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THOMAS DE WAAL: ARMENIAN AND AZERBAIJANI LEADERS MERELY USING ENDLESSLY ELUSIVE KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS AS DEVICE TO KEEP INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SWEET
arminfo
Thursday, June 2, 13:16
With the flurry of foreign news at the moment, you will be forgiven
for missing the statement of Presidents Medvedev, Obama and Sarkozy
from the G8 summit Deauville on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. But
it is the most serious international declaration on the conflict for
many years, Thomas de Waal, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, the authors of a series of books and publication
on Karabakh, writes in his article "The other Failed Peace Process"
in The National Interest.
"For a decade and a half the world has barely noticed the
negotiations to resolve the longest- running protracted conflict
in the post-Communist world, the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over
Karabakh. The peace process is too closed and the issue too complex
and mysterious for anyone but the poor tiny benighted group of analysts
(such as myself) who do follow it to take notice.
The statement made on May 26 by the three heads of state of
the mediating powers, makes it clear that a moment of truth is
approaching. At Kazan in late June, President Dmitry Medvedev, backed
by the French and U.S. mediators, will make a strong push to have
Presidents Aliev and Sarkisian finally cut a deal on the Document on
Basic Principles that they have been discussing for more than five
years now.
As I have argued before in The National Interest, the Karabakh
conflict gets only a fraction of the attention that Kosovo did but
is in a much more strategically sensitive neighborhood. If one of
the two sides-and basically this means the losing side from the
1991-94 conflict, Azerbaijan-chooses to go back to war, it will be
a catastrophe. The Deauville declaration says, "The use of force
created the current situation of confrontation and instability. Its
use again would only bring more suffering and devastation, and would
be condemned by the international community."
The Document on Basic Principles aims to bridge the sovereignty
conundrum at the heart of the conflict. In Soviet times, Nagorny
Karabakh was an Armenian-majority autonomous region inside Soviet
Azerbaijan. Since their military victory in 1994, the Armenians have
controlled not just Karabakh itself-which they say they will never
give up-but also a "buffer zone" of Azerbaijani territories around it,
which they say they will renounce if their possession of Karabakh is
ensured. For their part, the Azerbaijanis press their international
de jure claim to Karabakh and are pouring revenues from oil and gas
into building up a new powerful army.
The Basic Principles document offers constructive ambiguity. It
stipulates a gradual Armenian withdrawal from the territories around
Karabakh; "interim status" for Karabakh itself, giving it enhanced
international legitimacy but not full independence; and the promise in
the future of a popular vote, a "legally-binding expression of will"
to determine the future status of the territory.
But here come the doubts. Despite intense talks in private, in public
the leaders still voice maximalist positions and call on their
adversary to surrender. The rhetoric is especially brutal on the
Azerbaijani side. The day after the Deauville declaration, Azerbaijani
deputy prime minister Ali Hasanov called the Armenian president a
"criminal" and his government a "fascist regime" which needs to be
"overthrown."
So it comes down to political will. Are the Armenian and Azerbaijani
leaders merely using the endlessly elusive Karabakh peace process as a
device to keep the international community sweet and to demand loyalty
from their populations, while never seriously wishing to sign a peace?
Or are they genuinely committed to a peace agreement which would begin
the long-term transformation of their region, but trapped by their own
national discourse and political rhetoric and afraid to move forward?
Or a bit of both?
This is why I welcome the line in the Deauville document which says,
"Further delay would only call into question the commitment of the
sides to reach an agreement." Or to put it another way, "We now have
a workable document. Prove to us you are serious and sign it."
It is a matter of international will too. Foreign powers have to
be serious as well. Absent strong domestic support for peace, it is
internationals who will have to stiffen the resolve of the presidents
and shape a new discourse of compromise. They will have to make a
commitment to a reconstruction and peacekeeping operation. Russia, the
United States and the EU have worked well together in the negotiation
process, but, given all their diverse interests in the Caucasus,
their bilateral agendas with both countries and all the competing
claims on their resources, it will be tough to construct a joint
postconflict settlement for Karabakh.
This will be especially important if the framework plan is agreed and
there comes the inevitable hiatus between an initial agreement and
progress on the ground. The spoilers will rush in to try to destroy
it. Remember Oslo and the Middle East.
So, as the Kazan meeting approaches, the stakes are raised for both
peace and war in the Caucasus," Thomas de Waal writes.
arminfo
Thursday, June 2, 13:16
With the flurry of foreign news at the moment, you will be forgiven
for missing the statement of Presidents Medvedev, Obama and Sarkozy
from the G8 summit Deauville on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. But
it is the most serious international declaration on the conflict for
many years, Thomas de Waal, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, the authors of a series of books and publication
on Karabakh, writes in his article "The other Failed Peace Process"
in The National Interest.
"For a decade and a half the world has barely noticed the
negotiations to resolve the longest- running protracted conflict
in the post-Communist world, the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over
Karabakh. The peace process is too closed and the issue too complex
and mysterious for anyone but the poor tiny benighted group of analysts
(such as myself) who do follow it to take notice.
The statement made on May 26 by the three heads of state of
the mediating powers, makes it clear that a moment of truth is
approaching. At Kazan in late June, President Dmitry Medvedev, backed
by the French and U.S. mediators, will make a strong push to have
Presidents Aliev and Sarkisian finally cut a deal on the Document on
Basic Principles that they have been discussing for more than five
years now.
As I have argued before in The National Interest, the Karabakh
conflict gets only a fraction of the attention that Kosovo did but
is in a much more strategically sensitive neighborhood. If one of
the two sides-and basically this means the losing side from the
1991-94 conflict, Azerbaijan-chooses to go back to war, it will be
a catastrophe. The Deauville declaration says, "The use of force
created the current situation of confrontation and instability. Its
use again would only bring more suffering and devastation, and would
be condemned by the international community."
The Document on Basic Principles aims to bridge the sovereignty
conundrum at the heart of the conflict. In Soviet times, Nagorny
Karabakh was an Armenian-majority autonomous region inside Soviet
Azerbaijan. Since their military victory in 1994, the Armenians have
controlled not just Karabakh itself-which they say they will never
give up-but also a "buffer zone" of Azerbaijani territories around it,
which they say they will renounce if their possession of Karabakh is
ensured. For their part, the Azerbaijanis press their international
de jure claim to Karabakh and are pouring revenues from oil and gas
into building up a new powerful army.
The Basic Principles document offers constructive ambiguity. It
stipulates a gradual Armenian withdrawal from the territories around
Karabakh; "interim status" for Karabakh itself, giving it enhanced
international legitimacy but not full independence; and the promise in
the future of a popular vote, a "legally-binding expression of will"
to determine the future status of the territory.
But here come the doubts. Despite intense talks in private, in public
the leaders still voice maximalist positions and call on their
adversary to surrender. The rhetoric is especially brutal on the
Azerbaijani side. The day after the Deauville declaration, Azerbaijani
deputy prime minister Ali Hasanov called the Armenian president a
"criminal" and his government a "fascist regime" which needs to be
"overthrown."
So it comes down to political will. Are the Armenian and Azerbaijani
leaders merely using the endlessly elusive Karabakh peace process as a
device to keep the international community sweet and to demand loyalty
from their populations, while never seriously wishing to sign a peace?
Or are they genuinely committed to a peace agreement which would begin
the long-term transformation of their region, but trapped by their own
national discourse and political rhetoric and afraid to move forward?
Or a bit of both?
This is why I welcome the line in the Deauville document which says,
"Further delay would only call into question the commitment of the
sides to reach an agreement." Or to put it another way, "We now have
a workable document. Prove to us you are serious and sign it."
It is a matter of international will too. Foreign powers have to
be serious as well. Absent strong domestic support for peace, it is
internationals who will have to stiffen the resolve of the presidents
and shape a new discourse of compromise. They will have to make a
commitment to a reconstruction and peacekeeping operation. Russia, the
United States and the EU have worked well together in the negotiation
process, but, given all their diverse interests in the Caucasus,
their bilateral agendas with both countries and all the competing
claims on their resources, it will be tough to construct a joint
postconflict settlement for Karabakh.
This will be especially important if the framework plan is agreed and
there comes the inevitable hiatus between an initial agreement and
progress on the ground. The spoilers will rush in to try to destroy
it. Remember Oslo and the Middle East.
So, as the Kazan meeting approaches, the stakes are raised for both
peace and war in the Caucasus," Thomas de Waal writes.