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The Political Implication Of The Turkish-Georgian "Cultural" Dialogu

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  • The Political Implication Of The Turkish-Georgian "Cultural" Dialogu

    THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF THE TURKISH-GEORGIAN "CULTURAL" DIALOGUE

    http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5868
    Tamara Vardanyan

    Expert, Center for the Armenian Studies, "Noravank" Foundation,
    Candidate of Sciences (History)
    23.06.2011

    Recently the issue of poor condition of the cultural monuments on the
    territory of Turkey and Georgia and the necessity of their restoration
    has stirred up. There is a pre-history: back in 2007 Turkey and
    Georgia initiated negotiations on this issue but the parties did not
    come to the agreement. Previous talks failed in a consequence of the
    opposition and efforts of the Georgian Patriarch Ilya II. Due to the
    public authority (according to the public opinion polls 90% of the
    respondents trust in the Georgian Orthodox Church and personally in
    the Patriarch) the later managed to put a veto and to prevent the
    conclusion of final agreement. The main reason was the concern that
    as a result of the agreement the Muslim factor and, naturally Turkish
    influence, would get stronger in Georgia. And the Georgian elite,
    especially the spiritual one, is well aware of the consequences it
    may have. As for the political elite, the later, of course, tries to
    maneuver between the Turkish demands on the one hand, and demands
    of the Georgian society and spiritual authorities on the other. It
    is obvious that the pliability of the political authorities of the
    country is conditioned by the strategic partnership with Turkey,
    continuous growth of the Turkish investments in the Georgian economy,
    and why not, by adopting short-term tactics in this issue. In case of
    adopting long-term strategy by the Georgian authorities it would have
    been at least obvious to them today that it is necessary to oppose
    Turkey's claims, and at the same time that making concessions may
    have disastrous effect for the territorial integrity of the country.

    Despite all this, the revival of the unfinished negotiations was
    initiated by the efforts of the Georgian side. Thus, in April 2011
    during his visit to Turkey the Foreign Minister of Georgia G. Vashadze
    spoke about the unfinished negotiations and hoped that in the near
    future the parties would manage to come to an agreement on that issue.

    The Georgian party explains its eagerness by the circumstance
    that on the territory of Turkey the so-called "Georgian" churches
    of Tao-Klarjeti are in a poor condition and this issue needs to be
    solved urgently. Let us mention that here we speak about four Medieval
    monuments - Oshkvank, Ishkhan, Khandza and Otkhta, which are today on
    the territory of Turkey. The Georgia party expects that they will be
    passed to Georgia in order to carry out restoration works. This claim
    is substantiated by that fact that the Armenian Surb Khach (St. Cross)
    Church was restored without participation of real proprietors -
    the Armenian party, which has its negative effect. In its turn,
    in exchange for such concessions, Turkey demands consent of Georgia
    for the restoration of three mosques in Samtskhe-Javakhq, Akhltskha
    and Kobuleti as well as building of one new mosque and Turkish bath
    in Batumi.

    It is remarkable that the details of the negotiations are kept secret
    from the Georgian public. The first public statement was made by M.

    Saakashvili during the live teleconference on January 26, 20111. In
    his address the president also mentioned that Georgia was a democratic
    country and the Muslims living there had a right to follow their
    national traditions. And the Minister of Culture of Georgia N. Rurua
    at the beginning of this year stated that the conditions would be
    published only after the signing of the protocols2. The Georgian
    authorities, using the state propaganda machinery, spread the viewpoint
    that this is only a cultural issue and has no religious nature. The
    secrecy of the negotiations as well as scrappy information about
    the content of the negotiations which appeared in the press caused
    both the discontent of the Georgian Orthodox church and Georgian
    society. Taking into consideration the poor experience in the past,
    the secular Georgian authorities, headed by the president M.

    Saakashivili, in fact, this time try to bypass the spiritual
    authorities and to come to an agreement with the Turks behind their
    back. As justly observes Georgian expert G. Nodia, this issue is a
    cornerstone of contradictions between the Georgian Orthodox Church
    and secular authorities3.

    The importance of those negotiations is in the fact that the considered
    issue, being cultural only at the first sign, in reality is not only
    a religious but also a political one.

    The agreement from the point of view of Georgian benefits The Turkish
    party, in fact, is ready to pass Oshkvank, Ishkhan, Khandza and
    Otkhta Medieval monuments, which are on the territory of Turkey, to
    the Georgians for the restoration. But the point is that the two of
    the aforementioned churches - Ishkhan and Oshvank, are the Armenian
    Chalcedon cultural monuments. They are not a part of the Georgian
    cultural heritage.

    Let us bring some extracts from chapter "The Architectural Monuments
    of Tayq" of a book "At the wellsprings of the Armenian Classical
    Architecture" (2003) by Doctor of Architecture T. Marutyan: "Tayq
    and its medieval monuments, including Iskhan and Banak built in the
    7th century, such wonderful monuments as Khukhuvank, Oshvank, built
    in the 10th century, and many other monuments are the fruits of the
    Armenian creative mind and there is nothing to argue about"4. Then
    T. Marutyan based on many sources consecutively proves his point of
    view. E.g. it is suffice to mention N. Marr's evidence based on the
    Georgian sources, which is mentioned in his book: "In the 9th and
    even 10th century Georgian monks in Tayq and Kkhardjk were surrounded
    by their coreligionists but they were of other nation - Armenians"
    5. Marutyan mentions: "till the last quarter of the 11th century
    Tayq was populated by the Chalcedon Armenians and this region is an
    integral part of Great Armenia"6.

    Correspondingly, Georgian and Turkish parties are partially negotiating
    about the Armenian cultural heritage in Turkey too.

    Georgian party considers those churches Georgian, substantiating
    this only by the inscriptions in Georgian made on the churches. The
    inscriptions in Georgian are explained by the fact that the church
    rites among the Chalcedon Armenians in that region were held in
    Georgian. And it is obvious that the inscription for the Chalcedon
    churches built for the Armenian community were in Georgian.

    Thus, this Turkish-Georgian agreement proceeds from the Georgian
    interests because they manage to proclaim publicly that those monuments
    are Georgian, which falls within the logic of the Georgian cultural and
    historic claims. But Georgian interests and achievements are restricted
    to that. Here one detail is important: if the aforementioned monuments
    are restored as Georgian, the liturgy will not be served there due to
    a simple reason that there are no adherents of the Georgian Orthodox
    Church there. Thus, the restored "Georgian" churches in Turkey will
    acquire the status of cultural monuments and not working religious
    facilities. So such an "achievement" cannot be of religious or
    political importance for Georgia. After the restoration, but being
    inactive, the history of those churches or even the churches too will
    fall into oblivion.

    The agreement from the point of view of Turkish benefits The situation
    is different for Turkey. So, according to the variant of the agreement
    which is being discussed, Turkey will acquire a right to restore
    mosques in Samtskhe-Javakhq, Akhltskha and Kobuleti and to build a new
    mosque and a bath in Batumi. The most important is the fact that they
    will be active religious facilities. This is the item which caused the
    discontent of the Georgia Orthodox Church. The activity of the Muslim
    religious organizations will, of course, serve to stirring up of the
    local Muslim elements, the strengthening of the Muslim world-outlook
    and, why not, the proselytism among the local Christians. And if those
    organizations have constant financial assist from Turkey, it will be
    clear what kind of bomb is planted on the territory of Georgia. The
    considerable part of the Georgian community which is opposing to this
    scenario has a serious concern that it will result in a kind of tension
    between the Muslims and Christians living in the country. This is the
    reason why the Georgian Patriarchate has already twice made statements
    (on January 18 and February 4) in which it was mentioned that signing
    of the protocols in the current condition was unacceptable.

    The most dangerous for Georgia is considered to be the construction
    of a new mosque in Batumi - the capital of Adzharia.

    Today, 30% of population of Adzharia is Muslims (the population is
    376.016, of which 115.161 are Muslims). They are Adzharians who are
    known as the Georgians who adopted Islam. At present they preserved
    their Georgian identity mainly due to the Georgian language, culture,
    Georgian environment and Georgian citizenship. In past, during the
    Russian-Turkish wars the Muslims from Adzharia mainly supported Turks.

    Thus, during the Crimea war in 1853-1856 Adzharians rendered great
    assistance to the Turkish army and during the 1877-1878 Russian-Turkish
    war there were about 6000-10000 Adzharians, including high-ranking
    officers in the Turkish army7. And when the territory, by the decision
    of the Berlin summit, passed to Russia, many Adzharians moved to the
    territory of the Ottoman Empire (Muhajirs). The other part stayed at
    the territory of the Russian Empire where "Avengers" terrorist group
    was formed. The targets of the terrorist group were Russian officers
    and officials; they were mainly funded from the Ottoman Empire and
    Great Britain8.

    Later, at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century,
    alongside with the growth of the nationalist moods, pro-Turkish
    orientation got stronger among the Adzharians, pan-Turkic and
    pan-Islamist party was created and its aim was to join Turkey. At
    the same time, the local nationalist moods which pursued the idea of
    creation of independent Adzharia, stirred up.

    Nevertheless, after declaring the independent Georgia in 1918, "The
    People's Congress of Adzharia" in Batumi adopted pro-Georgian stance.

    In past, they constituted 70% but recently, due to the efforts of the
    Georgian Orthodox Church a vast number of them have been reconverted
    to Christianity. Today there are a number of families in which
    the representatives of the older generation are Muslims and the
    younger generation is Christians. Under A. Abashidze Adzharia was
    almost independent from Tbilisi, but M. Saakashvili managed to put
    the end to the factual semi-independent status and to establish the
    authority of Tbilisi in Adzharia. However, Adzharia still preserves the
    status of autonomic republic which was guaranteed by the 1921 Moscow
    Treaty. The item 6 of the aforementioned document stipulated that
    Turkey is the guarantor of the Muslim majority living in Adzharia. This
    circumstance, as well as the presence of the Muslims in Adzharia,
    serves ground for the periodically manifested Turkish claims. They
    were more vividly manifested in Turkish media and expert community
    after the Georgian-Ossetian war in 2008. Thus, Hassan Ali Karasar,
    the expert at SETA, immediately after the war presented extensive
    analysis9 in which he urged the Turkish authorities to stir up the
    Georgian direction of foreign policy, to reshape it, in particular,
    shifting from the approach from Tbilisi-oriented to multi-vector one
    and set direct ties with Adzharia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
    expert mentions that Turkey is involved in the processes in the
    region in historical and demographic (here he means the Muslim
    population) aspects. He remembered with pain the fact when, after
    the events in 2004, M. Saakashvili's cross (implying the new flag
    of Georgia) was placed on Adzharia's flag to which Turkish media
    responded rather harshly. Particularly the segment which was close
    to the authorities blamed M. Saakashvili and called him chauvinist10,
    irresponsible person who used national and religious symbols without
    any restrictions11. Thus, according to one of the Turkish experts "the
    main problem of modern Georgia is marginalization of non-Christian
    population, as this new state is based on past and Christian values"12.

    At present the conclusion of this kind of Georgian-Turkish agreement
    will be a prominent step in increasing of Islam and Turkish influence
    among the Muslim population of Adzharia (let us mention that the
    Muslims in Adzharia are Sunnites which is also an advantageous factor
    for the Turkish party).

    In the same way the restoration of mosques in Samtskhe-Javakhq,
    Akhltskha and Kobuleti should be considered. They all will serve for
    strengthening the positions of Islam on the spot, which is not an
    equal worth concession on behalf of Georgia for the restoration of
    inactive monuments on the territory of Turkey.

    Conclusion For Georgia undertaking the restoration of the Armenian
    churches of Tayq, in fact, declaration them as a part of Georgian
    culture, is a cultural achievement because this church should have
    a status not of an active church but status of a monument. But
    in exchange for this concession Turkey will get 4 mosques in the
    vulnerable regions of Georgia which will be a great political
    achievement for Turkey and great political defeat of Georgia.

    It is not difficult to forecast that in a consequence of the activity
    of the mosques the stances of Islam on the territory of Georgia will
    get stronger. So, this supposedly "cultural" initiative has definite
    political purposes. Opposing of the Georgian Patriarchate to this
    agreement is not only in Georgian interests but also in Armenian ones.

    If the agreement is concluded in the form which is today submitted
    for the negotiations, it becomes obvious that Turkey will appear in
    the most profitable position. Turks estimated everything clearly - on
    the one hand passing of the Armenian Chalcedon churches to Georgia will
    cause new tension in the complicated Armenian-Georgian relations which
    are especially tensed in religious issues and issues connected with
    the churches. But the Turkish estimations are not restricted to that.

    On the other hand it will considerably strengthen Turkish influence
    in the domestic live in Georgia. The mosques in Georgia, thus turning
    into a crucial weapon of Turkish expansionist policy, will threaten
    Georgian identity and territorial integrity.

    1 http://www.chechenews.com/developments/2316-1.html

    2 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/10343

    3 See Nodia G., Georgia's Showdown
    Between Church And State, 20.02.2011,
    http://www.rferl.org/content/commentary_georgia_churches/2314963.html

    4 Õ~UÕ·Õ¯Õ¾Õ¡Õ¶O~DÕ" Õ¶Õ¸O~@Õ¸Õ£Õ´Õ¡Õ¶ Õ£Õ¸O~@Õ®Õ¨
    Õ°Õ¡Õ¶Õ±Õ¶Õ¾Õ¡Õ® Õ§ Õ~NO~@Õ¡Õ½Õ¿Õ¡Õ¶Õ"Õ¶, 27.11.2008,
    http://noravank.am/arm/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=2452&sphrase_id=5051&print=Y

    5 Ibid

    6 Ibid

    7 Asari Moin, Islamic Emirates of Tiflis-Georgia: Ajara & Meskhetia,
    Feridun, 21.08.2008, http://lahoreledger.com/?p=8154

    8 Ibid

    9 Hasan Ali Karasar, Sahakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between
    Russia and Georgia, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social
    Research, Policy Brief, August, 2008, http://www.setav.org

    10 Hakan Albayrak, "SaakaÅ~_vili ve Å~^ovenist Siyasetin Ä°flası,"
    Yeni Å~^afak, 11 August 2008. - reference by Hasan Ali Karasar,
    Sahakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia,
    Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, Policy Brief,
    August, 2008, http://www.setav.org

    11 Ä°brahim KaragÑ~Ll, "Bir Delinin BaÅ~_ımıza Aзtıgı Belaya
    Bakın," Yeni Å~^afak, 12 August 2008. - reference by Hasan Ali
    Karasar, Sahakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between Russia and
    Georgia, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research,
    Policy Brief, August, 2008, http://www.setav.org

    12Bayram Balci, Is there a place for Islam in Mikhael Saakashvili's
    Christian Georgia?

    http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177

    Â"Globus Energy and Regional SecurityÂ", issue 3, 2011

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another materials of author

    â~@¢ARMENIANS OF TBILISI: NEW REALITIES [14.04.2011] â~@¢PECULIARITIES
    OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE NATIONAL
    IDENTITY[20.10.2010] â~@¢The Armenian community in Tbilisi:
    conclusion[11.12.2006]


    From: Baghdasarian
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