozen
conflicts in the South Caucasus. So while NATO is trying to redefine
its new global priorities, it is important to realize that peace and
economic prosperity in the South Caucasus are possible only when one
country of the region starts regarding the threat to its neighbour as
a threat to itself and protects the interests of its neighbours as it
would protect its own. Sadly enough, this sort of security perception
is lacking at the moment.
Kornely K. Kakachia is the Associate Professor of Political Science
Department at Tbilisi State University and Visiting fellow of the
Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University's Kennedy School
of Government..
From: A. Papazian