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Peace For Our Time In Nagorno-Karabakh

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  • Peace For Our Time In Nagorno-Karabakh

    PEACE FOR OUR TIME IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
    By Thomas de Waal

    The Moscow Times
    http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/peace-for-our-time-in-nagorno-karabakh/439421.html
    June 24 2011
    Russia

    Call it a sleeping volcano, the elephant or perhaps even the mammoth
    in the room. The Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is the
    longest-running unresolved dispute in the former Soviet Union, dating
    back to 1988. Much is at stake, from the ordinary human predicament
    of more than 1 million people displaced by war to the strategic map
    of the South Caucasus, which has been tied up by this dispute for
    a generation.

    The peace process for Nagorno-Karabakh, mediated by the co-chairs
    of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
    in Europe, France, Russia and the United States, does not get much
    attention, for understandable reasons. It has dragged on for years
    without results. There is nothing newsworthy about it. Negotiations
    are conducted behind closed doors between an inner group of about a
    dozen individuals, making it very closed - in fact, far too closed
    for its own good.

    A few near successes trumpeted by the mediators over the years
    inevitably evoke cynicism about the latest initiative. Many Armenians,
    having won a military victory in 1994, do not want to give up captured
    territory in return for an uncertain future. Many Azeris, flush with
    oil and gas revenues, believe they can wait until circumstances turn
    more in their favor in a few years.

    This time could be different, however. President Dmitry Medvedev
    has convened a meeting of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian
    President Serzh Sargsyan in Kazan on Friday. He is calling on them to
    agree to a framework deal, the Document on Basic Principles, which
    the parties to the conflict have been discussing in various drafts
    since 2007 and whose basic ideas were first formulated in 2004. In
    other words, a small document has been under discussion for a period
    longer than World War II. It is truly a moment of decision.

    The outline of the Document on Basic Principles was released into the
    public domain in two declarations made at the Group of Eight summits
    at L'Aquila and Muskoka in 2009 and 2010. It consists of six elements
    that seek to reconcile the Armenian aspiration for Nagorno-Karabakh's
    secession with Azerbaijan's claim to territorial integrity.

    The six elements, as stated at Muskoka, are: "The return of the
    occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; interim status
    for Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing security and self-governance;
    a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; final status of
    Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in the future by a legally binding
    expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons and
    refugees to return; and international security guarantees, including
    a peacekeeping operation."

    The most eye-catching elements in this package are the second
    and fourth points, which try to square the impossible issue
    of Nagorno-Karabakh's status. They are designed to persuade the
    Armenian side to give up the Azeri territories it captured outside
    Nagorno-Karabakh and has kept as a "security zone" pending a decision
    on the future status of the disputed enclave. The innovative term
    "interim status" will fascinate diplomats and international legal
    scholars as they ponder similar sovereignty disputes. It means a
    status that falls short of independence but gives Nagorno-Karabakh a
    place in the international system it does not have at the moment. The
    "legally binding expression of will" constitutes the theoretical
    promise of a vote on independence for the Armenian side. The timing
    and modalities of such a vote are the main target of concern for the
    Azeri side as it goes to Kazan.

    The declaration made at the G8 summit in Deauville in May by Medvedev,
    U.S. President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy
    crystallized the impression that the mediators have decided that
    now is the moment - five years on - to make the leaders bridge their
    differences on the Document on Basic Principles. The differences on
    paper are small enough for Medvedev to raise the stakes and demand
    his two colleagues to close the deal.

    Medvedev has personally involved himself in this process. This is the
    fifth meeting he has convened, and he has edited the document himself.

    His central role usefully turns the spotlight on Aliyev and Sargsyan
    so that they have fewer places to hide. It also exposes him and his
    reputation to the risk of failure.

    Up until now, resistance in the region to a peace settlement has
    always been stronger than international pressure. The suspicion has
    always been that the Armenian and Azeri leaders are too comfortable
    with their status quo, bad as it is for their citizens, and prefer
    not to step into terra incognita, unleash domestic opposition and make
    peace with the enemy. Leaders on both sides - especially Azerbaijan,
    the losing party in the conflict of 1991-1994 - continue to use strong
    nationalist rhetoric at home, even as they negotiate peace in private
    in foreign capitals. For peace to begin to happen on the ground,
    there needs to be a "rhetoric cease-fire" in which trust can start
    to form gradually between the two conflicting parties.

    It is worth underscoring the amazing fact that for all the years of
    diplomacy that have gone into it, the Document on Basic Principles
    is only a framework agreement. If it is agreed, there will then be a
    push to sign a comprehensive peace treaty several months down the line.

    That also means there will be a dangerous moment of hiatus in which
    even if initial agreement is reached, heavy domestic Armenian and
    Azeri opposition will remain against the deal.

    Medvedev's mini-summit in Kazan could usher in a fundamentally new
    phase in this protracted conflict, but there will still be a lot of
    work to do. If there is a breakthrough, it will require much greater
    international commitment to make peace a reality on the ground. If
    there is disappointment, expectations will have been raised and will
    have to be handled. There will be a greater risk of conflict, and the
    other international actors - primarily the United States - will need
    to move in and apply pressure to hold things together in the Caucasus.

    Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
    International Peace in Washington.

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