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NOBEL PRIZE IS NOT MORE THAN ARMENIA
HAKOB BADALYAN
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments22354.html
11:52:34 - 24/06/2011
Dwelling on the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue, most people
note the unacceptability of compromise as it makes a war inevitable.
Hence, the opinion is shaped that those who support the return of
territories want peace and development of regional integration while
those who disagree to the return of the territories want a war.
Mildly speaking, this is wrong, if not a device intended for a
political campaign. Consequently, this perception should be uprooted
from the consciousness of the Armenian society. Dwelling on concessions
does not mean being peaceful, liberal, pragmatic, sober-minded, and
modern-thinking, just like as denying concessions does not stand for
being romantic, daredevil, nationalist or narrow-minded.
Moreover, this separation indicates narrow-mindedness. In reality,
peacefulness, broadmindedness, modern thinking and pragmatism have
quite different measurements which are necessary to be rooted in the
society instead of the comparison of how much each side cedes. This
separation leads the Armenian society nowhere, it merely narrows the
ability to understand the global processes to a point that it starts
threatening the national security.
In addition, when assessing freethinking, broadmindedness, liberalism,
pragmatism, and modern thinking, the foreign partners of Armenia should
be guided by global measurements rather than the readiness of a force
or an individual to make concessions in the Karabakh issue. And most
probably, the foreign partners of Armenia assess everything this way,
otherwise they would have forced Armenia to make concessions a long
time ago.
So, what is the evidence that disagreeing to concessions does not
imply being an adventurer, romantic, and a supporter of war? The
arguments are the following: if we do not make concessions, we
provoke Azerbaijan to launch a war. And considering Azerbaijan's
economy is more developed than the Armenian economy, the supporters
of concessions say a war would cause not only a humanitarian disaster
but also defeat and loss of everything.
Generally, if we are a state, we have nothing to discuss, if it
is necessary, we need to fight in the war. As humans, it is very
difficult to imagine this because it is easy to speak but as soon as
one tries to individualize what one says, one can see how tragic a war
can be. However, we are a state, which implies a military function,
readiness for wars.
For its part, this means the presence of relevant resources. Among
other factors, the liberated territories are an important component
of this basis. The liberated territories are a moral, political,
economic and strategic resource.
No country is able to waive the war threat by pushing away a huge
system of resources of key significance in a possible war, the
significance of which is evident to the society, and especially to
the rival.
They can say this dispute consists in this system and the war threat
stems from it. Armenia wants to keep the status quo, which infuriates
Azerbaijan. In other words, by returning the territories we will have
no more war threats. Consequently, we will have no lack of resources
in case of a war.
Firstly, what is the guarantee that Azerbaijan's fury will ease? It
may even intensify in the course of years. We should know the "cost"
of international guarantees. We have witnessed lots of examples that
military actions easily bypass all kinds of international guarantees
if the geopolitical interest requires that.
Secondly, the South Caucasus is a complicated geopolitical knot. The
region has internal and adjacent problematic centers which if
generated will trigger a chain reaction. The people who think that
the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue will settle the issue
of peace for Armenia are mistaken. The issue of peace in the South
Caucasus can be settled only if all the regional, adjacent and global
actors reach a fundamental solution to all their problems. This is
impossible at least in the upcoming decade.
Losing a huge system of weighted resources of resistance, Armenia will
render itself a "weak link" or a "weaker link" in the geopolitical
chain.
It is clear that regional integration is very important and desirable
for the South Caucasus, and it is, of course, important for Armenia
to make efforts to contribute to integration. But it is strange to to
contribute by sacrificing an important part of one's security. Maybe,
this contribution will merit diplomatic appraisals or even a Nobel
Prize but all that is highly superficial, while in deep the world
will merely understand that all the issues of the South Caucasus can
be solved at the expense of Armenia because it is always ready to help.
For decades and centuries, several status quos have been maintained
in the South Caucasus at the expense of Armenia, its interests and
resources. Isn't it enough? Isn't it time to set up status quos based
on Armenia's interests?
From: A. Papazian
HAKOB BADALYAN
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments22354.html
11:52:34 - 24/06/2011
Dwelling on the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue, most people
note the unacceptability of compromise as it makes a war inevitable.
Hence, the opinion is shaped that those who support the return of
territories want peace and development of regional integration while
those who disagree to the return of the territories want a war.
Mildly speaking, this is wrong, if not a device intended for a
political campaign. Consequently, this perception should be uprooted
from the consciousness of the Armenian society. Dwelling on concessions
does not mean being peaceful, liberal, pragmatic, sober-minded, and
modern-thinking, just like as denying concessions does not stand for
being romantic, daredevil, nationalist or narrow-minded.
Moreover, this separation indicates narrow-mindedness. In reality,
peacefulness, broadmindedness, modern thinking and pragmatism have
quite different measurements which are necessary to be rooted in the
society instead of the comparison of how much each side cedes. This
separation leads the Armenian society nowhere, it merely narrows the
ability to understand the global processes to a point that it starts
threatening the national security.
In addition, when assessing freethinking, broadmindedness, liberalism,
pragmatism, and modern thinking, the foreign partners of Armenia should
be guided by global measurements rather than the readiness of a force
or an individual to make concessions in the Karabakh issue. And most
probably, the foreign partners of Armenia assess everything this way,
otherwise they would have forced Armenia to make concessions a long
time ago.
So, what is the evidence that disagreeing to concessions does not
imply being an adventurer, romantic, and a supporter of war? The
arguments are the following: if we do not make concessions, we
provoke Azerbaijan to launch a war. And considering Azerbaijan's
economy is more developed than the Armenian economy, the supporters
of concessions say a war would cause not only a humanitarian disaster
but also defeat and loss of everything.
Generally, if we are a state, we have nothing to discuss, if it
is necessary, we need to fight in the war. As humans, it is very
difficult to imagine this because it is easy to speak but as soon as
one tries to individualize what one says, one can see how tragic a war
can be. However, we are a state, which implies a military function,
readiness for wars.
For its part, this means the presence of relevant resources. Among
other factors, the liberated territories are an important component
of this basis. The liberated territories are a moral, political,
economic and strategic resource.
No country is able to waive the war threat by pushing away a huge
system of resources of key significance in a possible war, the
significance of which is evident to the society, and especially to
the rival.
They can say this dispute consists in this system and the war threat
stems from it. Armenia wants to keep the status quo, which infuriates
Azerbaijan. In other words, by returning the territories we will have
no more war threats. Consequently, we will have no lack of resources
in case of a war.
Firstly, what is the guarantee that Azerbaijan's fury will ease? It
may even intensify in the course of years. We should know the "cost"
of international guarantees. We have witnessed lots of examples that
military actions easily bypass all kinds of international guarantees
if the geopolitical interest requires that.
Secondly, the South Caucasus is a complicated geopolitical knot. The
region has internal and adjacent problematic centers which if
generated will trigger a chain reaction. The people who think that
the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue will settle the issue
of peace for Armenia are mistaken. The issue of peace in the South
Caucasus can be settled only if all the regional, adjacent and global
actors reach a fundamental solution to all their problems. This is
impossible at least in the upcoming decade.
Losing a huge system of weighted resources of resistance, Armenia will
render itself a "weak link" or a "weaker link" in the geopolitical
chain.
It is clear that regional integration is very important and desirable
for the South Caucasus, and it is, of course, important for Armenia
to make efforts to contribute to integration. But it is strange to to
contribute by sacrificing an important part of one's security. Maybe,
this contribution will merit diplomatic appraisals or even a Nobel
Prize but all that is highly superficial, while in deep the world
will merely understand that all the issues of the South Caucasus can
be solved at the expense of Armenia because it is always ready to help.
For decades and centuries, several status quos have been maintained
in the South Caucasus at the expense of Armenia, its interests and
resources. Isn't it enough? Isn't it time to set up status quos based
on Armenia's interests?
From: A. Papazian