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  • Knot Of Independence

    KNOT OF INDEPENDENCE

    Russia Profile
    http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a1280342832
    July 28 2010

    The Partial Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Means Academic
    Analysis of the "Kosovo Precedent" Is No Longer Abstracted

    The UN International Court last week effectively recognized
    the legality of the Kosovo authorities' 2008 decision to declare
    independence from Serbia. But the significance of this problem goes
    far beyond the limits of formal jurisprudence. The "Casus Kosovo"
    has a bearing on the formation of the basic principles of world
    order. And if ethnic nationalism is allowed in the Balkans, why
    shouldn't it be allowed in the mountains of the Caucasus or in the
    deserts and tropics of Africa?

    After the Kosovo Parliament approved the declaration of independence
    of the former autonomous province of Serbia (which was examined at
    the UN International Court), both Russian and Western experts began
    to talk about the opening of a new chapter in history - of "the world
    after Kosovo." At the same time, to speak of the event as some kind
    of sensation would be misleading. It had been long expected.

    For two decades the Kosovo question has been one of the most difficult
    and entangled ethno-political problems on the Balkan peninsular. In
    1991 Kosovar Albanian leaders declared their independence, but the
    problem did not go beyond the scope of the Balkans. And that is why
    Albania was the only country supporting Kosovo 19 years ago, although
    later the idea of uniting the two Albanian states was withdrawn from
    the agenda.

    The new generation of Kosovar-Albanians, involved in the political
    conflict against Belgrade, began to view independence not as an
    intermediate stage, but as the ultimate goal. If anything, as an
    end in itself. After NATO's operation "Allied Force," (the 78-day
    bombing campaign from March 24 to June 10, 1999) ended in the de-facto
    secession of the former Serbian autonomous province, much became
    absolutely clear. Belgrade did not (and does not) have either the
    power or the practical, political-ideological, or moral-psychological
    resources to "Serbianize" the province.

    However, to limit its impact to only the Balkans would be false. The
    Kosovo Casus is a subject of intense study in the countries of
    the "parallel Commonwealth of Independent States" (Abkhazia, South
    Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr). In August 2008 two of the
    four republics of "CIS-2" compared their status with Kosovo's. They
    had become semi-recognized. The difference was only in the number of
    states which recognized that independence. The former Serb province was
    recognized by 69 countries, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia received
    only 4 nuanced recognitions. But the UN has recognized neither Kosovo,
    nor the two former Georgian autonomies. And the chances of Kosovo
    receiving such recognition in that famous building in New York is
    precisely nil, taking into account not so much the widely publicized
    position of Russia, but also the role played by China. Moscow can
    theoretically recognize the independence of the former Serb autonomous
    province if it betrays Belgrade. Beijing can afford itself the luxury
    of ignoring the Serb position since its celestial interests (Taiwan,
    Tibet) are in fact much more important than the political-psychological
    problems of distant Serbia.

    In this way, the 2008 political decision and the 2010 legal decision
    have led to (and will to lead to) a situation where the principle
    of ethnic self-determination comes to the foreground. This is
    how it was at the beginning of the twentieth century. Then, the
    right of a nation to "self-determination" between the two variants
    (Woodrow Wilson's liberalism and Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevism) became
    the cornerstone of the global system. There was one problem. All of
    the various national elites had their own images of what constituted
    "their land" and "their country," and these did not correspond with
    those of the other elites. That's why the Czechs looked fearfully at
    the Germans and Poles, the Poles at the Germans and the Czechs, and the
    Romanians at the Hungarians. The years 1938 to 1939 led to territorial
    integrity becoming the new political principal (which would later be
    formalized in the Helsinki agreement in 1975). The land surveying of
    postcolonial Africa was carried out according to this model.

    With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ethnic
    nationalism acquired new youth and vigor. In February 2008 the United
    States and its allies took responsibility for legitimizing a new state,
    and half a year later it was Russia that did so. In the first instance
    the politicians who made the decision believed that a multinational
    Kosovo within Serbia was impossible, and those in the second case
    believed the same thing about "reintegration of Georgia."

    Since in the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr the positions
    of the Russian Federation and the West do not differ dramatically, no
    one is shouldering the onus of responsibility for determining these
    "shards of empires." In Nagorno-Karabakh there are "strong" parties
    interested in maintaining the status-quo, and in the other case
    Moscow does not have a common border with the unrecognized republic,
    which is why it is not unnecessarily charging the situation.

    The problem is not about who is right and who is wrong. The Serbs
    and the Albanians, the Abkhaz and the Georgians, the Armenians and
    the Azeris could all draw up a long list of claims against each other
    (including on their historical right to territory). The ethnic groups
    are not to blame (even more so as they don't have legal personalities),
    but rather the principles and the approaches. Ethnic nationalism in
    its extreme forms leads to the appearance of the "Kosovo casus," in
    which in there appears in Europe a fairly lame state, the government
    of which is run by an old fighter called Hashim Tachi and nicknamed
    "the Snake." To what extent the Snake is able to solve the social
    and daily problems of his compatriots is debatable.

    Before, everything could be blamed on the evil will of Belgrade. Today
    it necessary to take responsibility, regulate the judicial system,
    bring into line corrupt officials, and the old comrades-in-arms of
    the Kosovo liberation army. There remains the question of the Kosovo
    precedent. And whoever wants to, of course, will see a precedent
    without any formal jurisprudence.

    Now, the question surrounding the recognition of Kosovo has become a
    matter of interpretation. To the benefit of such interpretations there
    has appeared a starting point in the form of the partly recognized
    republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And that is why all the
    discussions and arguments about the precedent of Kosovo are not
    abstracted academic analyses, as was the case before 2008.

    The event can be considered an evil, or a "triumph for democracy,"
    but the independence of Kosovo did not unite the great powers. The
    event didn't even unite Europe (as had been planned in many
    strategies concocted in Brussels). Five EU countries (Greece, Spain,
    Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) do not recognize the result of the
    self-determination of the former Serb autonomy. But then the whole
    of Europe united in a stance toward the recognition of Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia. Here Greece, Romania, France and Britain spoke with one
    voice. But, be that as it may, Kosovo will never be a part of Serbia,
    and Abkhazia and South Ossetia will hardly return to the care of
    "mother Georgia."

    In addition we shouldn't exclude the conflicts (or at the very
    least serious confrontations) between partly recognized republics
    and their military-political patrons. Just as yesterday's Kosovar
    field commanders are not ready to embrace the standards of Western
    democracy, the leaders of Abkhazia are not pleased about the arrival
    there of "colossal Russian business" (which is prepared to buy up
    their energy at source, take total control of tourist facilities,
    and take over the administrative business of the local authorities).

    However, these conflicts will not entail a growth in sympathy toward
    Belgrade or to Tbilisi. The political agenda will simply change
    slowly. Besides, this is all ahead. And in any case, it will be a
    different history for these post-Serbian and post-Georgian countries.

    Sergei Markedonov is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program Washington, DC




    From: A. Papazian
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