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Escalation in Karabakh in the Context of President D. Medvedev's Visit
to the US and the Coming «Battle Over Iran»
en.fondsk.ruĞ?rbis Terrarum
23.06.2010
Andrei ARESHEV
The provocation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani Line of Contact in
Karabakh, in the proximity of the village of Chaylu, on the night of
June 19 had repercussions worldwide. The attempt of an Azerbaijani
reconnaissance group to cross the line left 4 Armenian conscripts dead
and 4 ` injured. Reportedly, some of the attackers were also killed.
Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev left for Baku unexpectedly after the
June 17 talks with his Russian and Armenian counterparts in St.
Petersburg, and the very next day the northern part of Karabakh's
Martakert region came under the Azerbaijani attack followed by 24
hours of continuous fire. Armenia termed the incident an act of armed
blackmail and a military extension of the politics of diplomatic
pressure exerted on it by Azerbaijan. There was an impression that the
region was on the verge of resuming full-scale hostilities.
Azerbaijan's defense and foreign ministries de facto accepted
responsibility for the outbreak of violence, stating that the Karabakh
conflict is not a frozen one and that Armenia stands to suffer even
more serious blows unless it withdraws from the disputed territories.
The obvious truth is that negotiations at gunpoint ` at the face of
capitulation demands ` are impossible. If, in evident anticipation of
a response that it would be possible to regard as casus belli,
Azerbaijan proceeds with the military pressure on Karabakh, the
situation thus created will fit into the pattern described by Gen. M.
Gareev as a part of the analysis of another war: `Throughout history,
country leaders were oftentimes oblivious to the multilateral nature
of military conflicts and wars, due to which things never evolve
entirely as planned. Opponents tend to take the least expected
steps'1.
The state of the Karabakh conflict was influenced by a number of
countries locked in a rivalry over the Caucasian energy resources and
transit routes. While watchers did discern the connection between the
trilateral meeting in St. Petersburg and the recent escalation in
Karabakh, it somehow flew below the radar that the skirmishes took
place on the eve of Russian President D. Medvedev's visit to the US
and against the backdrop of Washington's growing activity involving
Azerbaijan. Matthew J. Bryza, a diplomat notorious for the provocative
role he had played in August, 2008, was dispatched to Baku as the US
ambassador, US Secretary of Defense R. Gates honored the Absheron
Peninsula with his presense, and Washington announced that H. Clinton
will tour the Caucasus next July. On top of all that, a clearly
deceptive rumor goes around that Russian peacekeepres will soon be
deployed in Karabakh2.
Sergey Markedonov, currently a visiting scholar at the
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies,
maintains that chances for peace in Karabakh depend on the ability of
Washington and Moscow to jointly formulate resolute policies meant to
prevent fighting in the region. He is, however, highly skeptical about
the prospects for such synchronism between the two heavyweights3, and
indeed the Mensk Group's incoherent reaction to the recent escalation
seems to be indicative of serious discord. No international
investigation into the recent incident looms on the horizon, and Baku
can feel free to erode the current ceasefire regime with renewed
vigor.
The escalation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani Line of Contact in Karabakh
is likely incited by outside forces. Thomas de Waal, a British expert,
expressed the view that the parties to the Karabakh conflict would
have to be a lot more discontent with the status quo to start making
serious concessions4. The June 18 clashes were clearly meant to make
the status quo look like a not too attractive option, to expose the
volatility of the current situation, and to strengthen the dissonances
in Armenia's domestic politics5.
Overall, the developments suggest the existence of a broad agenda
which is not limited to discrediting the Russian-Armenian
military-political alliance and Russia as a mediator in Karabakh. Some
of the objectives may be of a more fundamental character, Iran likely
being the actual target. Iran is increasingly encircled by a network
of US military bases, and the new US Administration may be viewing the
Karabakh problem through the prism of the role Azerbaijan - as Iran's
neighbor - has a potential to play in a future campaign. No doubt,
Washington will be trying to draw Azerbaijan into the orbit of its
politics aimed at isolating and weakening Iran6.
Regardless of its outcome, a new round of fighting in Karabakh would
result in the complete expulsion of Russia from the South Caucasus,
become a logical outgrowth of the US anti-Iranian politics, and be a
prologue to a major war in the Middle East.
_______________________
(1) Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, #22, p. 10, 2010.
(2) The idea of deploying the US troops in the Fizuli district
bordering Iran is sold as a «joint Russian-US initiative» aimed at
countering the ambitions of Turkey and Iran in Transcaucasia.
(3) S. Markedonov. Karabakh Reverting to the Hot Phase //
http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=10314
(4) http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/170367/
(5) The plan is doomed to failure as the oppositional Armenian
National Congress pledges to spearhead the rescue of Karabakh.
(6) http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1296636.html
From: A. Papazian
to the US and the Coming «Battle Over Iran»
en.fondsk.ruĞ?rbis Terrarum
23.06.2010
Andrei ARESHEV
The provocation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani Line of Contact in
Karabakh, in the proximity of the village of Chaylu, on the night of
June 19 had repercussions worldwide. The attempt of an Azerbaijani
reconnaissance group to cross the line left 4 Armenian conscripts dead
and 4 ` injured. Reportedly, some of the attackers were also killed.
Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev left for Baku unexpectedly after the
June 17 talks with his Russian and Armenian counterparts in St.
Petersburg, and the very next day the northern part of Karabakh's
Martakert region came under the Azerbaijani attack followed by 24
hours of continuous fire. Armenia termed the incident an act of armed
blackmail and a military extension of the politics of diplomatic
pressure exerted on it by Azerbaijan. There was an impression that the
region was on the verge of resuming full-scale hostilities.
Azerbaijan's defense and foreign ministries de facto accepted
responsibility for the outbreak of violence, stating that the Karabakh
conflict is not a frozen one and that Armenia stands to suffer even
more serious blows unless it withdraws from the disputed territories.
The obvious truth is that negotiations at gunpoint ` at the face of
capitulation demands ` are impossible. If, in evident anticipation of
a response that it would be possible to regard as casus belli,
Azerbaijan proceeds with the military pressure on Karabakh, the
situation thus created will fit into the pattern described by Gen. M.
Gareev as a part of the analysis of another war: `Throughout history,
country leaders were oftentimes oblivious to the multilateral nature
of military conflicts and wars, due to which things never evolve
entirely as planned. Opponents tend to take the least expected
steps'1.
The state of the Karabakh conflict was influenced by a number of
countries locked in a rivalry over the Caucasian energy resources and
transit routes. While watchers did discern the connection between the
trilateral meeting in St. Petersburg and the recent escalation in
Karabakh, it somehow flew below the radar that the skirmishes took
place on the eve of Russian President D. Medvedev's visit to the US
and against the backdrop of Washington's growing activity involving
Azerbaijan. Matthew J. Bryza, a diplomat notorious for the provocative
role he had played in August, 2008, was dispatched to Baku as the US
ambassador, US Secretary of Defense R. Gates honored the Absheron
Peninsula with his presense, and Washington announced that H. Clinton
will tour the Caucasus next July. On top of all that, a clearly
deceptive rumor goes around that Russian peacekeepres will soon be
deployed in Karabakh2.
Sergey Markedonov, currently a visiting scholar at the
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies,
maintains that chances for peace in Karabakh depend on the ability of
Washington and Moscow to jointly formulate resolute policies meant to
prevent fighting in the region. He is, however, highly skeptical about
the prospects for such synchronism between the two heavyweights3, and
indeed the Mensk Group's incoherent reaction to the recent escalation
seems to be indicative of serious discord. No international
investigation into the recent incident looms on the horizon, and Baku
can feel free to erode the current ceasefire regime with renewed
vigor.
The escalation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani Line of Contact in Karabakh
is likely incited by outside forces. Thomas de Waal, a British expert,
expressed the view that the parties to the Karabakh conflict would
have to be a lot more discontent with the status quo to start making
serious concessions4. The June 18 clashes were clearly meant to make
the status quo look like a not too attractive option, to expose the
volatility of the current situation, and to strengthen the dissonances
in Armenia's domestic politics5.
Overall, the developments suggest the existence of a broad agenda
which is not limited to discrediting the Russian-Armenian
military-political alliance and Russia as a mediator in Karabakh. Some
of the objectives may be of a more fundamental character, Iran likely
being the actual target. Iran is increasingly encircled by a network
of US military bases, and the new US Administration may be viewing the
Karabakh problem through the prism of the role Azerbaijan - as Iran's
neighbor - has a potential to play in a future campaign. No doubt,
Washington will be trying to draw Azerbaijan into the orbit of its
politics aimed at isolating and weakening Iran6.
Regardless of its outcome, a new round of fighting in Karabakh would
result in the complete expulsion of Russia from the South Caucasus,
become a logical outgrowth of the US anti-Iranian politics, and be a
prologue to a major war in the Middle East.
_______________________
(1) Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, #22, p. 10, 2010.
(2) The idea of deploying the US troops in the Fizuli district
bordering Iran is sold as a «joint Russian-US initiative» aimed at
countering the ambitions of Turkey and Iran in Transcaucasia.
(3) S. Markedonov. Karabakh Reverting to the Hot Phase //
http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=10314
(4) http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/170367/
(5) The plan is doomed to failure as the oppositional Armenian
National Congress pledges to spearhead the rescue of Karabakh.
(6) http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1296636.html
From: A. Papazian