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Peter Henne
Security Fellow, Truman National Security Project
October 13, 2010
Huffington Post
Understanding Turkey's Foreign Policy
A few days ago, I returned from a trip to Turkey, sponsored by the Rumi
Forum. The trip included visits to four cities in Turkey and meetings with
community, business and political groups. As someone who studies Turkey, the
trip was an incredible opportunity to learn first-hand about a country I
already admire. I have discussed my thoughts on domestic issues in Turkey. I
also gained greater insight into the country's foreign policy.
Throughout the 20th century, Turkish politics was marked by the secular
nationalist image instilled in the country by Ataturk's dramatic
post-Ottoman reforms. The primary goal of the country's foreign policy was
to maintain its security and territorial integrity. This led to a hard
stance on minority issues such as the Kurds, hesitation to address the
Armenian issue, and tensions with Greece over Cyprus. It also contributed to
Turkey's US ties; fearful of the Soviet threat, Turkey allied itself with
America and joined NATO. It also established close ties with Israel.
Turkey's foreign policy has changed markedly since the rise of the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP), a conservative party with Islamist
roots. Opposition to Israeli policies has increased, as has hesitation to
support US military actions in Iraq. At the same time, Turkey has reached
out more to regional states such as Syria and Iran, made some progress on
the Armenia and Kurdish issues, and intensified its efforts to join the
European Union. These changes have led to a flurry of speculation, including
some decrying Turkey's Islamic or Eastern shift, and others claiming its
international relations can be explained by economic interests.
Neither approach is completely accurate. Turkey's relations with Israel and
the United States are more strained than they were throughout the Cold War,
but they do not represent a complete break. And claims of an Islamic shift
in Turkish foreign policy are contradicted by the AKP's great efforts to
join the EU. Instead, the two can be seen as part of Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu's "Zero-problems" approach to international relations, which
involves management of all regional and international issues. This includes
regional tensions such as Turkish-Syrian relations and Iran's nuclear
program.
At the same time, it would be inaccurate to claim economics or material
interests alone are driving these changes. Turkish people I met with did
discuss the monetary gains from the AKP's policies, but they also discussed
their support for the government in terms of its new approach to democracy,
and Turkey's historical and cultural ties to surrounding states. Beyond
this, there is the fact that something changed with the AKP; something about
this party led to a different approach to foreign policy. The potential
economic benefits from trade with Syria and EU membership, and the stability
to be gained from resolving the Iran issue were present before the AKP came
to power. That is, in order to explain Turkey's current foreign policy, one
cannot point solely to these international factors, which for the most part
remained constant.
Instead, I would argue, it is something about the AKP that led to these
changes. Again, it is not a story of an Islamist party coming to power.
Instead, we have a conservative party with a broad base. Their supporters
include business interests, religiously-minded voters, and minority groups.
And the AKP's leaders have a distinct belief in the important role Turkey
should play in international politics, which includes economic, security and
religious issues. Religion is important to AKP members and supporters, but
as a public value, not an Iranian-style theocracy.
When formulating foreign policy, then, Turkish leaders likely weigh these
various interests and concerns. Economic gains must be balanced against
security, domestic stability and religious values. At times these point in
the same direction; Turkish-Syrian ties satisfy Muslim identification among
voters, help Turkish businesses, ease regional tensions, raise Turkey's
international profile, and alleviate domestic unrest through economic
growth. At other times, these pressures may be counteracting each other,
such as in the case of Israel or relations with the United States over Iraq;
the increased prestige and domestic support gained through Turkish actions
on these issues accompany tensions with allies and possible regional
instability.
The answer, as always, is more complicated than most let on. Turkey is not
becoming an Islamist or anti-Western state, but it is also not only acting
on material incentives. Instead, its domestic politics, the makeup of its
governing party, and the current state of the international system have
combined to create a unique and dynamic foreign policy.
The important question, then, is what does this mean for the United States?
Turkey still values its ties with the United States, and there is a great
potential for the United States to work closely with Turkey on issues of
common concern, such as regional stability, counterterrorism and trade. But
America will have to accept some disagreements over the means through which
these goals are achieved, just as it does with other allies like Britain and
France.
Turkey's changing foreign policy is not a harbinger of a new multipolar
world. It is, however, the first chance for the Obama Administration to act
on its vision of a "multi-partner" world, which Secretary of State Clinton
has laid out. The manner in which the Administration deals with Turkey,
then, will have a great impact on its legacy and the US position in the 21st
century international system.
From: A. Papazian
Security Fellow, Truman National Security Project
October 13, 2010
Huffington Post
Understanding Turkey's Foreign Policy
A few days ago, I returned from a trip to Turkey, sponsored by the Rumi
Forum. The trip included visits to four cities in Turkey and meetings with
community, business and political groups. As someone who studies Turkey, the
trip was an incredible opportunity to learn first-hand about a country I
already admire. I have discussed my thoughts on domestic issues in Turkey. I
also gained greater insight into the country's foreign policy.
Throughout the 20th century, Turkish politics was marked by the secular
nationalist image instilled in the country by Ataturk's dramatic
post-Ottoman reforms. The primary goal of the country's foreign policy was
to maintain its security and territorial integrity. This led to a hard
stance on minority issues such as the Kurds, hesitation to address the
Armenian issue, and tensions with Greece over Cyprus. It also contributed to
Turkey's US ties; fearful of the Soviet threat, Turkey allied itself with
America and joined NATO. It also established close ties with Israel.
Turkey's foreign policy has changed markedly since the rise of the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP), a conservative party with Islamist
roots. Opposition to Israeli policies has increased, as has hesitation to
support US military actions in Iraq. At the same time, Turkey has reached
out more to regional states such as Syria and Iran, made some progress on
the Armenia and Kurdish issues, and intensified its efforts to join the
European Union. These changes have led to a flurry of speculation, including
some decrying Turkey's Islamic or Eastern shift, and others claiming its
international relations can be explained by economic interests.
Neither approach is completely accurate. Turkey's relations with Israel and
the United States are more strained than they were throughout the Cold War,
but they do not represent a complete break. And claims of an Islamic shift
in Turkish foreign policy are contradicted by the AKP's great efforts to
join the EU. Instead, the two can be seen as part of Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu's "Zero-problems" approach to international relations, which
involves management of all regional and international issues. This includes
regional tensions such as Turkish-Syrian relations and Iran's nuclear
program.
At the same time, it would be inaccurate to claim economics or material
interests alone are driving these changes. Turkish people I met with did
discuss the monetary gains from the AKP's policies, but they also discussed
their support for the government in terms of its new approach to democracy,
and Turkey's historical and cultural ties to surrounding states. Beyond
this, there is the fact that something changed with the AKP; something about
this party led to a different approach to foreign policy. The potential
economic benefits from trade with Syria and EU membership, and the stability
to be gained from resolving the Iran issue were present before the AKP came
to power. That is, in order to explain Turkey's current foreign policy, one
cannot point solely to these international factors, which for the most part
remained constant.
Instead, I would argue, it is something about the AKP that led to these
changes. Again, it is not a story of an Islamist party coming to power.
Instead, we have a conservative party with a broad base. Their supporters
include business interests, religiously-minded voters, and minority groups.
And the AKP's leaders have a distinct belief in the important role Turkey
should play in international politics, which includes economic, security and
religious issues. Religion is important to AKP members and supporters, but
as a public value, not an Iranian-style theocracy.
When formulating foreign policy, then, Turkish leaders likely weigh these
various interests and concerns. Economic gains must be balanced against
security, domestic stability and religious values. At times these point in
the same direction; Turkish-Syrian ties satisfy Muslim identification among
voters, help Turkish businesses, ease regional tensions, raise Turkey's
international profile, and alleviate domestic unrest through economic
growth. At other times, these pressures may be counteracting each other,
such as in the case of Israel or relations with the United States over Iraq;
the increased prestige and domestic support gained through Turkish actions
on these issues accompany tensions with allies and possible regional
instability.
The answer, as always, is more complicated than most let on. Turkey is not
becoming an Islamist or anti-Western state, but it is also not only acting
on material incentives. Instead, its domestic politics, the makeup of its
governing party, and the current state of the international system have
combined to create a unique and dynamic foreign policy.
The important question, then, is what does this mean for the United States?
Turkey still values its ties with the United States, and there is a great
potential for the United States to work closely with Turkey on issues of
common concern, such as regional stability, counterterrorism and trade. But
America will have to accept some disagreements over the means through which
these goals are achieved, just as it does with other allies like Britain and
France.
Turkey's changing foreign policy is not a harbinger of a new multipolar
world. It is, however, the first chance for the Obama Administration to act
on its vision of a "multi-partner" world, which Secretary of State Clinton
has laid out. The manner in which the Administration deals with Turkey,
then, will have a great impact on its legacy and the US position in the 21st
century international system.
From: A. Papazian